The European Union's authoritarian equilibrium

ABSTRACT

While the European Union (EU) professes a commitment to liberal democracy, in recent years it has allowed some member governments to backslide toward competitive authoritarianism. The EU has become trapped in an ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ underpinned by three factors. First, the EU's half-baked system of party politics and its ingrained reluctance to interfere in the domestic politics of its member states help shield national autocrats from EU intervention. Second, funding and investment from the EU helps sustain these regimes. Third, the free movement of persons in the EU facilitates the exit of dissatisfied citizens, which depletes the opposition and generates remittances, thereby helping these regimes endure. While more fully developed democratic federations have the capacity to eventually steer autocratic member states back toward democracy, the EU appears to be stuck in an autocracy trap.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• authoritarianism
• democratic backsliding
• Hungary

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Sanjana Chandra and Philip Olson for their research assistance. Also he thanks the anonymous reviewers and the special issue editors as well as participants in seminars at King's College, Stanford, Harvard, LMU Munich, Johns Hopkins, Princeton and the University of Montréal for their feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

R. Daniel Kelemen is Professor of Political Science and Law at Rutgers University.

Notes

1 See Article 22(1) of Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, 22 October 2014, OJ L 317/1.

2 For instance, the US federal government has used the threat of suspension of federal funding to pressure subnational governments to respect fundamental values such as civil rights laws.

3 Though see Closa (2019) who argues partisanship has not played a role in the Commission.

4 As this article goes to press, the EPP ‘wise men’ committee has yet to issue its report on Fidesz’ membership, but Orbán has already indicated he is considering quitting the EPP and instead joining the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) - the Europarty which is home to Poland’s ruling PiS party. Though protection from the powerful EPP was crucial for Orbán to consolidate his grip on power, at this point even a weaker party like the ECR could provide Orbán’s regime with adequate political protection to sustain the authoritarian equilibrium.

5 A recent New York Times investigation found that the Orbán regime also uses EU agricultural subsidies to support its patronage network and punish rivals (Gebrekidan, Apuzzo, & Novak, 2019).

6 Ninety-six percent (216,561 of 225,471) of the ethnic diaspora Hungarians who voted by mail in the 2018 election voted for Fidesz. Data available from Hungary's National Election Office at https://www.valasztas.hu/levelszavazas-jegyzokonyv.