Target-group influence and political feasibility: the case of climate policy design in Europe

Abstract

Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council.

Keywords:

• Political feasibility
• EU climate policy
• EU ETS
• target group influence

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge very useful comments to earlier drafts from Gunnar Eskeland, Jon Hovi and Lynn Nygaard, as well as the editor and three anonymous reviewers of JEPP. Lynn Nygaard also provided greatly appreciated help with copy-editing. The research was funded by the European Commission FP6 project ‘Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy’ (ADAM) and the ICEPS project (‘Impacts of Climate and Energy Policies on the Electricity Sector’) under the RENERGI research programme of the Research Council of Norway.

Notes

For a broader discussion of the role of interest groups in EU public policy see, for example, West European Politics 6 (2008).

Emissions trading should be seen as an alternative to the carbon/energy tax proposed by the Commission in 1990. For further analysis of the tax proposal, see Ikwue and Skea (1996), and of the early phases of the EU ETS, see Markussen and Svendsen (2005) and European Union (2009).

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review_en.htm (accessed 19 May 2009).

Most of these position papers are available online at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/list_review.htm (accessed 18 May 2009).

See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/list_review.htm (accessed 01 March 2008).

It should be noted, however, that the number of respondents to the survey from these sectors was very low.

Member states that rely on a single fossil fuel for more than 30 per cent of their electricity generation or are insufficiently connected to the European electricity network are eligible for this derogation (European Union 2009: 49; see also Council of European Union 2009: 3).

We thank Jon Birger Skjærseth for drawing our attention to this aspect of the agreement.