Regulating European Union lobbying: in whose interest?

ABSTRACT

Designing a regime regulating supranational lobbying is a contentious topic in the EU interinstitutional dialogue. Recently, the Commission drafted a proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register, and during this formulation process it consulted broadly with stakeholders. A key question is to which stakeholders has the Commission aligned itself with when designing this proposal? I argue the Commission acted as a legitimacy maximizer aiming to bolster its leverage in interinstitutional negotiations. To enhance input legitimacy, it had to build a reputation for being a responsive and representative policy initiator. To enhance output legitimacy, it needed a reputation for being a competent regulator. The analyses show the Commission prioritized input over output legitimacy and building a reputation for regulating lobbying in line with preferences of stakeholders representing the public interest. In politicized contexts, the Commission trades long-standing policy networks for a realignment with stakeholders that serve its legitimacy needs.

KEYWORDS:

• European Commission
• bureaucratic reputation
• interinstitutional agreements
• input and output legitimacy
• lobbying regulation
• policy networks

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Raimondas Ibenskas, Christel Koop, Anne Rasmussen, Christine Reh, Thomas Winzen and the anonymous referees for their excellent feedback and comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Adriana Bunea is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at University of Southampton, Department of Politics and IR. Address for correspondence: University of Southampton, Highfield Campus, SO171 BJ, Southampton, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]

ORCID

Adriana Bunea http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2348-9676

Notes

1 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/06/transparency-register-council-agrees-mandate-for-negotiations/ (Accessed: June 26th, 2018).

2 Preference attainment/lobbying success is however not the analytical focus of this study. No assumption or theoretical argument is made about stakeholders’ attempts to influence the Commission proposal.

3 However, despite its (relatively) more ambitious rhetoric asking for a mandatory TR, the EP has never introduced a register recording the meetings between interest groups and MEPs or their staff members, nor has it ever adopted more stringent rules regulating lobbying activities within its premises or involving its elected members. Cini (2013) discusses this nuanced EP position on lobbying regulation across time and political groupings.

4 http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=en&reference=KEY_DATES (Accessed July 23rd 2018).

5 http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do;TRPUBLICID-prod=XLrIFK2e8eQ3n08kboM_bLNouSHZaMnJCVdyPW_qAoLCIf9XAB7t!-158032683?locale=en&reference=KEY_DATES (Accessed July 23rd 2018).

6 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (2014) (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf. Accessed July 9th, 2018).

7 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0627

8 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3181_en.htm

9 For a detailed description of the consultation see Bunea (2018).