‘Heterodox economics’ and the problems of classification

Abstract

This paper discusses classification in Economics via the case of ‘heterodox economics (HE)’. It argues that the debate over HE reflects several important methodological issues: the need and motives for classification, and its consequences; dualism; and simplicity versus complexity. It presents four types of treatment of HE, which usually reach different conclusions about it. The paper argues that intellectual treatments suffer from problems of dualism: frequently offering strict, fixed, simple definitions of HE that are difficult to defend, especially in the light of recent developments in economics. For these reasons, sociological and psychological treatments have become preferred. These appear to avoid the problems faced by intellectual definitions and reflect existing social groups in economics. However, it is argued that these definitions are conceptually empty, still prone to dualism and reification. It is argued that all definitions reflect the sociology of the profession: dualist definitions of heterodoxy reflect interpretations of power structures within economics. Overall, definitions of HE should be multi-faceted, temporary and perhaps even purposefully vague.

Keywords:

• classification
• heterodox economics
• dualism
• mainstream economics
• critical survey

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their comments. I also thank John Davis, Sheila Dow, Daniela Gabor, Robert Garnett, Matthias Klaes, Tony Lawson, Frederic Lee and Heather Luna for their comments. I also acknowledge contributions from participants at the AHE conference, Bordeaux, July 2010; the SCEME workshop, Aberystwyth, June 2011.

Notes

1. Classifications involving HE are mostly exhaustive. Colander (2009), for example, seems to employ exhaustive classification, despite discussing heterodoxy within the mainstream. Dow (2000), who clearly recognises the perils of dualism (1990), seems to employ only two categories: mainstream and heterodox. Exhaustive categories beg questions about their epistemological grounds.

2. Of course, this point sets aside any discussion as to whether in fact the direction pursued by economists after Marshall has been appropriate, or has been excessive abstraction.

3. This is an important point. An account of heterodoxy could be described (following Blaug 1990) as ‘doxographical’ if it is based on a biased evidence base which makes a particular definition of heterodoxy more likely.

4. http://heterodoxnews.com/directory/graduate.htm. Accessed on 6th August, 2010.