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Abstract
Benchmarking and peer reviews have been identified as increasingly influential in a number of policy arenas. Little is known, however, about the interaction between international and national levels and its effects. This paper explores such processes in one of the ‘original’ settings of these governance types – the OECD's reviews of a country's regulatory policies in the case of Ireland. Based on the limited results in the Irish example, it is argued that the supposed effects of peer reviews and benchmarking require such high system requirements at the national level that they are unlikely to facilitate the innovation of national regulatory policies according to international ‘best practice’ standards.
Notes
1 I am grateful to Julia Black, Bridget Hutter, Oliver James, Michael Moran, Lindsay Stirton, Kai Wegrich, the reviewers and Jeremy Richardson for valuable comments and suggestions. The ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, the Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin and the Juan March Institute in Madrid have provided most supportive research environments. I am indebted to the numerous officials who have been extremely supportive and informative.
2 Meta-regulation is defined by voluntary efforts of organizations to comply with particular objectives set by an external organization. The achievement of particular goals is said to be far more likely by encouraging voluntary compliance by the organizations to be regulated to report on their self-evaluation to regulators and shareholders (Parker Citation2002: 245).
3 The so-called Mandelkern Group was established as part of the agenda following the publication of the Commission's White Paper on Governance (July 2001). Its report (Better Regulation, November 2001) led to a series of Commission recommendations on ‘improving’ and ‘simplifying’ the ‘regulatory environment’, including impact assessment methods, consultation and member state–Commission interaction.
4 For example, the United Kingdom has not only witnessed a succession of ‘red tape’ units, the latest being the ‘Better Regulation Task Force’ (BRTF, established in 1997), but also a series of studies concerning the regulation of utilities, such as those by the Department of Trade and Industry, the BRTF, the National Audit Office and the Treasury, as well as by non-state actors, such as the employers' association, the Confederation of British Industry, as well as think-tanks such as Demos, the Social Market Foundation and Hansard. Benchmarking against ‘best practice’ has also received growing interest in local government.
5 Given the institutional nature of search and decision-making processes, regulatory innovation and ‘best practice’ are likely to follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than any extensive testing of all feasible or existing approaches or the development of a scientific understanding of what approaches may work ‘best’ in particular contexts.
6 See also Rose and Garvin Citation(1983) on the policy independence of Ireland vis-à-vis policies emerging from its colonial past.
7 This agenda involved the following recommendations for national regulatory reforms: (1) establishment of a broad regulatory reform agenda; (2) review of regulations; (3) transparent, non-discriminatory and efficient application; (4) review of competition policy; (5) reform economic market regulation to facilitate competition; (6) eliminate trade barriers; (7) develop cross-linkages to other public sector reform policies.
8 The standard structure of the OECD's review reports included chapters on macroeconomic background, government capabilities to offer high-value regulation, competition policy, sectoral chapters on market openness and policy recommendations.
9 The former concern emerged after the telecommunications regulator had initially refused to attend a parliamentary committee meeting on the grounds that she was not obliged to attend. The latter concern emerged in the allocation of the second cellular licence that was contested in court and where the legislation allowed for a suspension of the licence allocation, thereby delaying this step of liberalization.
10 The White Paper announced measures to address perceived accountability and ‘democratic deficit’ concerns, enhanced sanctioning measures, the move towards regulatory commissions and the increased use of standardized consultation processes.
11 These had also been noted in the OECD report.
12 Bertie Ahern, however, was not personally involved in the regulatory reform agenda apart from sharing the view that ‘less regulation is a good thing’ (interview).
13 One source of disagreement, the role and status of the ‘social partnership’, was solved after OECD officials had been introduced to the actual partnership mechanisms which previously had been regarded with considerable scepticism. This, however, did not lead to any positive endorsement of such procedures.
14 ‘The most well-known competition problem in Ireland, although perhaps not the one with the greatest economic impact, affects one of its most characteristic institutions, the pub’ (OECD Citation2001: 203).
15 Pharmacists without an Irish qualification were barred from managing or supervising a pharmacy that had been in existence for less than three years.
16 The consultation document cited EU and OECD reports as well as domestic reform experiences and offered widespread discussion of a variety of ways in which regulation impacted on administrative, economic and political life. It was structured in a series of chapters which mainly reflected the OECD agenda (‘performance of the economy and consumer welfare’, ‘quality of governance’ and ‘efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector’) and which addressed a series of concerns, reflecting ‘that this was not driven by any coherent idea, but rather aimed to get everyone's ideas reflected in the document’ (interview), therefore moving from a mostly economic view on regulation (as had been provided by the OECD) to a view that regarded regulation as a valuable tool to address social and consumer welfare policy goals. The report on the consultation exercise attracted some criticism for its consideration of the views of the ‘social partners’ in particular.
17 Numerous officials, in Ireland, Spain and the UK, shared this judgement.
18 Parliamentary Debates, Dáil Éireann, 15 June, pp. 220–39. (http://debates.oireachtas.ie/Xml/29/DAL20040615.PDF (last accessed 13 December 2004).)