The Italian white-goods industry and the European Common Market during the years of the ‘economic miracle’ (1958–63): quantitative evidence and interpretative hypotheses

Abstract

The white-goods industry is one of the key fields of Italian economic development following the Second World War, and it represents the most resounding example of how, in just a few years, Italian entrepreneurs managed to reach the top of a market already occupied by the largest foreign multinationals. This article offers a quantitative view of the role played by foreign markets during the ‘economic miracle’, which is generally taken to be the first five years of the European Common Market (1958–63). There is a lack of an aggregate study of this subject for the Italian white-goods industry. As well as supplying some starting points for new research into the rapid international success of Italian producers, this study has allowed two inter-connected objectives to be reached. Firstly, it has highlighted how intense the inter-dependence of foreign markets was when the Common Market was set up, and therefore before the date claimed by the literature: the first important process of the rationalisation of the sector and the consequent formation of a national oligopoly was the result of the battle with competitors in foreign markets. Secondly, it seems to confirm how the process of European integration was not a substitutive factor, but the accelerant for a process of development that had already started.

Keywords:

• Italy
• twentieth century
• domestic appliances
• foreign commerce
• European Common Market

Notes

 1. Between 1948 and 1973, the whole of the Western world benefited from economic growth which was sustained by and pivoted around the American system and the US dollar (for example, see Marglin and Schor, The Golden Age of Capitalism; Toniolo, ‘Europe's Golden Age’).

 2. Amatori, ‘La grande impresa,’ 732. Although not the subject of this article, it should not be forgotten that the study of the domestic-appliance sector is relevant not only in an economic context, but also from a strictly social point of view. In fact, the spread of consumer durables such as domestic appliances is a characteristic element of consumption patterns for the Golden Age of the Western economy and is one of the most commonly used indicators of a country's standard of living (see, for example, De Grazia, ‘Irresistible Empire,’ 438–57; Engerman, The Standard of Living Debate in International Prospective). As a consequence, domestic appliances can be considered a lens through which can be seen the social transformation of Italy during a historic period which saw Italy complete the transition from an agricultural country to an industrial force. (With regard to the role played by the washing machine, see Asquer, La rivoluzione candida).

 3. See Castellano, L'industria degli elettrodomestici, 2; ‘Produzione mondiale di elettrodomestici.’

 4. That said is also valid for consumption. More common are studies into individual companies and those that examine the sector from the production side (and, in particular, from a technical-organisational point of view). For example see Nones, Dalla San Giorgio alla Elsag; Sori, Merloni; Burello et al. , Dalla Zanussi all'Electrolux. For a Chandlerian analysis of the Italian domestic-appliance industry in the 1950s and 1960s see Balloni, Origini, sviluppo e maturità, 59–221. On distribution see Soldera, L'associazionismo.

 5. See, for example, Gomellini and Pianta, ‘Commercio con l'estero,’ and relative bibliography.

 6. See Balloni, Origini, sviluppo e maturità, 40, 134; Paba, Reputazione ed efficienza, 41–2.

 7. The concept of the ‘substitutive factor’ was first introduced by Alexander Gerschenkron in his comparative historical studies of the transition to industrial economies by late-comer countries. According to Gerschenkron (Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness), compared to the reference model (the UK), the countries that followed featured different factors (substitutive factors), which nevertheless allowed the process of industrialisation to start. It is therefore clear that Gerschenkron (whose studies have been widely discussed by Italian historiography during the 1960s and 1970s) never used this concept with reference to the process of European integration. It is, nevertheless, a very evocative concept which, by extension, is suitable for use also in this context, to better summarise the objectives of the research.

 8. See Faravelli Giacobone et al. , Dalla casa elettrica, 52. The Battelle Institute (now the Battelle Memorial Institute) was founded in the 1960s and is based in Ohio, USA (htpp://www.battelle.org).

 9. By the beginning of the 1970s, companies such as Candy, Ignis, Indesit, Merloni and Zanussi were responsible for the production over 80% of Italian domestic appliances, meeting 75% of the domestic demand and making Italy one of the main exporters of white goods (Castagnoli and Scarpellini, Storia degli imprenditori, 325). These were companies which followed a path of training completely different from that of their European competitors. Abroad, it was companies already operating in the mechanical industry which first started to produce domestic appliances. In Italy, on the contrary, the mechanical or electro-technical companies such as Fiat withdrew when the market for domestic appliances was definitely taking off. The Italian domestic-appliance industry represents a typical case of family business. On this topic see, for example, Colli, History of Family Business; James, Family Capitalism; Astrachan, Family Business; for Italy see Colli, Capitalismo famigliare, 77–105.

10. In 1948 Italy was already fully entered into the international economic context, thanks also to its previous participation in the institutions defined by the Bretton Woods agreement. The World Bank and the International Monetary Found were the tools used by the new ruling class to obtain full international legitimacy for the electoral results in 1946 and 1948 (see Barbagallo, ‘Italia democratica’; Formigoni, La Democrazia Cristiana).

11. Although the Italian economy grew at rates which were constant and higher than the European average until the oil crisis of 1973, Italian historiography is now agreed on the conventional identification of the ‘economic miracle’ with the period 1958–63, these being the years which saw the highest growth rates. The period 1963–4 was, in fact, the start of a short-term crisis which lasted several years. See, for example, Cardini, Il miracolo economico; Crainz, Storia del miracolo.

12. In 1965, Italian production of dishwashers was 55,000 units and Italy was in a similar situation to that of the other principle European countries (at the top in Europe was West Germany, which produced 104,000 dishwashers; see Officiel Magazine des Arts Ménagers, ‘Statistiche comparate’; Gattoni, ‘Tecnologie di massa’).

13. It is necessary to remember how this situation did not only involve the Italian market, but also those of other more advanced countries. Even if higher than in Italy, in 1965 the saturation rates for the dishwasher market were also low in Western Germany (16%) and the United States (16%).

14. Bmfc, 1922, 277; 1924, 1407–8; 1926, 563.

15. Attilio Jacoboni (Rieti, 1905) graduated in Chemistry and worked for Agip and Eni. In 1966 he became general director of the Efim, of which he was president from 1975 to 1978. The Efim (founded in 1962 and wound up in 1992) was a state holding set up to manage the Mechanical Industry Finance Fund (Fim). The Fim was established in 1947 to finance the post-war reconversion of the mechanical industry. The professional curriculum of Jacoboni confirms his extensive knowledge of the Italian mechanical industry (Jacoboni, L'industria meccanica, 305–6).

16. Amongst the largest, Jacoboni recalls: Romeo Augustoni, Brown Boveri Tecnomasio Italiano S.A., Compagnia Generale di Elettricità S.A., Dell'Orto, Neowatt, Sacme, Scam and Triplex S.A. of Milan; Isothermos S.A. of Bresso (Milan); Osva of Sesto San Giovanni (Milan); Sire of Canegrate (Milan); Ignis of Comerio (Varese); Ambra S.A., Fiat S.A., Magnadyne S.A. and Merlini Alfredo of Turin; Scei of Novara; Feb of Ferrara; Cosme Officine of Brescia.

17. The Bank of Italy does not supply the average annual Italian lira/US dollar exchange rate for 1947. The first year for which data is available is 1955 and the rate was 624.8469. All conversions carried out in these pages have been made using the average annual exchange rate as supplied by the Exchange Office of the Bank of Italy.

18. Papette,‘Elettrodomestici in Italia 2’; Luzzatto Fegiz, Il volto sconosciuto, 1718. In 1946 Luzzatto Fegiz founded Doxa, the institute which specialised in opinion polls, market research and statistical analyses. In Italy, Doxa had a monopoly in the field of market research until the 1960s.

19. Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana, L'industria italiana, 420–1.

20. On Anie see Lavista, Sessant'anni di associazionismo (with regard to domestic appliances, see pp. 77–87).

21. For an analysis of the technical-organisational structure of the Italian white-goods industry during the 1950s and 1960s, see the previously cited study by Balloni.

22. See Giannetti, Tecnologia e sviluppo.

23. According to some models, the advantage gained from the favourable exchange rate of the Lira can be added to that derived from the low cost of labour. See, for example, Lamfalussy, ‘Contribution à une théorie.’

24. For example, see the authoritative opinion of Castronovo, Storia d'Italia, 405–8.

25. Asquer, La rivoluzione candida, 13, 151. The reference data were those of the electro-technical industry (1959) and the machines and electrical-equipment industry (1964), of which the domestic-appliance industry was part. Data was given in Belgian francs and Italian lire. Conversion into US dollars has been carried out by the author using the following average annual exchange rates: 49.9603 Belgian franc/US dollar (1959) and 624.3681 Italian lira/US dollar (1964). For a more detailed comparison of salaries and the cost of labour in Europe in the period in question see also Associazione Industriale Lombarda, Comparazione dei salari e del costo del lavoro; Istituto Statistico delle Comunità Europee, Salari CECA.

26. See Insee, ‘Equipaggiamento domestico’; ‘Salari e aumento della produzione.’

27. Maddison, ‘Nature and Functioning,’ 32–4. For an international comparison of per capita GDP levels in the same period see Maddison, ‘Historical Statistics,’ tab. 3.

28. According to a study published in Elettrodomus , prices had already halved in the second half of the 1950s. If the average price per litre of some of the most popular brands was 100 in 1955, by 1960 it had fallen to 57 (‘Ricerche sul comportamento del consumatore,’ 23).

29. See ‘Produzione in serie.’

30. On the role of price competition, see Castellano, L'industria degli elettrodomestici, 159–67.

31. See ‘Lavatrici.’

32. Union pour l'étude du marché de l'électricité, Comparaison des prix.

33. See Castiglioni, ‘Elettrodomestici.’ On Castiglioni see Polano, Achille Castiglioni.

34. See Vercelloni, Breve storia del design, 94; Castellano, L'industria degli elettrodomestici, 49. On the evolution of Italian design see Branzi, Introduzione al design; De Fusco, Storia del design, 257–316; Riccini, ‘Disegno industriale’; Sparke, ‘Design in Italy.’ The Manifesto del disegno industriale was published in April of 1952 by the well-known architect Alberto Rosselli in the pages of the prestigious specialist magazine Domus (see Rosselli, ‘Manifesto’). On Rosselli see Fracassi, Stile industria.

35. Many studies carried out during the 1950s and 1960s confirm this transformation. For example, see that dedicated to refrigerators and published in the specialist trade publication Elettrodomus in April 1960 (M.G., ‘Vendita di frigoriferi’).

36. On the more general effects of the Marshall Plan for the economic growth of Italian industry, see the extensive bibliography. Here we shall only state that, according to recent studies, the Marshall Plan proved to be an additional factor and not a substitutive factor for the ability for recovery demonstrated by the Italian economy at that difficult juncture. On this subject see Segreto, ‘Americanizzare o modernizzare’; Zamagni, ‘Un'analisi critica.’ On the role of the Marshall Plan in Italy see D'Attorre, ‘Il Piano Marshall’; Fauri, ‘Il Piano Marshall’; Quartararo, ‘Italia e Piano Marshall’; Spagnolo, La stabilizzazione incompiuta; Campus, L'Italia, gli Stati Uniti e il piano Marshall. On industrial reconstruction see Zamagni, ‘Betting on the Future.’ On the entry of Italy into the Western system see Cova, Il dilemma dell'integrazione. On the participation of Italy in the process of European economic integration see Fauri, L'Italia e l'integrazione economica. More generally on the motivations behind the Marshall Plan see Gimbel, The Origin. On the process of reconstruction of Western Europe see Bossuat, L'Europe occidentale; Donovan, The Second Victory; Milward, The Reconstruction. There is a vast range of material on the process of Americanisation of Europe. A summary of the various interpretations can be found in Zeitlin and Herrigel, Americanization and its Limits (see the article by Ruggero Ranieri on the case of the Italian steel industry). For a recent interpretation of the role played by the economic policies adopted in Italy following the Second World War, see Nardozzi, Miracolo e declino. A comparative analysis of the economic policies adopted by European countries in the post-Second World War period can be found in Graham and Seldon, Government and Economies.

37. With regard to the Italian white-goods market, see Paris, ‘L'industria italiana degli elettrodomestici bianchi.’

38. Italian manufacturers were amongst those best able to exploit the opportunities offered by the process of integration. On the positions adopted with regard to the Common Market see Petrini, ‘Les milieux industriels italiens’; Paolo Tedeschi, ‘Les industriels lombards.’

39. Paris, ‘L'industria italiana degli elettrodomestici bianchi,’ 93.

40. See Gattoni, ‘Vendite boom’; ‘Panorama del mercato italiano.’

41. The percentages relating to the individual countries have been calculated using the data taken from the same source as Table A3.

42. See Paris, ‘L'industria italiana degli elettrodomestici bianchi.’

43. See Balloni, Origini, sviluppo e maturità, 137–8; Paba, Reputazione ed efficienza, 71–80.

44. For example, the model 36 refrigerator, launched in the mid-1950s by the Ready Industries, was the first product in Europe entirely formed in plastic (‘Frigorifero tuttoplastica’). By the mid 1960s, Ignis was the first company in Europe to apply expanded polyurethane technology for refrigerator insulation, allowing larger internal capacities and smaller external dimensions (Paba, Reputazione ed efficienza, 44). The examples could also continue with regard to washing machines. We claim that in the domestic-appliance sector, Italian industry followed a dynamic course of innovation, based upon the development of original capacities which allowed it to make a name for itself in foreign markets.

45. The number of Italian refrigerator producers grew from 15 to 60 between 1953 and 1960, falling to 22 in 1964. Those for washing machines rose from five in 1953 to 50 in 1960, before dropping to 18 in 1964 (Balloni, Origini, sviluppo e maturità, 65).

46. Paba, Reputazione ed efficienza, 41.