Spillover in a soft policy era? Evidence from the Open Method of Co-ordination in education and training

Abstract

In this paper we re-examine early neofunctionalist concepts of spillover, spill-around and build-up, and apply them to the case of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in education and training policy. We show that even an EU at ‘the end of integration’ can bind its Member States more closely together over time. In this way, we add to recent analyses of unanticipated spillover in ‘hard’ policies by showing that such can be the outcome of ‘soft’ policies too, and set out a hypothesis to guide future investigations.

Keywords:

• Open Method of Co-ordination
• education and training policy
• spillover

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors thank the three anonymous referees for their supportive and helpful comments.

Notes

One of the authors undertook participatory observation in OMC processes regarding E&T policy between November 2004 and December 2007. The paper also draws on 22 semi-structured interviews with a range of EU, national and civil society actors carried out between November 2007 and August 2008. Unless otherwise stated, we report here the general view of the interviewees, triangulated against both each other and, where possible, primary documentation.

Several scholars re-examined spillover in the light of the Single European Act. See, for example, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), and for a counter-argument Moravcsik (1991).

Two further notes of caution should be sounded regarding the novelty of these forms of governance. To some extent they are part of a broader, international shift towards less hierarchical, command-and-control forms of government, and must thus be considered in the context of the Zeitgeist (Scott and Trubek 2002). Furthermore, some of these ‘new governance tools’ share significant similarities with the previous modus operandi in the EU, and can coexist with it (Laffan and Shaw 2006).

Presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm (accessed 17 February 2010).

In what follows, we draw primarily on the evidence gathered in our interviews. Unless otherwise stated, views are those of the majority of interviewees, triangulated against each other and, where possible, with primary documentation.

For an overview of the historical development of European E&T policy, see Ertl (2006), Hingel (2001) or Pépin (2007).

Presidency conclusions Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000 Council, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm (accessed 17 February 2010).

Ibid.

Our use of the term ‘joint problem-solving’ is one used by our interviewees, and not a conceptual term as such. It denotes such actors' views that the injunction in the Lisbon Process that Member States should produce joint objectives, not solely national ones, was a crucial catalyst as this engendered a sense of shared responsibility for these objectives (Hingel 2007; Thiele 2008). This belief has been fostered through various means, such as the peer-learning activities in which representatives visit each other's states to exchange ideas on good practice; over time, participants have come not only to know each other, but also to value the process, re-evaluating their national systems and policies in this light (Aribaud 2007; Kreiml 2007; Teutsch 2007).

Interviewees agreed that the Commission's role had been essential in this regard. Formally, the Commission is merely a facilitator of the process, but in practice it has become something of an agenda-setter in E&T policy, ensuring that momentum is maintained and generating a workable set of structures for the participants to use. Interviewees also felt that the Commission used its powers of both oversight (it is the only actor with a full overview of the process) and the purse (it has instruments such as the European Social Fund which it can use to fund – or not fund – activities related inter alia to E&T policy) successfully to gain leverage over other actors when this is considered necessary. See in particular Aribaud (2007), Crowley (2007), Teutsch (2007) and van der Pas (2007).

This comment reflects the experience of one of the authors through his participation in the process. It was also reported in interviews with social partner organizations.

This confirms the findings of Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006).

A further example is the content of national schools curricula, which in some cases – i.e. in those Member States which did not previously make this commitment – were amended to express a set of shared ‘key competences’ and, inter alia, to include obligatory education in the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’.

For an overview of the policy outputs, see European Commission (2008a), or http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/doc36_en.htm (accessed 17 February 2010).

It is interesting that none of our interviewees considered the Bologna Process to have been influential regarding EU co-operation in E&T policy. Indirectly, it may well have helped foster a culture of working together rather than in national isolation on issues related to E&T policies; however, the intergovernmental nature of the Bologna Process, and its sole focus on higher education, rather than the range of issues treated as ‘E&T’ in the EU context, which range from pre-schooling to adult education, meant that interviewees considered it less influential for their own work in EU E&T policy than the work of the OECD in the same policy fields.

See http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/coordination/coordination02_en.htm