Changing visions of the world sugar market in the Great Depression1

  1. For comments I am grateful to all the participants of the workshop on the cultural history of politics, to Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Friedrich Lenger, Kathrine Lausted Veie, and the anonymous referees.

Abstract

The interwar period is usually characterised as a prime example of disintegration and national antagonism, and even claimed by some to be the ‘end of globalisation’. This article shows, however, that first attempts towards an economic internationalism were possible and implemented. It argues that a changing vision of the world provided the basis for this new tendency. The irreversibility of the interconnectedness of the national economies became obvious in spite of an end of globalisation as mirrored by the decline in international trade. This shift in the vision of the economic world is described for the case of the international sugar market. Driven by the Great Depression, the sugar industries of the main European sugar exporting countries concluded a private ‘gentlemen's agreement’ with the main producers of sugar cane, Cuba and Java. This innovative measure of international market regulation together with the change in the vision of the world sugar market laid the foundation for the international negotiations of sugar politics after the Second World War.

Keywords:

• globalisation
• Great Depression
• international sugar trade
• transnationalism

Notes

  1. For comments I am grateful to all the participants of the workshop on the cultural history of politics, to Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Friedrich Lenger, Kathrine Lausted Veie, and the anonymous referees.

  2. Trentmann, “Coping with Shortage,” 15.

  3. Trentmann, “Coping with Shortage,”, 27.

  4. Trentmann, “Coping with Shortage,”

  5. Three-quarters of world sugar production was consumed in protected markets in this period. Therefore, any increase in world sugar production entering the free market put more than proportional pressure on the world market price for sugar. In his sugar memorandum for the League of Nations, Gustav Mikusch described the structure of the world sugar market in 1929, using the picture of four concentric circles: ‘In the innermost circle is the sugar which is either consumed under the protection of a duty in the country of production or which is consumed in another country where some other form of duty is levied but where sugar is exempt from import duty. To the next circle belongs the sugar consumed in a country where it enjoys a preference over sugar of other origin. In the third circle is the sugar consumed in countries in which it receives no kind of preferential treatment with regard to tariffs or other duties but in which it enjoys a favoured position – which may in some cases almost amount to a monopoly – on account of its geographical situation, freight conditions, marketing, Customs or any other circumstances.… Finally, sugar which is really sold in the open market belongs to the outermost circle. Here again, so to speak, the race is not run without handicaps, since the duration and cost of transport, the method of production and the taste of the consuming country are important factors in success. On the other hand, the race, to keep to our metaphor, is at least open to all comers and is run under conditions which give everyone a chance to win.’ Mikusch, “Sugar,” 31.

  6. See for instance the anthropological study of Mintz, Sweetness and Power. Furthermore Baxa, Zucker im Leben der Völker.

  7. Braudel, Sozialgeschichte, 238; Kuster, “500 Jahre Kolonialer Rohrzucker,” 477.

  8. Michael Mende, “Rübenzucker,” 337f. The importance of cane sugar in the respective cane-growing countries can be considered as even more fundamental. Not only did the sugar cane represent the main crop within the respective national agriculture but it was pillar of the economy. This was especially the case for the main cane sugar-exporting countries Cuba and Java. See Prinsen Geerligs, “Cane Sugar.”

  9. Mende, “Rübenzucker,” 342. For the importance of the beet within the European system of crop rotation see Economic and Financial Section League of Nations, Sugar.

 10. ‘Nous avons vu que les répercussions de cette culture sont considérables, notamment sur le rendement de l'exploitation agricole, sur la masse des matières indispensables à l'alimentation humaine, sur l'existence même d'une foule d'industries agricoles, sur l'industrie des engrais, sur la prospérité des régions d'élevage, fournisseuses de bœufs de travail.’ Institut International d'Agriculture, Notes sur le Rôle de la Culture de la Betterave à Sucre, 17.

 11. See for nineteenth-century globalisation and protectionist measures on the European continent Torp, Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung.

 12. Hartmut Berghoff and Jacob Vogel identify the ‘world perception of the economic actors’ as a specific field of research in cultural history. See Berghoff, Vogel, “Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte,” 15.

 13. The definition of the term politics is not made in correspondence to the trio of polity/policy/politics in the English-language literature. Here, politics will be used in the broader sense of the German das Politische or the French le politique and therefore as focused on the establishment and implementation of commonly binding rules and decisions.

 14. For the theoretical applications see Mergel, “Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik.” For a classification see Frevert and Haupt, Neue Politikgeschichte: Perspektiven einer historischen Politikforschung.

 15. See Rödder, “Klios neue Kleider,” 660, who criticises the concept of a cultural history of politics.

 16. Mergel, “Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik,” 596ff.

 17. Herren, “Modernisierung, Aussenpolitik und Integration im Jahrhundert des Internationalismus,” 2. For non-governmental internationalism in agriculture in the nienteenth century see for instance Houillier, L'Organisation Internationale de l'Agriculture.

 18. ‘Während die völkerrechtlichen Vereinbarungen in früheren Jahrhunderten nur machtpolitische Zwecke verfolgten (Friedensschlüsse und Bündnisse), sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer mehr Kollektivabkommen hervorgetreten, welche die Erreichung allgemeiner kultureller Zwecke zum Inhalt haben.’ Jacobs, Die Internationale Zuckerkonvention, 132. Emphasis added.

 19. At this juncture, the global and national markets play an important role. Under the expression of ‘markets as politics’, the sociologist Neil Fligstein developed a ‘sociological view of action in markets’. Fligstein develops a conceptual view of social institutions like insurance in combination with the question of inclusion and exclusion. His ideas are partly applicable to the international sugar market in the interwar period. See Fligstein, “Markets as Politics,” 657.

 20. For further methodological discussion on ‘transnational history’ see Kiran Klaus Patel, “Transnationale Geschichte – Ein neues Paradigma?; Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte;” Clavin, Wessels, “‘Transnationalism and the League of Nations.”

 21. ‘Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln aller Menschen. Aber: Die, Weltbilder’ welche durch, Ideen’ geschaffen wurden, haben sehr of als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fortbewegte.’ Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 252.

 22. Haushofer, Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik, 187. For trust being a cultural aspect within an economic history see Berghoff, Die Zähmung des entfesselten Prometheus?. This idea has also been taken up in the recent economics literature, see e.g., work by Timothy Cogley and Thomas Sargent (2008) on the impact of the Great Depression on asset prices. See Cogley and Sargent, “The market price of risk and the equity premium.”

 23. James, The End of Globalization, 26.

 24. Jacob Tanner rightly emphasised in his article on the relationship between economic and cultural science that the simple emergence of the term culture in the economic discourse – as is hinted at above – does not suffice to establish culture as an explanatory variable in economic processes. See Tanner, “‘Kultur’ in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften,” 208.

 25. Thomas Mergel applies this dimension in an example to specific policies perceived diversely by different groups. Here, instead, the view of one specific group is taken to show a diverse perception of the world economy and – as a direct result – of the set of economic policies. See Mergel, “Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik,” 600f.

 26. Osterhammel and Petersson, Geschichte der Globalisierung, 9.

 27. Torp, Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung; Conrad, Globalisierung.

 28. See for instance James, The End of Globalization, 108ff.

 29. In 1935, only one-third of the value of world trade of 1929 was bought and sold. See Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy, 102.

 30. Capie, “The International Depression and Trade Protection in the 1930s”; James, The End of Globalization, 29f, 109. See for example the protectionist postulations by the German sugar industry in Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie 54 (1929), 402f.

 31. ‘Es macht sich also in der Zuckerwirtschaft ebenfalls die auch sonst im Wirtschaftsleben ganz allgemein zu beobachtende Tendenz zur Autarkie geltend.’ Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 5. As Mark Mazower had shown, economic autarchy came along with ‘national purification [which] lay at the heart of interwar European politics’. Mazower, Dark Continent, 41.

 32. Stefan Zweig wrote that certitude in its broader sense was removed from the vocabulary as being a phantom. ‘Sicherheit … [wurde] als ein Phantom aus dem Vokabular gestrichen.’ Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern, 21. Similar argument in James, The End of Globalization, 25.

 33. For detailed information on the Brussels Sugar Convention (1902) see for instance Jacobs, Die Internationale Zuckerkonvention; Wilk, “International Affairs: The International Sugar Regime”; Davis, “Experience under Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements.”

 34. European beet sugar production fell from 8.3 million tons in 1912–1913 to 2.6 million tons in 1919–1920. On the other hand, Cuba increased its sugar production from 2.5 million tons in 1914 to approximately 4 million tons in 1919. See James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies.” 482. In other words, Cuba raised its production from 1915 to 1920 by 52% compared with the period from 1910 to 1915. See International Sugar Council, The World Sugar Economy, 41ff.

 35. Chalmin, The Making of a Sugar Giant, 140.

 36. See for instance Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 5f. See also Figure 1(a) and 1(b) on p. 728.

 37. The deficit made by exporting ( = difference between the national price and the world market price) could have been financed by the higher national price level. Treiber, Die Probleme der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 49. For the different measures of state invention in international agricultural trade see Schiller, Marktregulierung und Marktordnung.

 38. For a general interpretation of ‘depeasantization’ and ‘deruralisation’ causing agricultural crisis and state intervention mainly in the interwar period see Mai, “Die Agrarische Transition.”

 39. ‘On conçoit alors le monde comme une seule unité économique et l'interdépendance des nations et des agriculteurs nationales apparaît plus nettement.’ Houillier, L'Organisation Internationale de l'Agriculture, 20.

 40. See for instance Hart, “Competition and Control,” 317. For the International Sugar Organisation see http://www.sugaronline.com/iso/.

 41. Member states were Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain (until 1912), Hungary, Italy (until 1912), Luxembourg (from 1903), The Netherlands, Peru (from 1903), Russia (from 1907), Sweden, and Switzerland (from 1906). See Wilk, “International Affairs: The International Sugar Regime,” 862.

 42. Bloch, “Impending Shortages Catch Sugar Consumers Napping,” 141. See also International Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar, of May 6, 1937, League of Nations, Publications, 1937, II B. 8, 7–19.

 43. Wilk, “International Affairs: The International Sugar Regime,” 862f.

 44. Sugar was mainly produced on large-scale landed property, which was very well organised politically in different national interest groups. Treiber shows for 1925 the surfeit of large-scale landed property in the production of sugar. See Treiber, Die Probleme der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 31.

 45. James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies,” 481.

 46. See Chalmin, The Making of a Sugar Giant, 151. The world market price of sugar was mainly determined by the cane sugar growing areas of Cuba and Java and on the European beet sugar side Czechoslovakia and Poland. See Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 6.

 47. Chalmin, The Making of a Sugar Giant, 151.

 48. Germany's share in this quota was 16.5%, Poland's 17.5%, and Czechoslovakia's 66%. The German delegates were not very content with the agreement. First, they considered the shared quota as being too low. Second, they would have liked to see an international binding agreement concerning a limitation of Czechoslovakian sugar sold on the German market. See note from the German ministry of foreign affairs, November 21, 1927, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA) 118210, W 5031. See Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 37; Protocol of the meeting of the European delegates on January 20, 1928 in the Deutschen Zuckerbank A.G., PA AA, R 118210, W 425, 2ff; Société des Nations, Organisation économique, La Situation mondiale du Sucre, Rapport du Comité économique de la Société des Nations, C.303.M.104.1929.II.

 49. See note from the German ministry of foreign affairs, November 21, 1927, PA AA 118210, W 5031.

 50. Writing about the Javanese sugar industry is actually writing about the sugar industry of the Netherlands. In a similar way, American interest is preponderant in the Cuban sugar business. See for instance Rowe, Studies in the Artificial Control of Raw Material Supplies.

 51. In August 1918, the major proportion of Javanese sugar producers were unified in a common sales organisation in order to better exploit the economic cycle during the war. In 1930, this organisation included some 90% of Javanese sugar production. The head office of the V.J.S.P was in Amsterdam. See furthermore report of the consul von Bülow in the German consulate general for the Netherlands, Amsterdam, December 15, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5558, 4ff. See Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaf, 35.

 52. Havana Post, November 15, 1927, in: PA AA, R118210, W 5353.

 53. Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 37.

 54. Chalmin, The Making of a Sugar Giant, 151.

 55. Houillier, L'Organisation Internationale de l'Agriculture, 35.

 56. League of Nations, Report and Proceedings of the World Economic Conference, 1927, Geneva 1927, vol. 1, 237f.

 57. League of Nations, Economic and Financial Section. Sugar.

 58. Société des Nations, Organisation économique, La Situation mondiale du Sucre, Rapport du Comité économique de la Société des Nations, C.303.M.104.1929.II, 16.

 59. See also Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 37.

 60. Société des Nations, Organisation économique, La Situation mondiale du Sucre, Rapport du Comité économique de la Société des Nations, C.303.M.104.1929.II, 16.

 61. See letter from the German embassy in Brussels to the German ministry of foreign affairs, July 5, 1929, PA AA, R 118211, W 2725.

 62. This was mainly due to a new variety of cane introduced in Java in 1927 increasing the yield by 30%.

 63. See letter from the German embassy in Lime to the German ministry of foreign affairs March 10, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 1527; Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 37.

 64. The Agencia Cooperativa de Exportacion was installed on 26 July 1929, when the USA raised the tariff on Cuban sugar imports and thus reduced the Cuban export prospects. See letter from the German embassy in Havana to the German ministry of foreign affairs July 27, 1929, PA AA, R118211, W 3607, 1ff.

 65. In addition to the crisis on the world market, Cuba had to struggle with the tariff policy of the United States, its main export market for sugar. The total export of Cuban sugar to the USA decreased in the years 1925 to 1930 by 64.88%. Particularly in 1930, the decline in exports to the US was substantial. See report of the German consulate general of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, January 2, 1931, R 118212, W 30.

 66. The banks represented included Chase National Bank, the National City Bank, Hayden, Stone & co., and the Royal Bank of Canada. All were interested in Cuban sugar property, either as investors or as lenders. See James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies,” 486, footnote 13.

 67. To underline and support the mission of Chadbourne, the Cuban president enacted a decree on 24 October 1930 halting sugar exports from Cuba. On 15 November, the Cuban chamber of deputies adopted a restriction plan reallocating the sale of the Cuban sugar surplus of the year 1929–1930 (1.5 million tons) to the following five years. This plan was not only to increase world market prices. It also had to send a signal in the direction of Java, with whom the Cuban sugar industry wanted to degrade the back-breaking price concurrence. The plan was financially hedged by the issue of a public bond (42 million dollars). See Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 38.

 68. Wilk, “International Affairs: The International Sugar Regime,” 863. See letter from Chadbourne to Rabbethge, December 14, 1930, S. 3, annex to letter from Rabbethge to assistant secretary of state Dr. Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5538.

 69. Vossische Zeitung, May 19, in Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 41.

 70. The Conference even suggested the introduction of differential tariff systems against cane sugar. See Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie 55 (1930): 782, 1261.

 71. Zeitschrift des Vereins der Deutschen Zucker-Industrien, 80. Band, Berlin 1930, Allgemeiner Teil, p. 266.

 72. ‘Begründung des abweichenden Standpunktes der Ned.Ind.Landbouw–Mij. bezüglich des auf der Amsterdamer Konferenz getroffenen Abkommens zwischen der Visp und der Chadbourne–Kommission’, annex 1 to report No. A 1/31, January 2, 1931, of the consulate general in Amsterdam, 1, annex to the letter from the consulate general of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, January 2, 1931, R 118212, W 30, 1.

 73. The German sugar industry expressed its very clear idea about the role of governments concerning the international agreement on the occasion of a rather informal meeting between Ritter, Ministerialrat in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Colijn, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, v. Schlieben, president of the German Sugar Industry, and his colleague Wenzel, one of the major German sugar producers. V. Schlieben was very ‘concerned’ about the possibility of inter-governmental negotiations. He announced strong opposition against any attempts to establish an agreement similar to the Brussels convention in 1902, which stipulated a national tariff policy. See note for the file of Ritter, German ministry for foreign affairs, December 1, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5281, 1f. But the Polish former minister and president of the highest council of the Polish Sugar Industry in Warsaw, Jan Zagleniczny, also refused the Javanese advance in the direction of a common agreement on the regulation of sugar tariffs and subventions paid to the sugar industries. For him, the totally different conditions of sugar production made the proposal an impossible project. See Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie, Berlin, August 23, 1930, no. 34.

 74. Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie 55 (1930): 1137f.

 75. Chadbourne referred to the analogue restriction of export at 15% for Cuba and Java for the year 1930–1931. See letter from Chadbourne to Rabbethge, December 14, 1930, 2, annex to letter from Rabbethge of assistant secretary of state Dr. Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5538.

 76. See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5524.

 77. The company Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht still exists today as KWS SAAT AG. See http://www.kws.de/.

 78. Abschrift des Memorandums über die Aussichten für eine Zuckerkonvention im Sinne derjenigen von 1902 (Colijn) vom 15.7.1930, 1, annex to note in the German ministry of foreign affairs, August 8, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 3405.

 79. See for instance Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie, 55 (1930); Bericht Erich Rabbethges über die Verhandlungen in Paris, 4, in annex to letter from Rabbethge to assistant secretary of state Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, April 18, 1931, PA AA, R 118212, W 1843.

 80. See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5524.

 81. Letter from Rabbethge to assistant secretary of state Dr. Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5538.

 82. Czechoslowakia (590,000 t), Poland (320,000 t), Hungary (87,500 t), Belgium (31,500 t). See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5524.

 83. The extreme increase in German sugar production was the result of an increase in the growing area for beet, because the German farmers still saw in beet growing a better alternative compared with, e.g., cereals. Additionally, the harvest was exceptionally good and at the same time domestic sugar consumption stagnated. See explanations of Rabbethge for the New York Times, 1, annex to letter from Rabbethge to assistant secretary of state Dr. Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5538.

 84. See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5524.

 85. See letter from Thomas L. Chadbourne to Erich Rabbethge of December 16, 1930, Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie 55 (1930): 1362f.

 86. See letter from Erich Rabbethges to Thomas L. Chadbourne of December 20, 1930, Die Deutsche Zuckerindustrie 55 (1930): 1365f.

 87. See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, December 17, 1930, PA AA, R 118211, W 5524.

 88. ‘First and foremost it was Cuba, who consigned 555,000 tons of its quota, reducing it to 18.05 million tons. Java stuck to its quota … of 12.5 million tons, whilst the European countries … had to concede the rest out of their quota.’ Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 40.

 89. James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies,” 490.

 90. The result was that at a price of 2 cents, a 5% increase in all export quotas would automatically be applied by the International Sugar Council. An additional 5% increase in export quotas was foreseen at the price of 2½ cents. Above 2½ cents it was up to Council to decide further increases in export quotas. The negotiations concerning the administrative body were characterised by unanimity in way that on 10 April ‘dead straw was threshed for at least eight hours’. See report from Rabbethge concerning the negotiations in Paris, 1, annex to letter from Rabbethge to assistant secretary of state Ritter, German ministry of foreign affairs, April 18, 1931, PA AA, R 118212, W 1843.

 91. Since it was stipulated that the Council meet four times a year, an executive chairman, general secretary and office staff were designated. See James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies,” 491; Treiber, Die Probleme der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 73f; Lehmann, Die schlechte Lage der deutschen Zuckerwirtschaft, 42f.

 92. See letter from the German embassy, Brussels, to the German ministry of foreign affairs, May 12, 1931, PA AA, R 118212, W 2228.

 93. Both dimensions help to deconstruct the universally accepted comprehension of global market intervention which has its roots in the Great Depression, or as Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger puts it, in general terms: ‘Das Anliegen einer Kulturgeschichte des Politischen ist … die Dekonstruktion jedes überhistorisch-universalisierenden und essentialistischen Verständnisses politischer Handlungsformen und Institutionen, Wertvorstellungen und Motive.’ Stollberg-Rillinger, “Was Heißt Kulturgeschichte Des Politischen? Einleitung,” 13.

 94. Mahler, “The Political Economy of North–South Commodity Bargaining,” 714. According to the statistics of the League of Nations, the decrease in worldwide production since 1930–1931 of 5.2 million tons was due to the reductions made by the Chadbourne countries. See letter from the Reichsministeriums für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft to the German ministry for foreign affairs, March 23, 1933, PA AA, R 118212, W 2025, 2.

 95. See for instance the critique of a major Dutch sugar mill association in Java, letter from the consulate general of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, to the German ministry for foreign affairs, January 2, 1931, R 118212, W 30.

 96. See letter from the German representation at the League of Nations, to Ritter, German ministry for foreign affairs, February 1, 1933, PA AA, R 118212, W 971, 1.

 97. Wilk, “International Affairs: The International Sugar Regime,” 864.

 98. See Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations.

 99. See for the new direction in economic sciences at that time of course Keynes, The General Theory.

100. James, “International Control of Raw Sugar Supplies,” 492.

101. As seen above, representatives of national interest groups were elaborators of an international regime, breaking out of the national surround usually framing their ‘interventional’ action. Hence, international movements should not be exclusively interpreted in opposition to national interests. As actors in national power politics found it worthwhile to operate on the international level, international regimes in the interwar period cannot be considered as weak alternative to the power politics of nation-states, but rather as a second paralleling strategy to achieve gains. See also Geyer and Paulmann, “Introduction, the Mechanics of Internationalism,” 2.

102. The World Economic Conference of 1927 had already failed because of making an international reduction in tariffs one of its main goals.

103. In economic terms, there was no need for reciprocal adjustments of trade politics after the internationally coordinated world market intervention, which therefore dangled potentially lower welfare costs in the long run.

104. Houillier, L'Organisation Internationale de l'Agriculture, 104.

105. Fligstein, “Markets as Politics,” 661. See also Rohe, “Politische Kultur,” Historische Zeitschrift, 336.