Freed slaves, their status and state control in Ancient Greece

Abstract

Freed slaves in the ancient Greek world usually held the legal status of foreigners or non-citizen residents. The Greek states adopted various means to control social distinctions, and in many cases actively engaged in the process of manumission and its publication, thus applying public interests to private concerns. This is evident from many manumission documents, which allude to the involvement of political institutions in manumission, and to payments made by freed slaves to the treasurers or other officials. It can also be inferred from documents in which ex-owners seemingly grant to their freed slaves several civic rights and sometimes even citizenship.

Keywords:

• slavery
• manumission
• polis
• status of freed slaves
• grants of privileges and citizenship
• laws
• inscriptions
• state's involvement in manumission

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the anonymous readers of European Review of History for their useful comments and suggestions.

Notes

 1. In most cases freed slaves remained in the underprivileged status of foreigners, unless granted the better status of non-citizen residents. Such non-citizen residents were called metoikoi in Athens and in other places, but elsewhere they had other labels such as paroikoi or katoikoi. The communis opinio is that manumitted slaves automatically gained the status of metics or its equivalent. See, for instance, on Athens, Todd, Athenian Law, 190. For a different view see Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 4–5, 104–5, 308.

 2. Important information is also extracted from literary sources: epics, drama, historiographies, orations, philosophical writings and biographies. These, however, seldom specify the procedure of manumission or the freed slave's status, and many of them are anecdotal. An extreme example perhaps is the Life of Aesop, a popular biography of the sixth-century BC fable-teller, originally composed around the first or second century AD. The text(s) we have – compilations of adaptations of the original(s), made over the centuries – abounds with details concerning Aesop's status, manumission and status after manumission, but most of them are probably fictitious. For a study that uses Aesop's Vita to extract evidence and offers important insights on master–slave relations, see Hopkins, “Novel Evidence”.

 3. For this law see Ath. Pol. 26.4; Plutarch, Periclēs, 37.2–5; Davies, “Athenian Citizenship”; Rhodes, Commentary, 331–5; Patterson, Citizenship Law; Todd, Athenian Law, 177–8; Ogden, Bastardy (1996): 59–69; Harrison, Law of Athens, 25.

 4. See Todd, Athenian Law, 178; Harrison, Law of Athens, 25–9.

 5. See Todd, Athenian Law, 109; Harrison, Law of Athens, 165.

 6. On dikē apostasiou see Todd, Athenian Law, 102, 190–2; Harrison, Law of Athens, 182–3, 190; Klees, Sklavenleben, 299, 328–30; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 274–90. Athenian judges were occasionally also called to decide the legal status of a person, whose liberty had been asserted by the defendant (aphaeresis eis eleutherian) while the prosecutor claimed he or she was his slave. A famous such case is that of Neaera, whom Phrynion claimed to be his slave and prosecuted Stephanus, who asserted her liberty; this case, however, was settled outside the law court ([Dēmosthenēs] 59.40–5). See Hamel, Trying Neaira, 72–5.

 7. Aeschinēs, 3 (Against Ctēsiphōn), 41, 44: The act of bestowing crowns was a token of the people's gratitude – whether expressed by tribes and demes or by the whole citizen body – to citizens or foreigners who benefited the state. By ‘foreign crowns’ Aeschinēs relates to crowns that were voted to Athenian citizens by foreign states. A deme was a township or a village which served as the basic political and administrative unit in the Athenian polis. On manumission by proclamation in the theatre, see Rädle, “Freilassung von Sklaven im Theater”; Mactoux, “Regards sur la proclamation”.

 8. Aeschinēs had already launched his motion against Ctēsiphōn in 336 BC, but the case was brought to court only in 330. On probable reasons for the delay see Harris, Aeschines, 140–1. On Aeschinēs' arguments in Against Ctēsiphōn see Harris, ibid.; Gwatkin, “Legal Arguments”, 135–8.

 9. Plutarch, Nicias, 3.3:

10. For the epigraphic evidence of proclamations of crowns in the theatre see Gwatkin, “Legal Arguments”, 138–40. See also Mactoux, “Regards sur la proclamation”, 450-1, who believes that proclamations of manumissions stopped because this mode of manumission (which, in her opinion, was a ritualised integration of the freed slaves into the community as a defined group of non-citizens) was no longer needed in the fourth century BC, when the free non-citizen population became more diverse, fluctuating and less identified with the polis.

11. I here disagree with Mactoux, “Regards sur la proclamation”, 441, 445, who argues that since the herald had an official role in the polis, we should see manumission by proclamation in the theatre as an official act, used by the state as a means of controlling a social process which might generate disorder. By contrast, I believe that proclamations in the theatre were not an official mode of manumission that was assigned to the herald by the dēmos. Aeschinēs may have told the truth-when he described the tumulus raised by such proclamations, and it may well be that slave-owners exploited the fact that the herald was present in the theatre for other matters and asked him to proclaim the manumission of their slaves. We should also note that according to Aeschinēs' quotation of the ‘Dionysiac Law’, the herald is threatened with losing his civic rights should proclamations be made in the theatre without the authorisation of the people. Such a threat makes no sense if we presume that the herald was officially entrusted with the task of proclaiming manumissions in the theatre.

12. IG IX(2) 109a, lines 1–9: The stratēgos (literally, ‘general’) was the chief elected magistrate of the Thessalian Confederacy, to which belonged the city of Halus.

13. See Larsen, Federal States, 291–2; Rädle, “Untersuchungen”, 158–9; Helly, “Lois”, 154.

14. For example, Calderini, Manomissione, 141; Rensch, “Manumissionum”, 95; Busolt, Staatskunde, I, 290; Helly, “Lois”, 154.

15. See Liv., 7.16.7.

16. The stone on which the manumission document was inscribed could not of course be carried around as an “identity card”, but it was placed in a public place so that all passers-by could see it. Moreover, in many cases (if not in every case) the inscription was a copy or an abridgement of the original handwritten document, which was often deposited in public archives. Sometimes several copies were made and entrusted to archives, magistrates, or private persons. See Mulliez, “Actes d'affranchissement”, 34–7; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 203–4.

17. On manumission by the fictive sale of the slave to a divinity, see most recently (also reviewing previous studies) Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 86–99.

18. IG IX(1) 3² 709a:

19. On manumission by consecration of the slave to a divinity see Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 86–99.

20. IG VII 3314: Cf. IG VII 3330, 3313. See also IG IX(1) 109, 120, 125–7, in which both the Assembly and the Council were involved. Lines 3–4 of the inscription quoted here, where the slaves are required to stay with their ex-mistress as long as she lives as a prerequisite to the act of manumission, constitute a paramonē clause, frequently found in manumission documents in many parts of the Greek world. On paramonē clauses and the status of freed slaves under paramonē, see Calderini, Manomissione, 286; Koschaker, Griechische Rechtsurkunde, 45; Westermann, Slave Systems, 35, 55–6; Gernet, Droit et Société, 169–70; Babacos, “Familienrechtliche Verhältnisse”; Samuel, “Paramone clauses”; Rädle, Untersuchungen, 142–5; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 149–50; Albrecht, Rechtsprobleme, 199–200; Kränzlein, “Bemerkungen”; Waldstein, Operae Libertorum, 93–101; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 222–48.

21. As believed, for instance, by Albrecht, Rechtsprobleme, 119–23, 135–7, 151–3.

22. IG V(2) 345, lines 1–13: …. The dāmiourgoi were eponymous magistrates in Orchomenus.

23. IG IX(1) 109:

24. Pollux, 3.83: . According to Pollux, Dēmosthenēs referred to laws of the apeleutheroi and laws of the exeleutheroi, both terms denoting freed slaves. If Pollux presents Dēmosthenēs' words correctly, there must have been a difference between these two appellations. For the possibility that these terms represented two distinct groups of manumitted slaves, see Harrison, Law of Athens, 181; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 100–26.

25. See, for instance, Segré, Tituli Calymni, no. 158, 167, 169, 193.

26. See, for instance, IG IX(2) 1296 A, lines 31–2 from Azorus; SEG 23, 462 ( = SEG 26, 670), lines 12–15 from Dolichē; and Helly, “Lois”, 143–52 ( = IG IX(2) 1290), lines 13–16, from Pythion, discussed below.

27. Details on the status and activity of Pasiōn, his wife Archippē, and sons Apollodōrus and Pasiclēs, and on Phormiōn, are found in the orations 36, 45, 49, and 50 in the Dēmosthenic corpus, and in oration 17 of Isocrates. On Pasiōn and Phormiōn see Davies, Propertied Families, 429–42; Cohen, Athenian Economy, 81–106; Trevett, Apollodorus.

28. Although often grouped together with other non-citizen populations in official texts, the sources reveal that the Greeks had a distinct terminology for freed slaves: apeleutheros, exeleutheros and apheteis. These terms distinguished them from metoikoi, paroikoi and other terms denoting free non-citizen residents, and from xenoi – foreigners staying in the state for a short while. See, e.g., IG I³ 237, lines 9–10; IG XII(5) 647; Syll.³ 742.

29. IG IX(1) 1², 96a, lines 1–6:

30. On such acquiescence clauses and their meaning (and their link to communal ownership) see, for manumissions in Thessaly and Calymna: Babacos, “Vormundschaft”, 321–2; idem, “Familienrechtliche Verhältnisse”, 31–6; idem, Actes d'aliénation, 79–85; in Delphi: Westermann, “Extinction of Claims”, 54–8; in Macedon: Petsas et al., Leukopetra, 39–40; in Western Locris and Aetolia: Blavatskaja, “Geschichte der Sklavenhaltung”, 49–50, 74–5; in Epirus: Cabanes, L'Épire, 417–22, 459–61; in Boeotia, Phōcis, and Locris: Albrecht, Rechtsprobleme, 216–31, 245–77; and generally: Calderini, Manomissione, 188; Rädle, Untersuchungen, 128–30, 188. On women's role as manumittors, as guardians to their children, as witnesses and as guarantors, see Calderini, Manomissione, 189–91; Babacos, “Vormundschaft”, 314–5; Rädle, Untersuchungen, 125–7; Vatin, Mariage, 241–51; Cabanes, L'Épire, 399–461; Albrecht, Rechtsprobleme, 243–4; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 163–4; Schaps, Economic Rights, 7–8, 50–1; Garlan, Slavery, 74; Grainger, Prosopographical Studies, 37–8. In our inscription both the mother of the manumittors and the freed slave seem to have a status better than is usually given to women in Athens and other areas. See also below.

31. In this manumission document the manumittors also stipulate that should Sōtia die childless her property will go to them and their heirs.

32. IG IX(1) 82c: On foundlings (threptoi) as slaves see Cameron, Nadel, “Slavery”, 204–19; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free, 173–80.

33. On the isoteleia in Athens see Harrison, Law of Athens, 189, 193; Whitehead, Athenian Metic, 11. The isoteleia was considered to be a privilege since it exempted the beneficiary from taxes paid only by non-citizens, thus removing the apparent mark of non-citizen status.

34. I follow the reading of B. Helly, “Lois”, 151–2 ( = IG IX(2) 1290): Lines 6–10 of this inscription, where Philoumenē and her son are ordered to stay with their ex-owner Amyntas as long as he lives and to do whatever he says, constitute a paramonē clause; see above, note 20.

35. See Harrison, Law of Athens, 108–9; Schaps, Economic Rights.

36. Arvanitopoulos' amendment, followed by Babacos, Actes d'aliénation, 80 is: The inscription reads (with Arvanitopoulos’ amendments): ‘and marry whomever they wish’, instead of ‘whomever she wishes’, but there are other grammatical mistakes on the stone.

37. IG IX(1) 34, lines 1–5, 8:

38. On the Phōcian Confederacy see Larsen, Federal States, 40–8, 300–2.

39. SGDI 1718, lines 10–12:

40. SGDI 1844 (186 BC), and 2133 (182 BC), performed in Delphi by men from Amphissa. See also IG IX(1) 1² 9 from Thermon in Aetolia (third century BC), where a woman (her legal status is not noted) and her descendants are granted citizenship by the Aetolian League – on which see below.

41. Cabanes, “Bouthrôtos”, 105–209.

42. Cabanes, “Bouthrôtos”, no. IV, lines 31–32: No. XIII, lines 29–31: Cf. also ibid., nos. XIII + XIX, XXX + I; SEG 15, 384 = 37, 515.1–19.

43. On collective ownership and joint manumission in Epirus see Cabanes, L'Épire, 418–22, 459–61.

44. That women could also become citizens in Aetolia may be gathered from a third-century BC grant of citizenship to a woman and her descendants (IG IX(1) 1² 9, from Thermon) by the Aetolian League. The inscription does not specify the woman's previous legal status, but, obviously, she formerly belonged to the non-citizen population and might have been a freed slave. From the city of Crannon in Thessaly comes a third-century BC grant of citizenship to a woman, together with, so it seems, the right to own land (politeian kai en[k]tasin; IG IX(2) 458). Similarly, there is evidence of a fourth-century grant of citizenship to a woman in Dōdona in Epirus (SEG 15. 384 = 37. 515, lines 1–19). In some regions of the Greek world women seem to have enjoyed a better legal status than in classical Athens, for instance, but it is not clear whether this was also the case before the Hellenistic period. Likewise, it seems that kyrieia (legal power) over women was in some places or some periods not known or non-binding, since women are known to have transacted without a kyrios. See Babacos, “Familienrechtliche Verhältnisse”, 116–27; Actes d'aliénation, 93–5; Vatin, Mariage, 243–52; Cabanes, L'Épire, 408–13; Albrecht, Rechtsprobleme, 242–4; Schaps, Economic Rights, 49–51.

45. Helly, “Lois”, 152–6. The ex-owner himself, Amyntas, did enjoy his freed-slaves' further services since he had obligated them by a paramonē clause for the rest of his life. For the formula ‘and he/she/they will by no means whatever be liable to the law of manumitted slaves’ see also IG IX(2) 1296 A, from Azorus, and SEG 26. 670 [ = 23. 462] from Dolichē (both in Thessaly) = Helly, ibid., 143–49. For a similar formula see P. Lazaridis, BCH 99 (1975), nos. 1, 4, 5, from Pthiōtic Thēbes. See also Babacos, Actes d'aliénation, 79–88, on laws pertaining to manumitted slaves in Calymna and Thessaly.