Model diversity and the embarrassment of riches

ABSTRACT

In a recent special issue dedicated to the work of Dani Rodrik, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni [(2018). Modeling model selection in model pluralism. Journal of Economic Methodology, 25(3), 265–275. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2018.1488572] raise a potentially damning problem for Rodrik's suggestion that progress in economics should be understood and measured laterally, by a continuous expansion of new models. They argue that this could lead to an ‘embarrassment of riches’, i.e. the rapid expansion of our model library to such an extent that we become unable to choose between the available models, and thus needs to be solved to make ‘model pluralism’ viable. Drawing on Veit’s [(2019a). Model pluralism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(2), 91–114. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393119894897] ‘model pluralism’ account, this paper argues that model pluralism as a thesis about the relationship between science and nature undermines the very idea of a general model selection framework for policy making.

KEYWORDS:

• Pluralism
• models
• model selection
• policy making
• Rodrik

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Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 A popular idiom intended to signify that there is too much of a good thing.

2 I initially developed the view largely in response to a perceived need in economics, psychology, and biology (sciences dealing with complexity) to embrace a wider range of models (see Veit, 2019b), and defended an early version of this view in Veit (2019c). I have since applied model pluralism as a more general view about science to a wide range of phenomena such as cultural evolution in economics (Schlaile et al., forthcoming), climate modeling (Ortmann & Veit, 2021), autism (Chapman & Veit, 2020a, 2020b), cognitive enhancements (Veit et al., 2020), health and disease (Veit 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming), animal welfare (Veit & Browning 2020a, forthcoming), consciousness (Browning & Veit, 2021; Veit, 2021c), and conceptual engineering more generally (Veit & Browning, 2020b). It is now time to revisit my view within the economic modeling literature where it has been originally articulated, to address its biggest challenge (EoR), and explicate it as a general thesis about the nature of science.

3 Though usually referred to as the checkerboard model or Schelling model after Schelling (1971), Hegselmann (2017) elegantly showed that James Sakoda (1971) as a victim of the Matthew effect, deserves at least equal credit and recognition for his earlier development of the idea.

4 I thank one of my reviewers for convincing me to press Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) on this point in more detail.

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Notes on contributors

Walter Veit

Walter Veit is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of History and Philosophy of Science at The University of Sydney whose interests and publications stretch widely across both science and philosophy. He primarily works on the intersection of the biological, behavioral, and cognitive sciences with a special interest in scientific modeling. Website: https://walterveit.com/.