EXPERIMENTS IN SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS A LABORATORY

Abstract

Classical international organizations are formally governed by ministers who have their primary institutional affiliation at the national level. The European Commission, on the other hand, represents a notable organizational innovation in the way that executive politicians at the top, i.e., the commissioners, have their primary institutional affiliation at the international level. Thus, the Commission constitutes a ‘laboratory’ for experiments in supranational institution-building: what is the relative importance of nationality and organizational position with regard to explaining actual decision behaviour? This article takes stock of the existing literature in the field, and also launches a future research agenda. Concerning Commission officials, nationality seems to play a minor role. Nationality matters somewhat more regarding commissioners' behaviour, but makes up only one of several components of their highly compound role, thus making behaviour at the top of the Commission qualitatively different from behaviour in, for example, the European Council.

Keywords:

• Decision behaviour
• European Commission
• nationality
• organizational position
• organization structure
• supranationality

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Berthold Rittberger, Jarle Trondal and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Thanks also to Johan P. Olsen, who made me aware of the insightful piece written by Saint-Simon (1760–1825).