The veterans' movement and First World War memory in Portugal (1918–33): between the Republic and Dictatorship

Abstract

The lack of consensus regarding Portugal's participation in the First World War's European front, combined with the post-war political and economic crisis, highlights the difficulty of integrating a large number of mobilised men, mainly rural workers, who now found themselves unemployed and physically and psychologically traumatised. The return, reaction and insertion of soldiers would configure the social and political milieu in which, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the first images of the conflict were built, based on interactions between veterans and the political authorities, not always on an equal footing. This study will first seek to identify the context and external elements so as to trace a concrete and immediate profile of the veterans. Secondly, it will analyse the creation and intervention of associations – their active social ‘intervention’ – amidst their internal activities and attempts to shape public opinion – actively making demands – in order to influence State policy. Finally, this text will attempt to shed light on the relationship between veterans and contemporary political dynamics, especially keeping in mind the eventual militancy of their actions.

Keywords:

• First World War
• Portugal
• memory
• veterans
• war culture

Notes

 1. Horne, ‘Corps, lieux et nation,’ 97.

 2. Cf. Prost, ‘Les représentations de la guerre,’ 23.

 3. The crisis that characterised the post-war scenario classified them ambiguously, as Mosse states, portraying them as a ‘stereotype of those who were thought to menace society, defined as “outsiders”, on the margins of established society, […] in direct opposition to the ideal manhood, the foil which such “outsiders” represented in mind and body. Such men were nervous, ill-proportioned, and, above all, constantly in motion’ (‘Shell-Shock as a Social Disease,’ 102).

 4. Cf. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers.

 5. Prost, ‘The Impact of War,’ 209–17.

 6. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 14–15.

 7. Cf. Gentile, Il culto del littorio. In Italy, veterans' support for paramilitary groups resulted from a ‘virtual civil war’ context, as a consequence of the disastrous war intervention. The parliamentary regime's instability meant that it was unable to stop extremist mass-party affirmation and a wave of radical working-class protests that instilled in society the desire for order and the support of a – minority – group of veterans for paramilitary organisations.

 8. Zroka, ‘Veterans’ Movements,' 2639.

 9. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the movement converged into a single national association, concentrating all veterans. The American Legion integrated all mobilised men, not only expeditionary, having around one million members in 1931. The British Legion, on the other hand, had between 300,000 and 400,000 members between 1929 and 1939. France is a singular case, with a vast multiplication of organisations, born out of political, professional or type of disability affinities (Cf. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 2, Mentalités et Idéologies, 226, 1087–98.). My doctoral research has revealed that an analysis of the French movement is particularly useful for comparative studies of the Portuguese veterans' movement, not because of its dimension or structure, but due to its universe of ideological values, amidst political and social transitions in the post-war period.

10. Cf. Winter, ‘Shell-Shock and the Cultural History,’ 2.

11. Cf. Gibelli, La Grande Guerra degli Italiani, 322.

12. In Portugal, the First World War definitely hastened the fall of the Ist Republic (implemented in October 1910), which could not survive the war's consequences (Rosas, ‘A crise do liberalismo’). Still, Portuguese intervention in the European front was far from having obtained a national consensus: far away from territorial threats, the defence of the colonies did not justify involvement in the European arena, even for diplomatic reasons; therefore it is possible to anticipate political motives in the Democratic Party's desire to intervene (Teixeira, O poder e a guerra). However, Portugal's entry into the war, which took place only in March 1917, under the aegis of the Union Sacrée, and its victory alongside the Allies did not pacify internal political dissent or prevent Sidónio Pais's conservative presidential government (from December 1917 to December 1918), which almost put an end to the Republic.

13. This number is difficult to calculate due to the poor records of treatment, hospitalisation and medical leaves in the CEP, combined with missing information and the inability to identify this type of physical and psychological trauma. Cf. AHM, 1. Divisão, 3. Secção, Caixa 1401 – Serviços de Estatística e Estado Civil do CEP, Livro de Estatística do CEP.

14. José Pontes, ‘A assistência aos mutilados,’ O Século, 12 March 1918, 1.

15. José Pontes, Diário do Senado, 15 Jan. 1926, 7–8.

16. Cf. Decree No. 14:044 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 167, 5 Aug. 1927. This was republished with a few changes in Decree 16: 443 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 138, 6 June 1929. Some subsequent additions were made to the rights of dependents by Decree No. 17:335 (Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 211, 10 Sept. 1929), which promulgated the Code for pensions, Decree No. 20:251 (Diário do Governo, I Series I, No. 197, 25 Aug. 1931); among others.

17. Suspended laws Nos. 1:170, 21 May 1921; 1:464, 16 Aug. 1921; 1:467, 18 Aug. 1923; 1:477, 4 Oct. 1923; No. 1:777, 2 May 1925; No. 1:858, 7 April 1926; and Decree No. 10:099, 17 Sept. 1924.

18. Although the figures proposed by the Comissão encarregada de legislação sobre os inválidos do Serviço Militar (Cf. AHM, 1 Divisão, 35 Secção, Caixa 442) are quite high, considering the national average of industrial workers' salaries (between one and five escudos in 1921), the figures attributed to disability pensions, according to most critics, did not exceed 40 cents a day (20 cents if the individual was undergoing rehabilitation). See Ministério das Finanças (Direcção Geral de Estatística), Anuário estatístico de Portugal, 323.

19. Sometimes the evaluations and mismatched results between the juntas (the military hospital and the state) resulted in different verdicts. See, for example, ‘Vem isto a propósito de… Oh! As Juntas de saúde e os pobres mutilados de Guerra,’ A Guerra, 1, No. 3, 1 March 1926.

20. In Portugal, there is very limited information available about soldiers who were victims of mental illness. This was a disease extremely specific to this conflict, rarely identified by the health services of the CEP. Peter Barham was one of the first historians to address the question of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among First World War soldiers in Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War. On the subject see, among others, Mosse, ‘Shell-Shock as a Social Disease’; Lerner, Hysterical Men; Leese, Shell Shock; Leed, No Man's Land; Winter, ‘Shell-Shock and the Cultural History of the Great War.’ More common are studies that sought to understand the physical effects of the war on soldiers, see Bourke, ‘Remembering War’ and Dismembering the Male ; Reznick, John Galsworthy and Disabled Soldiers; Delaporte, ‘Le corps et la parole des mutilés’; Keegan, The Face of the Battle; Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom’; and Mosse, The Image of Man.

21. Scarce sources inevitably pose restrictions. The LCGG's archive disappeared in a fire at the League's headquarters in the 1960s. Apart from being unstructured, the archives of the Republic's ministries have little or no information in this regard. Some official information has survived, comprising parliamentary and legislative publications, press reports, activity reports, correspondence and other sources (mostly pertaining to the period after 1931). Hence, this research does not have a tight timeline.

22. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 3, Politique et Sociologie, 9.

23. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 3, Politique et Sociologie, 10.

24. An analysis of the veterans' movement has concrete limitations that prevent the formulation of questions about the definition of former soldiers and the veterans' movement. Hence, it is limited to a major veterans' association in Portugal. All statistics are exceptional, transitory and irregular. In the French case, operational definition and control of the disabled veterans' phenomenon made the task of the Pensions Ministry easier. Having an exact idea of the numeric relevance of veterans' associations – the evolution and geographic distribution of their members – raised fundamental problems of definition as well as discrepancies in numbers (from conferences, the press and activity reports). There are overall indications in Portugal regarding members, but they are very critical. A profound sociological framework was not possible due to the evident lack of sources, so a selective appraisal of information was used instead.

25. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 1, Histoire, 3.

26. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 29.

27. The result of great efforts and pressure by the movement's leaders, the statutes were finally approved by António Maria da Silva in October 1923 and officially published in the Diário de Governo on 22 January 1924, ordered by Major Ribeiro de Carvalho of the War Ministry, who, aware of the institution's precarious conditions, temporarily provided a space in the Direcção de Arma da Aeronáutica. The new headquarters were officially inaugurated on 23 February 1924 in the presence of senior government and Portuguese Armed Forces officials (Order No. 3:888 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 22, 29 Jan. 1924).

28. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 15.

29. Order No. 3:888 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 22, 29 Jan. 1924.

30. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 15.

31. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 23.

32. Direct aid had two forms: granting a subsidy (single instalment) or the payment of a monthly pension (which usually was under 100$00 escudos). Subsidies were attributed for funerals, illness, unemployment or assistance. The unemployment issue affected the largest number of soldiers and, as such, most subsidies were granted on that basis. Cf. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 43–6 (1923–25), 69–74 (1925–26), 96–105, (1926–7), 140–53, 247 (1927–8); LCGG, Relatório da Gerência de 1931 a 1934.

33. The limits imposed on this research, a centripetal analysis, exclude a broad study of local nuclei, for which information is scarce. It was also important to safeguard the importance of the DC, a key element of this study, since the objective was to examine general actions by veterans in Portugal, which involved the LCGG in most cases. It is extremely important to study local nuclei and their members; their social origin; funding and means, as well as the whole set of activities they implemented, apart from immediate assistance and commemorative activities. In other words, to understand how this group identity process functioned at a local level.

34. Art. 10 of Order No. 3:888 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 22, 29 Jan. 1924 –Statutes of the Liga dos Combatentes da Grande Guerra.

35. Several benefits were achieved: discounts for ex-soldiers in medical appointments, pharmacies, hospital admission, legal services and several establishments; priority enrolment for the children of veterans at the Instituto de Pupilos do Exército, Instituto Feminino de Educação e Trabalho and Casa Pia de Lisboa; the appointment of unemployed veterans to public positions; funeral subsidies for those who died without any money; resources for official institutions; and schools and summer camps created for the children of veterans (see, for example, AHM, F0, 006, L, 52, Caixa 905; LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 42–8).

36. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 82.

37. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 93.

38. Several commissions asked the DC for aid since they faced great difficulties. David Aboim published several requests in order to alert official entities to the desperate situation, mainly involving unemployment: ‘This huge crisis spreading all over the country is sadly striking the homes of former Great War soldiers who have even pondered begging for money in the cities. While they departed for the battlefields, where they fought and suffered, many of those who stayed to taste Capua's delicacies were making huge profits in the wombs of the strong room. Maybe it is time the Nation remembers to fulfil its duty regarding those who did not hesitate to fulfil theirs at the right time?’, ‘Crise de trabalho,’ A Guerra, 2, No. 17, May 1927, 7.

39. During the 1927–8 administration the Military Qualifications Law was approved, guaranteeing relative financial autonomy and aid to ex-soldiers. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 116–24.

40. Portugal was admitted into FIDAC on 18 October 1927. This proved crucial to the internationalisation of the Portuguese veterans' movement, which developed strong relationships with its foreign counterparts, participating in various international activities and welcoming several foreign delegations to Portugal. Cf. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 122.

41. Was the deterioration of the War Ministry's relations with the right-wing Government the reason for the withdrawal of a Congress that brought together men who had been or still were responsible for the regime's changes?

42. Cf. Law No. 1:858 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 73, 7 April 1926.

43. Assis Gonçalves, ‘O Próximo Congresso,’ A Guerra, 5, No. 50, Feb. 1930, 1–2.

44. Gonçalves became the civil governor of Vila Real during the Estado Novo regime and exchanged many letters with Salazar, providing information about the League and its members.

45. Elections were held for the magazine's board in August 1926 and Gonçalves became the director of the publication, since James Cortesão, the first choice, was not available.

46. With regard to the ‘feast of Republican combatants’ to celebrate 9 April, the Diário da Manhã fuelled this controversy by publishing letters from readers who opposed the initiative mooted by Captain Santos Costa and the LCGG's president, Hernâni Cidade, accusing them of not representing all combatants (‘9 de Abril,’ Diário da Manhã, 2 April 1933, 2). In 1958, during Salazar's regime, the League organised a conference dinner with some men who had been connected to the opposition to the dictatorship since the 1930s (Cf. ACPC-BN, E. 25: Jaime Cortesão, 1290, 24 April 1958).

47. See correspondence from Augusto Casimiro in exile during the dictatorship (ACPC-BN, D 5: Augusto Casimiro, Caixa 1).

48. Order No. 7:826 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 115, 18 May 1934.

49. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1934 a 1935, 3.

50. It should be mentioned that, until 1926 or even 1934, prominent Republicans, some of them future opponents of first the Military Dictatorship and then the Estado Novo, were part of the League's governing body, such as Jaime Cortesão, Mardel Ferreira, Afonso Júlio Cerqueira, José Esquível, Alberto MacBride, Augusto Casimiro, Augusto Campilho Lima Barreto, António Germano Ribeiro de Carvalho, Carlos Ludgero Cabrita and, in the Oeiras nucleus, Luiz Augusto Ferreira Martins and Manuel Gonçalves Monteiro.

51. Internal divisions in the soldiers' movement were evident and linked with political events and changes in the Armed Forces. The political transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian dictatorship (the ‘Estado Novo’) inevitably marked the League's organisation, ending the initial balance between civilian and military leaders. Some of these men were overtly republican and took control of the League and this movement. This study considered the cases of Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra, which are easier to analyse.

52. Cf. Lucena, A evolução do sistema corporativo, 207–27.

53. In this period there was an intensive process of checking the number of members forming this association, even locally. It was a search for definition, resembling the French ‘soldier's letter’ that emerged very late in Portugal, and an important resource for homogenisation, but was primarily a question of political ‘control’ of the movement.

54. Campos Rego, ‘A obra da Liga dos Combatentes,’ A Guerra, 1, No. 9, 11 Nov. 1926, 5–7.

55. Mosse, ‘Two World Wars and the Myth,’ 491–513.

56. Cf. Prost, In the Wake of War, 95.

57. In Portugal, conscription prevented the creation of a mass of volunteers in the Great War, represented by a narrow minority of Republican intellectuals. The absence of a national interventionist consensus and national unity played a decisive role in the development of a singular war-experience remembrance process in Portugal. Cf. Marques, Das trincheiras com saudade, 273–370.

58. Order No. 3:888 – Diário do Governo, Series, No. 22, 29 Jan. 1924 – statutes of the Liga dos Combatentes da Grande Guerra (Art. 3).

59. The veterans' anti-parliamentary stance was justified by ‘mauvais fonctionnement des institutions parlementaires en France dans les années 1930 […] l'insatisfaction des combattants tient à ce qu'ils n'arrivent pas à infléchir le pouvoir dans le sens où ils le souhaitèrent’. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 2, Mentalités et Idéologies, 218.

60. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 14–15.

61. Cortesão, Memórias da Grande Guerra, 239–42.

62. Conservative Republicans, who supported the 28 May 1926 coup, which eventually gave rise to the military dictatorship, just wanted to restore ‘constitutional normalcy’. Cf. Rosas, O Estado Novo (1926–1974), vol. VII, 154–5.

63. Cf. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 2, Mentalités et Idéologies, 217–18: ‘L'existence d'un puissant mouvement combattant, républicain dans ses objectifs aussi bien que dans ses méthodes et ses réactions spontanées, a constitué au contraire l'un des obstacles majeures au développent d'un fascisme en France.’

64. See n. 17.

65. Cf. See n. 17, 124.

66. LCGG, Relatório de Gerências de 1923 a 1928, 15.

67. Cf. Prost, Les anciens combattants, vol. 2, Mentalités et Idéologies, 124.

68. Villaverde Cabral stated: ‘If the army finally rearranges itself, politically and ideologically, on 28 May, it will be around the Republican and nationalist faction. It is Republican because it must be: high command mass pronouncement, the 28 May coup had to rely on the staff placed by Republican governments in these high commands. It is nationalist owing to its roots in the colonial actions and Flanders war.’ Cabral, ‘Sobre o fascism,’ 902.

69. Cf. Pinto, ‘Muitas crises,’ 62–7.

70. Ferreira, O comportamento político dos militares, 128.

71. Gomes da Costa, ‘A Guerra!,’ A Guerra, 1, No. 3, 1 March 1926, 2. Gomes da Costa was a Portuguese soldier and politician. As a politician, he was the leader chosen by the conservative Right to lead the 28 May revolution, which would start the military dictatorship.

72. Local branches were responsible for an aid programme for former soldiers and war victims in Portugal. This was mainly aimed at those who were physically or psychologically impaired, who usually benefited from institutional support. Assistance was provided through pensions and subsidies, medical-protection discounts or gratuities, resources in official entities for cases aimed at obtaining rights and benefits, the struggle for legal changes, and so on.

73. See Tables 1 and 2.

74. Cf. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, ‘Violence et consentement,’ 255; Becker et al., eds, La violence de guerre, 1914–1945.

75. Cf. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 32–3.

76. ‘The war created a messianic expectation, the premonition of deeper changes, for both neutralists and interventionists as much as for the great majority of the soldiers, who had accepted the war passively, fighting on with a steadfast spirit of dedication, believing in the promise of great rewards. This state of mind, and these subversive residues, that were to feed the myths of bolshevism and fascism, was the result of the way Italy actually took part in the war.’ Gentile, The Origin of Fascist Ideology, 51.

77. Cf. Pinto, ‘A queda da I República,’ 25–44; Cabral, ‘Sobre o fascism,’ 899

78. According to Rosas the causes that led to the dictatorship in Portugal had been brewing for a while, resulting in a growing crisis of liberalism, which the war accelerated. See Rosas, ‘A crise do liberalism,’ 105.