Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation

ABSTRACT

The literature on power dispersion in the regulatory state emphasizes the interdependence of regulatory agencies. However, this may conflict with their independence and specialization. Given this potential conflict, what provisions exist to facilitate co-ordination? And do these reflect national administrative traditions? This study explores these questions in the context of the formalization of co-ordination in economic regulation. First, we develop a new analytical framework for the analysis of co-ordination. Second, we set out how national administrative traditions may affect the formalization of co-ordination. Third, we explore the variation in co-ordination by analysing the formal relations among regulators in four countries with distinct administrative traditions – Germany, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). Our findings suggest that the variation may at least partially be traced back to the independence of agencies. They also stress the importance of competition authorities as focal organizations in shaping relations in the area of economic regulation.

KEYWORDS:

• Administrative traditions
• co-ordination
• power dispersion
• regulation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Previous versions of this contribution were presented at the workshop ‘Coping with Power Dispersion?’, held at the University of Copenhagen's Centre for European Politics in December 2012, and at the PSA Conference 2013 in Cardiff. We would like to thank the participants at these occasions as well as the anonymous reviewers and Scott James for their useful comments.

Notes

1 The term ‘consultation’ is used here in a broad sense to refer to various procedures in which the other organization is asked for its opinion. In some cases, the agency may be asked only for advice, while in other cases, the agency may be able to veto a decision, procedure or policy rule.

2 A fourth network regulator – an independent transport regulator (Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti) – was, at the time of writing, in the process of being created (autumn 2013).

3 The Competition Commission is excluded as it cannot start inquiries on its own. It represents a different part of the ‘regulatory chain’ without jurisdictional overlap.

Additional information

Biographical notes:

Christel Koop is Lecturer in Political Economy in the Department of Political Economy, King's College London.

Martin Lodge is Professor in Political Science and Public Policy in the Department of Government and the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science.