ABSTRACT
In March 2019 the European Union adopted the first pan-European investment screening framework, thus joining the bandwagon of growing investment screening mechanisms around the world. This article explores why the European screening framework was adopted swiftly and with no politicisation, even as the negotiations unfolded against the background of heightened politicisation of trade and investment policy. The paper develops three expectations: (1) converging member state preferences; (2) securitisation of investment policy; and (3) Commission entrepreneurship. It then explores them empirically through process-tracing, drawing on extensive interviews with the actors involved. We argue that the European Commission played a pivotal role. To avoid falling into another strand of politicisation and to defuse political mines, the Commission engaged in a ‘pre-emptive depoliticization’ strategy that shortened the policy process, limited the number of actors involved, and justified the policy options in a legalistic framing.
Acknowledgements
In addition, the paper has been presented at the 17th Biennial EUSA Conference (Miami, May 2022), the conference ‘The Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms’ held at Princeton University in November 2022, and the 18th Biennial EUSA Conference (Pittsburgh, May 2023). We would like to thank Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dür for their helpful feedback during the work on the paper, the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments to the manuscript, as well as to all our interviewees for sharing their insights with us.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC
2 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain.
3 Proposal for ensuring an improved level playing field in trade and investment attached to the Letter to the Commission by France, Germany and Italy, February 2017.
4 10 MEPs from European People’s Party: Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld, European People’s Party.
5 For example EU’s laws in energy sector on certification of foreign-owned / controlled companies.
6 Respective policy proposal was submitted in May 2021
7 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market {SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}
8 Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries.
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries market {SEC (2021) 418 final} - {SWD(2021) 371 final} - {SEC(2021) 372 final}
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Anna Vlasiuk Nibe
Anna Vlasiuk Nibe is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark (Denmark).
Sophie Meunier
Sophie Meunier is a Senior Research Scholar at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University (USA).
Christilla Roederer-Rynning
Christilla Roederer-Rynning is a professor (with special responsibilities) in comparative European politics in the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark (Denmark).