Policy-making institutions and water policy outputs in the European Union and the United States: a comparative analysis

Abstract

In multi-level political systems such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), central governing institutions balance the influence of territorially and functionally based interests in the policy-making process. This article argues that EU institutional structures provide relatively strong opportunities for policy influence by territorially based interests, while policy-making institutions in the US tend to allow for the exercise of greater levels of influence by functionally based interests. It further argues that these institutional differences have implications for water policy outputs in the two political jurisdictions. Specifically, it suggests that the EU’s territorially oriented institutional structures enable a relatively high level of horizontal integration across policy sectors during the formulation stage of the policy process. In the US, by contrast, relatively high levels of institutional receptiveness to functionally oriented interests contribute to more vertically integrated structures for drinking water and surface water policy implementation.

Keywords:

• Environmental policy
• federalism
• implementation
• institutions
• multi-level governance
• policy integration
• water policy

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Dr Alberta Sbragia, Dr B. Guy Peters, Mr Tom Garvey, Dr Regina Axelrod, Dr Tanja Börzel, Dr Jeremy Richardson, and Mr Mike Aiton for helpful comments, insights, and assistance relating to this article. Three anonymous reviewers also provided a number of detailed and useful comments. However, the author alone is responsible for the arguments made and for any errors or omissions contained herein. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of his current or past employers.

Notes

While the EU’s tools of influence over member state water policies are ‘under- developed’ when compared to those of the US federal government over the states, they are quite well developed when compared to other international organizations. Throughout this paper we use the term ‘relatively’ as a term of comparison between the EU and the US. Obviously, the conclusions would often be different if other frames of reference were used.

This article focuses on differences between US and EU water policy outputs. However, there are also numerous similarities between the ways in which the two systems manage water policies. For example, both systems are moving toward geographically based management schemes that coincide with watershed boundaries. In addition, both systems are seeking to incorporate pollution prevention oriented activities and non-point source pollution control efforts into their water pollution control programs. It is not yet clear whether these similarities represent parallel learning curves in the process of developing water pollution control programs within multi-level systems of governance, or whether they are the product of some form of transatlantic learning process (Majone 1991).

It is worth noting here, however, that cross-national functional interests can seek influence in these settings as well.

One of the more prominent of the organizations now representing state environmental officials in the US is the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS), an organization born in the 1990s to represent top state environmental officials in Washington. For more information on ECOS, visit www.ecos.org

The procedures undertaken by the Commission to ensure compliance typically involve the following: (1) informal consultation; (2) a formal notice or warning letter; (3) a reasoned opinion of the Commission outlining the rationale underlying its belief that a particular country has failed to live by its Treaty obligations; and (4) the filing of a case in the ECJ. If the ECJ finds that the nation-state is in violation of an EU directive, it may impose penalty payments on the defaulting country (Kunzlik 1994).

Viewed as a whole these sectors bear some resemblance to policy ‘subsystems’ as introduced by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in their advocacy coalition approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

For example, Article 174 of the Treaty (formerly Article 130r) indicates that Community policy on the environment should seek preservation, protection, and improvement of the environment, the protection of human health, and prudent and rational utilization of resources. It also states that ‘Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at sources and that the polluter should pay’ (European Union Consolidated Treaties 1997).

Notable in this context, however, is the fact that a provision in the Treaties makes the ‘management of water resources’ subject to unanimous approval in the CM, and there appears to be some legal question as to the precise scope of this phrase (Kramer 2000: 183–5).

For example, both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Housing and Urban Development fund water-related infrastructure projects in co-operation with the states.

For good overviews of EU water legislation, see Matthews 1997, 1999; Johnson and Corcelle 1995; Haigh 1992

The Clean Water Act, originally passed in its current form in 1972, regulates discharges to the ‘waters of the United States.’ And the Safe Drinking Water Act, passed in 1974, establishes standards in the form of maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for public drinking water systems (Government Institutes 1998). The functionally based interests that pressured for greater federal involvement in water policy focused on obvious and visible problems associated with surface water quality and drinking water. They were not as focused on ‘invisible’ groundwater or more regionally based concerns about water quantity.

It is appropriate to note here, however, that there are signs that US law-makers are becoming more reasonable in their establishment of statutory deadlines relating to water policy. The 1996 amendments to the SDWA, for example, scaled back certain requirements with ambitious timetables that were established in the 1986 SDWA amendments.

The evaluations summarized in Table 6 represent a snapshot in time around the turn of the century. They do not fully recognize current efforts in both the US and the EU to improve horizontal policy integration, and clearly include subjective elements. Nevertheless, they do reflect overall strengths and weaknesses in the two systems and are therefore useful for general comparative purposes.

Forty-nine states enjoy ‘primacy’ to administer the SDWA within their jurisdiction (Wyoming is the only exception). Forty-four states are ‘authorized’ to administer the NPDES permitting program established by the federal CWA. (There is further discussion of CWA delegations contained in Hunter and Waterman 1996 and Ringquist 1993.) Updated statistics on delegations are often available through the Environmental Council of the States world-wide web site (www.ecos.org).

Like the evaluations of horizontal policy integration shown in Table 6, these evaluations represent a snapshot in time and also include clear elements of subjective judgement. Once again, however, I would suggest that they are basically accurate for comparative purposes. Efforts are underway in both the EU and the US that affect vertical policy integration. Major EU efforts are underway to improve communication and information relating to environmental policy implementation. Conversely, in the US, efforts are being made to provide states with both greater flexibility and accountability in the administration of federal environmental and water policies.