Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying

Abstract

The volume offers an analysis of large N empirical studies of interest groups in Europe. It calls for a shift from exploratory or descriptive interest studies to more confirmatory theory testing. Recognizing the continued European economic integration, globalization and the changing role of the state, we observed significant adaptations in interest mobilization and strategic behaviour. The various papers assess the logic of collective and direct action, the logic of access and influence, the logic of venue shopping and alliance building. Specifically, the volume notes the emergence of élite pluralism in EU institutions, the pump priming of political action by EU institutions, and the growing political sophistication of private and public interests in a complex multi-level venue environment.

Keywords:

• Elite pluralism
• European Commission
• European Union
• interest groups
• lobbying.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume is the result of a workshop held at University College London in January 2006 on European lobbying. The author would like to thank the Department of Political Science and Friends of UCL for funding the gathering and London University Research Fund for supporting the primary research for this paper. The author would also like to thank Wyn Grant, Cornelia Woll, Fabio Franchino, Graham Wilson, Jeremy Richardson and Yuki Hamada for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. Franchino (2005) counted 201 case studies in JEPP, EUP and WEP for a 10-year period from 1994 to 2004.

2. This number may be inflated as every body who wants to enter the EP regularly (to drink coffee with friends) needs to be declared as a potential lobbyist – hence you will find the name of Simon Hix on the EP list of lobbyists. Woll (2006: 6) more optimistically guesses the figure to be nearer 3,000 real lobbyists.

3. Coen (1997: 98–9) defined élite pluralism as an interest arrangement where ‘access is generally restricted to a few policy players, for whom membership is competitive and strategically advisable.’ In such a political environment, competition for places at the table can define/redefine the lobbying strategies of interests groups (Broscheid and Coen 2003).

4. While the latter observation runs contrary to Bouwen's (2002) and Coen's (1997) studies, it does not undermine the general observation that business interests have favoured access, and the result may be a function of the sample's large bias towards EU and national trade associations. Moreover, the data came from the supply side of the equation and it would be interesting to compare in future studies the responses of the Commission and EP officials. For example, Koeppl (2000), in a survey of 373 heads of Commission units, observed that 65.7 per cent of functionaries believed that lobbyists were necessary for policy-making.