The European Union as a global regulator? Context and comparison

ABSTRACT

The European Union's (EU's) regulations affect how business is conducted and consumers and the environment protected in parts of the world far beyond its borders. Moreover, the external impact of its regulations informs understandings of the EU as a global actor. This contribution makes three main arguments. First, the EU's regulatory influence varies systematically across different forms of regulatory interaction: regulatory competition and different forms of regulatory co-operation. The form of regulatory interaction, therefore, is a critical intervening variable between the EU's regulatory power resources and its influence. Second, within the different forms of regulatory co-operation the EU's influence varies in line with expectations derived from the literature. But, third, the magnitude of the EU's influence seems to be considerably less in regulatory co-operation than suggested by the literature on regulatory competition; a finding that reinforces the first argument. The contribution also introduces the rest of the special issue, identifying three overarching conclusions: the utility of the EU's regulatory power resources is context specific; debates about what kind of power the EU is, at least as previously conceived, are unproductive; and that the EU's engagement in the world is better explained through general theories of international political economy.

KEY WORDS:

• European Union
• influence
• regulatory competition
• regulatory co-operation
• regulatory power

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This contribution is part of a wider project that has been funded with support from the European Commission (Jean Monnet Chair 2012-3121). It reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein. Earlier versions of this contribution were presented at the ‘Regulatory Power Europe? Assessing the EU's Efforts to Shape Global Rules' Jean Monnet Chair Workshop, Georgia Institute of Technology, 18–19 April 2014, and the 14th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, 5–7 March 2015. I am grateful Vicki Birchfield, Chad Damro, Robert Kissack, Sandra Lavenex, Abraham Newman, Elliot Posner, Jamal Shahin, Mike Smith, Kazuto Suzuki and two anonymous referees for their comments. I assert sole ownership of all errors and omissions.

Notes

1 There are two partial exceptions. Both Drezner (2007) and Müller and Falkner (2014) consider a wide range of policies that fall within different forms of regulatory interaction. In neither case, however, is the focus explicitly on influence. Drezner analyses the likelihood of regulatory co-ordination, with an emphasis on the degree of great power agreement. In addition, he does not explicitly consider the relevance of different contexts on the interaction among the great powers. Müller and Falkner's (2014: 6) main concern is the form of interaction and whether the EU has tended to export, import or protect its rules. There is a very limited focus on explaining the observed variation (Falkner and Müller 2014: 223–4).

2 Simmons (2001: 598–9) distinguishes between ‘market’ and ‘political’ mechanisms. Bütte and Mattli (2011: 19) distinguish between ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ mechanisms. Koenig-Archibugi (2010: 408), Lazer (2006: 456) and Holzinger et al. (2008: 556) draw tri-partite distinctions, but these include one co-operative mechanism and two policy diffusion mechanisms. Müller and Falkner (2014: 8) identify four mechanisms: ‘bargaining’ (co-operation) and three forms of diffusion.

Additional information

Biographical note

Alasdair Young is professor of international affairs and Jean Monnet Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. He is also chair of the European Union Studies Association (2015–17).