Political humanitarianism in the 1930s: Indian aid for Republican Spain

Abstract

This article examines Indian humanitarian help for Republican victims during the Spanish Civil War. It focuses in particular on aid initiatives by the Indian national movement, which were embedded in the larger quest for independence from British colonial rule. By creating their own humanitarian programme in favour of Republican Spain, Indian nationalists dissociated themselves from Britain’s foreign policy and tried to orchestrate a politics of moral superiority for themselves. The article also explores Indian participation in transnational networks of Left solidarity. Established to generate political and humanitarian support for Republican Spain, Indian actors concurrently utilized these networks to enhance their status in the international community and to advance their own end of an independent state.

Keywords:

• India
• Spanish Civil War
• political humanitarianism
• transnational solidarity
• Jawaharlal Nehru
• independence movement

Introduction

In the 1930s, humanitarian help in armed conflicts became an area of engagement for the Indian national movement. While fighting for India’s independence, the Indian National Congress (INC) and civil-society actors displayed an increasingly international spirit and provided not only ideological support, but also financial and material humanitarian assistance to different countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. The article explores the intersection of Indian humanitarianism and transnational solidarity by taking up the example of the Spanish Civil War. Focusing on this highly politicized conflict, it traces the aims, ideas and practices of Indian political humanitarians in the late colonial period. Humanitarian relief is, despite claims to the contrary, rarely apolitical, and is comprized of several political dimensions.¹ However, while using the term political humanitarianism in this article, I mean a form of humanitarianism in which political motivations are particularly explicit. To understand ‘humanitarianism as a form of politics’ also implies, according to Daniel Laqua, that we take into account the humanitarians’ views on domestic politics and the international order.²

In the case of Indian solidarity and relief initiatives during the Spanish Civil War, the insight that humanitarian initiatives are motivated not only by moral concerns leads to two interconnected arguments. One, Indian political humanitarianism was closely linked to nationalist claims for sovereignty from British colonial rule. Understanding Great Britain as a reactionary, imperialist power, the Indian national movement decided to give its support to democratic and progressive forces, such as the Spanish Republic, to help their causes, but also to enhance its own ambitions. Indian humanitarian relief thus became part of the nationalist foreign-policy approach, which developed independently from the official British policy. Two, at the same time, Indian humanitarianism created a new opening for international linkages as they were embedded in transnational networks of humanitarianism and Left solidarity in the late 1930s.³ By providing humanitarian aid Indian nationalists not only showcased their presence on the international stage, but they also displayed India as a worthy member of the international community, a country that was ready for independence.

The Spanish Civil War triggered broad international interest, expressions of solidarity and manifold forms of assistance for the belligerents, i.e., the Republicans, fighting for the Spanish Republic and the rebellious Nationalists, led by General Francisco Franco.⁴ Although the policy of Non-Intervention was adapted by a number of nations shortly after the outbreak of the conflict⁵, both warring parties received external military support of differing strengths. The Spanish Republic was aided by the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree by Mexico and France. Furthermore, the International Brigades supported the Republican cause, rallying foreign volunteers, often with a Communist or socialist background, to fight alongside the government forces.⁶ Franco’s insurgent army received a significant amount of material from Germany and Italy. Both countries also sent regular units, which participated in naval and air combat and provided training for the Nationalists.⁷ Next to the military assistance the Spanish Civil War also witnessed a sizeable provision of humanitarian aid. International and national organisations provided assistance for the military and civilian victims and prisoners of the war. Besides well-established humanitarian actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Save the Children, Service Civil International, the British Friends Service Council and the American Friends Service Committee,⁸ a number of new groups were established in Europe and the United States, for instance, the Spanish Medical Aid Committee, the Scottish Ambulance, the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, the Basque Children’s Committee, the Spanish Relief Fund for Sufferers from Red Atrocities, the Medical Bureau and North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy and the International Solidarity Fund. These aid committees were often linked to left-wing political parties, trade unions or Catholic circles, which mobilized significant enthusiasm and support for their charitable endeavours.⁹ The humanitarian organisations started fundraising campaigns, shipped foodstuffs and offered medical help. Some of them also cared for refugees inside and outside Spain, particularly concentrating on children.¹⁰ Following the principle of impartiality and neutrality, several humanitarian organisations worked for both sides of the conflict.¹¹ Reflecting their particular political or religious concerns, the majority of actors, however, chose to provide humanitarian aid either to the Republicans or to the Nationalists.¹²

The history of Indian humanitarian help before 1936

Indian initiatives to provide humanitarian assistance during an international conflict had first been launched in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1899, a war broke out between Britain and the two Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Mohandas K. Gandhi, who was working as a lawyer in South Africa at the time, aligned himself unhesitatingly with the British Empire and formed an Indian Ambulance Corps assisting wounded soldiers.¹³ In 1906, after the outbreak of the Bambatha Rebellion by several Zulu-speaking groups in the province of Natal, Gandhi aligned himself again with the British and set up another Indian Ambulance Corps, which was responsible for tending the wounded Zulus.¹⁴ Gandhi’s efforts were not organized in India, but in South Africa. The next Indian humanitarian initiative, however, involved the dispatch of a medical mission from the South Asian subcontinent to Turkey. In 1912, after the outbreak of the Balkan wars, Indian civil-society actors, mostly members of the Indian Muslim community, collected funds to send several medical missions to the Ottoman Empire and help wounded soldiers and refugees.¹⁵

During the First World War Great Britain drew on its colonial resources and India’s contributions of men, materials and money became a crucial source of supply to the Allied Powers. While soldiers of the British Indian Army served in France, Mesopotamia, East Africa and China, extensive Indian humanitarian initiatives emerged to help wounded military and civilian victims of the war in Europe and India.¹⁶ In London, Gandhi decided to form an Indian Field Ambulance Training Corps, which assisted Indian victims in Europe. In India, the Indian St John Ambulance became highly active. In co-operation with the British Red Cross Society, it provided help to prisoners of war. Besides financial and material contributions to different national Red Cross societies, the association also established and equipped hospitals in India, Great Britain and France and sent ambulances to East Africa and Mesopotamia. In its activities St John Ambulance was supported not only by donations from British people living in India, but also from wide sections of upper and middle-class Indian civil society.

The nature of Indian humanitarianism during the Great War was closely intertwined with the imperial framework, a characteristic feature that was to change in the interwar period. An early instance of emancipated political humanitarianism in an international conflict occurred in 1927. The Chinese nationalist revolution had challenged Britain’s formal presence in China.¹⁷ Britain’s reaction – dispatching the Shanghai Defence Force, which also included Indian soldiers – was heavily criticized by the Indian National Congress. The latter condemned the British use of Indian troops and money for what it perceived as imperialist action and decided to send an ambulance corps to China.¹⁸ Preparations were already well underway when the British Indian Government in Delhi, in agreement with London, refused to grant the ambulance corps the necessary passports, fearing that the proposed Indian medical mission would serve political purposes by being used ‘as a demonstration against the British policy in China’.¹⁹ Although this first instance of politically motivated humanitarianism that aimed to demonstrate an independent foreign-policy stance could not be realized, humanitarian help in armed conflicts and civil wars developed into an area of engagement for Indian nationalists. While aspiring to become independent, in the course of the 1930s, the Indian National Congress and civil-society actors provided ideological support and financial and material humanitarian assistance to Abyssinia, the Spanish Republic and China.

Lasting from October 1935 to May 1936, the Italian-Abyssinian war was closely followed in India.²⁰ Public debates focused on which position to take and what kind of help could be provided for the African victims.²¹ The INC, for example, aligned itself officially with Abyssinia and expressed its solidarity with its African ‘brethren in distress’.²² As well as passing resolutions that supported Abyssinia morally by condemning the imperialist aggression of Italy²³, the INC held events in different towns in May 1936.²⁴ While pursuing an explicit pro-Abyssinian line, the INC became increasingly critical of British foreign policy, which it also thought partly responsible for Abyssinia’s fate.²⁵ To become more engaged in foreign-policy matters and to be able to develop self-defined political standpoints, the Congress decided during its annual meeting in Lucknow in April 1936 to establish a foreign department.²⁶ This foreign department became an influential factor in humanitarian efforts in subsequent international crises. Although the INC expressed its support for Abyssinia, this did not translate into any official material or financial support for the African country. Widespread debates about the provision of financial and medical aid for Abyssinia also appeared in civil-society groups and the Indian nationalist media, however, without any substantial materialisation.²⁷ Only the Indian Red Cross Society supported the war victims indirectly by forwarding money and medical supplies to the Abyssinian Red Cross.²⁸ These donations came not only from the members of the Indian Red Cross, but also from the general public. Appeals for contributions were made in the Indian press and also during protest meetings against Italy’s imperialist war.²⁹

The Spanish Civil War

Only two months after the official end of the Abyssinian war in May 1936, the conflict in Spain began with the revolt by parts of the military. Soon the coup spread and grew into a full-fledged civil war, which only ended in April 1939 with the defeat of the Republic.³⁰ The Spanish Civil War, which had started as an internal conflict, soon gained a European dimension and became a focal point of European differences and ideological battles.³¹ Furthermore, it also quickly gained a global dimension as its events were closely followed outside of Europe, for instance, in British India. The Indian public, especially anti-colonial politicians, intellectuals and members of the English educated middle class, took a strong interest in the political developments on the Iberian Peninsula, which were covered broadly by the Indian media. Nationalist English-language newspapers and journals reported in articles, editorials and by publishing Reuters’ messages on an almost daily basis about the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, letters to the editor discussed the conflict in detail and often supported explicitly one of the warring parties.³² The thematic scope of the Indian media coverage was extensive. Apart from information about the fighting, the Indian press dealt with the policy of Non-Intervention, often questioned the position of the British government and denounced Mussolini’s and Hitler’s active backing of Franco.³³ Although the Indian nationalist press included neutral articles and several contributions that supported Franco’s Nationalists, the majority of reports, however, were in favour of the Republican cause.³⁴ Similar to the reporting in Europe, the Indian media also informed its readers about the on-going atrocities, pointed to the necessity of humanitarian aid to ease the suffering and republished calls for help.³⁵

Detailed information about the conflict was not only provided by (Indian) correspondents based in Europe, but also by well-known authors such as H. G. Wells, George Orwell and Mulk Raj Anand, who were involved in transnational networks aligning with the Republican cause.³⁶ Anand, who was living in Great Britain between 1924 and 1945, established himself as distinguished writer, critic and journalist in the 1930s. During this period he also committed himself to left-wing politics and began campaigning for India’s independence. Anand expressed his anti-colonial and anti-fascist activism in numerous articles for British journals and newspapers, but also in his speeches, for instance at the meetings of Krishna Menon’s India League. Moreover, his involvement brought him into close contact with British intellectuals and activists, such as Bertrand Russell, George Orwell, H. N. Brailsford and Ralf Fox.³⁷ Anand’s deep sympathy with the Spanish Republic made him join the International Brigades for three months. He communicated his war experiences to Indian socialist and Communist circles by publishing several articles in the Congress Socialist and the National Front.³⁸

The Indian public also received first-hand insights into the Spanish Civil War through the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru (see elsewhere in this article) and the reporting about two Indians who participated in the conflict on side of the Republicans. Gopal Mukund Huddar joined the British contingent of the International Brigades under the name of John Smith. His experiences in battles, his detention in Franco’s prison and his return to India were covered widely in the Indian press,³⁹ which celebrated him as ‘the only Indian [...] [that] fought against Franco’.⁴⁰ In regard to the thematic scope of this article, however, the case of Dr Madan Mohan Lal Atal is more intriguing. In spring 1937, Atal joined the Spanish Medical Aid Committee – a British left-wing organisation supporting the Republican side – and worked for 10 months in different Spanish hospitals and at the front.⁴¹ His work provided him with crucial experiences of working for a humanitarian organisation in armed conflicts. Atal’s activities in Republican Spain were driven by humanitarian considerations as much as by his leftist anti-fascist stance. Therefore, after his return to India, he seemed particularly qualified to lead the Indian medical mission, which was organized by the Indian National Congress in humanitarian support of the Chinese nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War.⁴² Hence, Atal was of the few Indians actively involved in the global Popular Front, which concentrated its effort on both the Spanish Republic and China.⁴³

The INC and in particular its acting president Jawaharlal Nehru also followed events closely in Spain. The war, its causes and the current developments were repeatedly addressed at Party and public meetings in the second half of 1936.⁴⁴ In doing this as well as by organising a Spain Day in different Indian cities in August 1936, the Congress Socialists took a pioneering stance in displaying their solidarity with the Spanish Republic.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the newly established foreign department exchanged information about the conflict with international organisations, such as the World Committee against War and Fascism.⁴⁶ The Congress, under the influence of men like Nehru, did not hide its sympathies with the Spanish Republic and adopted the following resolution during its annual meeting at Faizpur in December 1936:

The Congress has followed with the deepest sympathy and anxiety the struggle that is going on in Spain between the people of Spain and a military group aided by foreign mercenary troops and Fascist Powers in Europe. The Congress realizes that this struggle between democratic progress and Fascist reaction is of great consequence to the future of the world and will affect the future of imperialism and India. The Congress has noted without surprise that in this struggle the policy of non-intervention followed by the British Government has been such as to hamper in many ways the Spanish Government and people in fighting the Fascist rebels, and has thus in effect aided these rebels who are being openly backed and helped by the Fascist Powers.⁴⁷

The resolution portrayed the Spanish Civil War as a conflict of international importance and as an example of the contemporary global struggle between the forces of democracy and fascism, between progress and reaction. The Congress, as William Kuracina has argued, believed in ‘the commonality of anti-imperialist struggles – an understanding which implied the Congress’s favoring any nationalist movement striving against a foreign exploiter’.⁴⁸ Within the context of the Italian-Abyssinian war and the Spanish Civil War, this understanding soon also was applied to anti-fascist struggles.⁴⁹ Thus, against the background of the Indian movement for independence, the Congress aligned itself with the side seen to represent democracy and progress. By criticising Britain’s policy of non-intervention as a support for the fascist and reactionary powers, the INC indirectly reinforced its claim about the necessity of a distinct Indian foreign policy.⁵⁰

In February 1937, Nehru issued a public appeal on behalf of the Congress, in which he described the British policy as an obstruction to the Spanish Republic’s fight for freedom and drew parallels between Spain and India, both victims of fascism and imperialism. After pointing out that ‘everywhere the lovers of freedom, the exploited of the world have raised their voices in defence of the Spanish people and have sent them such help as they could – ambulance corps, medical supplies, food supplies and even volunteers’⁵¹, Nehru asked his fellow countryman what help other than mere expressions of sympathy and solidarity India could offer to the ‘cause of human freedom’.⁵² He suggested:

We must translate our sympathy into active and material help. We are poor and hungry folk, crushed under many burdens, dominated by an arrogant imperialism, and we struggle ourselves for freedom. But even in our poverty and misery we feel for our Spanish comrades and we must give them what aid we can, howsoever little this might be. We can help in sending them medical supplies and food. I trust it will be possible for us to arrange to send grain and other food supplies.⁵³

Thus, expressing sympathy was in Nehru’s opinion not enough to show India’s solidarity with Republican Spain on the international stage. The display of solidarity with the Republican cause in the framework of a common anti-imperialist and anti-fascist struggle also had to include material aid, just as it was done outside of India by various organisations and activists. Nehru proposed that all donations should be sent to the foreign department of the INC. As a start, the department forwarded the money to the Spain-India Committee, which had been formed in London by V. K. Krishna Menon.⁵⁴

Menon, who was one of Nehru’s closest associates in Europe, played an important role in linking Indian nationalist efforts for Spain with corresponding left-wing solidarity and aid networks in Britain. In 1929, he had organized the India League, an organisation that campaigned vigorously for India’s independence in Great Britain during the 1930s, and thereby he increasingly combined forces with the Communist Party of Great Britain.⁵⁵ Menon became involved in humanitarian relief activities, first in connection with the Spanish Civil War and subsequently for China. He actively participated in different British and international initiatives that were rooted in the Left and/or pacifist milieu, such the World Peace Congress, the Left Book Club and the National Conference on Spain. These initiatives took a stand against war and fascism, while championing collective security and the Spanish Republic.⁵⁶ Menon not only participated in many protest meetings as well as fundraising campaigns in Great Britain by delivering speeches, but also established, together with fellow Indians in Britain, the Spain-India Committee. The committee appealed for donations in metropolitan newspapers and organized demonstrations, talks and cultural events in support of Spain.⁵⁷ While doing so, Menon often explained the attitude of the INC towards peace, imperialism and the Spanish Civil War to British audiences. Unofficially representing the Indian National Congress and Nehru in particular, Menon acted as a transnational broker, bringing concerns by certain metropolitan and colonial groups closer together.⁵⁸

As suggested in February 1937 by Nehru, first donations were forwarded to the London-based Spain-India Committee.⁵⁹ The Congress Socialist Party, for instance, decided to contribute 37.5% of its income from a flag sale on May Day.⁶⁰ However, the Indian National Congress also answered appeals for aid by British initiatives involved in organising humanitarian assistance for Spain. Responding to a call of the Independent Labour Party of England, the Congress forwarded £50 dedicated to food provisions for Bilbao.⁶¹ These examples highlight the fact that Indian humanitarianism was embedded in wider transnational networks, in this case in networks of the political Left. In addition to these financial remittances, Nehru entertained the idea of sending an ambulance unit on behalf of India to the Spanish Republic. He calculated an amount of £1,000 necessary for this venture, a sum that most of his colleagues thought impossible to raise in India. Due to their non-enthusiastic response, Nehru did not pursue the plan any further.⁶² Similarly, the setting up of a Spain-India Committee in India in the first half of 1937 by the Congress proved to be not very successful. According to Nehru, this committee had achieved nothing, as it only existed on paper.⁶³ Despite these first unsuccessful attempts to establish larger aid initiatives in India, INC politicians, such as Nehru and Sarojini Naidu, but also the Congress Socialists, continued to issue appeals to the Indian public to support financially and materially the victims of the Spanish Civil War in the following months.⁶⁴ Their ideological activism to assist the Republic did not awake any substantial material response in India. This activism, however, enabled Indian nationalists to express their solidarity with Republican Spain and to affirm their own international aspirations and credentials.

Indian humanitarian endeavours for Spain gained momentum after Nehru returned from his prolonged stay in Europe in November 1938. During his tour through Britain, France and Czechoslovakia Nehru acted as the representative of the INC. In numerous meetings with politicians, activists and journalists he publicized India’s situation, propagated its anti-colonial struggle and explained its demand for independence to European audiences.⁶⁵ He met, amongst others, Clement Atlee, Stafford Cripps and Harold Laski, all Labour Party members, and the Indian Viceroy Lord Linlithgow.⁶⁶ His interest in the developments on the Iberian Peninsula made him visit the Spanish Republic in June 1938. Being accompanied by Krishna Menon, Nehru stayed for five days in Barcelona. His tight schedule not only included meetings with prominent Republican politicians, such as Foreign Minister Julio Álvarez del Vayo, President Manuel Azaña and Communist leader Dolores Ibárruri, also known as La Pasionaria, but also with factory workers and trade unionists. In his honour two receptions were arranged: one by the Cortes, the national Parliament, and a second by the Foreign Ministry. These receptions provided him with an excellent opportunity to give his views on the Spanish conflict and to familiarise his hosts and the attending press with the developments in India. At the battlefront, Nehru spoke with officers from the Republican Army and also spent time with the International Brigades. His interview with German and Italian aviators, detained in the prison of Barcelona, as well as his visit to a government-run children’s home for orphans, convinced him further of the good intentions of the Republican government. Despite the war-time circumstances, visible, for instance, in food scarcity, the government, according to Nehru, did its best to care for all refugee children as well as the enemy soldiers.⁶⁷ During his stay Nehru was accompanied by a representative of the Spanish Ministry of Propaganda who, in his own words, proved to be ‘most helpful’.⁶⁸ When reviewing Nehru’s programme, it becomes obvious that the Republican government attached great importance to his visit. It not only ensured that the Indian politician gained access to different sensitive sites, but its arrangements also evoked the sense of a state visit. By treating Nehru like the official representative of an independent country, the Spanish government subscribed wholeheartedly to the idea of transnational Left solidarity in favour of progressive, democratic forces: a solidarity that was needed for fighting the Nationalists, but that also reciprocally supported Indian nationalist demands for independence.

After his return from Barcelona, Nehru eagerly conveyed his impressions to his countrymen and to the European public in various press articles, interviews and speeches.⁶⁹ His short but intense time in Spain reinforced his belief in the close connection between the Spanish Civil War and the anti-colonial struggle in India. The ‘hostile’ attitude of the London government especially prompted him to state: ‘After seeing British policy at work in Spain and elsewhere, India is more than ever determined to free herself from British domination. [...] This is especially true with regard to her international policy.’⁷⁰ Being invited to speak at political meetings and conferences strengthened Nehru’s involvement in Left networks. These invitations to Victor Gollancz’ Left Book Club Rally, the Conference on Peace and Empire, the Trafalgar Square demonstration of the National Conference on Spain and so on, enabled Nehru to point to the commonalities of fascism and imperialism, and therefore to the necessity for all democratic-minded people of not only solidarising with Spain, but also with India.⁷¹ Nehru’s travels in Europe and his continuous efforts to disseminate information about the Spanish Civil War and colonial India’s struggle for independence were important tools to further strengthen the transnational solidarity for both causes.⁷²

His experiences in Barcelona also reinforced his eagerness to organize as much humanitarian aid for the Republic as possible. Thus, back in India, Nehru, on behalf of the INC, took immediate steps to form a relief committee responsible to collect and send food items directly to the Republic.⁷³ The Spanish Relief Committee consisted almost entirely of ‘representatives of the principal merchants associations of Bombay’ and therefore included important and economic influential sections of the Bombay middle class.⁷⁴ The choice of Bombay as starting point for the humanitarian campaign in favour of Spain was a deliberate move, as its citizens had the reputation of giving generously for various concerns. Yet, Nehru hoped for wider activities all over India, especially in the other port cities, such as Karachi, Calcutta and Madras.⁷⁵

The establishment of the Bombay committee was only the first step in the organisation of humanitarian help and soon it became clear that various issues needed further clarification. In particular, two sets of questions were discussed in detail, i.e., which items should be donated and how to organize their transport to Spain. Taking into consideration the purchase value of certain foodstuffs, such as wheat and sugar, it seemed economically appropriate to buy them in Europe at a cheaper rate, rather than in India. Nehru prepared a list of items that he hoped could be collected in India itself, including, for instance rice, tea, coffee, soap, bajra (pearl millet), cotton and jute.⁷⁶ In regard to the second question of transporting the goods, Nehru doubted the feasibility of sending them directly to Republican Spain. Thus, he wrote immediately to the Spanish Foreign Minister Del Vayo to learn about possible transport options. At the same time he asked Krishna Menon and G. P. Hutheesing, Nehru’s brother-in-law, who acted as one of the secretaries of the Bombay committee, to enquire with the Spanish authorities as to the most convenient way.⁷⁷

After the encouraging start in Bombay, Nehru discussed the matter of relief for Spain also with representatives of the Bara Bazar Congress Committee of Calcutta, which consisted mainly of businessmen. He was hopeful to send a first instalment of humanitarian aid to the Republicans within the next two to three weeks, in mid-December 1938.⁷⁸ Therefore, he renewed his public appeals for help.⁷⁹ These efforts, however, did not merely serve a humanitarian cause, but were again motivated by and intertwined with nationalist ambitions. In a press statement in November 1938 Nehru explained:

By sending food to Spain we help indirectly our own cause and enhance the prestige and position of India in the world. By the help we have sent to [...] Spain we have compelled the attention of the world and made it clear that our sympathies and policy are not those of the British Government. [...] Thus not only for humanitarian reasons but for considerations of self-interest and the growing international status of India, we have to help the Spanish people with food.⁸⁰

Humanitarian aid, as understood by the INC and especially by its foreign-policy expert Nehru, was thus not only motivated by moral concerns, but also by multi-faceted political considerations. Assisting distant others in need bestowed legitimacy upon donors and enhanced their identity as actors on the international stage. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this double function of aid as entrance ticket into the international community and as an instrument of foreign policy and diplomatic relations had already featured prominently in the case of two countries that were supposedly outside the ‘civilized world’ of Western powers. Both these countries, Japan and China, engaged with the normative politics of international humanitarianism by joining the Red Cross movement in order to become acknowledged members of international society.⁸¹ The idea that governments and non-state actors could improve their nation’s public image and enhance its international status by providing aid gained further momentum in the interwar years⁸² and also decisively influenced Congress’ initiative for Republican Spain. By providing humanitarian help and by dissociating from the policy of the British rulers, Indian nationalists substantiated their claims for a legitimate place on the international stage and aimed to prove India’s readiness for independence.

Naturally, the Congress’ interpretation of world politics, its rejection of British foreign policies, its engagement in transnational left-wing networks and its solidarity with the Spanish cause was not shared by everyone in India, but elicited dissenting voices. One article published in the Times of India, for instance, unambiguously repudiated Nehru’s appeal for Spanish relief, noting the latter’s Communist leanings and therefore his political unreliability. The author described the idea of aid provision as ‘a step of very doubtful wisdom for India’.⁸³ He argued that an (independent) India would not profit internationally from providing help, but would rather put its status at risk by exposing the ‘country to the hostility of the totalitarian States’. By taking into account India’s social-economic status, the author also expressed the view that India should first and foremost ‘provide relief for her own sufferers’.⁸⁴

Responding to this criticism and other doubtful voices, Nehru published an article in the National Herald, which was also reprinted in the Manchester Guardian. In this reply he did not address the question whether the proposed foreign-policy approach would put India’s security at a potential risk. Instead, Nehru reasserted the importance of siding with the forces of progress and democracy. He believed that the provision of humanitarian help, and thus ‘giving practical shape to our sympathies has a vital significance in giving India a position and a prestige which usually only free countries possess’.⁸⁵ He argued that in the past India’s international prestige had neither been enhanced by its membership of the League of Nations, nor had been effectively influenced by nationalist foreign propaganda work.⁸⁶ But the plan of giving free aid to Spain would enable Indians to ‘take [their] place then as of right in international conferences and speak as equals to equals, with authority and confidence’.⁸⁷ Keeping these objectives in mind, Nehru did not find his appeal for help misplaced, even in a poverty-stricken country such as India. Although he accepted humanitarian reasons for assisting Spain in general, he candidly admitted that the political dimension of relief work was of much greater importance to India.⁸⁸

The efforts of the INC resulted in collections of funds and food items for Spain.⁸⁹ It has, however, not been possible to find out the exact volume of items that reached the Iberian Peninsula or determine more precizely the amount of financial contributions. The aforementioned London-based Spain-India Committee used the Indian donations to buy and send an ambulance car to the Republic.⁹⁰ However, even without any precize information about the exact material and financial amount contributed by the Indian national movement, one can assume that the Congress’ initiative is rather negligible in real terms when looking at the bigger picture of humanitarian giving during the Spanish Civil War. The British labour movement, for instance, contributed supplies worth around £200,000 to the Republic and the amount of the entire British donations, private and governmental, has been estimated as more than £1,000,000, given to both sides of the conflict.⁹¹ Similarly, the American public gave generously and the aid collections added up to more than US$2,356,000.⁹² Although nationalist India’s contribution is comparatively sparse, it should not easily be discounted as pure lip service that aimed exclusively to serve Congress’ political ambitions as another humanitarian initiative proves. Simultaneously to its efforts for the Spanish Republic, the INC began to organize an Indian Medical Mission to help Chinese victims of the Second Sino-Japanese war. It successfully collected the necessary amount of 30,000 rupees and thus enabled the dispatch of the humanitarian mission to China in September 1938.⁹³

Finally, it is important to note that the Congress was not the only Indian actor that provided relief during the civil war. While the former exclusively supported the Spanish Republic, donations from the Indian Red Cross Society were used to bring relief to the war victims of both parties in the conflict. The society, which had been founded in 1920, had established 25 provincial and state branches until 1936. Although the Viceroy of British India acted as the President of the Indian Red Cross and despite the fact that one would find high-ranking British civil servants and military personal amongst its Honorary Vice-Presidents, Indians from the beginning took a deep interest in the society’s work and outnumbered British members many times during the mid-1930s.⁹⁴ Being an active member of the international Red Cross network, the Indian society donated 5,000 rupees in September 1936 for Spain after it had received an urgent appeal by the League of Red Cross Societies. It also issued a circular to its branches and was able to raise another 7,037 rupees which were transferred to the International Relief Fund in the same year. In 1937, the Indian Red Cross Society and its branches donated a further 4,172 rupees for the relief of the victims of both sides in the Spanish Civil War. A final contribution of 2,065 rupees was made on behalf of the Spanish refugees and thus forwarded to the French Red Cross in 1939.⁹⁵

Conclusion

The interwar period was highly internationalist and Indian internationalisms, characterized by global interactions and transnational interventions, took multiple forms, i.e. ‘communist, anarchist, social scientific, socialist, literary and aesthetic’ as well as humanitarian.⁹⁶ Being part of an ever-shrinking world, the different Indian actors and groups – in our case especially the members of the Indian national movement – discussed and actively engaged in humanitarian initiatives in the interwar period. These initiatives aimed to bring relief to the victims of the Spanish Civil War. The Indian Red Cross Society, which was supported by sections of the Indian upper and middle classes, repeatedly donated money. Integrated in the international Red Cross network, it followed the International Committee of the Red Cross’ insistence on neutrality in aid giving.

When looking at humanitarian relief initiatives coming from members of the Indian national movement, one can see a different picture. In the 1930s British India found itself in a changed framework of nationalist protest and growing internationalism, unravelling the tension created due to the colonial status of India on the one hand and its independent posturing on international platforms and organisations on the other. Of course, the British Indian government did not favour an independent Indian stand on foreign issues and often pursued a policy dictated by London, which was antithetic to Indian international ambitions. But still, India was often listed on international bodies, for instance, most importantly in the League of Nations, as a country with a free voice. Moreover, Indian nationalists were connected and co-operated with international networks and pressure groups. The analysis in this paper suggests humanitarianism can help to better understand this conundrum. It appears that the implementation of humanitarian help was viewed by Indian nationalists not only as a moral necessity, but also as a political instrument to distinguish their own visions of foreign policy from the one pursued by the British. Providing aid to Republican Spain bestowed legitimacy upon them and enhanced the status of the Indian national movement on the international stage. At the same time the (humanitarian) campaign for the Republican cause allowed Indian nationalists to point again and again to India’s colonial situation and to repeat its own demands for independence. Political humanitarianism became, therefore, a tool for anti-colonial emancipation.

Note on contributor

Maria Framke is a historian of modern South Asia, specifically focusing on the themes of history of politics, humanitarianism, international relations and ideologies. Her research interests include topics such as fascism, colonialism and imperialism, ideas and knowledge transfer, and transnational history. Maria is “wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin” in history at Rostock University, Germany. She is working on “South Asian humanitarianism in armed conflicts, 1899–1949”. Maria received her doctorate from Jacobs University Bremen in 2011. Her book on the “Engagement with Italian Fascism and German National Socialism in India, 1922–1939” was published in 2013 with the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt. Together with Joel Glasman she edited a special issue on “Humanitarianism” in WerkstattGeschichte.

Funding

This article is part of a research project that was carried out at the Chair for History of the Modern World at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant 144483).

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Kevin O’Sullivan, Matthew Hilton, Nitin Sinha, Anna Mohr, Harshit Rathi and the two anonymous reviewers for comments and criticism on this paper.

Notes

1. Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 5–6, 32, 34, 38 and 40.

2. Laqua, “Inside the Humanitarian Cloud,” 177.

3. See for transnational solidarities: Alston, “Transnational Solidarities;” Sapire, “Liberation Movements.”

4. Mates, The Spanish Civil War, 26; Albert, “To Help the Republicans.”

5. Collado Seidel, Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg, 142–64; Alpert, A New International History.

6. Collado Seidel, Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg, 111–40; Alpert, A New International History; Alpert, The Republican Army, 219–57; Payne, The Spanish Civil War; Radosh et al. Spain Betrayed; Berg, Die internationalen Brigaden.

7. Collado Seidel, Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg, 89–110; Alpert, A New International History.

8. Pretus, Humanitarian Relief; Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, 316–28.

9. Alpert, “Humanitarianism and Politics;” Buchanan, “The Role of the British Labour Movement;” Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War, ch. 4; Smith, American Relief Aid; Brown, “The Great Betrayal;” Mates, The Spanish Civil War, chs. 5 and 6.

10. Pretus, Humanitarian Relief; Buchanan, “The Role of the British Labour Movement.”

11. Pretus, Humanitarian Relief; Alpert, “Humanitarianism and Politics,” 427 and 430; Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream, 316–28.

12. Alpert, “Humanitarianism and Politics;” Smith, American Relief Aid; Convery “Irish participation;” Brown, “The Great Betrayal;” Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War, ch. 4; Palfreeman, ¡SALUD!

13. Datta, “The Interlocking Worlds,” 61–77; Brock, “Gandhi’s Nonviolence,” 71–3; Misra, “Sergeant-Major Gandhi,” 694–5.

14. Hyslop, “Gandhi 1869–1915,” 42–3.

15. Wasti, “The Indian Red Crescent Mission,” 393–406; Ozaydin, “The Indian Muslims Red Crescent Society's Aid,” 12–18; Akçapar, People’s Mission.

16. Das, “Indians at Home,” 79–81; Hyson and Lester, “‘British India on Trial’,” 18–34; Jarboe, “Soldiers of Empire,” ch. 4.

17. Bickers, Britain in China, 115–69.

18. Prasad, The Origins, 73–4.

19. “Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, July 3, 1927,” British Library (BL), Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections (APAC), IOR/L/PJ/6/1941; “Letter from Secretary to Government of India, Home Department to T. C. Goswami, August 3, 1927,” BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/6/1941.

20. Asserate and Mattioli, Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg; Brogini Künzi, Italien und der Abessinienkrieg; Mattioli, Experimentierfeld.

21. Framke, Delhi-Rom-Berlin, 249–57. In a similar way, the Egyptian public discussed the Abyssinian war and the question of aid provision. See: Gershoni and Nordbruch, Sympathie und Schrecken, 187–90, 195–9 and 217–31.

22. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Observance of Abyssinia Day – Statement to the Press, May 05, 1936,” Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [henceforth SWJN], vol. 7, 567.

23. Indian National Congress, “Sympathy for Abyssinia, April 12–14, 1936,” The Indian National Congress, 1934–36, 76–7.

24. Without author, “Congress Diary, Obituary,” All India Congress Committee Papers [henceforth A.I.C.C. Papers], Nehru Memorial Museum and Library [henceforth NMML], File 7/1936.

25. Framke, Delhi-Rom-Berlin, 257–67.

26. Indian National Congress, “Foreign Department: Resolution Passed at the Congress in Lucknow, April 12-14, 1936,” INC 1934-36, 75.

27. Shapurji Saklatvala, “Abyssinia's Call to India,” Bombay Chronicle, 12 Aug. 1935, 8; Editorial, “Wanted, Abyssinia Fund,” Bombay Chronicle, 12 Oct. 1935, 6; Mulraj Karsondas, “Reader’s Letter: Italy’s Aggression on Abyssinia,” Bombay Chronicle, 24 Aug. 1935, 8; Balwantray Mehta, “Threat to Abyssinia’s Independence,” Bombay Chronicle, 29 Aug. 1935, 8; Without author, “Indian Medical Mission,” Bombay Chronicle, 10 Oct. 1935, 14.

28. Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report, 1936, 9–10.

29. Without author, “Unjustifiable War on Abyssinia,” Times of India, 14 Oct. 1935, 12; B. M. Mistry, “Abyssinia,” Times of India, 16 Oct. 1935, 18; Editorial, “Help Abyssinia’s Wounded,” Bombay Chronicle, 6 Jan. 1936, 6.

30. Collado Seidel, Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg.

31. Albert, “To Help the Republicans.”

32. These findings are evident when analysing nationalist English-language newspapers such as the Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), the Bombay Chronicle (Bombay), National Herald (Lucknow) and Mahratta (Poona). Similar extensive media coverage can be found in left-wing oriented journals like the Congress Socialist, the National Front and the New Age as well as in English-language newspapers belonging to the establishment press, such as the Times of India.

33. See amongst others: Without author, “The Spanish War: Britain to Play the Role of Mediator,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 11 July 1937, 8. From our own correspondent, “60,000 Italians in Spain: Review of Position after Two Years’ Civil War,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 29 July 1938, 13; From our correspondent, “Barcelona Scenes: Farewell to International Brigade,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 29 Oct. 1938, 8; Without author, “Two Years of War in Spain,” Bombay Chronicle, 9 Aug. 1938, 6; From our own correspondent, “The Fall of Barcelona,” National Herald, 7 Feb. 1939, 6; From our own correspondent, “Chamberlain Goes from Blunder to Blunder! Anglo-French Mediation in Spanish War,” Mahratta, 15 July 1938, 5.

34. See amongst others: From our special correspondent, “Our Rome Letter: The Great Powers & Spain,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 13 Sep. 1936, 22; J. B. Saldanha, “Reader’s Letter: Spain,” Times of India, 15 Nov. 1938; Editorial, “Madrid in Grave Peril!,” Congress Socialist, 24 Oct. 1936, 5; Without author, “Atrocities by Fascist Gang: Massacre in Spain,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 14 March 1937, 13; From our own correspondent, “Our London Letter,” Mahratta, 3 March 1939, 5; Without author, “‘No Morality in International Politics’: Why Help Spain and China while Indians in Andamans Continue to Suffer, Asks Savarkar,” Bombay Chronicle, 22 Feb. 1939, 9.

35. Willis, “Medical Responses to Civil War,” 160; Without author, “Atrocities by Fascist Gang,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 14 March 1937, 13; From our correspondent, “Spanish Letter,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 Aug. 1937, 20; From our own correspondent, “Spain’s Grim Resolve,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 19 Oct. 1938, 8; From our own correspondent, “Our London Letter,” Mahratta, 4 June 1937.

36. H. G. Wells, “Fascist Triumph in Spain,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 24 Feb. 1939, 8; Georg Orwell, “The Central Issue of Spanish War,” Congress Socialist, 16 Oct. 1937, 7–8.

37. Nasta, “Negotiating a ‘New World Order’,” 144–9; Bluemel, George Orwell; The Open University – Making Britain, “Mulk Raj Anand,” http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/mulk-raj-anand (accessed 12 January 2014). For Anand’s political activism and his ambivalent stance regarding contributions to the BBC overseas broadcasts to India during the Second World War see: Ranasinha, “South Asian Broadcasters,” 57–71; Nasta, “Sealing a Friendship,” 14–21.

38. Mulk Raj Anand: “Homage to Spain I,” Congress Socialist, 1 May 1937, 9–10; “Homage to Spain II,” Congress Socialist, 11 May 1937, 11–14; “Homage to Spain III,” Congress Socialist, 29 May 1937, 9–10; “They Shall Not Pass!,” National Front, 16 Oct. 1938, 1; “Three Sketches of Spain,” National Front, 17 July 1938, 1 and 14.

39. See amongst others: From our own correspondent, “Experiences in Spain: Mr. Huddar’s Letter,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 Dec. 1938, 16; Reuter, “Indian Prisoner in Spain: Mr. Huddar’s Ordeal,” Times of India, 9 Nov. 1938, 18; Without author, “‘Conte Rosso’ in Bombay: Ex-Prisoner of War Arrives,” Times of India, 19 Dec. 1938, 10; Without author, “Fought for Spain,” National Front, 28 Nov. 1938, 9; Without author, “Back from Spain’s Battlefield,” National Front, 25 Dec. 1938, 11.

40. From our own correspondent, “London Letter,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 20 Nov. 1938, 22. It seems likely that Huddar was not the only Indian fighting in Spain. Thus, Nehru and other Congress politicians asserted that about 100 Indians would be members of the International Brigades. There is, however, no evidence that would substantiate this claim (Jawaharlal Nehru, “Press Statement, April 24, 1937,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Subject Files, Statement no. 257; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Why Burma Was Separated, May 11, 1937,” SWJN, vol. 8, 654; Hajra Begum, “The Spanish Struggle and International Solidarity,” New Age, 5 Oct. 1937, 183).

41. From our own correspondent, “Indians Abroad IX – Dr Atal in Spain,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 16 May 1937, 17; From our correspondent, “Epic Stand: Dr Atal’s Impressions of the Spanish Struggle,” Bombay Chronicle, 15 Aug. 1937, 10; From our own correspondent, “Fascist Attempt on Indian Doctor’s Life,” Bombay Chronicle, 24 Feb. 1938, 8. For the Spanish Medial Aid Committee see: Alpert, “Humanitarianism and Politics,” 423–40; Pretus, Humanitarian Relief, 230–1.

42. From our own correspondent, Bombay Chronicle, 24 Feb. 1938, 8; “Extract from Interception – Letter by R. M. Lohia, May 27, 1938” and “Special Cable – Medical Unit for China. Sent off to Dr Atal, July 14, 1938,” Intelligence Files, West Bengal States Archives [henceforth WBSA], 21/1938, File 221/38.

43. For the idea of the global Popular Front and other individuals who were closely involved in helping the Spanish and Chinese cause see: Buchanan, “Shanghai-Madrid Axis.”

44. Prasad, The Origins, 123; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Two Messages, October 6, 1936” and “Spain and Palestine, September 27, 1936,” SWJN, vol. 7, 493–4 and 583–4; Rammanohar Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 6, August 13, 1936,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File FD11/1936.

45. M. R. Masani, “The All India Congress Socialist Party, Circular No. 7, August 24, 1936,” Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Subject Files, File No. 6/1936. Rammanohar Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 7, September 10, 1936,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File FD11/1936.

46. Francis Jourdain, “Letter to Rammanohar Lohia, (September 28, 1936),” and Rammanohar Lohia, “Letter to F. Jourdain, November 06, 1936,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File FD7/1936.

47. Indian National Congress, “Resolution Passed at the 50th Session of the Congress, Held at Faizpur, December 27–28, 1936,” Indian National Congress 1936–37, 86.

48. Kuracina, “Colonial India,” 523.

49. Ibid.

50. For the development of INC’s foreign policy and its linkages to ideas and transnational mobilisations on the political Left see: Keenleyside, “Origins of Indian Foreign Policy,” 67–82; Owen, The British Left, 235–51; Framke, “International Events,” 37–56.

51. Rammanohar Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 12, February 25, 1937,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File FD/1936.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. For Krishna Menon and the India League see: Chakravarty, V. K. Krishna Menon; Owen, The British Left, 241–7. For his relationship with British intellectuals see: Moscovitch, “Harold Laski’s Indian Students”, 40–1.

56. “Confidential reported, undated,” BL, APAC, IOR/L/I/1/1457; “Extract from New Scotland Yard Report, No. 121, July 27, 1938,” BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/12/293; Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 7, September 10, 1936.” For the work of pacifist organizations in Britain see: Birn, “The League of Nations Union,” 131–59. See for Menon’s support for China: Clegg, Aid China, 21, 26, 77 and 127.

57. “Extract form New Scotland Yard Report, April 20, 1938,” “Extract from New Scotland Yard Report, No. 126, October 5, 1938,” “Extract from New Scotland Yard Report, No. 148, August 23, 1939,” BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/12/323; “Extract from New Scotland Yard Report, No. 121, July 27, 1938;” From our special correspondent, “The Situation in Ireland,” National Herald, 29 Jan. 1939, 6; V. K. Krishna Menon and Protdol C. Bhandari, “Reader’s Letters: Indian Help for Republican Spain,” Manchester Guardian, 20 Dec. 1938, without page; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Fascism and Empire, March 27, 1937,” SWNJ, vol. 8, 705 fn. 1; Archives of the Trades Union Congress, Spanish Situation, “For Spain: Indian Evening, Leaflet, 1937,” Warwick Digital Collections, http://contentdm.warwick.ac.uk/cdm/ref/collection/scw/id/3386 (accessed 14 January 2015).

58. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, August 07, 1937,” SWJN, vol. 8, 295; From our own correspondent, “India and World Politics,” Bombay Chronicle, 25 May 1938, 6.

59. Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 12, February 25, 1937;” Rammanohar Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 16, April 22, 1937,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File FD/1936.

60. General Secretary, “Letter to the Secretary Bihar, CSP, April 24, 1937,” Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Subject Files, File 2.

61. Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 16, April 22, 1937.”

62. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to J. A. D. Naoroji, January 16, 1937,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33.

63. Nehru, “Letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, August 07, 1937,” 295.

64. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Appeal for Aid to Spain, March 30, 1937,” “The Need for Active Support for Spain, April 20, 1937,” SWJN, vol. 8, 708-11; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Press Statement, April 24, 1937;” Rammanohar Lohia, “Foreign Department Newsletter, No. 14, March 25, 1937,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML, File 39/Foreign Department; Begum, New Age, October 5, 1937, 183; Without author, “Andhra Party Organizes Spain Week,” Congress Socialist, 3 April 1937, 19.

65. Krása, “Jawaharlal Nehru,” 333–55.

66. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Note to the Working Committee, August 1, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 96–102.

67. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Spain: Note for the Members of the Working Committee, June/July 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, II. Subject Files, D. Message no. 72.

68. Ibid.

69. See amongst others: Jawaharlal Nehru, “On Spain and Britain,” SWJN, vol. 9, 17–8; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Spain, China and India,” SWJN, vol. 9, 91–2; From our own correspondent, “Lessons of Spain,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 24 June 1938, 9; From our correspondent, “Nehru at Barcelona,” Amrita Bazar Patrika, 27 June 1938, 10; “Extract from New Scotland Yard Report, No. 121, July 27, 1938;” “Translation from ‘Lumea Romaneasca’, August 20, 1938,” BL, APAC, IOR/L/PJ/12/323. Nehru also published a four-part series about his experiences in Spain after one year in the National Herald (Jawaharlal Nehru, “Spain – A Year Ago,” SWJN, vol. 9, 267–79.

70. Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Situation in India, June 21, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 21–4; Jawaharlal Nehru, “India and Britain,” SWJN, vol. 9, 34–55; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Peace and Empire, July 15, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 61–8; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Greetings to Spain and China, July 17, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 77; Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Bombing of Open Towns, July 24, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 85–9; Ellen Wilkinson, “Letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, July 18, 1938,” A.I.C.C. Papers, NMML File 31/1938.

71. For the importance of travel, mobility and the media in constructing solidarity see: Thörn, “The Meaning(s) of Solidarity.”

72. Jawaharhal Nehru, “Letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, November 17, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 201.

73. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to Senor Del Vayo, November 21, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33.

74. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, November 21, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 211.

75. Ibid., 212.

76. Nehru, “Letter to Senor Del Vayo, November 21, 1938;” Nehru, “Letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, November 21, 1938,” 212; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to G. P. Hutheesing, November 21, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33.

77. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to G. P. Hutheesing, November 26, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to the Secretary Bara Bazar Congress Committee, November 26, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33.

78. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to G. P. Hutheesing, November 26, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Letter to the Secretary Bara Bazar Congress Committee, November 26, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, Individual Coll., vol. 33.

79. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Cable to India League, November 10, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 200–1; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Statement Issued to the Press, November 22, 1938,” Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, NMML, Manuscript, II. Subject Files, Writings/Speeches, statement no. 285; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Spanish Relief, December 4, 1938,” SWJN, vol. 9, 216–8.

80. Nehru, “Statement Issued to the Press, November 22, 1938.”

81. Makita, “The Ambivalent Enterprize;” Reeves, “From Red Crosses to Golden Arches.”

82. Maul, “‘Silent Army of Representatives’.”

83. Without author, “India and the World, November 24, 1938,” Times of India, 10.

84. Ibid.

85. Nehru, “Spanish Relief, December 4, 1938,” 217. See also: Jawaharlal Nehru, “Indian Aid for Republican Spain, December 19, 1938,” Manchester Guardian, without page.

86. For India as member of the League of Nations see: Verma, India and the League of Nations; Keenleyside, “The Indian Nationalist Movement,” 281–98. For the nationalist foreign propaganda work: Keenleyside, “Diplomatic Apprenticeship,” 97–106.

87. Nehru, “Spanish Relief, December 4, 1938,” 217.

88. Ibid., 216.

89. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 233; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Help to China and Spain,” SWJN, vol. 9, 225; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Homage to the Spanish Republic, January 24, 1939,” SWJN, vol. 9, 235.

90. Jawaharlal Nehru, “Food for Spain, February 20, 1937,” SWJN, vol. 8, 703 fn. 5.

91. Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War, 137; Alpert, “Humanitarianism and Politics,” 437.

92. Smith, American Relief Aid, 131.

93. Without author, “Congress Chinese Ambulance unit, July 30, 1938,” Times of India, 20; Without author, “Medical Mission to China, September 1, 1938,” Times of India, 12.

94. Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1934, 146–71; Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1936, 67–9.

95. Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1936, 10–11; Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1937, 7; Indian Red Cross Society, Annual Report 1939, 9.

96. Goswami, “Imaginary Futures,” 1465. See also: Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia,” 65–92; Bose and Manjapra, Cosmopolitan Thought Zones.