Free to trade? Commission autonomy in the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations

Abstract

In this article, we suggest that the degree of (dis)unity – both between the member states (MS) in the Council and within the Commission – is a key factor in affecting the balance between Commission autonomy and MS control in international trade negotiations. We shed empirical light on this issue, and on the relative influence of MS and the Commission in general, through a case study of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. We suggest that the differing preferences and priorities among MS and the relative cohesiveness of the Commission provided the Commission with quite a high degree of autonomy during all phases of the EPA negotiations. The informational and procedural advantages given by its institutional position as sole negotiator also contributed to the significant autonomy of the Commission.

Keywords:

• ACP countries
• cohesiveness
• Commission autonomy
• EPA negotiations
• member state control
• trade negotiations

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The first author would like to express his gratitude to the Swedish Tercentennial Bank Foundation for financial support.

Notes

Many of the scholars who analyse the Commission–Council relationship use a principal–agent approach, as witnessed by their terminology. Although not using it explicitly, this article contributes to the principal–agent approach. We argue that a focus on Council and Commission (dis)unity further increases the understanding of the arguments for agent autonomy and principal control respectively.

Under EBA (Everything But Arms) all imports from the least developed countries to the EU are duty and quota free, with the exception of armament.