Party politics as usual? The role of political parties in EU legislative decision-making

Abstract

Scholars have raised doubts about the ability of political parties to fulfil their traditional role as ‘transmission belts’ between citizens and legislators in the EU. We discuss how the different institutional environment of the EU affects the assumptions and predictions of theories of political parties developed for the national context and discuss how political parties can influence EU legislative decision-making. We distinguish between partisan effects in the electoral and legislative arena, and argue for a clear distinction between the effects of national parties, national party delegations and transnational party groups when studying EU party politics. The empirical literature shows that, whereas parties play a role in most institutions, they are not always the dominant players, and their effect varies both across and within these institutions.

Keywords:

• Democratic deficit
• European Union
• legislation
• political parties
• political representation

1. INTRODUCTION

At the national level, political parties play an important role in making representative democracy work. ‘Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties’ (Schattschneider 1942: 1). They help to aggregate and communicate policy preferences, link decision-making between different legislative bodies and hold politicians accountable.

The essential role of political parties in a representative democracy is their competition in repeated electoral contests, which allows voters to choose between different policy packages and to reward or punish governing parties for their legislative performance (Powell 2000). Through their party platforms, political parties aggregate wide sets of preferences held by citizens into competing policy packages. They also facilitate the selection of citizens' representatives by informing the electorate about the policies to be enacted by their candidates (Snyder and Ting 2002).

Besides their role as ‘transmission belts’ between voters and policy outcomes in the electoral arena, parties are commonly held to be fundamental in structuring the legislative process, ensuring voting cohesion and distributing positions in the legislature and executive (Strøm et al. 2003: 665). The maintenance of cohesive voting behaviour of parties within the legislature is crucial for the stability of the legislative decision-making process and for voters to hold their representatives accountable (Bowler et al. 1999; Sartori 1994). Only if the majority party or the majority coalition in the legislature is able to display cohesive voting behaviour can legislation be passed and voters identify the actors responsible for policy innovations. Consequently, there is a large body of work investigating the role of political parties in national political systems. In contrast, legislative politics in the European Union (EU) was initially largely studied in the context of international relations, focusing on the national rather than partisan background of the main actors (Hörl et al. 2005). For more than a decade now this has been complemented by an increasing number of studies building upon the comparative politics tradition (cf. Hix 1994). One prominent topic in these studies is inevitably the role of political parties. In the EU, however, the electoral connection is weak. Elections to the European Parliament (EP) are second-order national elections because they focus on national and not European issues. Moreover, it is the national and not the EU-level parties that nominate the candidates to these elections. Hence, the transnational party groups in the EP are generally considered to be weak in comparison to national parties (Judge and Earnshaw 2003; Faas 2003; Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1997). The lack of electoral connection in the EU is widely seen as an important cause of its legitimacy problems (Hix 2008: chs 5 and 6). As an example, Andersen and Eliassen (1996: 255) argue that in the EU, ‘direct influence replaces in many ways the parliamentary channel as the most important channel for influence, thereby leading to problems of democracy.’ And according to Peter Mair, the EU ‘fosters a version of democratic engagement that may indirectly undermine the conventional partisan agenda’ (2006: 165).

This raises the question of whether political parties in the EU are able to fulfil their traditional role as ‘transmission belts’, ensuring political accountability and consistent decision-making. In the parliamentary systems of the EU member states, the governmental party or coalition can enforce (party) voting cohesion among legislators by threatening to attach a confidence vote to a legislative proposal (Huber 1996). Furthermore, the cabinet, with its prerogatives in the legislative process, is formed along partisan lines and the portfolios are distributed by party leaders (Laver 2006: 125–6). In this way, in an ideal-type parliamentary system political parties are part of a single and simple chain of delegation. Voters elect parliamentarians, parliamentarians elect the cabinet, and the cabinet proposes and implements legislation (Strøm 2000: 267–70). Political parties are involved in all the steps in this chain in the EU member states (Müller 2000: 312, 317–19) and voters can thus hold political parties to account if they feel that their preferences have been distorted or misrepresented in the democratic chain of delegation. The constitutional structure of the EU does not, however, resemble the structure of a parliamentary system. The EP as the directly elected European legislature does have the power to vote the European executive, the Commission, out of office through a vote of no confidence but the necessary majority is so difficult to reach that this comes closer to an impeachment procedure (Hix et al. 2007: 21). Nor is the Commission recruited from a majority coalition within the EP (cf. Hix 2008: 77–8, 125–35). Furthermore, the Commission cannot dissolve the Parliament or the Council. Owing to the relative political independence of the legislative bodies, the EU is closer to a separation of powers system like the presidential system of the US. Much of the current research on political parties in the EU is therefore inspired and guided by theories of political parties which have been developed to study partisan politics in the US Congress.

Despite doubts about partisan politics as usual in the EU, recent literature on legislative decision-making in the EU has pointed to several instances of the influence of political parties. It has, for example, been demonstrated that political parties play a role in the legislative organization and voting behaviour of the EP (e.g. Hix et al. 2007; Kreppel 2002). Some studies have also identified a partisan alignment in the voting behaviour of governments in the Council (Mattila 2004; Aspinwall 2007: 105; Hagemann 2007: 290; Hagemann and Hoyland 2008) and pointed to the selection of Commissioners on party political grounds (Wonka 2007; Döring 2007). Finally, scholars have also noted the impact of political parties on the composition and formation of coalitions within and across legislative bodies (Rasmussen 2008c; Hoyland 2006a).

However, in order to draw general conclusions about the extent to which parties can act as ‘transmission belts’ between citizens and the EU level, we need to know more about their effect on EU legislative decision-making. One difficulty lies in distinguishing between the effect of national and transnational parties. In this article, we examine whether or not there is a partisan effect, and how national and transnational parties influence legislative decision-making in the EU. The contributions cover the different stages of political representation and all legislative bodies. The results are mixed. On the one hand, they confirm the findings of recent studies showing how parties affect the daily decision-making of the EU. On the other hand, they also show that parties are not always the dominant players, and that their effect varies both across and within the institutions.

This introduction starts with a review of US theories of partisan influence and discusses how the different institutional environment of the EU affects the assumptions and predictions of these models. We point out that when studying EU party politics it is important to distinguish between different types of parties, because national and transnational parties cannot be expected to have the same effects on the legislators. In the third section, we scrutinize the empirical evidence on the role of these different types of partisan actors in the electoral and legislative arena based on the key findings of the existing studies on party politics in the EU and the following contributions.

2. THE US PARTY LITERATURE AND ITS ADAPTATION TO THE EU CONTEXT

The dominant theories of partisan influence in the US are built upon the rational choice assumption of utility-maximizing actors. They show which benefits individual legislators derive from establishing political parties. The explanation is divided into two parts: one explains the utility of parties in the electoral arena, while the other emphasizes the purpose of political parties in the legislative field. Although legislators are generally assumed to care about their re-election (vote), the implementation of good public policy (policy) and prominent office positions (office), the re-election goal figures most prominently in most US party theories, following Fenno (1973: 1). All of these goals of legislators are, however, intertwined. Getting re-elected is the prerequisite for holding public office positions and implementing good public policy. To paraphrase a West Wing character: ‘If my first priority isn't re-election then it doesn't really matter what my second priority is.’ Legislative behaviour is thus shaped by the electoral contest.

The party in the electoral arena

In the electoral arena political parties perform a function similar to the brand name of an established company in the marketplace (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 39–40; Aldrich 1995: 49; Cox and McCubbins 2007: 100–3). Voters are ultimately interested in which policies their representatives will enact once elected. The party label offers a simple and cheap way for voters to find out what policies a candidate would pursue in office, and which constituencies he or she would seek to benefit (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 40; Cox and McCubbins 1993: 134).

In order to maintain a clearly recognizable brand name, political parties not only need to advocate clear positions in the electoral contest, but they also need to pursue these policy goals within the legislature. Only if parties vote cohesively can they maximize their influence in the legislative decision-making process and foster their brand names. Once elected, however, legislators face incentives to defect from the party line in plenary voting. First, they might simply disagree with the advocated party position; second, it might not benefit their constituency; and/or third, they may be swayed by the influence of interest groups. Although the party collectively strives to present a unified front, individual legislators are tempted to pursue divergent interests, hurting the party label. The reputation of the party is essentially a public good whose consumption cannot be effectively limited to those who contribute to maintaining it, i.e. to those who support the party line in plenary voting, and a failure to produce legislation as promised jeopardizes the reputation of the party in the electoral arena (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 125). To solve their collective action problem (Olson 1965; Laver 1997) party members establish the party leadership as a central agent and put it in charge of maintaining support for the party line. The party group leadership can maintain party voting cohesion both through its disciplinary and agenda-setting powers. Using its disciplinary powers, the party leadership monitors the voting behaviour of legislators and sanctions them if they deviate from the party position (on the motivation of the party leadership, see Cox and McCubbins 2007: 115–23). The party leadership has different selective incentives at its disposal with which it can discipline its members; for example, it can deny its members access to positions on more prominent committees or other offices in the legislature (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 45; Cox 2006: 147–9). Ultimately, the leadership can bar a legislator from running again using the party label. Through keeping divisive bills off the floor, the leadership of the majority party is able to maintain voting cohesion without recourse to disciplinary actions (Cox and McCubbins 2005: 210–15). Thus, party members establish the party leadership as its central agent to solve external collective action problems and maintain voting cohesion, either through disciplinary actions or through agenda control.

The party in the legislative arena

Political parties not only increase the chances of politicians being (re)-elected but they also increase the utility of politicians once they are inside the legislature. Aldrich argues that political parties are institutional solutions created by rational utility-maximizing legislators to reduce the transaction costs of collective decision-making and solve the internal collective action problems they face in the legislature (Aldrich 1995: 19). To influence policy, legislators have to form a majority coalition to pass legislation. Building a coalition requires effort and time. In other words, it involves transaction costs: the costs of putting together a proposal, identifying potential coalition partners and forging a compromise acceptable to a sufficient majority (Furubotn and Richter 1998: 42–9). The existence of political parties reduces these costs (Aldrich 1995: 36). Rather than searching out possible coalition partners for every single proposal, political parties in a legislature ‘pre-pack’ like-minded legislators.

Beyond reducing the transaction costs of coalition-building in majority decision-making, political parties solve the collective action problems of legislative decision-making. Through organizing themselves into a majority party legislators can receive a higher pay-off in terms of policy than they could achieve as individual legislators (Aldrich 1995: 35). The ability of the majority party to determine policy outcomes, however, hinges on it being able to maintain voting cohesion in the legislature. The party-internal collective action problem of maintaining party voting cohesion can be solved through delegating agenda control and disciplinary powers to a party leadership as outlined above. Thus, both the electoral and legislative explanations of political parties state that they need to be able to vote cohesively in the legislature in order to influence policy outcomes and maintain a positive reputation. Keith Krehbiel has, however, pointed out that a high degree of party voting cohesion in the legislature is not sufficient evidence for an effect of political parties on the legislative decision-making process. We only know that political parties significantly affect policy outcomes if members vote with their party despite disagreements about the policy (Krehbiel 1993: 238). Otherwise, legislators might simply follow their individual preferences, which happen to be aligned along partisan lines.

In summary, US theories of partisan influence state that rational utility-maximizing legislators establish political parties as institutional solutions to solve collective action problems in the electoral and the legislative arena. Political parties also reduce the transaction costs of forming a majority coalition in the legislature. Through cohesive voting behaviour, the majority party in the US Congress is able to determine the outcome of the legislative decision-making process, satisfying the policy-seeking incentives of the members of the majority party and preserving a positive brand name in the electoral arena. The party-internal collective action problem of maintaining voting cohesion is solved through empowering the party group leadership with agenda control and disciplinary powers in the legislative chamber.

Adapting the assumptions to the EU context

The preceding section has explained the main theories of a partisan effect on legislative decision-making from a rational choice institutionalist perspective developed for the US Congress. Whilst application of US research to the EU has brought great theoretical and methodological advancements to the study of the EU in general, there are some caveats. If the assumptions behind these theories are not carefully checked and adjusted, the import of US Congress theories to the study of political parties in the EU might be unable to reveal the full picture of party politics at the European level and lead to incomplete conclusions (Kreppel 2002). This is not to say, however, that the EU is a sui generis phenomenon and that ideas and concepts developed for a different setting cannot be adopted (Hix 1994, 1998).

The partisan landscape in the EU is much more complex than in the national context. We will distinguish between transnational parties, European party federations and the national party delegations in the EP. When we speak of transnational parties, we refer to a group of representatives within a given institution that typically come from the same party family. In the EP, these transnational parties are also commonly referred to as (transnational) party groups. When we study transnational parties in the Commission and the Council we are looking at groups of representatives from these institutions that would have belonged to the same EP party groups. European party federations refer to the party organizations at the European level, which are active outside the European institutions. Finally, national party delegations refer to entities within the transnational parties in the EP consisting of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same national party. We need to distinguish between these different types of partisan actors because we would not necessarily expect them to play the same role in the electoral and legislative arenas.

There are other differences between the EU and US contexts that have to be borne in mind when applying US party theories to the EU context. In studies of partisan effects within the legislative chambers of the EU, two main adaptations have to be made. First, the electoral connection does not explain the existence of transnational parties. The legislative performance of transnational parties represented in the Council is not evaluated in national elections and the elections to the EP are second-order national elections, which are based on national issues, and where the governmental performance at the national level is evaluated (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2005). Thus, political actors in the Council and the EP do not have incentives to establish and maintain political brand names. This does not mean that politicians at the European level are not re-election seekers, just that the re-election chances of European legislators are determined by national parties and national issues. European legislators are therefore frequently assumed to be policy-seekers (Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2007; Lindberg 2008a). Politicians at the European level are more likely to benefit from transnational parties in order to achieve their policy goals.

Second, no transnational party can use agenda control powers in order to keep policy issues which divide the party from arising in the legislative decision-making process. It is the European Commission which initiates all proposals in the European legislative decision-making process, although both the EP and the Council can request proposals for legislative action. Thus, the transnational parties in the Council and the EP cannot keep issues off the agenda, even if they hold a sufficient majority of votes within these bodies. In other words, partisan control of the legislative agenda is only possible if a political camp dominates all three legislative bodies in the EU. Since the actions of European legislators at the European level are not decisive for the electoral contest, increased voting cohesion through agenda control would not even benefit the maintenance of a good reputation with the electorate. The formation of transnational parties is nevertheless in the interest of legislators because political parties reduce the transactions costs of legislative decision-making and increase their influence over policy outcomes (Hix et al. 2007: 40–6). Since their legislative influence can only be maintained if transnational parties vote cohesively, legislators have a rationale for establishing a centralized party leadership which monitors the compliance of party members and sanctions them accordingly. If European legislators are assumed to be policy-seekers, two scenarios of transnational party politics seem to be applicable. In the first, politicians can establish a transnational party together with like-minded legislators in order to reduce the transaction costs of legislative decision-making. This does not entail the establishment of a centralized party group leadership because the collective action problem of maintaining party unity can be solved through repeated interactions (Axelrod 1984). Alternatively, legislators can go one step further and establish a party group leadership with monitoring capabilities and disciplinary powers.

Thus, legislators can be said to have incentives to form transnational parties at the European level in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes. Yet, owing to the separation of the electoral and the legislative arena in the EU these transnational parties face strong competition from national parties, which control the nomination and re-election opportunities of legislators (Hix 2002), and which might have divergent preferences. This is why we have to distinguish between national and transnational parties.

3. THE EFFECT OF PARTIES ON EU LEGISLATIVE POLITICS

In the following we will discuss in more detail how far the theories of partisan influence developed for American politics can be applied to the EU and provide an overview of the evidence for a partisan effect on EU politics. We distinguish between party effects in the electoral and legislative arenas. In the former, we scrutinize the ability of parties to influence the selection of representatives to the EU institutions. In the latter, we are instead interested in whether the transnational parties in the European institutions have established a party leadership which can control the legislative agenda, whether national or transnational parties control assets within the European institutions with which to discipline their members, and whether political parties play a role in the inter-institutional decision-making process of the EU. The results of a review of the existing empirical literature are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 Party effects on legislative decision-making

		National parties	Transnational parties
Electoral arena	Selection of representatives
	European Parliament	Yes	No
	Council	Yes	No
	Commission	Yes	No
Legislative arena	Legislative organization
	European Parliament	Mixed	Mixed
	Council	No	No
	Commission	No	No
	Intra-institutional decision-making
	European Parliament	Yes	Yes
	Council	Mixed	Mixed
	Commission	No	No
	Inter-institutional decision-making	Mixed	Yes (preliminary evidence)

Selection of representatives

As mentioned above, we would expect the national, not the transnational, parties to control the selection of legislators and thus enjoy stronger links to European legislators. Even if current work on EU legislative politics does not directly examine these selection processes as such, it confirms this expectation by demonstrating that strong links exist between the national parties and the representatives of the different institutions. For example, Rasmussen (2008b) shows that when it comes to looking at attitudinal ties between MEPs, they are significantly more in line with the opinion of their national parties than with that of their EP party groups. Also Scully's work has shown that even though national politicians are socialized into the EP, they do not automatically become more pro-integration, but remain national politicians in their attitudes (2005). In the Council, the link to national parties is also clear, because this body consists of representatives from the national governments themselves. The representatives of these governments are overwhelmingly elected as national party members (save the occasional independent minister).

Despite the notion of independent Commissioners in the treaties, research has also provided evidence that national party affiliation plays a role in the selection of the Commission. Wonka (2007) shows how governments have used their appointment powers to select Commissioners of their own national party affiliation. Döring (2007) also finds links between the Commissioners and the parties in their national governments. The choice of the Commission President is also influenced by party political considerations (Wonka 2008a). A recent study by Thomson (2008) of policy positions on legislative proposals also demonstrates strong links between the Commission and the member states. His results show that there is generally high coherence between the position of the Commission and the member state of the responsible Commissioner. This research casts serious doubt on the conventional wisdom that regards the Commission as a pro-European integration policy outlier (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).

On the whole, we therefore have strong (although often indirect) evidence that national parties play an important role in selecting representatives for all three institutions.

Legislative organization

When it comes to examining legislative organization, we still know relatively little about the internal procedures and structures within the Commission and the Council compared to the EP. As far as the first two are concerned, it is obvious that neither institution has solved its internal collective action problems by creating a transnational partisan structure along the lines predicted by the US party theories. To minimize the transaction costs of collective decision-making, the Council has instead decided to divide its work between sectoral Council formations. Along similar lines, the organization of the Commission also divides responsibilities between policy-specific directorate generals, which prepare the decisions of the College.

No transnational party leadership structure exists in the Council or the Commission. Legislative leadership in the Council of the EU is provided by the rotating Council Presidency (Tallberg 2003, 2006; Warntjen 2007). It is a partisan office in so far as it is held by a government composed of political parties which may push for a partisan agenda (Tallberg 2003: 9). However, the office of the Presidency is not an instrument of the transnational majority party in the Council for advancing partisan goals. It cannot strip national ministers of their office. Furthermore, its legislative powers are not as far-reaching as a partisan office in the US Congress, such as the Speaker of the House (Warntjen 2008). Leadership in the Commission is exerted by the Commission President. However, just like in the Council, the Commission President does not hold a partisan leadership office as we know it from the US context. There is also therefore no issue of using party disciplinary measures, such as the allocation of important offices in the institutions to loyal party members.

In addition, there is no transnational party control of the agenda in either of these two institutions. The Council Presidency can steer the legislative agenda in the Council (Warntjen 2007), but it cannot keep such initiatives off the floor (Warntjen 2008). In a similar manner, the Commission President can affect the work of the Commission but does not control a majority of votes in the College. Even if he or she did, a range of other factors beyond the control of the Commission President affect whether legislative proposals are put forward (Rasmussen 2007).

In contrast to the Commission and the Council, the EP has a leadership which is composed of transnational party groups. The office of the President and the 14 vice-presidents are divided between the transnational party groups according to their political strength. Despite this apparent partisan leadership structure of the EP, we are very far from the partisan control predicted by US party theories. No EP transnational party has a majority of seats, and so far the selection of the EP President has been mostly the result of a compromise between some of the large groups, each of which has held the position for one half of a parliamentary term. Similar to the Presidents of the other institutions, the EP President cannot keep issues off the agenda. A key body in the leadership of the EP is the Conference of Presidents, consisting of the Presidents of each political group. This body serves an important information function and lowers the transaction costs of bargaining between the different EP groups. For example, it is charged with setting the broad direction of the EP such as distributing legislative reports to the committee(s) with jurisdiction, authorizing the drafting of non-legislative reports, and deciding on the draft agenda for the plenary sessions. However, it is not comparable to the majority party leadership office in the US House. If there is no cross-partisan consensus on an issue, a vote is taken, with the votes weighted according to the size of the groups. No group has an absolute majority with which to control these outcomes and turn the Conference of Presidents into an instrument of partisan agenda control (Corbett et al. 2007).

Although the transnational party groups of the EP do not control the legislative arena and cannot keep issues off the floor via a partisan leadership office, they do control important assets within the EP such as committee positions, rapporteurships for writing legislative reports, and plenary speaking time in much the same way as the US majority party does. The allocation of these offices in the legislature can be used to enforce the party line. Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) show that rapporteur allocation is largely proportional to the size of the EP party groups, although other concerns such as expertise also matter (Kaeding 2004, 2005; Benedetto 2005). In addition, Hausemer (2006) shows how the most salient reports are allocated to the most loyal MEPs. Lindberg (2008a), however, finds that of the two largest party groups only the European People's Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) group is able to discipline its members for disloyal voting behaviour through denying them access to co-decision rapporteurships. Furthermore, the disciplinary powers of the EPP-ED leadership are limited because it cannot sanction voting defections by the national party delegations which make up the group. Yet, both the EPP-ED and the Party of European Socialists (PES) group appoint rapporteurs with policy preferences close to the median position of their party groups (Lindberg 2008a, 2008b). The underlying reasoning in all these studies is that these linkages provide at least indirect evidence of a party group effect on rapporteur appointment as a tool for disciplining MEPs.

When it comes to the allocation of standing committee seats, an early study by Bowler and Farrell (1995) of the EP third term (1989–1994) found that the share of standing committee places is proportional to both nationality and ideological party blocs. This finding was confirmed in a later study by McElroy (2006). Examining the EP's conciliation delegation, Rasmussen (2008a) has also recently shown that the ideological positions of the delegates are generally in line with the EP party groups. McElroy has also more directly examined whether parties use committee assignments to discipline their members in line with the predictions of US party theory. She shows that less attractive committee seats are allocated to MEPs who vote against the party line (McElroy 2001).

Interestingly, research further shows that not only the transnational party groups, but also the national level actors matter when it comes to allocating assets within the chamber in order to discipline members. Lindberg (2008b) demonstrates that the rapporteur on the Services Directive had showed a higher degree of voting loyalty to her national party delegation than to her transnational party group. Kreppel (2002) also supports the notion that the national party delegations control the allocation of legislative rapporteurship. Hoyland's study of rapporteur appointment (2006b) emphasizes linkage to the national party by showing how the likelihood of being appointed rapporteur is higher for MEPs whose national parties are in government in their home country. Finally, we know from Whittaker's work (2005) that the ideological stance of MEPs on a committee typically conforms to that of their national party delegation, especially on committees with legislative power.

In sum, whereas studies so far have not identified transnational party effects as predicted by the US party theories on legislative organization in the Commission and the Council, we have mixed evidence in the EP. On the one hand, party leadership control of the legislative agenda does not exist in the EP. On the other hand, some studies do find that the leaders of the transnational party groups are able to discipline their members for voting defections, while others highlight the importance of the national party delegations in disciplining MEPs.

Intra-institutional decision-making

Besides, and sometimes related to, the question of legislative organization, scholars have studied the link between national and transnational parties and MEPs, particularly in terms of voting behaviour. With regard to contacts with and influence on the daily work of MEPs, national party delegations are gradually becoming stronger (Raunio 2000, 2002). Scully (2001) shows that the issuing of voting instructions forms a particularly strong bond for MEPS who are often in touch with their national party leaders. Relying on the most recent MEP survey, Rasmussen (2008b) shows that the linkage to transnational parties is significantly stronger compared to national party delegations. We also find evidence of partisan alignments in voting behaviour in the EP. Early work on voting behaviour in this body (Attina 1990; Raunio 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Thomassen et al. 2004) and the most comprehensive and sophisticated work to date by Hix and his collaborators (Hix et al. 2005, 2007; see also Noury 2002; Hix 2002) show that the party political left–right dimension dominates in the EP. Moreover, despite frequent criticism of the lack of strength of the EP party groups, it is shown that they achieve relatively high and rising levels of cohesion.1 That the left–right dimension dominates does not in itself tell us whether it is mainly the transnational or the national parties that act as the principals of the MEPs. Instead, studies of voting defection indicate that when there is a conflict of opinion between the national party delegations and their EP party groups, MEPs tend to follow their national parties (Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 2002). Recent studies have also looked at the conditions under which MEPs follow the view of their national parties (Hix 2004; Faas 2003). An important conclusion from this work is that national electoral systems play a role. Even if it is widely accepted that the electoral connection of the MEPs is weak and does not affect their work in nearly the same way as is commonly held for US legislators, there is still a connection between the MEPs and their national parties. Hence, Hix (2004) has shown that if MEPs are elected under institutions that enable parties to exert a strong control over their appointment (such as closed lists, small district magnitudes and centralized candidate selection), their tendency to follow their national parties is stronger. Also Farrell and Scully's recent work finds links between electoral institutions in the member states and how MEPs perceive their representational role (2003, 2007).

In contrast to the EP, we know little about partisan alignments in intra-institutional decision-making in the Council and the Commission. In the Council, the empirical evidence with regard to voting behaviour is mixed and it is too early for any definitive conclusions. In general, there are no clear patterns as voting behaviour seems to be strongly influenced by factors idiosyncratic to individual proposals (Thomson et al. 2004: 257; but see Zimmer et al. 2005: 413). A challenge in studying voting behaviour in the Council is that formal voting is even less used in this body than in the EP (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006). The first systematic study of voting records pointed to voting along a north–south cleavage (Mattila and Lane 2001: 45). Studies based on expert surveys also identified a north–south division which can be interpreted as reflecting the different economic interests of member states (Thomson et al. 2004: 254–6; Kaeding and Selck 2005; Zimmer et al. 2005). More comprehensive studies of voting records, however, also show a partisan pattern in Council decision-making (Mattila 2004; Aspinwall 2007: 105; Hagemann 2007: 290; Hagemann and Hoyland 2008). There is also some evidence that policy-making is influenced by sectoral interests, with ministers deviating from the general (governmental or national) position on an issue (Franchino and Rahming 2003). With regard to the European Council, which acts as the final arbiter of legislative disputes in the Council, Tallberg and Johansson's study (2008) concludes that the conditions for partisan coalition formation in this body are demanding. Only a small fraction of the agenda of this body is salient along the left–right dimension, it is rare that there is a dominant number of heads of government from a particular party family with coherent views, and the party federations are relatively weak when it comes to mobilizing and disciplining ‘their’ heads of government.

Nor do we have clear evidence of partisan alignments in intra-institutional decision-making in the Commission. Egeberg (2006) has made the first examination of intra-institutional decision-making within this body by examining which of a set of role expectations created by the environment dominates the behaviour of the Commissioners. His theoretical conclusion is that the role of the Commissioner is mainly dictated by the nature of his portfolio, but that it is also affected by his country and party, although the latter is the least visible. Wonka (2008a, 2008b) has conducted the most detailed empirical studies of intra-institutional Commission decision-making to date based on a series of case studies. He tests four scenarios of Commission decision-making which are distinguished by the factors that are expected to influence the preferences of the Commissioners when deciding with which of their colleagues to co-operate. His cases show evidence of sectoral and national patterns of decision-making, whereas he cannot detect any clear national or transnational party effects. In sum, whereas intra-institutional decision-making shows a clear partisan pattern in the EP in line with other parliamentary systems and the US Congress, the picture in the Council and the Commission is much more blurred and leaves much scope for future research.

Inter-institutional decision-making

The last aspect of the legislative arena is inter-institutional decision-making. The question is whether political parties provide a co-ordination mechanism between the different EU institutions similar to the way they link decision-making between different legislative and executive bodies in the national context. Very little EU research focuses on this aspect, not least because of the tendency in the early literature on legislative politics to regard the institutions as unitary actors (Hörl et al. 2005). However, two recent studies examine the effect of partisan linkages between the EP and the Council in the co-decision procedure (Hoyland 2006a; Rasmussen 2008c). The logic in both accounts is that partisan ties might reduce bargaining uncertainty between the co-legislators. Hoyland's study covering all the proposals initiated between 1999 and the end of 2002 shows that conclusion takes place earlier if the EP rapporteur comes from a national party in government. His argument is that such a rapporteur will have better access to information about the Council. Rasmussen's study covering all the cases that had their first reading between May 1999 and the end of April 2004 cannot confirm Hoyland's finding. Instead, she shows that another type of partisan link can help to explain whether conclusion takes place early. In cases in which the EP rapporteur and the Council Presidency belong to the same party family, the chance of concluding early in the legislative process is increased. Thus, her study provides some preliminary evidence of the ability of transnational parties to act as a co-ordination mechanism reducing the transactions costs of bargaining in inter-institutional decision-making.

5. CONCLUSION

Political parties feature prominently in the legislative politics of the EU member states. They act as a ‘transmission belt’ between citizens and legislators, facilitating accountability and responsiveness. In the parliamentary systems of the EU member states, political parties are crucial at all stages of the making of public policy. In the electoral arena, citizens vote along partisan lines. In the legislative arena, parliamentarians vote for a cabinet and legislative proposals along partisan lines. Finally, ministers act along partisan lines. If voters are dissatisfied with the performance of the legislators from a given party, they can ‘throw the rascals out’.

The role of political parties is much less apparent in the EU. Indeed, many scholars doubt that political parties can play a role in the EU because of the weak electoral connection between citizens and European legislators. Owing to the second-order nature of European elections, there are few incentives to form powerful transnational parties. Furthermore, in the legislative arena there is no clear majority party which can push a distinct partisan agenda, and no executive which can enforce party unity via a vote of confidence. Accordingly, scholars have turned to the literature on partisan influence in the US separation-of-powers system. These theories show that there are incentives to form (transnational) party structures in the legislative arena to lower transaction costs and overcome internal collective action problems. Some of these incentives apply to legislators who are not (primarily) concerned with their re-election.

Building on these theories, an empirical literature on the role of national and transnational political parties in the EU legislative institutions has emerged, focusing in particular on the EP. In the electoral arena, national parties affect the selection of the members of the European Commission, the Council and the EP. Transnational parties do not play a role in the Council and the EP and have only limited powers when it comes to the selection of the Commission. In the legislative arena, the evidence is less clear-cut. Party politics is generally most prominent in the EP and least visible in the Commission. Parties can exercise influence via the organization of a legislative body by controlling the distribution of valuable offices inside the legislature or by issuing voting mandates. In all three institutions, the legislative organization does not reflect the interests of parties to the degree predicted by US theories of partisan influence. In particular, even in the EP there is no partisan leadership office which can prevent divisive votes. In addition, in the Commission and Council the internal spoils of office cannot be used as a partisan sanctioning mechanism by transnational parties. In contrast, in the EP, allegiance to the transnational party does play a role in the distribution of rapporteurships and committee memberships. However, MEPs are torn between their loyalty towards the national party, which is important for their future careers, and the transnational party group, which can be instrumental for their policy goals. Further research is needed to clarify under which conditions which one of these partisan bonds dominates. In contrast to the Commission and the Council, there is also strong evidence of a partisan voting pattern in the Parliament. It is difficult to establish, however, whether this is because of the influence of the national party delegations or the transnational party groups (or because of individual preferences). Some studies of voting behaviour and preferences in the Council have also identified a left–right pattern whereas there is no evidence of a partisan effect in the Commission. It is too early, however, to draw any definitive conclusions given the limited empirical evidence scrutinized so far. This is also true for the question of a partisan effect on inter-institutional decision-making. The few existing studies point to a partisan effect in lowering the transaction costs of bargaining, which leads to a faster resolution of the legislative process.

In sum, both national and transnational parties are always present, often active, and sometimes influential in EU legislative decision-making. Partisan politics exists at the European level, but it is not partisan politics as usual. Owing to the missing electoral connection and the mixed evidence on partisan influence in the intra- and inter-institutional decision-making processes, it is too early to claim that political parties at the European level can act as transmission belts of voters' preferences and ensure the accountability of European decision-makers. Moving beyond the question of the ‘nature of the beast’ of the EU, studies of the legislative process have shown that political parties do play a role at the European level. By distinguishing clearly between the various partisan actors (national parties, transnational party groups, transnational party federations) studies on the micro-foundations of legislative decision-making can provide crucial insights into the role of political parties in the EU and the possibilities for representative democracy familiar from the national level in the future.

Notes

For a critical view on the usefulness of an analysis of roll-call votes, see Carruba et al. (2006) and Ringe (2005). Hoyland (2006c) and McElroy and Benoit (2006) provide evidence for the conclusion of a left–right voting pattern.