The British warfare state and the challenge of Americanisation of Western defence1

  1. I would like to thank Philippe Laredo, Lorenza Sebesta, Inderjeet Parmar, Harm Schröter, Jonathan Aylen, Bertrand Taithe, Maurice Kirby, Hilary Owen and the two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this article. While their comments proved invaluable in clarifying my ideas, the interpretation and any errors remain entirely my own.

Abstract

This article examines the response of British policy-makers to American thinking on how to organise Western defence following the formation of the Western military alliance in 1949. As part of their vision, American policy-makers argued for the integration of Western European armed forces and defence production. As the British defence production base had largely survived the war unscathed, the British warfare state was better placed than other Western European governments to resist this American vision for Western defence. Seeing Britain as a major power, British policy-makers remained committed to an independent defence posture within the alliance, ignoring the disapproval of American military leaders. Convinced that its defence industry could produce technologically advanced military weapons equal to those developed in the United States, the British Government continued to maintain an independent armaments production capability rather than participate in the Western European armaments cooperation in the 1950s. When serious problems affected several military aircraft projects in the mid-1950s, the British Government nevertheless looked to the United States for models of how to improve the efficiency of its weapons acquisition process. This article argues that while never Americanised, Britain's participation in Western defence cooperation undermined the British warfare state as a techno-nationalist project from the late 1940s.

Keywords:

• British warfare state
• British defence policy
• Cold War
• national security state
• North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
• American military assistance to Western Europe
• Operations Research
• Americanisation
• defence industry
• European defence cooperation

Notes

  1. I would like to thank Philippe Laredo, Lorenza Sebesta, Inderjeet Parmar, Harm Schröter, Jonathan Aylen, Bertrand Taithe, Maurice Kirby, Hilary Owen and the two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this article. While their comments proved invaluable in clarifying my ideas, the interpretation and any errors remain entirely my own.

  2. Salisbury, Harrison E. “Moscow Says Pact Gives U.S. Vassals.” New York Times, 5 April 1949.

  3. On this point, see Varga, Eugen. Grundfragen de Ökonomik und Politik des Imperialismus nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Joseph Harhammer, 100–120. Berlin: Dietz, 1955.

  4. As Vojtech Mastny has stressed, the new Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 as a ‘cardboard castle’ with the intention to use the newly created alliance as a bargaining tool in an attempt to replace the rival military alliances through a collective security system. Indeed, the subsequent history of the Warsaw Pact showed that Moscow's satellites pushed for a limited role in deciding the alliance's military plans and political strategy; see Mastny, Vojtech. “Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact.” In A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, Vol. 2, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 158–61. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.

  5. Reston, James. “Issue of Arms for Europe is Soldiers vs. Economists: Bradley and Nourse Statements Contrasted, While Neither Pleases Diplomats.” New York Times, 8 April 1949. Indeed, Nourse was repeating warnings previously made in a speech to the National Military Establishment Joint Orientation conference in November 1948 that the American economy could not support an increase in its current defence and foreign assistance budget; the speech is reprinted in Appendix E of Nourse, Edwin G. Economics in the Public Service: Administrative Aspects of the Employment Act, 485–95. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953.

  6. Vandenberg, Arthur H. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., in collaboration with Joe Alex Morris, 502–18. London: Victor Gollancz, 1953. On the initial hostile reaction of the Congressional Leadership, see Reston, James “8 Pact Nations Appeal to U.S. for Urgent Arms, Cash Aid: Acheson Says Congress Will be Requested to Provide Assistance – Brussels Treaty Powers Set European Defense Plan.” New York Times, 9 April 1949 On the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, see also Pach, Jr., Chester J. Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950, 221–26. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

  7. Pach, Arming the Free World, 227–32.

  8. Hogan, Michael J. The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 21–2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

  9. Document 6: “Paris Dinner on E.P.U., 25.3.50.” 27 March 1950, reprinted in The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell, 1945–1956, ed. Philip M. Williams, 178–82. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983; Marjolin, Robert. Architect of European Unity: Memoirs, 1911–1986, trans. William Hall, 218–20. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989.

 10. If a state's ability to wage war defines its national sovereignty, the formation of military alliances limited that sovereignty, while having a clearly identified enemy instilled a sense of community; see Buck-Morss, Susan. Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West, 7–11. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. However, the Western alliance was not exclusively defined by its shared enemy, but also by its shared values and traditions reflected in the NAT text. By the Western alliance primarily as product of American imperialism, Stalin and Soviet analysts misunderstood the nature of western defence cooperation; see Mastny, “Learning from the Enemy,”158.

 11. For a survey of this literature, see Mastny, Vojtech. “The New History of Cold War Alliances.” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (2002): 55–84. On the economic aspects of Western defence cooperation, see Gordon, Lincoln. “Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy: The NATO Experience.” International Organization 10, no.4 (1956): 529–43; Milward, Alan S. “Different Securities?: NATO and the Transformation of the State.” In A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, vol. 1, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 15–26. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001; Segreto, Luciano. “L'OTAN entre contraintes militaires and enjeux économiques et financiers.” In L'Europe et l'OTAN face aux défis des élargissements de 1952 et 1954, 173–87, Organisation internationale et relations internationales. Bruxelles: Émile Bruylant, 2005.

 12. See for example, Krige, John/ American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006; Pestre, Dominique. “Repenser les Variantes Du Complexe Militaire-Industriel-Universitaire.” In Deux Siècles d'Histoire de l'Armement en France: De Gribeauval à la Force de Frappe, ed. Dominique Pestre, 135–65. Paris: CNRS éditions, 2005; Edwards, Paul N. The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America. Cmbridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996; Leslie, Stuart W. The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

 13. In its examination of the extent of Americanisation of Britain's defence effort, this article uses Harm Schröter's definition of “Americanisation as an adapted transfer of values, behaviour, institutions, patterns of organisation, symbols and norms from the USA to the economic life of other states”; see Schröter, Harm G. Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe Since the 1880s, 4. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. Following this definition, Americanisation can be described as the deliberate transfer process of an institutional arrangement, practice or mentality. The actual transfer process does not just involve a sender and a receiver, but also depends on the channels or conduits for the transmission of these ideas or practices. Moreover, the transferred ideas and practices may be translated and adapted by the receivers into domestic economic life; see Bjarnar, Ove, and Matthias Kipping. “The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models to Europe: An Introductory Framework.” In The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models, Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar, 4–8. London: Routledge, 1998.

 14. On the American technical assistance programme and productivity mission, see Barjot, Dominique, ed. Catching up with America: Productivity Missions and the Diffusion of American Economic and Technological Influence After the Second World War. Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2002; Barjot, Dominique, and Christophe Réveillard, eds. L'Américanisation d'Europe Occidentale au XXe Siècle: Mythe et Réalité. Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2002; Zeitlin, Jonathan, and Gary Herrigel, eds. Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. On the economic impact of the restrictions on East–West trade, see Eloranta, Jari, and Jari Ojala, eds. East–West Trade and the Cold War. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä Press, 2005; Enderle-Burcel, Gertrude, et al., Cold War and Neutrality: East–West Economic Relations in Europe. Cracow: Jagellonian University Press, forthcoming 2008.

 15. An exception is Engel, Jeffrey A. Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

 16. On this point, see Engerman, David C. “American Knowledge and Global Power.” Diplomatic History 31, no. 4 (2007): 599–622; Pestre, “Repenser”. This point will be explored in more depth in the next section.

 17. Kaplan, Lawrence S. The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, 140–2. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1984.

 18. On this point, see Hogan, Marshall Plan, 386–89; Berghahn, Volker. Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik, 263–67. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1985; Maier, Charles S. “Finance and Defense: Implications of Military Integration, 1950–1952.” In NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, 335–51. London: Macmillan, 1992.

 19. Deloge, Pascal. Une coopération difficile: Belgique et Grande-Bretagne en quête de sécurité à l'aube de la guerre froide, 314–15. Bruxelles: Musée Royal de l'Armée, 2000.

 20. Würzler, Heinz-Werner. “Die Anfänge kanadischer Militärhilfe für die europäischen NATO-Partner: Probleme und Motivationen. 1948/49–1951/52.” In Das Nordatlantische Bündnis, 1949–1956, ed. Klaus A. Maier and Norbert Wiggershaus, 109–29. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993.

 21. Dauchelle, Sandrine. “La place des États-Unis dans la reconstruction d'une industrie française d'armement sous la quatrième République. 1945–1958.” In L'Américanisation d'Europe occidentale au XXe siècle: mythe et réalité, ed. Dominique Barjot and Christophe Réveillard, 155–69. Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2002; McGlade, Jacqueline. “NATO Procurement and the Revival of European Defense, 1950–60.” In A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, vol. 3, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 13–28. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.

 22. Geiger, Till, and Lorenza Sebesta. “A Self-Defeating Policy: American Offshore Procurement and Integration of Western European Defence Production, 1952–56.” Journal of European Integration History 4, no. 1 (1998): 55–73.

 23. On the link between American knowledge and global power in the context of the early cold war, see Engerman, “American Knowledge.”

 24. I am following Foucault's use of governmentality as an analytical tool adopted in his analysis of the neo-liberal critiques of modern welfare state; see Foucault, Michel. Naissance de la biopolitique: cours au Collège de France. 1978–1979, 192. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2004.

 25. Bush, Vannevar. Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy, 249–61. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949.

 26. George Lincoln, Arthur, William S. Stone, and Thomas H. Harvey. Economics of National Security, 56–64, quote: 57. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950.

 27. On the shortcomings of the national security organisation, see United States. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. 1947–1949, The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, reprint of the 1949 ed., 185–97. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970.

 28. Gorn, Michael H. Harnessing the Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944–1986. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988.

 29. Allison, David K. “U.S. Navy Research and Development Since World War II.” In Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perpectives on the American Experience, ed. Merritt Roe Smith, 289–328. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.

 30. Leslie, Cold War and American Science.

 31. Edgerton, David E.H. Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970, 324–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

 32. Klein, Burton H., William H. Meckling, and Emmanuel G. Mesthene, Military Research and Development Policies, 26, Report R-333. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1958.

 33. Pestre, “Repenser.” 148–62. On RanD work on systems analysis, see Quade, Edward S. “Introduction.” In Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense, ed. Edward S. Quade and W.I. Boucher, 4–5. New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 1968. On the growing influence of economic thinking on American national security policy in this period, see the recent critical account by Kuklick, Bruce. Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger, 19–36. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

 34. Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954, 212–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

 35. The instructors at West Point wrote one of the first widely read textbooks on defence economics; see Lincoln, Stone, and Harvey, Economics of National Security; George Arthur Lincoln and associates in the social sciences. Department of Social Sciences U.S. Military Academy, Economics of National Security: Managing America's Resources for Defense. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954.

 36. “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14 April 1950.” In Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, 385–442. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

 37. Foucault, Naissance, 223–4.

 38. Hogan, Cross of Iron, 267–91.

 39. “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14 April 1950.” On the rhetoric of NSC-68, see also John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy, 107–9. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

 40. Armatte, Michela. “Les sciences économiques recofigurées par la pax americana.” In Les Sciences Pour la Guerre: 1940–1960, ed. Amy Dahan and Dominique Pestre, 129–73. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2004.

 41. On the use of national income statistics in NSC-68, see Geiger, Till. “Studies in the Political Economy and Economic Impact of British Defence Expenditure and American Military Aid to Britain, 1945–1955.” Ph.D. diss., Department of History, University of Aberdeen, 1999, 181–92.

 42. Hitch Charles J., and R. M. McKean. Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, 11–19. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society, 140–50. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.

 43. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. iii: Western Europe. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977, hereafter: FRUS (1950) iii, 1–3: Acheson–Truman, 3 January 1950; see also Thoß, Bruno. “Kollektive Verteidigung und ökonomische Sicherheit: Die Verteidigungsplanung der NATO zwischen militärischen Erfordernissen und finanziellen Begrenzungen, 1949–1967.” In Von Truman bis Harmel: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration, ed. Hans-Joachim Harder, 21. München: Oldenbourg, 2000.

 44. FRUS (1950) iii, 43–48: Vorhees–Acheson, 5 April 1950.

 45. For an in-depth analysis of these efforts, see Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe.

 46. Beer, Francis A. Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Communit, 210–12y. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969.

 47. Locke, Robert R. Management and Higher Education Since 1940: The Influence of America and Japan in West Germany, Great Britain and France, 118–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

 48. Geiger, Till. “American Hegemony and the Adoption of National Income Statistics in Western Europe After 1945.” In L'Américanisation en Europe au XXe Siècle: Économie, Culture, Politique, vol. 1, ed. Dominique Barjot, Isabelle Lescent-Giles, and Marc de Ferrière le Vayer, 151–67. Lille: Centre de recherche sur l'Histoire de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest, Université Charles de Gaulle – Lille 3, 2002.

 49. Geiger, “Studies.”198–9.

 50. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970, passim, but particularly 270–304.

 51. In the index of Edgerton's book, NATO is not listed. The British position in the cold war technology rivalry is only briefly considered; see Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970, 231–7.

 52. For example, see Shonfield, Andrew. British Economic Policy Since the War. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958; Anderson, Perry. “The Origins of the Present Crisis.” New Left Review, no. 23 (1964).

 53. Peden, G.C. Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

 54. Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, 14–16.

 55. On this point, see Geiger, Till. Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945–1955, 19–60. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. The remainder of this section will draw heavily on this account.

 56. Hyam, Ronald, ed. The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–1951; Part III: Strategy, Politics and Constitutional Change, British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, Volume 2. London: HMSO, 1992. hereafter: BDEE A2 iii, 333–340: “Strategic position of the British Commonwealth”: report by COS for Cabinet Defence Committee, 2 April 1946.

 57. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 39–40.

 58. Ministry of Defence, Central Organisation for Defence, in Cmd. 6923. London: HMSO, 1946.

 59. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970, 90–93.

 60. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 31–34.

 61. Pollard, Robert A. Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950, 71–2. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

 62. Bullen, Roger John, and M.E. Pelley. Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 1, Volume 4: Britain and America: Atomic Energy, Bases and Food, 12 December 1945–31 July 1946. London: HMSO, 1987. hereafter: DBPO 1iv, 93–6: Joint Staff Mission–Cabinet Office, 9 February 1946.

 63. DBPO 1iv, microfiche Calendar 104ii: Standardisation of Armaments, 4 and 20 June 1946.

 64. Leigh-Phippard, Helen. Congress and US Military Aid to Britain: Interdependence and Dependence, 1949–56, 23–31. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.

 65. Cox, Philip. “The United States Air Force in Britain, 1947–50: British Decision-Making and the Anglo-American Relationship.” Unpublished MA thesis, University of Manchester, 2005.

 66. Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 387–88. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969.

 67. MC3: “The Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area.” 19 October 1949, reprinted in Pedlow, Gregory W., ed. “NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969.” Brussels: NATO International Staff Archive (updated May 1999). http://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm (accessed 10 January 2007).

 68. The concept of ‘self-help and mutual cooperation’ first appeared in section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948; see Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Public Law 472, 80th Congress, Chapter 169, 2nd session. S.2022. 1948, reprinted in American Journal of International Law 43, no. 2 (1949), Supplement: Official Documents, 64–5. This concept was integrated into the bilateral Marshall Aid agreements, the Vandenberg resolution and eventually in Article 3 of the NAT. On the central importance of improved European cooperation and integration both economically and militarily, see Hogan, Marshall Plan, 310–16.

 69. See the suggestions and comments by various member states contained in Enclosure 3: MC3/1: “The Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area.” 19 November 1949, reprinted in Pedlow, ed., “NATO Strategy Documents”.

 70. Hogan, Marshall Plan, 310–16.

 71. FRUS (1950) iii, 108–12: Acheson–Acting Secretary of State, 16 May 1950, and 123–5: Acheson–Truman, 18 May 1950.

 72. Milward, “Different Securities?”16; Milward, Alan S. “NATO, OEEC, and the Integration of Europe.” In NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis Heller and John Gillingham, 241–52. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

 73. Ismay, Hastings Lionel. NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, 127–8. Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1954.

 74. National Archives Washington [hereafter: NAW], R[ecord] G[roup] 330, [Records of the Secretary of Defense], Entry 44, Box 2: “‘Appraisal of European Offers of Increased Defense Expenditures.’ ECA Study for Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee.” 18 August 1950.

 75. Geiger, Till. “Western Defence, Economic Cooperation and the Atlantic Paradox: Multilateralism and Governmentality in the Cold War, 1949–1960.” In Nouvelles Perspectives sur les Trente Glorieuses et le Multilatéralisme en Europe de 1945 à 1975, ed. Régine Perron and Guido Thiemeyer. Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-So-rbonne, forthcoming.

 76. On the work of the TCC, see Hammerich, Helmut R. Jeder für sich und Amerika gegen alle?: Die Lastenteilung der NATO am Beispiel des Temporary Council Committee 1949 bis 1954. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003.

 77. DBPO 2 iv, 411–31 (quotes 413 and 420): “Defence Policy and Global Strategy.” Report by the Chiefs of Staff, 7 June 1950.

 78. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 75–112.

 79. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 96–7.

 80. Middleton, Drew. The Defence of Western Europe, 129. London: Frederick Muller, 1952.

 81. Middleton, Defence, 128–37.

 82. Johnston, Andrew M. “Mr. Slessor Goes to Washington: The Influence of the British Global Strategy Paper on the Eisenhower New Look.” Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (1998): 361–98.

 83. Hammerich, Jeder für sich, 322–4.

 84. Maier, “Finance and Defense.”

 85. Johnston, “Mr. Slessor,”386–7.

 86. FRUS (1958–1960), vii, 549–552: Telegram from the delegation at North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting–Department of State, 18 December 1959.

 87. Heinz Rebhan, “Der Aufbau des militärischen Instruments der NATO.” In Die NATO als Militärallianz: Strategie, Organisation und nukleare Kontrolle im Bündnis, 1949 bis 1959, ed. Bruno Thoß, 227–43. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003.

 88. Leigh-Phippard, US Military Aid to Britain, 79–101. On the Centurion procurement contract, see also Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 268–71.

 89. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 262–8.

 90. Gilbert, Milton, and Irving B. Kravis. An International Comparison of National Products and the Purchasing Power of Currencies: A Study of the United States, The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, 36–45. Paris: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, 1954.

 91. Geiger and Sebesta, “Self-Defeating Policy,”60–1.

 92. British Productivity Council, Ammunition: Report of a British Productivity Team on Ammunition Which Visited the United States in 1952. London: British Productivity Council, 1953; Geiger, Till. “The British State, Defence Industry and the Influence of American Technology, 1945–65.” In Catching up with America: Productivity Missions and the Diffusion of American Economic and Technological Influence After the Second World War, ed. Dominique Barjot, 157–70. Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2002.

 93. Ministry of Defence, The Supply of Military Aircraft, 9, Cmd. 9388. London: HMSO, 1955.

 94. TNA PRO AIR 20/8571: Paper on “The Weapons System Concept. O.R.16(55)8),” 15 November 1955.

 95. PRO AIR 20/8571: Paper on “The Weapons System Concept. O.R.16(55)8),” 15 November 1955.

 96. PRO AIR 20/8571: Paper on “The Weapons System Concept. O.R.16(55)8),” 15 November 1955.

 97. House of Commons, Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, Session 1956–57: The Supply of Military Aircraft, xxi–xxii, Parliamentary Papers. London: HMSO 1956.

 98. House of Commons, The Supply of Military Aircraft, xviii–xxiii.

 99. House of Commons, Supply of Military Aircraft, xxiii–xxv. As the Ministry of Supply officials in their evidence to the Select Committee on Estimates, Edgerton has emphasised the neglected importance of civilian scientists working for the ministry; see Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970, 108–90.

100. Shonfield, British Economic Policy, 95–96.

101. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 145–89.

102. TNA PRO AIR2/15422: “Air Armament – Future Procurement Following Abolition of Ministry of Supply”, minute by Oakes, [undated] 1960.

103. On the development of Operational Research in Britain, see Kirby, Maurice W. Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970. London: Imperial College Press, 2003. All three branches of the armed forces had their own operational research teams; on their work see Pennycuick, K. “Army Operational Research in the Far East, 1952/54.” Operational Research Quarterly 5, no. 4 (December 1954): 120–9; Gadsby, G. Neville “The Army Operational Research Establishment.” Operational Research Quarterly 16, no. 1 (March 1965): 5–18.

104. E.K.G. James, “O.R. in Defence.” Operational Research Quarterly 16, no. 2 (June 1965): 247–8.

105. Klein, Meckling, and Mesthene, Military Research and Development Policies.

106. Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem, 187–189.

107. TNA PRO FO 371/113404: Minute by Blaker, 30 October 1954.

108. NA PRO FO 371/113404: Letter Beith–Hancock, 10 December 1954. On the Western European armaments pool, see also Calandri, Elena. “Western European Union Armaments Pool: France's Quest for Security and European Cooperation in Transition, 1951–1955.” Journal of European Integration History 1, no. 1 (1995): 37–63; Abelshauser, Werner. “Rüstung, Wirtschaft, Rüstungswirtschaft: Wirtschaftliche Aspekte des Kalten Krieges in den fünfziger Jahren.” In Das Nordatlantische Bündnis, 1949–1956, ed. Klaus A. Maier and Norbert Wiggershaus, 89–108. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993.

109. On this point, see Scranton, Philip. “Turbulence and Redesign: Dynamic Innovation and the Dilemmas of US Military Jet Propulsion Development.” European Management Journal 25, no. 3 (2007): 235–48, DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2007.04.001; Scranton, Philip. “Urgency, Uncertainty, and Innovation: Building Jet Engines in Postwar America.” Management and Organizational History 1, no. 2 (2006): 127–57, DOI: 10.1177/1744935906064096.