ABSTRACT
The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton’s political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Paolo Graziano is professor of Political Science at the University of Padua.
Miriam Hartlapp is professor of Comparative Politics: France and Germany at the Freie Universität Berlin.
ORCID
Miriam Hartlapp http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2696-2748
Notes
1. We are aware that rather than setting public opinion and demand equal, the former is shaping the latter (cf. Easton Citation1965: 42).
2. We note that changes in governments’ composition across Europe are closely connected, but we find it difficult to integrate them as inputs to our scheme for analytical reasons. Rather national governments act in the EU political system via the Council.
3. The codes covered are freedom of movement for workers (05.10), general social provisions (05.20.05), European Social Fund (ESF, 05.20.10), working conditions (05.20.20), employment and unemployment (05.20.30), social security (05.20.40), approximation of certain social provisions (05.20.50), insurance related to the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (06.20.20.10), social conditions of transport policy (07.20.40.20), health protection (15.30), and European citizenship (20.20).
5. We are aware that variation across national parties is substantial, even within party families, but think that party political orientation of Commissioners can nevertheless bears insights.
6. We thus exclude the last two years since on average it takes two years to adopt an EU act in the inter-institutional process).