Inter-institutional cooperation and intergroup unity in the shadow of veto: the construction of the EP’s institutional role in the Brexit negotiations

ABSTRACT

From its initially limited role under Article 50 in the withdrawal negotiations, the EP has constructed a central role for itself in the process. How was the EP able to shape the rules to its advantage? As instruments to enhance its own role, the EP combined the unconcealed brandishing of its veto threat with the promotion of strong internal unity and supporting the Commission’s role as central negotiator. The EP was able to exploit interpretative ambiguities in the incomplete contract which is the EU Lisbon Treaty to reinforce its institutional position.

KEYWORDS:

• Article 50
• Brexit
• European Parliament
• EP empowerment
• withdrawal from the EU

Acknowledgements

I have presented earlier versions at the ECPR General Conferences in Oslo, Norway (6–9 September 2017) and Hamburg (21–25 August 2018) and the ECPR EUSG in Paris (13–15 June 2018). I am grateful for the comments from Adrienne Héritier, Katharine Meissner, Magnus Schoeller, Johannes Pollak and Daniela Vintila to an earlier version of this draft. I also thank three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Minutes CoP 7 July 2016.

2 Minutes 29 September 2016 PV CPG 29.09.2016; PE-8/CPG/PV/2017-16.

3 Lane, 10.

4 Minutes 8 September 2016. Interviewees also added his Europeanism (Jáuregui, 1), knowledge of EU negotiations (Jáuregui, 1 Bresso, 3), belonging to a smaller group (Lane 6), and tactical considerations linked to his ALDE alignment in the forthcoming EP President elections (Teasdale 18 and 19).

5 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20161214+ITEM-007+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

6 Grave consequences if Parliament is all but excluded from EU Brexit talks [14 December 2016 Press release http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161214IPR56183/grave-consequences-if-parliament-is-all-but-excluded-from-eu-brexit-talks.

7 Statement after the informal meeting of the 27 heads of state or government, 15 December 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/15-statement-informal-meeting-27/.

8 See the CoP Minutes 20 October 2016, PV CPG 20.10.2016 PE 590.308/CPG PE-8/CPG/PV/2016-19. The EP recalled that its approval of the withdrawal agreement is required. 5 April 2017 Resolution (point 4) extended the threat of veto also to the future agreement governing relations between the EU and the UK, as well as any eventual transitional agreement.

9 Corbett; 2, 16; Lane, 23; Jauregui; 13; Bresso, 7,10, 14 and 18; Javelle, 5,6, 31, 47; Riekeles; 14,20,21; Smith; 2; Teasdale; 3; Evison 3 and 6; Pescher, 17,18 and 20.

10 McLaughlin, 13; Evison, 14.

11 Teasdale, 6, 41 and 19.

12 Corbett, 6; McLaughlin 33; Evison 26.

13 Zimmer, 15.

14 Teasdale, 15.

15 Lane 3 and 4; Evison, 10; Zimmer, 12.

16 MEPs tell Britain: Without us, no deal Politico Maïa De La Baume | 4/5/17.

17 Javelle, 29, 30; Lane 16.

18 McLaughlin 38; Bresso, 5; Javelle, 14, Smith 11.

19 Corbett; 7 and 10; McLaughlin 9, 10, 40; Lane; 17; Jauregui 7 and 8; Javelle; 12; Smith 12 and 15 and Zimmer; 7.

20 Javelle, 1, 11; Riekeles, 4; Evison, 7.

21 McLaughlin; 12 and 19; Smith, 13 and 14; Teasdale; 20,21 and 22; Evison; 19 and 20.

22 Javelle; 49; Evison 21; Pescher; 6.

23 Lane 18; Javelle; 27 and 28.

24 Corbett, 12; McLaughlin 20.

25 McLaughlin, 14, 16; Smith, 16; Evison 17.

26 Corbett; 12; McLaughlin; 20.

27 Jáuregui, 11, Bresso, 2.

28 McLaughlin, 21, Pescher, 21 Jáuregui, 16,17, 18.

29 Pescher, 1,2,3, 4; Lane 32.

30 I am grateful to one reviewer for summarising these findings.

31 Brussels power struggle over Brexit negotiations Ryan Heath and Florian Eder Politico 6/28/16 http://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-power-struggle-over-brexit-negotiations/.

32 See CoP minutes 24 and 30 June, 29 September and 23 and 30 November (PV CPG 24.06.2016 -PE583.273/CPG.; PV CPG 30.06.2016- PE 583.260/CPG EN PE-8/CPG/PV/2016-13; PV CPG 29.09.2016 PE-8/CPG/PV/2017-16 and PV CPG 30.11.2016-PE 590.500/CPG-PE-8/CPG/PV/2016-05).

33 Minutes 30 November 2016.

34 Corbett, 3, 14, 15; Javelle; 19, 20; Teasdale; 20, 27; Riekeles 9, 13, 23, 24 and 25.

35 Bresso, 6, 8; Teasdale; 25; Zimmer, 6 and 9; McLaughlin 18; Riekeles; 20.

36 Smith; 22; Evison, 7 and 11; Pescher, 12 and 13.

37 Lane, 36, 37; Jauregui; 115; Bresso, 17; Javelle; 36 and 37.

38 Javelle; 33, 34; Riekeles; 10 and 15.

39 Speech of the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz at the European Council of 15 December 2016.

40 Speech by Michel Barnier at the European Economic and Social Committee Brussels, 6 July 2017 SPEECH/17/1922.

Additional information

Funding

This paper is part of the project Institutional design in comparative regional integration (InDeCRI) (CSO2016-76130-P) https://www.researchgate.net/project/Institutional-Design-in-Comparative-Regional-Integration-InDeCRI supported by a grant from the Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI).

Notes on contributors

Carlos Closa

Carlos Closa is Professor at the Institute for Public Goods and Policies (IPP), Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) and faculty member at the School of Transnational Governance (STG) at the European University Institute (EUI).