External democracy promotion in times of internal rule-of-law crisis: the EU and its neighbourhood

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to unpack the implications of the deteriorating rule of law within the EU’s eastern members for the EU’s external democracy promotion. We examine the legitimacy of the EU’s support for democracy in the European neighbourhood in light of the internal EU rule-of-law crisis. Adopting a sociological perspective, we emphasize local perceptions of the EU by tracing the legitimation dynamics at play in neighbouring societies. We adopt a tripartite conception of external legitimacy based on appropriateness, utilitarian consensus, and empathy. Using representative public opinion surveys, we show that the democratic erosion in the eastern EU members has not (yet) negatively impacted the EU’s credibility in supporting democracy in the neighbourhood. The article contributes to the research on the legitimacy of EU foreign policy and the literature on the legitimacy of international organizations. It also contributes to the broader effort at provincializing International Relations and decentring EU foreign policy studies.

KEYWORDS:

• Legitimacy
• EU foreign policy
• perceptions
• decentring
• rule of law
• European neighbourhood

Introduction

Political developments in central and eastern Europe (CEE) in the last decade have raised serious doubts about the sustainability of democratic gains observed in the region after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Democracy indices such as Bertelsmann, Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Nations in Transit, and V-Dem capture a steady erosion of liberal democracy across the countries that acceded to the EU in the early 2000s. Today, talk of an ‘illiberal turn’ is widespread against a deepening authoritarian trend in some of the eastern EU member states, characterized by weakened judicial independence, restrained media freedom, curtailed civil liberties, eroded checks on government and politically divided societies. The EU’s feeble response to the democratic breaches among its own ranks has been seen as equally damaging for the EU’s democratic identity, which is a main legitimation pillar for its democracy support abroad (Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2022; Meunier & Vachudova, 2018). On both accounts, the EU’s internal democracy and rule-of-law crisis is generally thought to undermine the credibility of the EU’s external democracy promotion.

Against these expectations, we find little evidence of deterioration in the EU’s image as a democracy promoter and human rights defender, as seen from the countries in the European neighbourhood (both east and south). The discourse of ‘crisis’ in EU democracy and rule-of-law has not – yet – permeated the discourse of European integration in the neighbourhood and the perceptions of the EU held by neighbourhood societies. In this sense, the East–West divide in the EU, the focus of this Special Issue, has not (yet) negatively impacted the EU’s credibility as a supporter of democracy in the neighbourhood.

We focus on the way in which the populations of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods recognize and perceive the EU in addition to how these perceptions influence the legitimacy of the EU and its ability to act in the area of democracy promotion. We adopt a sociological approach and contribute to a growing body of literature that examines the legitimation and legitimacy foundations of EU foreign policy (Raube & Tonra, 2018; Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018; Wajner & Roniger, 2019). EU external relations have mostly been studied through a Eurocentric lens that regards the European view of the world as universal and more advanced (Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013). In so doing, the scholarship has reinforced Western agency and reproduced Western biases in explaining EU policies vis-à-vis various regions (Sabaratnam, 2013). We heed the call for decentring the analysis of EU foreign policy and its external legitimacy voiced earlier by Lecocq and Keukeleire (2018; 2021). By giving primacy to local perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy, we help bring the neighbourhood regions’ perspectives into the study of EU foreign policy, thus contributing to the broader effort at provincializing IR and decentring EU studies (Alejandro, 2021). We also move the decentring agenda one step further (Fisher Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013) by focusing on the legitimacy of EU actions as seen from the perspective of local populations in the neighbourhood regions. In this way, we attribute a particular role to citizens’ perceptions, further unpacking local agency and giving it importance in addition to the discourses and views of local elites (Chaban & Elgström, 2021a).

We demonstrate that the EU’s role in democracy within the neighbourhood has not visibly suffered from the rule-of-law crisis in the EU. We adopt Wajner’s concept of legitimacy and legitimation dynamics based on a triple lens of appropriateness, utilitarian consensus, and empathy (Wajner, 2019, p. 1039). This approach allows us to uncover similarities and differences in the perceived legitimacy of the EU in both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. It also allows us to reveal the justification dynamics that are active within different societies with respect to socially held views regarding other actors who are external to the community, such as the EU. Our methodology aims at tapping into local legitimacy beliefs of societies. As our focus is on public perceptions in both neighbourhoods, we rely on representative surveys conducted across the eastern and southern neighbourhoods between 2016 and 2022. This method allows us to evaluate the legitimacy of norms and beliefs over time and across nations.

Specifically, we analyzed sub-regional and country-specific results of the recurring EU surveys in its neighbourhood, covering separately, but with similar questions, the ENP East (six Eastern Partnership countries) and the ENP South (ten Maghreb and Mashrek countries); recurring surveys in individual relevant countries by non-profits National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) in the United States (US); the Arab Barometer, recurring public opinion surveys in the Middle East and North Africa conducted by a non-partisan research network; the Arab Transformations Project, an international research project that studied public attitudes and behaviours in selected MENA countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq); the Caucasus Barometer, recurring surveys in South Caucasus (Armenia and Georgia, and Azerbaijan until 2013); as well as surveys run by domestic polling agencies (e.g., the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre in Ukraine) and one-off country surveys (e.g., ZOiS’ survey in Belarus in 2021).

A few general disclaimers are due here. First, given the regional rather than country focus, the usual ‘breadth versus depth’ trade-offs are inevitably at play and at fault. It is our intention to explore the general trends in the eastern and southern neighbourhood, rather than analyze nuances of the dynamics in perceptions in any one country. Second, given the autocratic nature of domestic political regimes, populations of some countries (e.g., Azerbaijan, Belarus, Syria, or Libya) are much less surveyed than populations of others (e.g., Ukraine, Moldova, Jordan, or Morocco). Finally, besides surveys, we used secondary sources from local scholarly and policy literature in both neighbourhoods to contextualize local notions of appropriateness, local considerations of alternative political models, and local sentiments about the rule-of-law issues experienced in both the EU and the neighbourhood.

Following this introduction, the next section discusses the East–West divide in the context of EU integration and EU foreign policy studies. This is followed by a presentation of the analytical framework on the EU’s external legitimacy in the neighbourhood. The subsequent sections analyze empirically the perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy as democracy promoter in both neighbourhoods. The final section concludes with the main findings and lessons.

The East–West divide and EU foreign policy

The literature examining the integration of central and eastern Europe into the EU in the post-accession period has mainly focused on internal dynamics. On the one hand, accession to the EU has strengthened the economic development of CEE countries through capital flows, investments, trade and access to the single market (Medve-Bálint, 2014), while also rendering them dependent on western member states economically and financially (Epstein, 2014; Epstein & Jacoby, 2014; Jacoby, 2014). On the other hand, the eastern enlargement has not done away with the political differences between eastern and western member states. The eastern members continue to lag behind when it comes to democratic standards, liberal values, the rule of law, and fighting corruption. The recent decline of liberal democracy in Hungary and Poland as well as in Bulgaria and Slovenia (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017; Cianetti et al., 2018; Krastev & Holmes, 2019; Krekó & Enyedi, 2018; Vachudova, 2020) has added to the perceived East–West gap in the quality of democracy, regardless of the decline of liberal democracy worldwide (Freedom House, 2021; 2022; Pintsch et al., 2022). In fact, studies show that the quality of liberal democracy has suffered not only in eastern European member states but also in founding members such as France and Germany (Smolka, 2021). The rise of populism and the electoral success of populist parties have had a negative effect on liberal democracies across the EU (both East and West). So despite the ambiguous and essentially discriminatory foundations and connotations of the reasoning behind the perceived East–West divide in some segments of the scholarship, its existence is seen as an obstacle to deeper European integration (Anghel, 2020; Bârgăoanu et al., 2019; Kelemen, 2017; Makszin, 2020; see also other contributions in this Special Issue).

While the scholarship has examined the dynamics within the EU, not much attention has been paid to studying whether and how the East–West divide has manifested itself in the EU’s foreign policy. This is not surprising given that on major foreign policy issues, the eastern member states have simply amplified existing cleavages within the EU (Zielonka, 2020). The EU’s rule-of-law crisis has however been seen as likely having major consequences for the EU’s external legitimacy and has been expected to undermine the EU’s credibility to inspire and demand democratic change beyond its borders (Meunier & Vachudova, 2018). Aside from a study on the rise of populism in the EU and its consequences for external democracy promotion (Pintsch et al., 2022), the literature has shied away from examining closely the effects of internal EU tensions on the EU’s external democracy promotion.

The EU foreign policy literature has itself pondered the question of what makes the EU’s foreign policy legitimate. Scholars have examined both internal sources of legitimacy arising from institutional and procedural mechanisms of the EU’s decision-making system and external sources of legitimacy arising from the EU’s engagement with partners and actors in the international system (Raube & Tonra, 2018). Other scholars have studied the sources of legitimacy as originating from intergovernmentalism and the involvement of EU member states as well as from supranationalism and EU institutions themselves, both contributing to enhancing the legitimacy of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at EU level (Sjursen, 2018, pp. 253–254). Legitimacy, recognition, or acceptance of authority come back as key criteria in various definitions of EU actorness (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). This paper views actorness or the ability and the will to act as crucially dependent on legitimacy in targeted countries, among other factors.

External perceptions of the EU’s policies and practices and how they relate to international legitimacy have been a focus of intense scholarly debate in EU foreign policy studies (Chaban et al., 2018; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009). The perceptual approach to EU external action has linked the study of external perceptions to EU foreign policy effectiveness, showing how the ‘perception gap’ – or the difference between the EU’s self-image and the image of the EU held by others – likely leads to EU policy adaptation (Chaban & Elgström, 2021b; Chaban et al., 2017; Chaban, Elgström, & Knodt, 2019). By attributing considerable weight to outsiders’ perceptions of the EU, the perceptual paradigm equally advances the decentring agenda of EU foreign policy studies as it obliges the EU to pay attention to outsiders’ views (Chaban & Elgström, 2021b). Engaging others and taking non-European perspectives into account (‘engagement’) is a key step in decentring the EU’s democracy support, alongside questioning European assumptions about the supremacy of the EU democratic script (‘provincialization’) and re-imagining the EU’s toolbox for democracy support in light of the legitimate aspirations of local actors (‘reconstruction’) (Fisher-Onar & Nikolaïdis, 2013). Our approach acknowledges the value of non-European contributions to debates about democracy, good governance, and justice and gives voice to local and regional knowledge about legitimate pathways to political change. We therefore propose a closer engagement with the external dimension of the EU’s foreign policy legitimacy, inter alia moving forward the ‘decentring agenda’ in the area of EU democracy support.

Legitimacy and the EU’s rule-of-law crisis

Our approach is rooted in the study of legitimacy and legitimation dynamics in global governance. We adopt a sociological definition of legitimacy, following the organizational sociologist Mark Suchman, who defines the concept as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). While we recognize the normative approach to legitimacy emphasizing the legality, justifiability and recognition of authority of public institutions (Beetham, 1991, 2013), we find the sociological lens particularly suited for the purposes of understanding global legitimation dynamics, because it acknowledges the contextuality of these processes and emphasizes the role of social audiences in judging the rightful exercise of authority (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).

Our analysis, in this sense, focuses on the EU’s attributes and actions as seen by societies in the neighbourhood rather than on EU’s institutional features and policies. In other words, we are not interested in uncovering how the internal rule-of-law crisis in the EU undermines the legitimacy of the EU by violating internal legal norms (illegality), by contesting internal social conventions about democratic governance (non-justifiability), or by eliciting weak reactions to the wrongdoing by other democratic governments within the EU (withdrawal of recognition). By all three accounts of Beetham's (1991; 2013) conceptualization of legitimacy, the EU’s rule-of-law crisis likely qualifies as a major episode of de-legitimation for the EU’s external democracy support policies. Such an analysis, however, is narrowly focused on EU institutions, actions, and processes and cannot capture the transnational nature of the phenomenon at stake. Likewise, conceptions of legitimacy popular in the EU studies literature, such as Scharpf’s notion of input and output legitimacy (1997, 1999), focus primarily on the EU decision-making machinery and the perceived effectiveness of EU policies and as such ‘neglect the specificities of the external contexts at which European foreign policy is directed’ (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2021, p. 301).

Our interest lies instead in understanding how the neighbourhood audiences perceive this internal EU ‘crisis’ from the perspective of their own standards of legitimate political authority and their own collective meaning-making of crisis events. We are interested in moving beyond the Eurocentric focus on internal logics and procedures to zooming in on how the EU is ‘received and reacted to as a foreign policy actor’ (Chaban & Elgström, 2021a, p. 2). We therefore approach legitimacy as a relational quality that is experienced in relation to another actor (Finnemore, 2009; Hurd, 1999) – the EU in this case – and as an intersubjective phenomenon that involves a collectivity based on shared norms, values, beliefs, processes, etc. (Suchman, 1995; Zelditch, 2001). Furthermore, our approach to studying legitimation does not assume that the public is a passive recipient of legitimacy claims by political elites who proclaim the legitimacy of certain ideas and actions by virtue of their position of power (Seabrooke, 2006). On the contrary, collective meaning making at the societal level is prior, and political legitimacy is conferred on claims that can be justified in terms of shared values (Beetham, 1991).

Scholars of international legitimacy have distinguished between the structural dimension of the concept that is related to its embeddedness in a particular social context (Finnemore, 2009) and the agency-based component that is linked to its maintenance or contestation via legitimation or de-legitimation strategies, respectively (Börzel & Zürn, 2021; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Our analysis contributes to understanding the structural condition of legitimacy as it relates to the EU’s authority to promote democracy in the neighbourhood. We have not detected any substantial discursive or behavioural practices on the part of the EU aimed at limiting the damage to or boosting its credibility vis-à-vis the neighbourhood as a result of its internal rule-of-law crisis. Likewise, we have not observed an important contestation discourse or activity on the part of the neighbourhood countries that challenges the EU’s image as a democracy supporter while invoking the practice of democracy in some (eastern) EU member states. Although we recognize that such interaction dynamics are important and may in the future influence perceptions of EU’s legitimacy in the neighbourhood, our assumption is that such intentional efforts have not been a defining feature of the way in which the EU’s rule-of-law crisis has been received in the societies in the neighbourhood.

Our empirical study of legitimacy follows Wajner (2019, p. 1039) by adopting a ‘theoretical framework encompassing the normative, strategic, and emotional dimensions of legitimacy, represented respectively by three mutually constituting legitimation functions—appropriateness, consensus, and empathy’ (see also Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018; Wajner & Roniger, 2019). While Wajner (2019) presents this approach for examining the legitimation strategies that actors adopt in global politics – i.e., the agency-related qualities of the phenomenon – we claim that this tripartite categorization is also appropriate for studying the legitimation mechanisms that are at play within a social group – i.e., the structural elements of the concept. This analytical choice permits us to uncover the justification dynamics that operate within a collectivity with respect to socially held views regarding other actors that are non-members of the community – the EU, in our case. Furthermore, it allows us to trace differences and similarities in the perceived legitimacy of the EU in different societal contexts such as the eastern and the southern neighbourhoods, where the social construction of beliefs, values and standards of appropriateness is expected to be distinct owing to specificities in historical, cultural, religious and political dynamics (Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2022). In other words, we find Wajner’s approach particularly well suited to studying the public perceptions of the EU’s internal rule-of-law crisis, as it enables us to tap into wider societal orientations and views in the neighbourhood through its wholistic lens. It thus serves well our decentring goal of bringing into focus the citizens’ perspective in neighbouring countries, unlike other approaches that cannot transcend convincingly the EU-centredness in the analysis of legitimacy dynamics.

Our conceptual approach examines the legitimacy of EU democracy support in the neighbourhood in light of the internal rule-of-law crisis by tracing consecutively: 1) local perceptions of appropriateness based on judgements about ‘what is proper in a specific situation’; 2) local perceptions of utilitarian consensus based on ‘strategic calculations in light of collective preferences’; and 3) local perceptions of empathy/antipathy based on ‘an observer’s emotional reaction when he/she perceives others experiencing an emotion’ (Wajner, 2019, p. 1039).

The first dimension builds on a long tradition of studying norms in international politics. It is based on the ‘logic of appropriateness’, in which the standard of rightfulness is defined by a collectivity (March & Olsen, 1998). It is the manifestation of normative traditions and background (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) and ‘may reflect learning of some sort from history’ (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 479). This appropriateness is both ‘cognitive’ and ‘normative’ (March, 1995, pp. 30–31) and involves judgements about what is socially acceptable in a specific context (Wajner, 2019, p. 1039). In line with this view, an organization is appreciated by the public because what it does is in harmony with the collectivity’s normative standards (Steffek, 2003, p. 250).

The second dimension assumes rationality of human action and examines legitimacy as deriving from instrumental calculation in the process of collective preference formation (Wajner, 2019, p. 1039; March & Olsen, 1998). It follows the ‘logic of consequences’, which assumes that actors are utility maximizers and make decisions based on cost–benefit calculations (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). It ‘comprises deliberate consideration of alternatives, assessment of their outcomes and preference-driven choices’ (Schulz, 2018). So when (regional) organizations support specific policies, ‘it is precisely this perceived regional consensus that symbolizes to global audiences and actors that endorsing its strategies will guarantee the reduction of the potential costs of action’ (Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018, p. 500).

The third dimension builds on the ‘emotional turn’ in IR and EU foreign policy (Crawford, 2000; Terzi et al., 2021) and zooms in on the role of emotional beliefs in processes of cognition and attitude shaping. An emotional belief can be defined as ‘one where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief and which makes possible a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence’ (Mercer, 2010, p. 2). Recognizing the intersubjective nature of emotions (Clément & Sangar, 2018), the emphasis is on studying the emotional attachments and bonds of a collectivity as well as its emotional detachment and distance with respect to third parties (Lebow, 2005; see also Head, 2012).

By adopting this tripartite distinction of legitimacy, we can identify how the societies in the neighbourhood have made sense of the EU’s internal rule-of-law problems, delving into local evaluations of the gravity of the EU crisis and its impact on democracy’s image (appropriateness), local considerations of alternative models of governance in light of democracy’s crisis (utilitarian consensus) and local emotions of feeling similar or different to the EU countries experiencing rule-of-law issues (empathy/antipathy).

(Non-)Erosion of the EU’s democracy image in the neighbourhood

A series of recurring public opinion surveys conducted in the years 2016–2022 for the ENP East (covering the six Eastern Partnership countries) and the ENP South (survey results disaggregated for the ten Maghreb and Mashrek ENP countries) capture the general dynamic of these populations’ perceptions of the EU precisely during the time period that the rule-of-law crisis was unravelling internally within the Union (EU Neighbours East, 2021; EU Neighbours South, 2021). According to these surveys, the image of the EU was generally ‘positive’ in all three regions and remained so throughout the years. In both ENP East and ENP South, the EU is viewed positively by 45–55% of the population, with some variation within this range across years, sub-regions and countries, and the latest 2020 survey results stand at 49% in the East, 45% in Maghreb, and 47% in Mashrek. Importantly, the EU is viewed negatively by a rather small percentage of the population, ranging between 9–13% in the ENP East (at 11% in 2020), 9–18% in Maghreb (at 18% in 2020), and 17–22% in Mashrek (at 17% in 2020).

The recurring surveys in the ENP East (but not the ENP South) have probed also the level of popular trust in EU institutions compared to the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). the EU consistently scored best, with trust levels standing at 56–61%, again indicating no drop in popular trust with the deepening of the rule-of-law crisis in the EU. According to the 2020 survey, the EU is the most trusted international institution, and the only one trusted by the majority (60%) of Eastern Partnership (EaP) citizens, with the UN enjoying the trust of 48%, NATO 42%, and the EAEU 29%. Trust is higher in Georgia (69%), Ukraine (66%), Moldova (63%), and Armenia (60%) and lower in Belarus (45%) and Azerbaijan (41%). Overall, populations of the ENP East countries overwhelmingly perceive their countries’ relationship with the EU as ‘good’. Approval rates in the ENP East are stable at 63–67%, with 17–20% of the population viewing their country’s relations with the EU as ‘bad’.

There was a small dip in the EU’s positive image and popular trust in the ENP East, but it occurred back in 2014–2016, and the EU has since recovered its positive standing with the population in the region. For example, the recurring surveys on foreign policy orientations of Ukrainians by the Razumkov Centre in 2012–2016 showed a decrease in public support for prioritizing relations with the EU and eventual EU membership in the years 2015–2016 (Razumkov Centre, 2016). Ukraine’s country factsheet in the EU’s surveys, in turn, shows the lowest results in the starting year (2016) and a steady increase since then. Similarly, the Caucasus Barometer surveys in Georgia and Armenia (but not Azerbaijan) probed popular trust in the EU, and although the results show an overall drop in trust levels from 2008 until 2019 (from 54% to 37% in Georgia and from 45% to 37% in Armenia), trust levels have actually grown again since a dip in 2015 (Caucasus Barometer, 2022). Azerbaijan’s country factsheet in EU surveys also shows a progressively more positive image of the EU among the population, with a leap from 27% in 2016–44% in 2020. A study of EU perceptions in that period confirmed a ‘major mismatch between the EU’s self-perceptions and the perceptions of the three South Caucasian countries’: in contrast to the EU’s self-perception as a long-term security-builder, the Caucasian countries perceive it as a biased security actor in the conflict resolution process (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2018, p. 47). All this suggests that the regional dip was more likely due to the EU’s weak response to conflicts in the region, specifically Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion in the east of Ukraine, and had little to nothing to do with the EU’s internal rule-of-law crisis.

In the ENP South, scholars have noted that Arab citizens are generally much more sceptical of the EU and other international organizations than citizens in other world regions – a phenomenon that is attributed mainly to their strong desire for sovereignty and a fundamental lack of trust in political institutions, domestic and foreign (Isani & Schlipphak, 2017, p. 513). Yet when looking at a longer period (2008–2020), the trend is of an overall positive EU image in the MENA (EU Neighbours South, 2021; Teti, 2012; Teti & Abbott, 2017a, 2017c). In the most recent surveys, the EU continues to have a positive image in all southern neighbours surveyed, with a score of 56% in Tunisia, 57% in Morocco, 56% in Lebanon, 68% in Egypt, 47% in Jordan, and the lowest score of 36% in Algeria. Also, most neighbouring countries assess their relations with the EU as positive, with 66% in Tunisia, 76% in Morocco, 71% in Lebanon, 86% in Jordan, and 45% in Algeria (EU Neighbours South, 2021).

Some of the reasons for the less positive views of the EU in the ENP South have to do with the cooperation of Western institutions with the MENA authoritarian regimes ‘at the expense of true engagement with their societies’ (Colombo et al., 2019, p. 2). Further points of critique are mishandling of the refugee crisis, the EU’s reactions to the military coup in Egypt, and the mismanagement of the Libyan and Syrian crises altogether (see Chaban & Lucarelli, 2021; Görgülü & Dark Kahyaoğlu, 2019). Just like in the East, there is a perception of a mismatch between the EU’s interests (more security and well-being for EU) and MENA people’s aspirations (human rights, accountability, and good governance based on local perspectives and values) that leads to the ‘poor reputation’ of the EU in parts of the MENA region (Teti et al., 2021; Teti & Abbott, 2017a). The EU’s reception in southern neighbourhood societies is more critical and the EU’s democratic legitimacy more contested by the MENA population. This has been a rather stable feature of Arab public opinion.

Overall, we do not observe a visible, let alone drastic, deterioration in the EU’s image and perceptions among the populations of the neighbourhood countries. To the extent that the EU might have had legitimacy as a democracy promoter within the neighbouring regions, that legitimacy has not suffered. The discourse of ‘crisis’ in EU democracy and rule-of-law is not – yet – detectable in general public perceptions in the neighbourhood countries. In the following three sections, we will explore why the rule-of-law crisis in the EU has not had a bearing on the EU’s legitimacy with the populations of the ENP countries, following the tripartite definition of legitimacy as discussed in the previous section.

Appropriateness

In studying local perceptions of appropriateness, three observations come to the forefront. First, the EU is not valued primarily for democracy, and democracy is not the main value in most of the neighbouring countries. Second, there seems to be little knowledge or understanding outside the EU of the degree/gravity of the crisis. And third, the EU rule-of-law ‘crisis’ is not considered a real crisis by the countries in the region, relative to what counts as a crisis in these countries. We elaborate below.

Public opinion surveys in the ENP countries reveal that populations associate the EU with a number of values such as human rights, economic prosperity, individual freedom and freedom of speech, and the rule of law. Democracy and the rule of law appear among the top five values the EU represented in 2016 and 2020. Strikingly, however, in one study’s question on individuals’ personal values, democracy scored in the bottom three, with a mere 9% of respondents in the ENP East naming democracy amongst their personal values in 2020. Most of the ENP East population tended to link the EU with social, political, and economic values, especially issues of human rights and economic prosperity (which constitute 80% combined) (EU Neighbours East, 2021).

When zooming in on specific countries, we can see some minor differences. For example, when asked ‘what rights are most important to you?’, Belarusians mentioned, as their top three, physical integrity and personal security, political rights (freedom of speech, assembly and information), and socio-economic rights (right to housing, work, education, and healthcare) (Douglas et al., 2021, p. 16). In Belarus, 42% of respondents considered democracy a preferred mode of governance, while 32% hesitated to answer, and 13% said authoritarianism could be justified. Essential characteristics of democracy included a right to elect leaders, protection from oppression, and equality between men and women, as these criteria are currently unsatisfied by the Belarusian regime (Douglas et al., 2021).

In Azerbaijan, the top three ‘personal values’ practically overlapped with the top three ‘values associated with the EU’: whereas the former list included honesty and transparency (46%), peace and security (45%), and human rights (25%), the latter included human rights (75%), rule of law and economic prosperity (74%), and honesty and transparency, peace and security (72%) (EU Neighbours East, Azerbaijan county factsheet 2020). Individual and political freedoms and corruption were at the bottom among both personal values and those associated with the EU. Democracy, with a score of 36%, was among the bottom three ‘areas that benefited from EU support’ (alongside more employment [33%] and less corruption [23%]) and was where ‘a greater role for the EU is required’ (with education, employment and tourism in the lead with 46%, 35% and 34%, respectively, and democracy, infrastructure, quality of justice and law enforcement at the very bottom, with 13%, 9%, 6%, and 4%, respectively).

The surveys in Armenia and Moldova paint a similar picture, as here too democracy was found towards the bottom of the personal values lists. ‘Peace, security and stability’ were firmly in the top three personal values (61% in Armenia and 44% in Moldova), alongside economic prosperity (39% in Armenia and 52% in Moldova) as well as human rights for Armenians (32%) and absence of corruption for Moldovans (44%) (EU Neighbours East, 2020a, p. 9; EU Neighbours East, 2020b, p. 9). Democracy and the rule of law were mentioned as personal values, respectively, by a mere 17% and 16% of Moldovans and 11% and 23% of Armenians (EU Neighbours East, 2020a, p. 9; EU Neighbours East, 2020b, p. 9). Interestingly, though, the rule of law and democracy are among the values strongly associated with the EU: the rule of law was named by 89% of Armenians (and so came in the top three values associated with the EU) and 73% of Moldovans, while democracy was named by 84% of Armenians and 74% of Moldovans (EU Neighbours East, 2020a, p. 9; EU Neighbours East, 2020b, p. 9).

For Ukrainians and Georgians, however, democracy seems to be more important than for the populations of Azerbaijan or Belarus. Ukrainians prioritize equal justice for all (55–59% for women/men), human rights protection (55–54%), and freedom of speech (39–43%), followed by free and fair elections (37–38%), governmental transparency (22–23%), governmental accountability (19–21%), and citizens’ interests being represented by political parties (13–12%) (National Democratic Institute [NDI], 2021, pp. 4–5; NDI, 2019, pp. 6–7). Support for CSOs and NGOs, more exchange programmes, sending money and advisors, and even giving Ukraine a prospect of membership were all behind, with scores somewhere around 10%. And only 5.1% of Ukrainians believed that the EU was doing enough (DIF, 2019, p. 4). For Georgians, democracy was described as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ by 43% and 49% percent of the population, respectively, which brings the total to an overwhelming 92% (NDI, 2022, p. 23). However, economic insecurity remains the main concern across Georgia, with poverty, rising prices, and lack of jobs listed as the top three national issues (NDI, 2022, p. 11).

As we can see, countries such as Georgia and Ukraine that are more democratic and have EU aspirations, even long-term ones, seem to have stronger perceptions of democracy as a value, while countries that are more authoritarian and closer to Russia, such as Azerbaijan and Belarus, seem to have issues more important to them than democracy. Armenia and Moldova are more ambiguous: while democracy is a value firmly associated with the EU, it is not prominent in the lists of personal values, which are headed by peace and economic prosperity.

For the ENP South, the stable list of top-five values the EU represents includes individual freedom, human rights, gender equality, freedom of speech, and economic prosperity. Democracy did appear in 2018 and 2020, with a respective 73%/72% in Maghreb and 68%/63% in Mashrek. In a similar vein, the Arab Transformations Public Opinion Survey conducted in the MENA countries in 2014 showed the economic situation and corruption as the main drivers of the Arab Uprisings (Teti & Abbott, 2017c). More generally, people in the Arab countries are reported to understand and appreciate democracy as a political system (Pew Research Center, 2012), but doubt whether it is suitable for their particular country and, regardless, prioritize socio-economic rights over civil–political rights (Teti et al., 2019). Therefore, for the peoples of the region, democracy is conditional and not an absolute value. Furthermore, democracy is partly understood in socio-economic terms as people prioritize social justice and reduction of inequalities in their countries (Abbott & Teti, 2022; Teti et al., 2020). Arab Barometer data also supports an understanding of democracy by Arab people in which it is about multiparty elections, freedom of media, and providing jobs and security (Arab Barometer, 2020).

When asked to name the two most important characteristics of democracy, MENA people do not see civil and political rights as a priority in the same way in which EU policy does (Teti & Abbott, 2017b). Surveys also show that there is a mismatch between the liberal democracy the EU stands for and the demands of the MENA populations for social justice, accountability, and good governance. In other words, the EU is indeed loosely associated with democracy, but democracy is not the main association people in the ENP South countries have with the EU, and democracy is generally not the most important value for them personally. This claim is further corroborated by survey results on a question about where people would like to see the EU do more in their countries regarding democracy. When asked to choose one option from a list of ‘Democracy, Economic Development, Resolving Arab-Israel Conflict, Women’s Rights’, a majority of people selected economic development (exceeding 64% in some cases). Furthermore, in terms of the appropriateness of EU policies, a majority of respondents emphasized the importance of the EU providing financial support for education and health in addition to job creation and investments (Teti et al., 2017, 2021; Teti & Abbott, 2017c).

Furthermore, there is little knowledge or understanding in the European neighbourhood of the degree of the rule-of-law crisis in the EU nor media coverage and discursive space for discussing its consequences. While the EU’s rule-of-law crisis is a serious matter for the countries involved and for the EU in general, it is much less known, understood and visible beyond its borders. The neighbourhood countries’ own domestic issues, regional dynamics, as well as international crises (of which there is a long list) receive much more attention and concern. To the extent that the EU rule-of-law crisis is known amongst the neighbours, it is not considered a major problem: the EU’s ‘big crisis’ is inevitably perceived in the context of and relative to these countries’ own ongoing domestic issues, be they political, economic, or social. Most if not all of them have been existing for years and sometimes decades in a state of (semi)permanent political instability, economic crisis or decline, and social, migration, refugee or internally displaced people crises; many of them are also involved in an armed conflict of one kind or another. The EU’s ‘crisis’ simply does not meet the threshold of a crisis, considering these countries’ own experiences.

Utilitarian consensus

In examining utilitarian drivers of local perceptions, it is notable that the alternatives to the EU do not look better than the EU itself. Over the past decade, and in comparison to other international and regional players, the EU seems to continue to be the favoured partner to both neighbourhoods.

Notably, populations of the three countries in the ENP East that have concluded Deep Comprehensive and Free Trade Agreements with the EU (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) are generally more positive about the EU than populations of the three other ENP East countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus). In Moldova, relations with the EU are viewed positively by 73% of the population; the EU is viewed as the most important economic (66%) and political (60%) partner, with 64% supporting the idea of Moldova’s EU membership against 49% supporting Moldova’s membership in the EAEU (IRI, 2021a, pp. 23–26). In 2021, a majority of Ukrainians also supported joining the EU (58%) rather than the Customs Union with Russia (21%) (IRI, 2021b, pp. 49–53). In Georgia, 2020 and 2021 surveys showed that 73% and 83% of Georgians, respectively, supported the idea of EU membership (with only 7% opposed) and 71% supported the country’s NATO membership. In comparison, only 20% supported Georgia’s membership in the EAEU, with 44% opposing it (Sichinava, 2021, pp. 41–43; NDI, 2022b, pp. 18–19). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, all three countries have formally applied for EU membership. Ukraine and Moldova have been granted candidate status, while Georgia has to meet a set of priorities before being considered a candidate for EU membership. The idea of EU membership is supported by 61% of Moldovans (IntelliNews, 2022), between 80% (IRI, 2022a, p. 24) and 87% of Ukrainians (RaitingGroup, 2022), and 88% of Georgians (IRI, 2022b, p. 80).

Notably, Belarus has seen a steady increase in positive attitudes towards the EU since the start of popular protests against the domestic regime in 2020, which came hand-in-hand with plummeting support rates for Russia and its integration project. In July 2021, 53% of Belarusians viewed the EU positively (compared to 54% for Russia, 38% for the US, and 23% for NATO), and only 25% favoured the idea of unification with Russia – which is the lowest score in 20 years (EU Neighbours East, 2021; Euroradio, 2021). Belarusian Analytical Workroom’s recurring surveys indicate significant changes in the mindset of Belarusian citizens: between 2018 and 2019, support for a union with Russia dropped from 63.9% to 40.4%, while support for a union with the EU grew from 20.2% to 32%, with a clear trend towards increase and an ever-wider demographic support base for the EU (BELSAT, 2020; see also IISEPS, 2016 and Vardomatski, 2016).

In general, the EU is viewed positively in the MENA (Maghreb/Mashrek) with the exception of Egypt and Syria. When asked about the closest partners to their countries, 26% of respondents in the Maghreb saw the EU as the main partner, followed by the US (15%), then Russia and China (each 14%). This was not the same in the Mashrek, in which 25% considered the US and Russia to be the main partners, followed by the EU (10%), Turkey (6%) and the UN (or any of its agencies) (5%) (EU Neighbours South, 2022, pp. 52–53). Looking at specific cases, the EU is viewed as the most important partner for Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, and Tunisia. One of the reasons for the higher level of trust in the US and Russia in the Mashrek could be the presence of the US as the main player in the Israel-Palestine conflict and the positive Israeli view of the US, which skews the regional data (83% in 2021). In addition, the US and Russia are physically present in regional conflicts and directly attempt ‘to change the status quo either through military involvement, sanctions or other means. The EU has exercised chiefly ‘soft power’ which, although less violent and more democratic, has to some extent made it less visible in the region’s politics’ (EU Neighbours South, 2022, p. 52).

In sum, people of both neighbourhoods still view the EU positively more for various other reasons than for its democracy. There is no alternative to the EU for the neighbours willing to improve democracy at home. By a similar token, the fact that the EU has issues with democracy does not eliminate the fact that it is still the community of most democratic countries in the vicinity for countries in the neighbourhood. So the EU retains its role as a beacon of democracy and remains a reference point for pro-democratic, pro-European political forces in the neighbourhood.

Empathy/antipathy

When discussing emotional drivers of local perceptions, there is an important differentiation between ENP East and South. In the ENP East, the EU, its level of democracy and quality of life are associated first and foremost with its western members, while its eastern members are or used to be important sources of inspiration and even role-models to follow on these countries’ own path to European integration and eventually membership in the EU. As such, the rule-of-law crisis might be turning them from roadmaps to road-blocks. In the ENP South, the EU is associated exclusively with its western members, mainly France, Spain, Italy, and more recently Germany. Therefore, the deteriorating rule of law in some eastern European members (such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) appears less significant for the ENP South.

According to a public opinion poll conducted among Ukrainians in December 2021 (that is, before Russia’s full-out war on Ukraine), Poland and Lithuania, followed by Czechia, Germany, Slovakia, and Moldova, followed by Romania, Austria, and Hungary are perceived as the main supporters of Ukraine’s EU membership; the first three are viewed as most friendly towards Ukraine (DIF, 2021). The war has put Poland among Ukraine’s the top-three ‘allies’, alongside the UK and the US (DIF, 2022). In the case of Moldova, Romania is the one EU member state that appears on the list of ‘significant others’, alongside the EU, US, China, and Russia, and the relationship between the two is viewed positively by 83% of the population, putting Romania on top of the list (IRI, 2022c, p. 38). A comprehensive analysis of think tank publications in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia provides additional insight into local views and qualifies these societal perceptions by revealing that individual EU member states are framed either as spoilers, supporters, or role models (Axyonova et al., 2018, p. 38). Remarkably, while large western EU member states – France, Italy, Spain, and occasionally Germany – are framed as ‘spoilers’ due to their ‘much too soft position vis-à-vis Moscow’ (prior to the 2022 Russia war on Ukraine), central and eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004/2007 – Poland, Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic states, and less so Hungary – are framed as supporters and role models, with Visegrad countries ‘presented as sources of inspiration for Ukraine’s, Moldova’s and Georgia’s own paths’ (Axyonova et al., 2018, p. 38). The rule-of-law crisis in some eastern European member states can thus present obstacles to the eastern neighbourhood countries’ own membership ambitions by undermining the symbolic power of the positive example associated with the eastern European member states.

Survey data from the southern neighbours show that societies associate more with specific western EU member states. For example, when asked about which international/regional player is most favourable in 2021, the two standing countries were France and Germany, with greater favourability for Germany in Libya (67%, compared to 43% for France), Tunisia (66%, compared to 46% for France), Algeria (65%, compared to 32% for France), and Jordan (40%, compared to 28% for France). France is still viewed more favourably in Lebanon (46%, compared to 41% for Germany, with all other international/regional players such as the US, Russia, China, etc. ranking lower) and almost equally in Morocco (58%, compared to 57% for Germany)(Arab Barometer, 2021). These results are confirmed by the Arab Transformations Opinion Polls showing that southern neighbours’ societies nominated a total of 58 countries with which they should have strong relations. The three most frequently mentioned European countries were France (2.3%), Germany (2.5%) and the UK (1.6%) (Teti & Abbott, 2017c). When asked specifically with which European state they would like their country to have closer relations, 53% did not name any, and only 39% named an EU member state. In total, 16 EU member states were selected, with Germany and the UK taking the lead with 13.4% and 11.3% respectively (Teti & Abbott, 2017b).

For ENP South populations, eastern Europe does not seem to exist in their political imagination of the EU; this is why the rule-of-law crisis in eastern Europe is not even on their radar. For them, the focus in the EU is on the western European countries, former colonizers, and southern EU Mediterranean countries. Scholars have argued that the dominant sentiment that drives perceptions of the EU in the Arab world is the desire for sovereignty, which can be seen as a resistance act against European colonialism and European support for authoritarian rulers in the region in the last century (Schlipphak & Isani, 2018). Eastern EU members remain outside the dynamics of perception formation in the southern neighbourhood, even if they are part of the collective EU since 2004–7. In this sense, eastern European experiences matter less for the emotional bonds that link the Arab world to the EU.

Conclusion

Shifting the focus from internal to external conceptions of legitimacy, we have shown a different perception of the EU’s democratic credibility in the European neighbourhood. Adopting a sociological perspective on legitimacy, we have emphasized local societal perceptions to show that the EU’s internal rule-of-law crisis has not (yet) damaged the EU’s reputation as a democracy supporter and human rights defender in the neighbourhood. Survey data clearly demonstrates that in the past decade, the EU’s image has remained relatively unchanged. The EU’s rule-of-law crisis, while salient for the EU itself, is a trivial matter for its eastern and southern neighbours. Given the differences between the external perceptions of elites, the general public, and the media (Elgström & Chaban, 2015, p. 18), we are aware that elites in neighbouring countries may hold more critical views on the matter and may frame local debates about the EU’s democratic image differently. Additional research on elite opinion and media frames in the neighbourhood should reveal whether this is the case. Societal perceptions nevertheless weigh heavily, as they are at the core of the permissive consensus for the EU’s democracy support role in specific local contexts. Our findings are in this sense consequential for EU policy in this area.

We have shown that this phenomenon can be attributed to the complementary and mutually reinforcing power of three drivers of perceptions in the neighbourhood: 1) local notions of the EU as a prime economic power and development actor associated predominantly with economic gains and opportunities, against a paler image of the EU as a democracy promoter and defender of human rights; 2) local understandings of the EU as faring better in comparison with other regional actors and providers of assistance, security and order; and 3) local sentiments of being similar (eastern neighbouhood) or different (southern neighbouhood) to (a group of) EU countries. In so doing, we have demonstrated the suitability of Wajner’s theoretical framework based on appropriateness, consensus, and empathy for examining the legitimation dynamics that are at play within non-EU communities and that bear on the EU’s external policies. In this way, we have also contributed to the research on the legitimacy of EU foreign policy and the larger body of literature that examines the social legitimacy of international organizations.

Our study has also illustrated that the perceived East–West divide within the EU is not viewed similarly outside the EU. The neighbouring societies have a distant perspective on the EU, conditioned by historical legacies and tempered by multiple parallel crises that they have undergone. There is a good deal of continuity in societal attitudes shaped by past behaviour and identity patterns that remain stable even in times of crises. This reality signals an opportunity for EU democracy support in the neighbourhood. Our anlysis has in this way furthered the engagement agenda of the decentering approach with a focus on local perceptions and how EU narratives intersect with local views. It has emphasized the aspirations of neighbourhood citizens and in that sense pleaded for a more reflexive EU approach to democracy support in the neighbourhood.

Finally, we have brought to light the views, considerations, and emotional attachments of neighbouring societies and placed them at the centre of study of EU foreign policy legitimacy. This is a long overdue development that dwells on the growing realization that EU foreign policy studies are overly preoccupied with the EU itself at the expense of the perceptions and experiences of the recipients of EU policy – in this context, the neighbouring countries. Our study has in this way made a step in the direction of decentring EU democracy support and of overcoming Eurocentrism in studying EU legitimacy.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Professor Tanja Börzel, Professor Daniel Wajner, the guest editors of this special issue and the participants at the authors’ workshops as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback, comments, and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimers apply.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Erasmus+ programme of the European Union: [Project Number 620443-EPP-1-2020-1-NL-EPPJMO-CHAIR].