Spain's and Poland's Road to NATO: the problem of continuity and change in the foreign policy of a democratising state

Abstract

The aim of this article is to compare the Spanish and Polish road to NATO from the perspective of the shape of the foreign policy and its possible restructuring in states undergoing the process of democratic transformation. The study of both cases shows that the reorientation of the foreign policy of a democratising state results to a large extent from external conditions at the global and regional levels although the internal conditions may hinder or accelerate the reorientation. The example of Spain demonstrates that in a firm and stable international system (the bipolar system) it is extremely difficult to change the direction of foreign policy, even if there are internal premises such as democratisation, well-organised opposition supporting the change and social support. In the case of Poland, the flexible and unstable international system made it possible to radically change the direction of its foreign policy. The existing internal premises without the appropriate external context would not have been enough to generate the reorientation of foreign policy. The comparative study of Spanish and Polish cases should be treated as an introduction to the broader analysis on the subject of the restructuring of foreign policy in the democratising state. Democratic transformation processes which took place in Europe from the mid-1970s provide broad empirical material for further scientific work in this area.

Keywords:

• Poland
• Spain
• NATO
• democratic transformation
• foreign policy change

Notes

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 2. Hermet, G. “La démocratisation à l'amiable: de l'Espagne à la Pologne.” Commentaire no. 50 (1990): 279–86; Machcewicz P. “Hiszpańska droga do demokracji.” Tygodnik Solidarność no. 3 (1989): 4; Michnik, A. “La derrota de Stalin. La vía española como la esperanza para Polonia.” El País 23 March 1989; Kieniewicz, J. “Hiszpania-przykład czy wyzwanie.” Przegląd Powszechny no. 1 (1990): 92–104; Kieniewicz, J. “Doświadczenia hiszpańskie w rzeczywistości polskiej.” Polska w Europie no. 21 (1996): 102–14; Filar, D. “Polonia es diferente, czyli Socjoekonomiczna paralela Polski z Hiszpanią u schyłku wieku totalizmów.” Przegląd Powszechny no. 1 (1990): 105–16; Dobek-Ostrowska, B. Hiszpania i Polska: elity polityczne w okresie przejścia do demokracji. Analiza porównawcza. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1996. By the same author: “La transición democrática en España y en Polonia (análisis comparativo).” Investigaciones Históricas no. 16 ([Valladolid] 1996): 239–56.

 3. There were only some attempts to use the Spanish experience during its integration with the European Communities. See Bernatowicz, G. “Europejska polityka Hiszpanii. Wnioski dla Polski.” Sprawy Międzynarodowe no. 4 (1993): 85–100; Ważniewski, P. “Grecja, Hiszpania i Portugalia na drodze do Unii Europejskiej-wnioski z doświadczeń.” Handel Zagraniczny nos 10–11 (1994): 22–7.

 4. See Rosati et al., Foreign Policy Restructuring.

 5. See Volgy, T.J., and J.E. Schwarz. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint.” In Rosati et al., Foreign Policy Restructuring, 25. See also Hagan, J.D. “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring. A Framework for Comparative Analysis.” In Rosati et al., 138–63.

 6. This thesis is advocated by, inter alia, Pereira: “Transición y política exterior: el nuevo reto de la historiografía española.”

 7. For more on Spain's and Poland's road to NATO, see Wojna: La política de seguridad en España y Polonia en la transición hacia la democracia; Wojna: El camino de España y Polonia hacia la Alianza Atlántica.

 8. Alonso Baquer, M. Estrategia para la defensa. Los elementeos para la situación militar española, Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones del EME, 1984.

 9. A through analysis of the relations between Spain and United States is given in Viñas, En las garras del águila.

10. See Marquina: España en la política de seguridad occidental 1936–1986; Viñas, A. Los pactos secretos de Franco con los Estados Unidos. Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981.

11. See Vernant, J. “Le sommet atlantique de Bruxelles.” Défense nationale (juillet 1975): 89–94.

12. On this issue see more in Story, J. “La redefinición de las relaciones exteriores de España: 1975–89.” In Gillespie et al., Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática, 53–62.

13. It should be noted that it was the period when tensions in the Mediterranean region increased considerably. More information on the issue is given in the section devoted to external conditions.

14. Statement by Arias Navarro in Parliament, 28 January 1976, in del Arenal, C., and F. Aldecoa. España y la OTAN. Textos y Documentos. Madrid: Tecnos, 1984, 213.

15. Smith, M. NATO enlargement during the Cold War. New York: Palgrave, 2000, 141. See also Viñas: En las garras del águila, 429–41. There are no monographic studies on the Spanish–American Council (access to the documents in the archives is not allowed). In the understanding of the role of this structure the following may be of help: “Report of the Department of State, February 6, 1976.” Department of State Bulletin 22 March 1976, 362–4; “President Ford's Message to the Senate, transmitted on February 18.” Department of State Bulletin 22 March 1976, 362; “Statement by Ambassador at Large Robert McCloskey, made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 3.” Department of State Bulletin 22 March 1976, 364–6.

16. Pérez Muinelo, F. “Panorámica del presupuesto de defensa en España, 1946–1995.” Ensayos INCIPE no. 15 ([Madrid] 1996).

17. Barbé, España y la OTAN, 125–32. See also the press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcelino Oreja of 1 March 1977 in Oreja Aguirre, M. Discursos y Declaraciones del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores D. Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. Madrid: OID, enero 1978, 44–5.

18. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 9 March 1978 in del Arenal, C. and F. Aldecoa. España y la OTAN. Textos y Documentos. Madrid: Tecnos, 1984, 218–19.

19. For more on this issue see Rodrigo, F. “La inserción de España en la política de seguridad occidental.” In Gillespie et al., Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática, 86–8. See also the statement by the Prime Minister Leopold Calvo Sotelo, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados no. 143 (18 de febrero de 1981): 9156–7.

20. Kupiecki, R., and K. Szczepanik. Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1918–1994. Warsaw: Scholar, 1995; Zając, J., and R. Zięba. Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989. Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2005; Rychłowski, B., red. Polityka zagraniczna odrodzonej Polski 1918–1988. Warsaw: PISM, 1989.

21. On the goals of Polish foreign policy in the early democratisation period, see the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubiszewski in Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 28 posiedzenia Sejmu w dniu 26 kwietnia 1990 roku, X term. Warsaw: Sejm RP, 7–11.

22. Statement by Prime Mnister J. Olszewski in Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 3 posiedzenia Sejmu, 21 December 1991, I term. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1991, 6.

23. See Skubiszewski: “Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach 1989–1991,” 21–2; also Wojna: “El proceso de la integración de Polonia en la OTAN, de la opción europea a la opción atlántica en la política de seguridad de Polonia (1989–1993).” http://www.ugr.es/∼ceas/Seguridad%20Europea/El%20proceso%20de%20integracion%20de%20Polonia%20en%20la%20OTAN.pdf. The existence of the European option in the security policy is evidenced by the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubiszewski in the years 1990–1991. See Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 51 posiedzenia Sejmu, 14 February 1991, X term. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1991, 50; Biuletyn Komisji Obrony Narodowej i Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych no. 1069/X (13 March 1991), X term. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1991, 26.

24. For more on the issue of Polish security policy, see Kuźniar, R., ed. Poland's Security Policy 1989–2000. Warsaw: Foundation of International Studies/Scholar Publishing House, 2001.

25. Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 14 posiedzenia Sejmu RP, 8 May 1992, I term. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1992.

26. Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10 January 1994. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm,; See also Framework Document, from the same meting of the North Atlantic Council, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm; Study on NATO Enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 September 1995. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl–9501.htm.

27. Goldgeier, J. Not whether but when. The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999; Solomon, G. The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997. Blessing of Liberty. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

28. “Polsko–Amerykańska współpraca wojskowa.” Department of Military Foreign Affairs, National Security Bureau, update of 26 May 1997.

29. See Dobek-Ostrowska, B. Hiszpania i Polska: elity polityczne w okresie przejścia do demokracji. Analiza porównawcza. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1996; Taibo, C. Las transiciones en la Europa central y oriental. Copias del papel carbón? Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 1998; Linz, J.J., and A. Stephan, eds. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South Europe, South America and Post-Comunist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Karl, T.L., and Ph. C. Schmitter. “Modelos de transición en América Latina, Europa del Sur y Europa del Este.” Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales no. 128 (junio 1991): 283–300; Kieniewicz, J. “Inny kraj, inni ludzie, inne losy.” Rzeczpospolita 25–26 May 1996.

30. The Spanish Constitution was adopted at an early stage of the transformation, whereas its Polish counterpart was adopted only in the final period of democratisation. From 1992 until the Constitution was adopted in 1997, the so-called small Constitution was in force, i.e. the “Constitutional Act of 17 October 1992 on the mutual relations between the legislative and executive authorities of the Republic of Poland and on territorial self-government”. On the Spanish constitution, see Villaamil, O. Comentarios a la Constitución Española de 1978. Madrid: Cortes Generales, Editoriales de Derecho Reunidos, 1998; Falla Garrido, F. Comentrios a la Constitución Española. Madrid: Civitas, 1980. For more information on the Polish constitution, see Witkowski, Z., ed. Prawo Konstytucyjne. Toruń: TNOiK, 2002.

31. On the subject of the Spanish party system see Caciagli, M. Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid, CIS–Siglo, 1986. The Polish system was described by Jednaka, W. Proces kształtowania się systemu partyjnego w Polsce po 1989. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1995; Słodkowska, J. “Partie i ugrupowania polityczne polskiej transformacji” in Zbiorowi aktorzy polskiej polityki. Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1997, 9–87.

32. Between 1978 and 1981 the number of opponents to NATO accession increased from 15% to 43%, and the number of proponents fell from 27% to 13%. Data quoted after: Arija, J.M. “Los españoles ante la OTAN.” Las ideas para la democracia no. 1 (1984): 296 (monographic issue La política de defensa y la OTAN).

33. Consideration of the relationship between the Spanish membership of NATO and external conditions should include a mention of the unsuccessful military coup of 23 February 1981. The NATO supporters argued later that membership of the organisation would help them achieve democratic and civilian control over the military forces. It should be remembered, however, that the decision on Spain's accession to NATO had been taken by the Spanish government before the coup, not after it. Thus we can discuss only the influence of the coup on the decision already taken, not on the process of reaching it.

34. See “Polacy w NATO i Unii Europejskiej.” Report prepared in February 1997 by Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej, Warsaw, archives of OBOP. Between 1992 and 1997 the support for NATO membership ranged from 77% to 90%.

35. On the relationship between NATO accession and EEC integration see Rodrigo, F. “La inserción de España en la política de seguridad occidental.” In Gillespie et al., Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática, 83–6.

36. Transcipts of the debates in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputadop. Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores no. 41, 42, 43, of 6, 7 and 8 October 1981, 1802–2048; Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados no. 191, 192 and 193 of 27, 28 and 29 October 1981, 11295–11454.

37. Speech by Felipe González, candidate for the presidency of the government of 30 November 1982, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados no. 3, 30 de noviembre de 1982, 333.

38. The PSOE evolution in this period was discussed by Mendez Lago, M. La estrategia orgnizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (1975–1996). Madrid: CIS, 2000. The new pro-Atlantic position of the PSOE government was illustrated by the speech of F. González of 23 October 1984. In the so-called ‘Decalogue’ the president of the government advocates Spain's remaining in NATO on three conditions: Spain should remain outside the military structure of the Alliance, its territory should be de-nuclearised and its policy in the Western European Union should be active. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados no. 157, 23 de octubre de 1984, 7070–7092. The PSOE evolution in this period was discussed by Mendez Lago: La estrategia orgnizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (1975–1996).

39. In total, representatives of 26 parties and political groups were elected to the Sejm in the first term. Five of them had mandates exceeding 10%. See electoral platforms of the parties in Słodkowska, I., ed. Wybory 1991. Programy partii i ugrupowań politycznych. Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2001.

40. Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubiszewski of 8 May 1992, Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 14 posiedzenia Sejmu RP. 8 maja 1992, I kadencja. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu, 1992.

41. See the statement by L. Pastusiak and T. Iwiński in Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 14 posiedzenia Sejmu RP. 8 maja 1992, I kadencja Sejmu. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejmu RP, 1992.

42. The change in the attitude of the SLD can be explained as a consequence of an adjustment of the party to the new international and home situation.

43. Sprawozdania stenograficzne z 2 posiedzenia Sejmu w dniu 9 listopada 1993 roku. II term. Warsaw: Kancelaria Sejm RP, 1993, 7 and 17.

44. On the second Cold War see Halliday, F. Génesis de la segunda guerra fría. México: FCE, 1989; Chomsky, N. La segunda guerra fría. Barcelona: Crítica, 1989. For more on the Cold War in general, see Powaski, R.E. La guerra fría: Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética. 1917–1991. Barcelona: Crítica, 2000; Crockat, R. The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics. 1941–1991. London: Routledge, 1995; Veiga, F. La paz simulada: una historia de la guerra fría 1941–1991. Madrid: Alianza, 1997.

45. For more on the subject, see Wojna: “Uwarunkowania zewnętrzne i proces integracji Hiszpanii w NATO w latach 1973–1986,” 199–217.

46. The ruling elites were aware of the growing importance of Spain and tried to take advantage of the fact in order to achieve Spain's integration in NATO. Informe anual sobre Ejércitos Extranjeros (1974). Instrucción 269–2 del EMC, Madrid, Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, 2^a Sección, octubre 1975, difusión limitada (limited circulation), 4–5.

47. Riera Pons, M. “Situación estratégica mundial y situación geoestratégica española. Repercusiones de ambas en las relaciones España–Estados Unidos.” Boletín de Información” (CESEDEN) no. 140, XI–XII (1980): 19.

48. Gill, P., ed. Atlantic Relationship. Beyond the Reagan Era. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, 11.

49. In the context of the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, A.A. Hartman said that the national interests of the Alliance members won above the interests of the whole bloc. “The impact of the Middle East Crisis on the Atlantic Alliance.” Statements by Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 19 February, in The Department of State Bulletin, 8 March, 1974, 279.

50. In 1978 Horacio Rivero, the US ambassador in Spain (1972–1975) wrote on the reasons for the NATO crisis. Rivero, H. “¿Por qué una flota USA en El Mediterráneo?” Boletín de Información” (CESEDEN) no. 116–IV (1978): 8–14. In 1980 and 1981 the crisis of the Alliance and the necessity to strengthen the Western bloc was discussed by Reagan, R., and A.M. Haig. “Extraits du Discours de M.R. Reagan après son investiture par le Parti Républicain, Detroit, 17 juillet 1980.” Documents d'Actualité Internationale no. 38 (1980): 729–31. “Opening Statement by Secretary designate Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on January 8, 1981.” Department of State Bulletin, February, 1981, D.

51. See “Supplementary Questions Submitted by Subcommittee Chairman Lee H. Hamilton to Steve Canby and his responses.” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. Ninety-Fifth Congress, First session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, Appendix No.7, 324 and 340; Treverton, G. “Spain, the United States and NATO: Strategic Facts and Political Realities.” In Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives, ed. J.P. Gil and F.P. Tulchin. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1988, 136.

52. Kissinger's comments during his visit to Madrid in July 1974 in Department of State Bulletin (5 August, 1974): 228–9; President Ford's press conference in “Weekly Compilation on Presidential Documents dated June 9.” Department of State Bulletin (30 June 1975): 892.

53. Krauthamer, Ch. “The unipolar moment.” Foreign Affairs 70 no. 1 (1991): 23–33; Hoffman, P. “A New World Order and its Troubles.” Foreign Affairs 69 no. 4 (1990): 115–22; Nye, J. “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs 71 no. 2 (1992): 20–37. Cox, R.W. “Multilateralism and World Order” Review of International Studies 18 no. 2 (1992): 161–80; Halliday, F. “El balance de 1993: El mundo nuevo y sus insatisfacciones.” Anuario Internacional CIDOB 1993. Barcelona: CIDOB, 1994.

54. Vanhoonacker, P. The Bush Administration (1989–1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.

55. It seems that in the first years after the end of the Cold War, the USA perceived the EU involvement in Central Europe as a factor which could result in weakening the American position. American actions (including the development of bilateral relations with the states in the region and supporting the idea of NATO enlargement) were consequently aimed at increasing US influence in the region. The thesis may be too far-reaching, but the memoirs of the Secretary General of Western European Union seem to confirm it. Van Eekelen, W. Debating European security 1948–1998. Bruxelles: Sdu Publishers, Center for European Policy Studies, 1998, 75–8. See also the transcript of the so-called Bartholomew Telegrams in Van Eekelen, 340–4.

56. See Zorgbibe, Ch. Histoire de l'OTAN. Bruxelles: Ed. Complex, 2002, 183–93; Yost, D. NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998.

57. Waltz, K.N. “NATO Expansion: a Realist's View.” [In R.W. Rauchaus] Contemporary Security Policy. Special Issue: Explaining NATO Enlargement 21 no. 2 (August 2000): 23–38.

58. Critical views on Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty were expressed by Rummel, R., ed. Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992.

59. The same is true regarding integration in the European Community. The first declarations and documents evidencing Spain's efforts to integrate in the EU date back to the 1960s. See Crespo MacLennan, J. Spain and the Process of European Integration. 1957–1986. Oxford: Palgrave and St Anthony's College, 2000.