Republic of Korea’s “Anchored Flexibility” Diplomacy

Abstract

With the Republic of Korea’s (hereafter ROK, Korea) growing presence in the international arena, crafting a nuanced and forward-thinking diplomatic strategy has become a critical task. This article aims to dissect and conceptualize key features of ROK’s diplomatic strategy. The ROK prefers a strategic choice, which the author terms “anchored flexibility” diplomacy. Critical decisions regarding strategic alignments and partnership significantly shape Korea’s diplomatic trajectory. To effectively anchor its foreign policy strategy, Korea must clarify the values and principles that it aspires to protect and promote. Securing ROK from North Korean threats as a strategic priority is linked to anchoring diplomatic strategy to strengthening alliance with the US and promoting trilateral cooperation. The spirit of cherishing freedom, peace, and prosperity runs through ROK’s flexible engagement with likeminded countries in the international community. The Republic of Korea flexibly engages new frontiers, which the author calls a “Long Corridor” from India, Middle East to Eastern Europe. Under the banner of global pivotal diplomacy, the Republic of Korea also seeks to proactively embrace the Global South.

Notes

1 This article is a revised, expanded, and translated version of a speech delivered at the Korean Council on Foreign Relations on January 4, 2024. The views and opinions expressed in this article represent the author’s personal viewpoint, not the ROK government’s official position.

2 For example, Former President Moon Jae-in said, “If necessary, we can discuss with North Korea through the Inter-Korean Military Committee” at the New Year’s press conference on January 18, 2021, regarding the issue of resuming annual Korea-U.S. military exercises.” https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210118006700325.

3 Moon Jae-in said, “China is a country high as a mountain, …  … and I hope all nations share the ‘China Dream.’” https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp.

4 Victor Cha, “Korea Voluntarily Isolated Itself from the Democratic Countries,” Chosun Ilbo. April 5, 2021.

5 As for overall guidelines about the Korean government’s foreign policy directions, refer to Yoon Suk-yeol, “Korea Needs to Step Up: The Country’s Next President on His Foreign Policy Vision,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2022.

6 Kroenig Matthew, “The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

7 Jake Sullivan, “The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World,” Foreign Affairs, October 24, 2023.

8 Zakaria Fareed, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008).

9 An example of a study dealing with the decline of multilateralism is John J. Mearsheimer, ”Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2019), pp. 7–50.

10 Ideas and hints about varying strategic options have been discussed at Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999).

11 A survey conducted in 2023 by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies reveals that a total of 76.6% of 1,000 Koreans surveyed said Korea should have its own nuclear weapons. https://www.chey.org/Kor/Notice/NoticeView.aspx?seq=192.

12 The Korean government announced its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2022. Refer to the Office of the President of the Republic of Korea website, “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” (English version). https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/HC81lhZw.

13 For more information on KASI, refer to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. https://mys.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_3924/view.do?seq=363570&page=1.

14 In January 2023, Korea and the UAE agreed to continue strengthening cooperation in the defense and defense industry sectors through a summit meeting, followed by a defense ministerial meeting in February 2023. Furthermore, Korea and Saudi Arabia signed a “Medium-to-Long-Term Defense Cooperation MOU” and concluded an export contract for approximately $3.2 billion worth of mid-range surface-to-air missile defense system (M-SAM II) in November 2023.

15 In July 2022, Korea signed a weapons export contract with Poland worth approximately $14.5 billion, including tanks, self-propelled artillery, and fighter jets. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2022/07/27/poland-agrees-to-massive-arms-package-with-south-korea/.

16 The Korean government allocated 2 trillion won to expand the ODA budget from approximately 4.5 trillion won in 2023 to nearly 6.8 trillion won (around US$5.2 billion) in 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20230630078800325.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cheol Hee Park

Cheol Hee Park is chancellor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), an in-house think tank and educational institution at the ROK Foreign Ministry. Before assuming the current position, he was a professor at Seoul National University (SNU). He served as dean at the Graduate School of International Studies, director of the Institute for Japanese Studies, and director of the Institute of International Affairs at SNU. In 2022, he worked as a senior staff of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and National Security at the 20^th Presidential Transition Committee. He obtained a Ph.D. at Columbia University after his B.A. and M.A. at Seoul National University. He specializes in Japanese politics and diplomacy, Korea-Japan relations, and international relations in East Asia. He has written numerous articles and columns about international affairs in Korean, English, and Japanese.