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Abstract
In some epochs of the history of Western philosophy, language comes to be seen as a communication and knowledge instrument that is affected by some serious predicaments. In some versions of postmodernism, for instance, an incurable ‘difference' attains the ability of language to evoke a presence, a whole, and, as a consequence, ‘the fragment is the form of writing'. In the Sophistic age, language appeared as unable to produce an exact correspondence to things (Protagoras' criticism of Homer's imperative in the first line of the Iliad), and simultaneously as able to elaborate two opposite arguments on every notion or events. As a consequence, the polemical critics of the Sophists interpreted these features, the language's distance from things and its extreme liability to be subtly manipulated and abused as what transformed the sophistic discourse into a total fragmentation, into a sort of mere assemblage of sounds signifying nothing. A ruin. This paper traces the evidences for this negative and polemical meaning of ‘fragment' and ‘ruin' in Aristophanes and in a rarely cited, but very instructive, passage of Plato.
Notes
1. See CitationDerrida, “Edmond Jabès et la question du livre,” 107: “Le langage … est la rupture mème de la totalité. Le fragment n'est pas un style, ou un échec déterminés, c'est la forme de l'écrit. A moins que Dieu n'écrive lui-même; et encore faut-il qu'il soit alors le Dieu des philologues classiques”. CitationBarthes, Leçon inaugurale de la chaire de sémiologie littéraire du Collège de France prononcée le 7 janviere 1977, 42, describes his method of holding his seminar instead of imposing his lesson and says: “puisque cet enseignement a pour objet […] le discours pris dans la fatalité de son pouvoir [le language avec sa structure obligée est fasciste (p. 14)], la methode ne peut réellement porter que sur les moyens propres à dejouer, à déprendre ou tout au moins à alleger ce pouvoir. Et je me persuade de plus en plus, soit en écrivant soit en enseignant, que l'opération fondamentale de cette méthode de déprise c'est si l'on écrit, la fragmentation, et, si l'on expose, la digression, ou pour le dire d'un mot précieusement ambigu: l'excursion. J'aimerais donc que la parole et l'écoute qui se tresseront ici [au College] soient semblables aux allées et venues d'un enfant qui joue autour de sa mère, qui s'éloigne, puis retourne vers elle pour lui rapporter un caillou, un brin de laine, dessinant de la sorte autour d'un centre possible toute une aire de jeu, à l'intérieur de la quelle le caillou, la laine importent finalement moins que le don plein de zèle qui en est fait.” CitationDe Man, “Resistance to Theory,” 43, says: “Writing always includes the moment of dispossession in favour of the arbitrary power play of the signifier and, from the point of view of the subject, this can only be experienced as a dismemberment, a beheading, or a castration.”
2. σὸν ἔργον, ὦ καινῶν ἐπῶν κινητὰ καὶ μοχλευτά. Newness, in addition to its ability to revolutionise language, is an important element of Sophistic rhetoric. The vocative with ὦ is of course comic and highly poetic. Mοχλευτά does not come even close to having the same semantic ring.
3. ἀλλ' οὐράνιαι Νεφέλαι, μεγάλαι θεαὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀργοῖς,
αἵπερ γνώμην καὶ διάλεξιν καὶ νοῦν ἡμῖν παρέχουσιν
καὶ τερατείαν καὶ περίλεξιν καὶ κροῦσιν καὶ κατάληψιν.
Translations offer different renderings: “fit us out with judgement and logical insight, with discourse and reason, cant and humbug, with circumstance, chicanery and the binding spell of speech” (CitationStarkie, Aristophanes The Clouds); “who provide us with judgement and dialectic and intelligence, fantasy and circumlocution and verbal thrust and parry” (CitationHenderson , Aristophanes); “who bestows on us intelligence and discourse and understanding, fantasy and circumlocution and incisive and repressive powers” (CitationWilli, The Languages of Aristophanes, Aspects of Linguistic Variation in Classical Attic Greek); “savoir, dialectique, entendement, langage prestigieux et verbeux, l'art de frapper et d' empaumer” (Citationvan Daele, Aristophane, Comedies, vol. 1).
The shade and register of some words are uncertain: γνώμην is an important Thucydidean word with the sense of “intelligence, judgement, wisdom” (Hist. 1, 70, 75; 3,11, etc.), “opinion”, “resolution” (Hist. I, 140); διάλεξιv is difficult and could mean “discourse”, “speech”, “explanation” (see Plato, Ep. 7. 350d); τερατείαv has been interpreted as “fiction” (CitationDover, Aristophanes Clouds, 142: “the relation or exposition of the marvelous and the unusual”), “fantasy”; περίλεξιν could be Aristophanes' invention; κροῦσιν (again a new word) καὶ κατάληψιν “striking and checking” conjures up the rhetorical ability to strike an audience with a winning idea and to prevent unfavourable reactions or dangerous arguments by opponents. But κατάληψιν could also mean “grasping”, “assaulting” (LSJ).
4. On intellectuals as a class in Aristophanes' comedies, see CitationZimmermann, “Aristophanes und die Intellectuellen,” 38: 262 ff.
5. Willi, The Languages of Aristophanes, 67.
6. Dion. Hal., Thuc. 24: “In his choice of words he preferred those which were metaphorical, obscure, archaic and outlandish to those which were common and familiar to his contemporaries” (ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν τροπικὴν καὶ γλωττηματικὴν καὶ ἀπηρχαιωμένην καὶ ξένην λέξιν προελόμενος ἀντὶ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ συνήθους τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρώποις·) transl. CitationUsher, Dionisius of Halicarnassus, Critical Essays, I.
7. Against the idea that “Sophistic thought” does not exist see CitationKerferd, The Sophistic Movement and CitationFisher, Aristophanes Clouds, 244 ff.
8. Clouds 319–21:
{Στ.} ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἀκούσασ' αὐτῶν τὸ φθέγμ' ἡ ψυχή μου πεπότηται
καὶ λεπτολογεῖν ἤδη ζητεῖ καὶ περὶ καπνοῦ στενολεσχεῖν
καὶ γνωμιδίῳ γνώμην νύξασ' ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ ἀντιλογῆσαι·
Here and in Protagoras' Antilogiai “disputes, controversies” (DK, 80 a I, 4, p. 255) we find the verb ἀντιλογῆσαι with this meaning. Aristophanes' learned audience may have appreciated the paradoxical connection between leschê, the place in the village where people come to rest and converse (see CitationChantraine, Dictionaire étimologique de la langue Grecque) and “smoke”. Kapnos (“smoke”) was the nickname given to a chatterbox (CitationTaillardat, Les images d'Aristophane, 299).
9. Cratinus describes in famous lines the Sophistic rhetoric of Aristophanes, its subtlety, its love of new concepts, and its affinity to Euripides' style (fr. 342):
τίς δὲ σύ; κομψός τις ἔροιτο θεατής.
ὑπολεπτολόγος, γνωμοδιώκτης, εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων.
Who are you, a refined spectator may ask.
A subtle speaker, pursuing opinionlets, Euripidaristophanizing.
A murderous definition: in his parabases Aristophanes praises his own sophia (Clouds 522, etc.), the newness of his ideas (Clouds 547, etc.), his dexi ôtês (Clouds 548), all intellectual characteristics of his Sophistic characters.
Kompsos, meaning esprit de finesse, elegance, refinement, covers a concept that Aristophanes at once attributes to Socrates' teaching (Clouds 649), to the Weak Logos (Clouds 1030–1) and to Euripides (Women of the Assembly 93). Kompsos is also a characteristic feature of the Sophists' style (Plato Laches 197d7). See CitationGuidorizzi, Aristofane. Le Nuvole. It further characterises Socrates' refutation (elenkhos) in Callicles' adverse and defiant view: (Plato, Gorgias 486c5) < παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει>, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, < ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς>, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας … “…leave to others these refinements, whether they should be called nonsense or foolery…”
10. Taillardat, Les images d'Aristophane, 295.
11. Taillardat, Les images d'Aristophane, 295.
12. Frogs, 876 ff.:
λεπτολόγους ξυνετὰς φρένας αἳ καθορᾶτε
ἀνδρῶν γνωμοτύπων, ὅταν εἰς ἔριν ὀξυμερίμνοις
ἔλθωσι στρεβλοῖσι παλαίσμασιν ἀντιλογοῦντες,
ἔλθετ' ἐποψόμεναι δύναμιν
δεινοτάτοιν στομάτοιν πορίσασθαι 880
ρ῾ήματα καὶ παραπρίσματ' ἐπῶν.
In line 881 ρ῾ήματα has been questioned by philologists and many emendations have been offered. One that has been recently accepted, ρ῾ήγματα “fragments” (CitationFraenkel, Beobachtungen zu Aristophanes, 4: 144; CitationWilson, Aristophanis Fabulae, 174) is so perfectly adapted to the context that its corruption would seem unexplainable. The fact that this word repeats essentially what follows (“fragments and sawdusts of words”) may raise suspicion. If the word ρ῾ήματα is not changed, then we should probably interpret the second part of the line as “sawdust of verses” which would underline Euripides' precision in shaping his verses. But, then, what is this isolated word ρ῾ήματα doing in the line? The emendation is the least disconcerting solution. If we understand “sawdust of words” as Euripides' performance, it remains unclear whether this metaphorical mass of minute segments refers to his own discourse or to the disintegration he will effect on his opponent's argument, as in 828–9.
13. The encounter between the two poets recalls the most famous dispute in Greek literature, between Achilles and Agamemnon. In fact, in line 992 the Chorus turns to Aeschylus calling him “Achilles” through a quotation from Aeschylus' Myrmidons. See Citationdel Corno, Aristofane Le Rane, 209 on lines 877–8.
14. “If Euripides' creative organ and the god to whom he prays is the Tongue (892), Aeschylus' poetry is the mighty labor of his lungs.” CitationLada-Richards, Initiating Dionysus, 242.
15. Fisher, Aristophanes Clouds, 55 and 47.
16. “Hairsplitting twaddle,” Henderson, Aristophanes, 231.
17. Σκαριφησμοί, as Taillardat (Les images d'Aristophane, 296) explains, are perhaps the fragments of wax that the stylus produces in writing.
18. We have seen περίτριμμα δικῶν (Clouds 447), from τρίβω, “to rub down”, “to grind”, “to pound”.
19. See the argument and the list of passages in the persuasive paper by CitationDettori, “Il dialogo tra Socrate e Strepsiades in Aristoph. Nub. 260–62.” For the metaphorical sense (“subtlety”, “smartness”) of “fine flour” see παιπάλημa in Birds 430–1, where the context sounds Sophistic and CitationBeta, Il linguagio nelle commedie di Aristofane, 138.
20. On the “literalization of the metaphor” see Dettori, “Il dialogo tra Socrate e Strepsiade” (with bibliography); CitationGoldhill, The Poet's Voice, 189. On the grounding procedures for creating laughter, the bibliography is immense: I have reduced this here to a simple formula, an essential point that can be found with its necessary developments and elaborations in Kant, Freud, Lacan, Genette, to mention only a few with whom I have some familiarity. On the grounding features of laughter in Aristophanes see CitationDobrov, “Language, Fiction, and Utopia,” 96–108.
21. Guidorizzi, Aristofane. Le Nuvole, 207.
22. Beta, Il linguagio, 136–7. See also Socrates' advice on the right way to think (Clouds 740–45): “Let your thinking that is subtle go; examine your problems piece by piece distinguishing and examining in the correct way; […] and if you hit an aporia with one of your ideas throw it out and go beyond; then move to it again with your mind and weigh it up.” This recalls various Platonic descriptions of examining and meditating, Republic 505 b; Euthyphro 539e4–5; Phaedrus. 266b; in relation to the Platonic diairesis, see Dover, Aristophanes Clouds, xliii.
23. Hippias Major 304a5: Ἀλλὰ δή γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τί οἴει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα; κνήσματα τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων. Also 304b5:
χαίρειν ἐάσαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν
ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ νῦν εταχειριζόμενος.
24. For Prodicus' influence on Euripides and Thucydides see CitationDe Romilly, “Les manies de Prodicos, et la rigeur de la langue grecque,” 1–18.
25. Willi, The languages of Aristophanes, 120–2.
26. Thuc. 24, 20: καὶ τοτὲ μὲν λόγον ἐξ ὀνόματος ποιῶν, τοτὲ δ' εἰς ὄνομα συνάγων τὸν λόγον· καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸ ρ῾ηματικὸν ὀνοματικῶς ἐκφέρων, αὖθις δὲ τοὔνομα ρ῾ῆμα ποιῶν, καὶ αὐτῶν γε τούτων ἀναστρέφων τὰς χρήσεις, ἵνα τὸ μὲν ὀνοματικὸν προσηγορικὸν γένηται, τὸ δὲ προσηγορικὸν ὀνοματικῶς λέγηται.
27. See CitationSilk, Aristophanes and the Definition of Comedy, 101, on the Sophistic flavour of this sort of lists and for comments on the lexical tour de force in Clouds 445–51: “The facility with words that Strepsiades seeks (and which – exemplum sui – his own speech embodies) is the facility advertised and purveyed by the Sophists in the name of ‘persuasion'…”
28. CitationSilk, Aristophanes and the Definition of Comedy, 101.
29. See CitationWackernagel, Lectures on Syntax, 399–401
30. One thinks immediately of the long analysis of Simonides' poem in Plato's Protagoras with its endless discussion of the difference between gignesthai and einai, or of the disquisitions Socrates holds with different interlocutors in an attempt to define the precise, universal meaning of concepts, in the so-called “aporetic dialogues.”
31. “Elusive” for at least two reasons (yet, as the reader knows, these reasons too are elusive): the difficulty of formulating a universal concept often leads Socrates to no results; and, as our contemporary awareness teaches us, a closed meaning is in practice impossible.
32. See Dover, Aristophanes Clouds, 188 on line 702; CitationO'Regan, Rhetoric, Comedy and the Violence of Language in Aristophanes' Clouds, 82. See also the scholia ad loc.
33. See CitationAmbrosino, “Nuages et sens”; O'Regan, Rhetoric, Comedy and the Violence of Language, 124–5.
34. Starkie, Aristophanes The Clouds, 309–10.
35. Clouds 225 (Socrates) = Clouds 1503 (Strepsiades): ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον, “I tread the air and look down [scrutinize] the Sun.” The line is quoted by Socrates in Plato, Apology 19c.