ABSTRACT
Since 2014 the (relatively) calm waters of the EU’s trade policy have been roiled by wide-spread popular opposition to the EU’s trade negotiations with the United States and Canada and the apparent spread of anti-globalization populism. The Commission’s ‘balanced and progressive’ trade strategy is a response to these developments. This article assesses whether the response is adequate. It concludes that the strategy is unlikely to address the identified problem, because it largely reflects continuity with past practices that did not prevent or resolve the politicization of trade policy. It also concludes that the Commission’s assessment of the politicization of trade policy is exaggerated. Thus, two wrongs may have produced the ‘right’ policy, at least in the narrow sense that EU trade policy is unlikely to be as politically fraught in future.
Acknowledgements
Meghan Lowther provided valuable research assistance. Versions of this article were presented at the ‘Jean Monnet Fellowship Programme @ 25’ Alumni Conference, European University Institute, June 2017; the Council of European Studies 24th International Conference of Europeanists, University of Glasgow, July 2017; and the ‘European Union Trade Policy in the 21st Century International Research Conference’, University of Ottawa, March 2018. I am grateful to the participants, particularly Patrick Leblond, Sophie Meunier, and Crina Viju-Miljusevic, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their comments
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Alasdair Young is a professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Notes
1. https://stop-ttip.org/blog/eci-is-closed-signature-gathering-continues/?noredirect=en_GB. Accessed 15 March 2017.
2. https://www.globaltradeday.org. Accessed 5 June 2015.
3. The new, new trade theory (see Kim and Osgood Citation2019) implies that trade liberalization among advanced economies can also adversely affect jobs as more productive firms out compete less productive ones, which means that fewer workers are needed to produce the same volume of goods or services. The implications of TTIP for European employment or wages, however, was not a major reason the European Trade Union Confederation’s opposition to TTIP (ETUC Citation2015), nor did the Commission identify this dynamic as a concern.