Abe Shinzō’s Lasting Impact: Proactive Contributions to Japan’s Security and Foreign Policies

Abstract

Abe Shinzō’s long duration in office brought to Japan strategic vision, international respect, and a forward-leaning commitment to strengthen Japan’s defenses and uphold the major tenants of the international order. This article examines Abe’s achievements in the security and foreign policy domains. Specifically, it examines his domestic achievements in establishing the National Security Strategy and National Security Council, reinterpreting Japan’s ability to exercise its right to collective self-defense, passing a suite of security legislation, and strengthening of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. It also examines Abe’s foreign policy achievements of increasing Japan’s international presence and global role, expanding Japans’ strategic ties, creating and exporting a strategic framing vision called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and helping to establish the grouping of four maritime democracies called the Quad. The article argues that Abe’s desire for Japan to play a larger, more proactive role helped leave Japan—and the region—in a stronger place.

Notes

1 Gilbert Rozman, “Realism vs. Revisionism in Abe’s Foreign Policy in 2014” in Gilbert Rozman (ed) Asia’s Alliance Triangle: US-Japan-South Korea Relations at a Tumultuous Time (United States, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015), pp. 241-254.

2 Jamie Metzl, “Japan's Military Normalization,” Japan Times, March 6, 2015; Alex Ward, “The Rise of Japanese Militarism,” Vox, April 30, 2019.

3 Editorial Board, “Mr. Abe's Dangerous Revisionism,” New York Times, March 2, 2014.

4 Thomas Berger, “Abe’s Perilous Patriotism: Why Japan’s New Nationalism Still Creates Problems for the Region and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” CSIS’s Japan Chair, October 2014.

5 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 5.

6 Grant Newsham, “Note to Washington: Enjoy Abe While You Have Him,” The Interpreter, April 12, 2016.

7 Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “Shinzo Abe’s Decision to Step Down,” CSIS’s Japan Chair, August 28, 2020.

8 Noah Smith, “Abe Might Be the World's Best Leader,” Japan Times, June 13, 2014.

9 “Abe’s Master Plan,” Economist, May 18, 2013.

10 Abe Shinzō,「美しい国へ」[Towards a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo, Japan: Bungei Shunjū, 2006), pp. 101-106; 202-204.

11 Abe Shinzō, 「内閣総理大臣談話」 [Statement by Prime Minister], Kantei, August 14, 2015.

12 Shihoko Goto, “Shinzo Abe’s Legacy for Japan,” The Globalist, August 31, 2020.

13 “Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), December 28, 2015.

14 For a critical review of his treatment of history issues, see Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy, pp. 15-23.

15 Tobias S. Harris, The Iconoclast: Shinzō Abe and the New Japan, (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2020), pp. 59-73.

16 Abe Shinzō, “Japan is Back” (Speech at CSIS, Washington, D.C., February 22, 2013).

17 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s National Security Council: Policy Coordination and Political Power,” Japanese Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2018), p. 259.

18 One noticeable difference in the prior effort was the lack of a clause to establish the equivalent of the National Security Secretariat that was established in 2013, which became a strong entity within the executive branch for policy planning and interagency coordination.

19 Abe Shinzō「安倍内閣総理大臣就任記者会見」 [Prime Minister Abe Inaugural Press Conference], Kantei, December 26, 2012.

20 For example, the NSC’s National Security Secretariat was given strong powers to conduct policy planning and interagency coordination. See Article 12 (2)(ii) and 17(2)(i) of Cabinet Law. Government of Japan (GOJ), 「内閣法」 [Cabinet Law], 1947 Law No. 5 (Revised in 2019 as Law No. 18); Jeffrey W. Hornung, Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship, (Washington, D.C.: Sasakawa USA, 2017), p. 21; Jōji Harano, “Japan Launches Its Own National Security Council,” Nippon.com, December 25, 2013.

21 Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, ‘Will Tokyo’s Arms Exports Help or Hurt US Interests in Asia?’ Cipher Brief, July 14, 2017.

22  Liff, “Japan’s National Security Council,” p. 253.

23 Liff, “Japan’s National Security Council,” pp. 267-268.

24 Government of Japan (GOJ), National Security Strategy of Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, December 13, 2017, pp. 16-17.

25 GOJ, National Security Strategy, p. 17.

26 GOJ, National Security Strategy, pp. 23-36.

27 GOJ, National Security Strategy, p. 17; 19.

28 GOJ, National Security Strategy, p. 18.

29 GOJ, National Security Strategy, p. 19-20.

30 Cabinet, 「国の存立を全うし、国民を守るための切れ目のない安全保障法制の整備について」 [About the Development of Seamless National Security Legislation to Protect the People and Achieve the Country’s Survival, Cabinet Secretariat, July 1, 2014. The same day he also allowed limited use of arms and logistical support in international peace activities, but this will not be examined in detail here.

31 Cabinet, “About the Development” (translated), pp. 6-7.

32 MOD, 「憲法第9条の趣旨についての政府見解」 [Government Interpretation Regarding the Intent of Article 9 of the Constitution],” 「防衛白書平成25年版－日本の防衛 平成25年版」 [Defense White Paper 2013: Defense of Japan], (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2013).

33 MOD, “憲法第９条のもとで許容される自 衛の措置としての「武力の行使」の新三要件” [The New Three Conditions on the ‘Use of Force’ for Self-Defense Measures Allowed Under Article 9 of the Constitution], 「憲法と自衛権」 [The Constitution and the Right to Self-Defense], MOD, Undated.

34 Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Ten Myths About Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change,” Diplomat, July 10, 2014.

35 The prohibition against being directly integrated with the use of force has been largely nullified by the July 2014 Cabinet decision since it resulted in the government lifting some restrictions, such as enabling the SDF to provide the U.S. military with ammunition. That said, it still remains. As long as this principle exists, there will be difficulties pursuing some measures, such as a combined command and control. Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s 2015 Security Legislation: Changed Rooted Firmly in Continuity,” in Mary McCarthy, ed., Routledge Handbook of Japanese Foreign Policy, (Abingdon, United Kingdom, and New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 22-23.

36 The legislation has its roots in Abe’s first term in 2007 when he tasked an advisory panel to examine whether the SDF can act under existing laws in four hypothetical scenarios. Despite the panel submitting its recommendations to Abe in June 2008, his exit from the Kantei precluded action and none of his successors acted on it. After his return in 2012, he reconvened another panel in February 2013.

37 GOJ, 「我が国及び国際社会の平和及び安全の確保に資するための自衛隊法等の一部を改正する法律」[Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community], Cabinet Secretariat, September 19, 2015. For English translations and analysis, see Hornung, “Japan’s 2015 Security Legislation,” pp. 25-27.

38 GOJ, 「国際平和共同対処事態に際して我が国が実施する諸外国の軍隊等に対する協力支援活動等に関する法律 」[Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities Our Country Implements to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, Etc. in Situations Dealing with International Peace Cooperation], Cabinet Secretariat, September 19, 2015. For English translations and analysis, see Hornung, “Japan’s 2015 Security Legislation,” p. 27.

39 Hosoya Yuichi, Security Politics in Japan: Legislation for a New Security Environment, (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2019), p. 102. For details on the differences, see Fujishige Atsuhiko, “New Japan Self-Defense Force Missions under the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” Policy: Significance of the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security,” CSIS’s Japan Chair, July 21, 2016.

40 Kevin Drew, “Shinzo Abe’s Legacy: Progress and Missteps,” U.S. News, September 1, 2020.

41 GOJ, “Article 1,” 「重要影響事態に際して我が国の平和及び安全を確保するための措置 に関する法律」[Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security], 1999 Law No. 60 (Revised in 2015 as Law No. 76).

42 GOJ, “Article 2, Clause 3,” 「武力攻撃事態等及び存立危機事態における我が国の平和と独立並びに国及び国民の安全の確保に関する法律」[Law for Ensuring the Peace and Independence of Japan and the Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc., and Situations Threatening Japan’s Survival], 2003 Law No. 79 (Revised in 2015 as Law No. 76).

43 Under the Armed Attack Situations Response Law, two scenarios were defined: an “armed attack situation” and an “anticipated armed attack situation.” The former was one in which there is an organized and premediated armed attack against Japan and it could be applicable to an armed attack against Japanese ships on the high seas. The latter was defined as a situation in which an armed attack has not yet occurred but is anticipated.

44 Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Abe on His Heels,” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2015.

45 Defense Agency, National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-, December 10, 2004, p. 3.

46 Defense Agency, NDPG, p. 2.

47 Defense Agency, NDPG, p. 5.

48 Ministry of Defense (MOD), National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, December 17, 2010, pp. 6-7.

49 For a summary of Japan Coast Guard changes, see Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Kepe, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), pp. 98-102.

50 MOD, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, December 17, 2013, pp. 7-8.

51 MOD, Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018), December 17, 2013, p. 2.

52 MOD, MTDP, 2013, p. 5.

53 MOD, MTDP, 2013, p. 4.

54 MOD, NDPG, 2013, p. 22.

55 MOD, MTDP, 2013, p. 7.

56 MOD, NDPG, 2013, pp. 21-22.

57 Under Abe, both occurred. Not only have GSDF bases been established in on Yonaguni, Ishigaki, Miyako and Amami-Ōshima, ASCM and SAM batteries have been positioned at the latter two while similar batteries are planned for Ishigaki.

58 MOD, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond, December 18, 2018, p. 4.

59 MOD, NDPG, 2018, p. 2.

60 For more details, see Jeffrey W. Hornung, Japan's Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), pp. 67-75.

61 MOD, NDPG, 2018, p. 20.

62 Although the MTDP used the nomenclature JASSM, the Minister of Defense later said it would be the JASSM-ER, for extended range. MOD, Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019–FY 2023), December 18, 2018, p. 12.

63 For review of missile, see Hornung, Japan's Potential Contributions, pp. 58-67; Ministry of Defense, Medium Term Defense Program, 2018, p. 12.

64 「首相、スピード感重視　防衛費11年ぶり増」[Prime Minister, Eyeing Speed with Importance, Increases Defense Costs for the First Time in 11 Years], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 29, 2013.

65 Chang Che, “Japan Is the New Leader of Asia’s Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2021.

66 MOFA, 「総理大臣の外国訪問一覧 (2006) 平成18) 年10月から2020) 令和2) 年10月まで)」[[List of Prime Minister’s Foreign Visits (From October 2006 (Heisei 18) to October 2020 (Reiwa 2))], MOFA, October 22, 2020.

67 Taniguchi Tomohiko, “Countries No Japanese Prime Minister Had Ever Visited Prior to ABE, Shinzō,” Linkedin, March 2, 2021.

68 Abraham Denmark and Goto Shihoko, “Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Announces Resignation,” Wilson Center, August 28, 2020.”

69 Drew, “Shinzo Abe’s Legacy.”

70 Jacob Poushter and Moira Fagan, “On Global Affairs, Americans Have More Confidence in Other World Leaders Than in Trump,” Pew Research Center, November 5, 2018.

71 Karl Friedhoff and Craig Kafura, “American Views Toward U.S.-Japan Relations and Asia-Pacific Security,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April 17, 2018.

72 Bruce Stokes and Kat Devlin, “Countries’ Views of Japan, Abe; Japanese Views of China,” Pew Research Center, November 12, 2018.

73 Natasha Kassam, Lowy Institute Poll 2020, June 24, 2020, p. 6.

74 “Opinion Poll on Japan in ASEAN Countries,” MOFA, March 20, 2019.

75 Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China,” Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2014), 97-122.

76 President Barack Obama, “Remarks to the Australian Parliament,” (Speech at Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011); Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011.

77 Harris, The Iconoclast, pp. 188; 198-201; 221-223.

78 Abe, “Japan is Back,” p. 1.

79 GOJ, National Security Strategy, p. 17.

80 The Democratic Party of Japan administration that preceded Abe’s second tenure as prime minister had pushed for a revision of the defense guidelines, laying the groundwork for persuading the Department of Defense to revise it. The Abe administration, however, conducted these negotiations and saw them through to their conclusion.

81 Japan and the United States of America, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015, pp. 5-18.

82 Japan and the United States of America, Guidelines, p. 3.

83 Japan and the United States of America, Guidelines, p. 4.

84 Before his speech at the U.S. Congress, Abe provided similar views at speeches given at the Australian Parliament and the Bandung Conference.

85 Shinzō Abe, "Toward an Alliance of Hope" (Address, Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2015).

86 Steve Herman, “Japan: Abe Will Not Apologize at Pearl Harbor,” VOA, December 6, 2016; Yuki Tanaka, “An Appeal from Hiroshima To U.S. President and Japanese Prime Minister,” Personal Blogpost, May 20, 2016; Yamaguchi Mari, “A-Bomb Survivors Want Obama to Meet, Apologize in Hiroshima,” Associated Press, May 19, 2016; Julian Ryall, “Japanese Leaders are Pressuring Shinzo Abe Not to Apologize for Pearl Harbor,” Business Insider, December 9, 2016.

87 “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan at Hiroshima Peace Memorial,” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Hiroshima, Japan, May 27, 2016); Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan at Pearl Harbor,” (Oahu, Hawaii, December 27, 2016).

88 Gina Harkins, “Trump: If Japan is Attacked, They Can Watch on Sony TVs While US Fights World War III,” Military.com, June 28, 2019.

89 “Washington Asked Tokyo to Quintuple Payment for U.S. Forces in Japan,” Kyodo, November 16, 2019.

90 Ayumi Teraoka, “RESOLVED: Abe’s Investment in His Relationship with President Trump Has Advanced Japanese Interests,” Debating Japan, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 (January 30, 2020).

91 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, January 2018.

92 Pavel Alpeyev, “Abe Reiterates Support for Trump’s North Korean Policy in a Call,” Bloomberg, December 21, 2019; Reuters Staff, “Japanese PM Abe Says Fully Backs Trump over North Korea No Deal,” Reuters, February 28, 2019; Reuters Staff, “Japan's PM Nominated Trump for Nobel Peace Prize on U.S. Request: Asahi,” Reuters, February 16, 2019.

93 Peter Landers, “Trump’s Loyal Sidekick on North Korea: Japan’s Shinzo Abe,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2017; Denmark and Goto, “Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.”

94 Government of Japan and Government of Australia, “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defense Force,” MOFA, May 19, 2010.

95 Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe, “Joint Statement “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21^st Century”,” MOFA, July 8, 2014.

96 Takenaka Kiyoshi and Ju-min Park, “Japan, Australia Reach Security Pact Amid Fears Over Disputed South China Sea,” Reuters, November 17, 2020.

97 “Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defense to Japan,” Ministry of External Affairs, May 26, 2006; Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership,” MOFA, December 15, 2006.

98 Céline Pajon, “Japan’s “Smart” Strategic Engagement in Southeast Asia,” Asean Forum, December 6, 2013.

99 Céline Pajon, “Japan in South East Asia: Looking for a Balanced Indo-Pacific,” ISPI, December 11, 2019.

100 Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge,” p. 107-109.

101 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Japan Submarine, Destroyers Visit Philippines,” Diplomat, April 4, 2016; Reuters Staff, “Japanese Submarine Conducts First Drills in South China Sea,” Reuters, September 16, 2018; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan’s Izumo-Class Carrier to Visit Vietnam This Month,” Diplomat, June 10, 2019.

102 MOD, 「能力構築支援事業」 [Capacity Building Assistance], MOD, Undated.

103 “Vientiane Vision: Japan's Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN,” MOD, Undated; “Updating the “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN”,” MOD, November 2019.

104 While this effort began after the September 2010 Chinese fishing trawler collision near the Senkaku Islands, it picked up under Abe. Japan sought to push back on China’s excessive maritime claims by promoting legal interpretations of maritime law based on its interpretation of UNCLOS. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge,” pp. 109-111.

105 Jeffrey W. Hornung, Allies Growing Closer: Japan–Europe Security Ties in the Age of Strategic Competition, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020).

106 Anonymous Japanese Official, Interview, March 14, 2021.

107 Hornung, Allies Growing Closer, pp. 19-38; 39-57.

108 Hornung, Allies Growing Closer, pp. 59-75.

109 Hornung, Allies Growing Closer, pp. 77-92.

110 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 2018, (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), p. 128.

111 “Abe Shinzo’s Legacy is More Impressive Than His Muted Exit Suggests,” Economist, September 5, 2020.

112 Anonymous Japanese Official, Interview, May 31, 2019.

113 Anonymous Japanese Official, Interview, May 31, 2019. This included a 2007 speech Abe gave to the Indian parliament, ideas contained in the “value-oriented diplomacy” of Abe’s first term, an undelivered speech Abe was scheduled to give in Jakarta in 2013, and Abe’s NSS.

114 Shinzō Abe, “Address at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development,” (Speech at TICAD VI Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, August 27, 2016).

115 Government of Japan, “Towards Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2019.

116 Anonymous Japanese Official, Interview, May 31, 2019.

117 Brahma Chellaney, “Building a ‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific,” Japan Times, November 21, 2018.

118 Anonymous Japanese Officials, Interview, May 30, 2019 and May 31, 2019.

119 U.S. President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, December 18, 2017.

120 Green and Szechenyi, “Shinzo Abe’s Decision.”

121 Michael J. Green, “Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” as Grand Strategy,” JapanGov, Spring 2018.

122 The address he gave to Indian Parliament was the most foundational. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, “Confluence of the Two Seas” (Speech at Indian Parliament, New Delhi, India, April 22, 2007). For history see Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” CSIS Briefs, March 2020.

123 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012.

124 “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017),” Ministry of External Affairs, November 12, 2017.

125 Buchan and Rimland, “Defining the Diamond,” p. 1.

126 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Security Policy in the “Abe Era”: Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift?” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 (May 2018)

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeffrey W. Hornung

Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Indo-Pacific region. Hornung has written extensively about Japanese security and foreign policy issues and broader Northeast Asia security issues for numerous media, policy, and academic outlets. This includes Washington Quarterly, Asian Survey, Foreign Policy, New York Times, Washington Post, War on the Rocks and many others, including the two major Japanese dailies Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. Hornung received his Ph.D. in political science from The George Washington University. During 2005-2006, Hornung was also a visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo where he conducted his doctoral research as a Fulbright Fellow. He also holds an M.A. in international relations with a concentration in Japan Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).