STAGGERED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: DESIGN AND EFFECTS

ABSTRACT

This article highlights the importance of staggered membership renewal in political institutions and draws attention to its policy effects. Staggering exists when the terms of elected or appointed members of an institution do not coincide. Instead, partial renewal of membership is the norm, leading to overlapping terms of office and the co-existence of two or more ‘classes' of members whose mandates differ in remaining length. The article first reviews the limited existing scholarship on staggering, which tends to associate staggered membership with extended time horizons and policy stability. Using upper parliamentary chambers as an illustrative example, the discussion challenges this received wisdom and emphasizes the possibility of the multiplication of cycles within staggered institutions. The article points out that paying systematic attention to staggering promises to enhance our understanding of both majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions and their effects in the governance of the European Union.

KEY WORDS:

• European Union
• institutional design
• second chambers
• staggered terms
• time horizons

ORCID

David M. Willumsen http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2191-1765

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article arises out of a research project on ‘Staggered Membership Renewal and Differential Time Horizons in Second Chambers' (for details see http://www.politicaltime.eu). We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the German Research Foundation – DFG. We are indebted to the anonymous referees and the editors for their very constructive comments on previous versions of our article.

Additional information

Biographical notes

David Willumsen is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Munich.

Klaus Goetz is professor of political science at the University of Munich.