Fiscal decentralization, collusion and government size in China's transitional economy

Abstract

This paper examines the public sector in China's transitional economy, with the aim of testing the validity of a variety of hypotheses, namely the Brennan and Buchanan (1980, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, CUP, Cambridge); Oates–Wallis (1985, American Economic Review, 75(4) 748–57) version of the decentralization hypothesis and the Brennan and Buchanan collusion hypothesis, on the impact of fiscal decentralization at the provincial level. Pooled cross-section (province) and time-series data are employed with the period under consideration being 1986–1998. An error components technique is also used for the empirical testing. The empirical results provide evidence to support both the Oates–Wallis hypothesis and the collusion hypothesis that an increase in fiscal decentralization leads to a higher level of provincial government expenditure. The study also finds that the central and provincial governments are provided with an incentive to form collusive agreements through extra-budgetary funds.

Notes

 Berkowitz and Li (2000) found that during the period of transition, local governments in China have secured more clearly defined tax rights than their Russian counterparts.

 For a more detailed discussion of federalism, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a) and Oates (1999).