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Abstract
Political identifications among postcolonial Koreans in Japan have been characterized by a tension between assimilative and transnational orientations. The tension has been reshaped in the course of a recent debate on nationality acquisition, which Korean activists and commentators started in response to Japanese policymakers’ move in the 2001 National Diet to simplify the naturalization process for postcolonial Koreans. At the heart of the debate stand the issues of citizenship rights and collective memory, which are central to Koreans’ political identifications. Advocates of nationality acquisition accept the reality of cultural and socioeconomic assimilation and are ready to become ethnic minority members of the Japanese state in return for getting full citizenship rights. Guided by the collective memory of the colonial past and social discrimination against Koreans in postcolonial Japan, critics of nationality acquisition refuse incorporation into the Japanese state and seek the possibility of transnational citizenship and identification. Koreans in Japan are predicted to become more diverse in identification, but their diversity will probably continue to revolve around the two orientations.
Notes
1. There are South Korean residents who came to Japan after the colonial period. In this article, I focus on those who moved from colonial Korea to Japan proper and their offspring.
2. The number of the postcolonial Koreans is based on a special permanent resident status available only for postcolonial foreigners.
3. For a discussion on multiple forms of citizenship, see Gordon and Stack (Citation2007).
4. See Fukuoka (2000) for this kind of research.
5. There is an argument that Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910 was not officially processed and that Koreans thus never held Japanese nationality.
6. The repatriated included ethnic Japanese married to Koreans. Most of those Koreans were originally from regions in South Korea. The Japanese government and the Japan Red Cross Society played key roles in initiating the repatriation program. See Morris-Suzuki (Citation2005).
7. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out the need to clarify the use of the expression ‘Korean nationality’.
8. The validity of the notification was also questioned by scholars in laws (Ônuma, 2004, pp. 303–324).
9. I consider civil rights as part of citizenship rights, which also include political, social, and cultural rights.
10. There was no explicit policy for cultural assimilation. But the government made it difficult for Koreans to take care of everyday routines, such as making legal contracts and sending children to public schools, without using pseudo Japanese names.
11. By transnational activism, I generally mean ‘a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-distance social obligations and belonging and seek to transform political practices in their sending countries’ (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller 2003, p. 1239).
12. This organization was first formed as Kanmintô.
13. This divide has been discussed by resident Koreans as one between homeland (sokoku) orientation and zainichi orientation. ‘Transnational’ captures the reality of the homeland orientation in the twenty-first century as it has grown to include Northeast Asia.
14. Those who attended Korean ethnic schools have retained the culture and language of the homeland to varying degrees. Many homeland-oriented Koreans have employment within their community, resisting socioeconomic assimilation.
15. The government's expectation was similar to what was discussed in the US literature on assimilation. ‘Once structural assimilation has occurred … all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow’ (Gordon, 1964, p. 81).
16. There are several Japanese expressions that are translated into English as ‘Korean Japanese,’ including Kankoku-kei Nihonjin and Koria-kei Nihonjin. This group used the expression ‘Nihon-seki Chôsenjin,’ which literally means ‘Koreans holding Japanese nationality’.
17. The Japanese government had an unwritten rule to accept only those naturalization applications where all family members filed together, and facilitated a smooth integration of naturalized people into the system of household registration (koseki), through which it controlled Japanese nationals. The government has become lenient in imposing this rule.
18. Mindan started accepting naturalized Koreans as its members at the end of the 1990s. With Chongryun, some branches and younger generations became open to naturalized Koreans.
19. Based on my interviews with several Korean activists in October and November 2004.
20. These expressions (pronounced in Japanese ways) were commonly used to distinguish newcomers and old-timer Koreans and Chinese.
21. ‘Military comfort women’ were those who were taken by the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s and were forced to provide sexual services for soldiers.
22. The former opposition leaders Young-sam Kim and Dae-jung Kim were elected president in the 1990s.
23. Multiple opinions on nationality acquisition are discussed by Sasaki (Citation2006) and Shirai (Citation2007), among others.
24. To the symposium, Yee invited Hidenori Sakanaka, a then immigration officer who is notorious among resident Koreans for his role in promoting assimilationist policy in the 1970s. Sakanaka's participation triggered much criticism against Yee. Sakanaka acted as a consultant for politicians who made the move to simplify naturalization for Koreans. My discussion on Yee's position is based on my informal interviews with him on numerous occasions between 2001 and 2008.
25. LAZAK members have diverse opinions, but they all stress the importance of Koreans’ participation in national politics in Japan.
26. His name in Korean is Dae-kyun Chung.
27. Tei writes for Chuo Koron and Sapio, right-wing leaning magazines. He argues based on his experience of living in South Korea for 14 years and feeling like an outsider despite his South Korean nationality.
28. With multiple interpretations, the Korean Japanese identity has been gaining popularity as the fourth choice for Koreans in Japan in addition to the positions of sojourner, naturalized national with Japanese identity, and zainichi (Chapman, 2008, pp. 115–139; Tai, Citation2004).
29. For example, the Association for New History Textbooks has been trying to eliminate from history textbooks references to Japanese war atrocities and wrongdoings against other Asians, such as wartime prostitution.
30. Based on the website of the Korea NGO Center. Retrieved 1 May 2008, from http://korea-ngo.org/
31. Based on my interviews with several key activists of the Center on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2008.
32. Children of international marriage are allowed to keep double nationality until the age of 22.
33. Based on the website of the Korea International School. Retrieved 1 December 2008, from http://www.kis-korea.org/
34. Based on my participant observation on a preparatory meeting for the KIS in Osaka, 26 June 2006.
35. Shi-Jong Kim, a renowned Korean poet, is the director and Sang-jung Kang is a special advisor at the KIS.
36. Most importantly, Koria Jinken Seikatsu Kyôkai (The Korean Association of Human Rights and Life) seceded from Chongryun and has been involved in the operation of the KIS.
37. Most Mintôren offices have been closed. Osaka Mintôren was disbanded in 1995.
38. Individuals use the expressions ‘zainichi’ and ‘Korean Japanese’ regardless of their nationality status; some naturalized Koreans call themselves zainichi to express their identification with the postcolonial Koreans, and some resident Koreans call themselves Korean Japanese to show their sense of belonging to Japan. Many have multiple identities. See Lee (Citation2007).