The power of functionalist extension: how EU rules travel

ABSTRACT

This contribution proposes a decentred conceptualization of European Union (EU) international influence based on the external ramifications of its internal policies. It views the EU's international role less as that of an emerging unitary actor than as conglomerate of loosely coupled sectoral regimes expanding their prescriptive scope towards third countries in differentiated ways. Combining conceptual approaches to (EU) power with empirical–analytical research on external governance and policy diffusion, the contribution defines the mechanisms of regulatory extension, specifies their scope conditions, and highlights the role of transgovernmental networks, often involving international organizations, in ‘co-opting’ third country regulators into EU policies.

KEY WORDS:

• EU external relations
• functionalism
• global governance
• policy diffusion
• regulation
• transgovernmentalism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For helpful comments on earlier versions of the contribution, I would like to thank Joachim Blatter, Chad Damro, Thomas Diez, Tina Freyburg, Adrienne Héritier, Adrian Hyde-Price, Ivo Krizic, Kalypso Nicolaϊdis, Frank Schimmelfennig, Philippe Schmitter and Jonathan Zeitlin, as well as the two external reviewers.

Notes

1 The literature on the EU as an empire or imperial power addresses similar questions from a different angle. Owing to space restrictions, this contribution cannot address it.

2 Compared to the external governance approach developed by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009), the notion of functionalist extension conceptualizes further the non-hierarchical, sectoral patterns of rule projection, including direct technocratic/transgovernmental outreach and indirect socio-economic interdependence.

3 The case of Switzerland is illustrative of the tension between decentred functionalist integration ‘from below’ through the conclusion of delimited bilateral sectoral agreements which exclude juridical control and EU endeavours to embed these sectoral relations into a more hierarchical framework.

4 From this perspective, the major ‘handicap’ of the ENP is less the absence of coercion than the lack of technocratic and transnational dynamics spurring approximation on the basis of functional interdependence. For a similar argument on the Union for the Mediterranean, see Gillespie (2011).

5 http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29grpe/grpedoc_2013.html (accessed 3 February 2014).

6 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2012/wp29grpe/GRPE-63-13e.pdf (accessed 3 February 2014).

7 http://echa.europa.eu/about-us/who-we-are/mission (accessed 3 February 2014).

8 The existence of a shared professional ethos sustaining regulatory approximation was imminent in numerous interviews conducted by the author with third country regulators participating in EU-sponsored transgovernmental networks.

9 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/relations_china_en.htm (accessed 3 February 2014).

10 http://www.ecegp.com/index_en.asp (accessed 3 February 2014).

Additional information

Biographical note

Sandra Lavenex is Professor of International Politics at the University of Lucerne.