ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) has been hit by financial and economic crises since 2008. To shed light upon the impact of these crises, this article reviews punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) to develop expectations that are tested against two cases of financial regulation and privatization policy. In one, despite the demand for a new model from EU leaders, limited change occurred; in the other, despite legal limitations, significant change emerged. Analysis of the cases reveals a new form of policy venue, and the suggestion that the EU PET literature must consider more systematically and explicitly the role of veto players in shaping policy change.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the editors and the reviewers for their perceptive comments on an early draft. We also wish to thank the participants of the Conference: Governing Finances in Europe: Shifting Regimes and Shifting Powers, 27–28 May 2016, Uppsala University, where an early draft of this article was presented. This article was revised while Lucia Quaglia was a research fellow at the BIGSSS (University of Bremen) and the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg (HWK). Finally thank you to Neil Carter who read the article more than once and offered invaluable advice.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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Charlotte Burns
Charlotte Burns is a senior lecturer in environmental politics and policy at the University of York.
Judith Clifton
Judith Clifton is a professor of economics at the University of Cantabria.
Lucia Quaglia
Lucia Quaglia is a professor of political science at the University of York.