![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Under what democratic conditions does the ‘vertical accountability’ mechanism of voting maximise rights protection? Using an empirically informed political theory approach I argue that the Australian case demonstrates that it does so where compulsory voting laws are in place and are appropriately administered. It achieves this in often unappreciated and undetected ways. I begin by showing how compulsory voting uniquely ensures that the right to vote is transformed from a merely formal to an instantiated, material right; from a right that exists on paper to one that is not only exercisable but also exercised. It does this in a number of ways. First, compulsory voting, as it is practised in Australia, promotes the right to vote itself simply by removing most of the ergonomic, practical and even psychological costs of voting that often deter voters in voluntary regimes. Second, governments elected in compulsory voting elections are more responsive to the needs of all citizens, rather than just the (privileged) subset of citizens that vote in voluntary elections. In turn, this means they are better able (and willing) to protect such rights as the right to equality before the law and the right to be free from discrimination. In promoting these negative rights, compulsory voting also serves a number of positive welfare rights.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. By this I mean democracies characterised by universal suffrage, regular, free and fair elections, a competitive party system that offers choice, and where citizens enjoy the full complement of political rights necessary for the conduct of democracy (e.g. freedom of the press, freedom to dissent and associate). Authentic democracies are contrasted with nominal democracies that purport to be democratic and may even run elections but lack all or some of the necessary conditions for democracy as listed above.
2. I employ here the conceptual framework used by van Ham and Chappell (Citation2017), which posits the existence of three types of democratic accountability for the promotion of human rights. These are: ‘horizontal accountability’, which ‘refers to the rule of law and the role of the judiciary and integrity institutions’; ‘vertical accountability’ which refers to ’ elections and the role of citizens‘; and ’diagonal accountability‘ referring to ’the role of media and free speech in holding governments to account for human rights’.
3. However, at the state/territory level Victoria and the ACT have introduced two human rights acts. Note that some advanced democracies enjoy rights protection by virtue of being members of the European Union. They are therefore protected by EU human rights laws and charters (thanks to an anonymous referee for the suggestion of this qualification).
4. The Constitution is not entirely devoid of references to voting entitlements. Section 41 contains an express but limited form of protection in providing that: ‘No adult person who has or acquires the right to vote at elections for the . . . House of the Parliament of a State shall . . . be prevented by any law of the Commonwealth from voting at elections for either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth.’
5. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557.
6. Note, however, that Indigenous Australians were not required to vote until 1983. Yet, their formal electoral equality has not translated into equal rates of electoral participation, and Indigenous Australians continue to vote in lower than average numbers. Reliable figures are elusive, but it appears that only just over half do so (Chappell, Chesterman, and Hill Citation2009, 90–93).
7. A positive right is a right to be provided with certain goods and services; a right becomes ‘material’ when those things are either provided or not prevented from being obtainable (relative, of course, to the capacity of particular states to do so; see Dowding and van Hees Citation2003). In such cases the right has been exercised, or is at least readily exercisable. This enhances what Chappell and van Ham (Citation2017) refer to as ‘rights outcomes’.
8. Note, however, that voting is not compulsory for Australians living in the Antarctic due to the impossibility of ensuring that the ballot is secret.
9. ‘Valid and sufficient’ reasons may include: ‘Physical obstruction, whether of sickness or outside prevention, or of natural events, or accident of any kind. . . . One might also imagine cases where an intending voter on his way to the poll was diverted to save life, or to prevent crime, or to assist at some great disaster, as a fire: in all of which cases, in my opinion, the law would recognise the competitive claims of public duty’ [AEC (Australian Electoral Commission), Compulsory Voting Electoral Backgrounder (Citation2014) 8(1) http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/backgrounders/compulsory-voting.htm]. Initially, the Electoral Commission sends the absentee a ‘please explain’ letter with the option of paying a $20.00-dollar fine to settle the matter. If a satisfactory reason for abstention is provided, the matter is dropped, but if there is a dispute about the reasonableness of the explanation, the non-voter may be taken to court and a slightly heavier fine imposed ($50.00) in addition to legal costs.
10. That the disposition to vote is partly norm-driven is confirmed by research on voting behavior and attitudes. See, for example, Smeenk, de Graaf, and Ultee (Citation1995).
11. Even so, it should be noted that, because executive governments have the power to appoint the heads of electoral commissions ‘bi-partisanship over appointments’ can occasionally ‘deteriorat[e]’ (Orr, Mercurio, and Williams Citation2003, 400).
12. As Dowding and Van Hees (Citation2003, 281) have argued with respect to rights in general.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Lisa Hill
Lisa Hill is Professor of Politics, University of Adelaide. Her interests are in political theory, history of political thought and issues in electoral law and behaviour. She has published electoral studies work in British Journal of Political Science, Political Studies, Australian Journal of Political Science and Journal of Theoretical Politics.