The Rise and Decline of the Summit of the Americas

Abstract

This article analyzes the rise and decline of the Summit of the Americas (SOA). It explores the reasons for the SOA's decline, the prospects for its recovery, and indeed whether a recovery is desirable in the current juncture. Four theoretical perspectives are applied in order to answer these questions: neoliberal institutionalism; power dimensions (realism); constructivism; and the political economy of regionalism. Theoretically, the analysis suggests that all four approaches provide useful insights into why the SOA finds itself in its current predicament, and accordingly underlines the utility of a synthetic perspective on multilateralism in the Western Hemisphere. The article concludes that the SOA will continue to serve an important role as a forum for engagement and dialogue between the United States and Canada on one side and Latin American and Caribbean countries on the other. Nonetheless, contrary to its previous unparalleled importance, the SOA is now but one among numerous summits on the agenda of leaders in the hemisphere.

Keywords::

• Summit of the Americas
• Latin America
• summitry
• inter-American affairs
• multilateralism

Acknowledgements

This article originated as a presentation delivered at the international seminar ‘América Latina: Relaciones Internacionales en el Siglo XXI, Diplomacia de Cumbres, y Espacios de Concertación Regional y Global’, organized by FLACSO Costa Rica and held at Playa Langosta, Costa Rica on December 1-2, 2011. The author would like to thank Sean Burges and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. The usual disclaimers apply.

Notes

^1. Carlos M. Jarque, María Salvadora Ortiz and Carlos Quenan (eds), América Latina y la diplomacia de cumbres, Madrid, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, 2009; Francisco (ed.), Multilateralismo: Perspectivas Latinoamericanas, Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad y FLACSO-Chile, 2000.

^2. Francisco Rojas, ‘La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños’, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 10:3, 2010, p. 29.

^3. Prior to 1994, only two Inter-American presidential summits took place: in July 1956 in Panama City, when the IDB was created, and a meeting held in Punta del Este, Uruguay in April 1967 for the purpose of strengthening the Alliance for Progress. Jaime Aparicio-Otero, ‘The Summits of the Americas and the Inter-American System’, in Latin America Initiative at Brookings (ed.), The Road to Hemispheric Cooperation: Beyond the Cartagena Summit of the Americas, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, July 2012.

^4. My translation of the definition found in Thomas Legler and Arturo Santa-Cruz, ‘El patrón contemporáneo del multilateralismo latinoamericano’, Pensamiento Propio, 33, January-June 2011, p. 20.

^5. Robert O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, International Journal, 45:4, Autumn 1990, pp. 731–764; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, International Organization, 46:3, Summer 1992, pp. 561–98.

^6. Robert O'brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

^7. See Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Institutions in the Americas: Theoretical Reflections’, in Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Paul Haslam (eds), Governing the Americas: Assessing Multilateral Institutions, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp. 237–53; Lisa L. Martin, ‘Interests, Power, and Multilateralism’, International Organization, 46:4, Autumn 1992, pp. 765–92; William Zartman and Saadia Touval (eds), International Cooperation: The Extent and Limits of Multilateralism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

^8. Richard Feinberg, ‘Summitry in the Americas: The End of Mass Multilateralism?’ Policy Paper, Ottawa, FOCAL, March 2010.

^9. Amitav Acharya. ‘Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics’, in Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur and John Tirman (eds), Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change?, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2006, pp. 95–118.

^10. Enrique Iglesias, ‘Conclusiones’, en Carlos M. Jarque, María Salvadora Ortiz, y Carlos Quenan (eds), América Latina y la diplomacia de cumbres, Madrid, Secretaría General Iberoamericana, 2009, p. 226.

^11. The international bureaucratic planning and follow-up architecture includes a Summit Secretariat at the OAS, the Summit Implementation Review Group, and the Joint Summit Working Group.

^12. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security 19:3, Winter 1995, pp. 5–49.

^13. Fernando Simas Magalhães, Cúpola das Américas de 1994:Papel Negociador do Brasil, em Busca de uma Agenda Hemisférica, Brasilia, Instituto Rio Branco; Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão and Centro de Estudos Estratégicos, 1999. See also Sean Burges, ‘Without Carrots or Sticks: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25:1, January 2006, pp. 23–42. I am grateful to Sean Burges for this reference. Simas's viewpoint contrasts with that of President Clinton's architect for the event, Richard E. Feinberg, who asserted that Latin American countries, such as Mexico and those in the Andes, approached the United States to create such a summit. Power dimensions are less evident in his analysis. See Richard E. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report, Washington, D.C., Institute for Institutional Economics, 1997.

^14. On soft balancing, see the special issue of International Security, 30:1, Summer 2005.

^15. For an analysis that specifically employs the soft balancing framework in the Latin American context, see Alfredo Toro's study of ALBA, Alfredo Toro, ‘El ALBA como instrumento de ‘soft balancing’’, Pensamiento Propio, 33, January-June 2011, pp. 159–84.

^16. On CELAC, see Oneida A. Figueroa, ‘La CELAC: Nuevo actor regional en América Latina y el Caribe. Avales y obstáculos para lograr su consolidación’, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe 2012, 9, 2012, pp. 177–206; Francisco Rojas Aravena, ‘La CELAC y la integración Latinoamericana y Caribeña: principales claves y desafíos’, Nueva Sociedad, 240, July-August 2012, pp. 16–27.

^17. Emmanuel Adler, ‘Communitarian Multilateralism’, in Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman (eds), Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change?, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2006, pp. 34–55.

^18. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, International Organization, 56:3, Summer 2002, pp. 575–607.

^19. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

^20. Enrique Iglesias, ‘Conclusiones’, pp. 228–9.

^21. Andrew P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1954.

^22. See, for example, Gordon Mace and Louis Bélanger (eds), The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999; Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien and Paul Alexander Haslam (eds), Governing the Americas: Assessing Multilateral Institutions, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

^23. The literature on the political economy of regionalism in Latin America and/or the Western Hemisphere is voluminous. For a sample of recent publications in this area, see Manuel Cienfuegos and José Antonio Sanahuja (eds), Una región en construcción: UNASUR y la integración en América del Sur, Barcelona, Fundación CIDOB, 2010; Pia Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie (eds), The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin America, New York, Springer, 2012; Laura MacDonald and Arne Ruckert (eds), Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009; and Andrés Serbin, Laneydi Martínez, and Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior (eds), ‘El regionalismo “post-liberal” en América Latina y el Caribe: nuevos actors, nuevos temas, nuevos desafíos’, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe, 9, 2012;

^24. Aparacio-Otero, ‘The Summits of the Americas and the Inter-American System’, pp. 92–93.

^25. Although the OAS's record in defending democracy has been decidedly mixed and a healthy debate exists between its preferred type of democracy, representative democracy, and other rival participatory or plebiscitary forms, the Inter-American collective-defense-of-democracy regime has been instrumental in consolidating an anti-coup norm and outlawing undemocratic forms of political change in the region. Even its main detractors, the members of ALBA, eagerly supported the invoking of the Inter-American Democratic Charter following the coup d'état in Honduras in 2009. For analyses on the current state of Inter-American democracy promotion, see the special issue on the tenth anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: Thomas Legler, Riyad Insanally, Santiago Mariani, and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Latin American Policy, 3:1, June 2012, pp. i–iii, 1–144. See also Thomas Legler, ‘The Shifting Sands of Regional Governance: The Case of Inter-American Democracy Promotion’, Politics and Policy, 40:5, 2012, pp. 848–70.

^26. Declaration of Quebec City, Third Summit of the Americas, 20–22 April 2001.

^27. John W. Graham, ‘La OEA se hunde: ¿Merece ser salvada?’, Foreign Affairs en Español, 5:2, June 2005, pp. 3–9.

^28. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, p. 5.

^29. William C. Smith and Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, ‘Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Civil Society’, in Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Paul Haslam (eds), Governing the Americas: Assessing Multilateral Institutions, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp. 151–72.

^30. See Leslie Burns, ‘Reforming the Summit of the Americas’, Policy Paper, Ottawa, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, December 2009; Yasmine Shemsie, ‘Engaging with Civil Society: Lessons from the OAS, FTAA, and Summits of the Americas’, Ottawa, North-South Institute, January 2000.

^31. It is interesting to note that the challenge of democratising regional governance is also a problem for the newer summit processes of ALBA, CELAC, and UNASUR. Despite the participatory rhetoric of the left leaning governments that are the main impulses behind these new organisations, Andrés Serbin finds that civil society incidence in their activities is also limited due to the persistent presidentialist political culture to which their leaders subscribe. Andres Serbin, ‘Déficit democratic y participación ciudadana en el marco del regionalismo post-liberal’, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe 2012, 9, 2012, pp. 73–128.

^32. Andrés Serbin, ‘De despertares y anarquías: De la concertación regional’, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 10:3, 2010, p. 11.

^33. For example, article 19 of the Declaration of Mar del Plata stated that: ‘we remain committed to the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive FTAA agreement’ Furthermore: ‘We instruct our officials to examine the difficulties in the FTAA process, in order to overcome them’

^34. For institutionalist analyses of the problems confronting the SOA, see Aparicio-Otero, ‘The Summits of the Americas’; Burns, ‘Reforming the Summit of the Americas’; Carlo Dade, ‘Will There Be Another Summit of the Americas: A Case for Reform’, Ottawa, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 2009; and Richard Feinberg, ‘Summitry in the Americas’

^35. On the question of evolving polarity, see Richard N. Haass, ‘The Age of Nonpolarity’, Foreign Affairs, 87:3, May–June 2008, pp. 44–56.

^36. Roberto Russell, ‘The Development of Inter-American Relations in the Past Decade’, in Inter-American Dialogue (ed.), A Decade of Change: Political, Economic, and Social Developments in Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Dialogue, 2011, pp. 115–6.

^37. On the recent evolution of U.S.-Latin American relations, see Inter-American Dialogue, Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, An Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, Washington, D.C., Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012; Sergio Amaral, ‘U.S.-Latin American Relations over the Last Decade’, in Inter-American Dialogue (ed.), A Decade of Change: Political, Economic, and Social Developments in Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 2011, pp. 89–111; and, Russell, ‘The Development of Inter-American Relations’, pp. 71–87.

^38. My translation. ‘Asamblea de la OEA cierra en Bolivia con debate sobre derechos humanos’, Terra (Peru), June 5, 2012.

^39. Rafael Correa, ‘Intervención en la 42 Asamblea General de la OEA’, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 4 June 2012.

^40. My translation. Chávez quoted in ‘OAS aprueba Carta Social’, El Universal (Mexico City), 5 June 2012.

^41. Javier Corrales and Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions’, International Studies Quarterly, 43, 1999, pp. 1–36; Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Thérien, ‘Inter-American Governance: A Sisyphean Endeavour?’, in Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Paul Haslam (eds), Governing the Americas: Assessing Multilateral Institutions, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp. 35–50.

^42. Michael Shifter, ‘A Surge to the Center’, Journal of Democracy, 22:1, January 2011, pp. 107–21.

^43. ‘Remarks by President Juan Manuel Santos at the Opening of the Sixth Summit of the Americas’, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, April 14, 2012.

^44. For example, as Jorge Dominguez has observed, laxity in implementation has been a defining characteristic of all Latin American regional institutions since the nineteenth century. Jorge I. Domínguez, ‘International Cooperation in Latin America: the Design of Regional Institutions by Slow Accretion’, in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 83–128.