Abstract
This article considers how the efficiency of organizational forms of enterprise can depend on the level of sunk costs of physical capital in relation to market size, informational asymmetry and the heterogeneity of firm owners.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Tadasu Matsuo and Hikaru Ogawa for helpful comments. Special thanks are due to Mark Taylor and David Peel, the editors of the journal.
Notes
1For the proofs of the lemmas and propositions in this article, refer to Mikami (Citation2011), which is available upon request to the author.
2The surplus materializes by setting the supply price of the good at ν.
3 EquationEquation 15(14) yields a function , which appears in . Note that for with , and .
4Since and is continuous in x, such an x e exists.
5For a detailed discussion on this topic, refer to Mikami (Citation2011), Section 4.