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Research Article

Corruption in economics: a bibliometric analysis and research agenda

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ABSTRACT

We conducted a bibliometric analysis of the literature on corruption in the discipline of economics (4,488 articles) over the past 51 years between 1968–2019. Through this methodology, we identified seven research streams: (1) the economic framework of crime and corruption, (2) the legal institutions and corruption, (3) the effect of corruption on aspects of national economics, (4) the combating and monitoring of corruption, (5) the determinants of corruption, (6) political institutions and corruption, and (7) the effect of corruption on firms. In addition to these research clusters, we also identified the key journals, articles, countries, institutions, authors, data sources, measurements, theoretical frameworks, and networks dealing with this issue. Finally, we suggested 20 future research questions.

JEL CLASSIFICATION:

I. Introduction

Economists traditionally view corruption as a misuse of power for private gain (Shleifer and Vishny Citation1993; Treisman Citation2000). Corruption has been blamed for the failure of policy in some developing countries (Treisman Citation2000) and found to reduce investment, economic growth, and development (Mauro Citation1995; Bardhan Citation2017). As a result, academic researchers, controlling bodies (e.g., the IMF,Footnote 1 OECD,Footnote 2 and World Bank) and nations (e.g., America’s FCPA of 1977Footnote 3 and the OECD committee on bribery 1989Footnote 4 ) started reviewing and analysing the pathology of corruption and crime in the economy and society. Consequently, a substantial but scattered body of literature on corruption in economics has developed. We synthesized 51 years of research (between 1968 and 2019) (see ) to provide more clarity on the research clusters and research directions in the field.

Figure 1. Publications growth between 1968 (1st paper) to 2019 of topic: Corruption in Economics

Figure 1. Publications growth between 1968 (1st paper) to 2019 of topic: Corruption in Economics

To explore the literature, we conducted a bibliometric citation analysis of 4,488 articles on corruption in economics (Yuret Citation2014, Citation2018; Rath and Wohlrabe Citation2015a; Zupic and Čater Citation2015; Sommer and Wohlrabe Citation2016; Meyer and Wohlrabe Citation2017; Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri Citation2019; Bahoo Citation2020). Our analysis contributes to the literature by answering the following questions: (1) What are the leading research streams in the literature on corruption in economics? (2) What are the key journals, articles, countries, institutions, authors, data sources, measurements, theoretical frameworks, and networks in this field? (3) What are the future research directions?

II. Method

Our method consists of two techniques. The first is bibliometric analysis (Broadus Citation1987; Mingers and Leydesdorff Citation2015; Zupic and Čater Citation2015; Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri Citation2020). The second is content analysis (Gaur and Kumar Citation2018; Ahmed, Bahoo, and Ayub Citation2019; Ahmed, Bahoo, Aslam, and QureshiCitation2020). We utilized these techniques to conduct five analyses: (1) citation analysis, (2) co-citation analysis, (3) cartography analysis, (4) citation network analysis, and (5) content analysis. Our software tools consisted of the HistCite and VOSviewer software programmes.

Using 18 keywords for corruption that included combinations of the words ‘economics,’ ‘economy,’ and ‘economic,’ we searched the ISI Web of Knowledge (WOK) database for articles on the topic. We selected these words using a systematic, three-step process outlined in . Our first search resulted in 5,671 articles. In the next step, we excluded irrelevant articles by reviewing titles and abstracts. Our final set included 4,488 articles published between 1968 and 2019 dealing with corruption in economics. , which illustrates the growth in articles per year on the topic, shows a sharp growth trend beginning in the 1990 s after the Western world passed anti-corruption laws and formed an OECD committee on bribery.

III. Results

Influential aspects of the literature

Key journals and networks

Three hundred seventy-two journals published the 4,488 articles in our sample. Using HistCite, we ranked the top 11 journals that had the largest number of citation references and articles published on the topic (see ). In both rankings, the journals Applied Economics and Applied Economics Letters emerged as the most influential and provided quality research on corruption in economics. Furthermore, using VOSviwer we determined that Applied Economics Letters was also among the top-cited journal networks (see ).

Figure 2. Citation network among journals generated by VOSviewer

Figure 2. Citation network among journals generated by VOSviewer

Influential countries, institutions, authors, articles, and networks

Using these two software programs, we ranked the most influential countries, institutions, authors, and networks in the field (see ). With regard to authors, 6,828 authors wrote the 4,488 articles in our sample. illustrates the top 11 authors and networks among them, which is useful for policymakers and prospective researchers for future projects. With regard to countries and institutions, most studies came from Western countries such as the US and Europe, reflecting the serious desire to overcome the problem of corruption and crime. China is also emerging as a major contributor.

Figure 3. Citation network among authors generated by VOSviwer

Figure 3. Citation network among authors generated by VOSviwer

Our sample of 4,488 articles had 10,629 total local citations (TLC) and 97319 total global citations (TGC). We also divided the top 11 trending articles from 1968 to 2019 into two categories based on TLC/t (total local citations per year) and TGC/t (total global citations per year) (see ).

Keyword networks to identify research areas

The keywords assigned by authors or the ISI WOK database to a research article represent the field of study and directions of the literature. Therefore, using VOSviwer we created keyword networks based on the repetition of words, which is called cartography analysis. depicts the resulting networks and identifies the associated research areas. As the figure indicates, the most repeated keywords in the literature are corruption, crime, economy, economic growth, deterrence, punishment, law, institutions, models, determinants, causes, and consequences. On the other hand, the keywords that appeared least frequently are firm performance, firm, earning management, political institutions, politics. The findings from confirm that two critical areas of research–political institutions and corruption, and the effect of corruption on firms–are underdeveloped and neglected. These two areas of research contain knowledge gaps that suggest the need for further investigation.

Figure 4. Keyword analysis to identify research areas in the literature through cartography analysis using VOSviwer

Figure 4. Keyword analysis to identify research areas in the literature through cartography analysis using VOSviwer

Citation mapping: identification of research streams, trends, and synthesis

We used bibliometric co-citation analysis (Cainelli et al. Citation2012; Rath and Wohlrabe Citation2015b; Aria and Cuccurullo Citation2017; Paltrinieri et al. Citation2019) and content analysis (Bahoo et al. Citation2018; Gaur and Kumar Citation2018) to identify the research streams in the literature on corruption in economics. In the first step, bibliometrics co-citation analysis identified the 70 top-cited papers, resulting in the citation map depicted in . Second, we applied traditional content analysis to these 70 articles to understand the content (Bahoo, Hassan, Paltrinieri, and Khan Citation2019). This quantitative and qualitative process resulted in the following seven research streams in the literature: (1) the economic framework of crime and corruption, (2) the legal institutions and corruption, (3) the effect of corruption on aspects of national economics, (4) the combating and monitoring of corruption, (5) the determinants of corruption, (6) political institutions and corruption, and (7) the effect of corruption on firms. The 70 key papers are listed under each stream in .

Figure 5. Research streams in the literature created by HistCite. *Top 70 influential articles with a minimum of 20 TLCs, resulting in the seven research streams listed in Table A3

Figure 5. Research streams in the literature created by HistCite. *Top 70 influential articles with a minimum of 20 TLCs, resulting in the seven research streams listed in Table A3

These seven research streams are interconnected. The key frameworks of corruption and crime (Becker Citation1968; Rose-Ackerman Citation1975; Olken Citation2009) are helpful in explaining the effect of corruption on the economy (Macrae Citation1982; Mauro Citation1995; Fisman and Svensson Citation2007), businesses and firms (Shleifer and Vishny Citation1994; Dove Citation2017). Nations and controlling bodies have established laws and legal institutions (Tirole Citation1996; Devaraj and Patel Citation2017) to combat financial and political corruption (Alam Citation1989; Goel and Saunoris Citation2017) by identifying the key determinants of corruption (Dey Citation1989; Shleifer and Vishny Citation1993; Lee and Holoviak Citation2006).

We also reviewed the titles and abstracts of our sample to create a publication trend in each research stream during the last 51 years. shows that the first (the economic framework of crime and corruption) and third (the effect of corruption on aspects of national economics) research streams, which economists have been exploring extensively since 1990, peaked in 2015. The research on the second stream (legal institutions and corruption) has remained constant because researchers are concerned about the implementation of laws and regulations. The fourth (the combating and monitoring of corruption) and fifth (the determinants of corruption) streams are at the regeneration stage, as researchers are revisiting and exploring the measures and determinants of corruption and crime in this era of globalization and internationalization. However, the research on the sixth (political institutions and corruption) and seventh (the effect of corruption on firms) streams is underdeveloped and comparatively negelected. The keyword analysis in also confirmed the underdevelopment of the sixth and seventh research streams. Therefore, in Section 4, we recommend future research directions in these two areas.

Figure 6. Publication trends in the seven research streams between 1968 and 2019. *However, more extensive research started on the topic in the 1990 s

Figure 6. Publication trends in the seven research streams between 1968 and 2019. *However, more extensive research started on the topic in the 1990 s

Finally, we also summarized the data sources, measurements, and theoretical frameworks used in the 70 most influential papers in . This listing and summary of the critical aspects of these 70 papers should be helpful to researchers in producing additional quality research on the topic.

IV. Future research agenda

We used bibliometric citation and content analyses to identify future agendas (Bahoo Citation2020). First, we created a citation map () using the top 70 papers. Second, through HistCite we determined the trending (between 2009–2019) and most influential articles and reviewed them. Third, we analysed recent articles published in 2017, 2018, and 2019 to avoid citation bias. Fourth, we used the idea of putting ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Dunning, Kim, and Park Citation2008, 158) to re-explore past frameworks, theories, models, and inferences concerning corruption and crime in developing, emerging, and developed countries. Finally, we converted these research gaps into future research questions under each research stream. The results appear in .

V. Conclusion

Corruption is a significant challenge for all societies and has a negative effect on their economic growth and development. It is one of the main reasons for the slow growth of developing countries. It exists in several forms: financial, non-financial, public, private, petty, and grand. It also occurs at the upper, middle, and lower levels of society in developed as well as underdeveloped countries. Due to globalization and the digitalization of the world economy, it has become an even more complex phenomenon. Thus, we must establish anti-corruption systems and revisit economic frameworks and models of corruption and crime. In addition, political corruption is a critical challenge for countries at all levels of development. Hence, it is essential to understand and explore the economic model of crime and corruption and its relationship to legal institutions, political institutions, and firms. These goals motivated our desire to summarize the literature on corruption in economics. While we used the full ISI WOK database, we recommend that future bibliometric studies on the topic use Scopus and Google Scholar database to validate our findings.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 IMF: International Monetary Fund.

2 OECD: Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development.

3 America’s FCPA of 1977: The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.

4 OECD Committee on Bribery 1989: Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/38865251.pdf.

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Appendix

Table A1. Key methodological concepts and sample section process

Table A2. Influential aspects of the literature

Table A3. Key papers that create a citation map of the literature

Table A4. Summary of data sources, methods, and theoretical frameworks

Table A5. Future research questions