Celebrating victory on a day of defeat: commemorating the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933

Abstract

In Portugal, the development of a memorial project commemorating the First World War, from the treatment of physical bodies to their more or less symbolic (or more or less doctrinal) representations, did not achieve its intended results, in the sense that it did not succeed in consecrating Portugal as a participant of recognized standing and a victorious Allied nation. The memory of the war was clearly shaped by a dimension of tragedy and not by victory. This article will provide, via the dialectics between official and public memory, an in-depth analysis of the politics of memory as it manifests in official commemorative projects. It will examine the forms, pace of implantation and rituals carried out to renew the meaning of memory, as well as the underlying play of forces it is subject to, along with the way in which it establishes cultural and even political rupture or continuity. Through the observation of elements that constitute a war culture – images, language and practices – which emerged during and after the conflict, this study seeks to clarify the First Republic’s successes and failures in delineating and consolidating an official memory of the First World War in Portugal.

Keywords:

• First World War
• Republic
• memory
• war culture
• commemoration

Notes

1. Portugal enters in the war in March 1917 after a long period of negotiations, although its troops were already in combat in Africa. Portugal had experienced, since October 1910, a very unstable republic aggravated by the conflict, since there was no consensus around the participation. After Portugal entered the war, a Sacred Union government was established to command the national participation in the war. However, it was not politically representative and as a consequence was overthrown in December 1917 by a coup that established a presidential government for nearly a year. The republic would collapse in May 1926 with the establishment of the military dictatorship. The scope of mobilisation cannot be compared with France and Germany, but I believe the political, social and cultural impact could be comparable. Altogether nearly 100,000 men were mobilized. The total number of Portuguese war dead for the entire conflict, on all fronts, was, at most, 8000. For the losses of the mobilized men in the European front see Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933,” 534.

2. According to Mosse’s understanding, “the war experience myth is a democratic myth centered on the nation, representing all war deaths” (Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 110). It emerges during the conflict but is configured, albeit never definitively, in the post-war period. In ritual terms, this is an essentially public consolatory effort that reclaims glory rather than lamenting atrocity (Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 7). By the same author, see also Mosse, “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience.”

3. The following elements led to a scenario of vittoria mutilata (Gibelli, La Grande Guerra degli Italiani, 322): the instability of a rare European republic; victory alongside the Allies; frustration concerning compensations and peace negotiations when compared to a neutral and acknowledged Spain; political evolution towards a military dictatorship. On war defeat and national identity and memory, see Mock, Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity, Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recovery; and Isnenghi, “Gli italiani in guerra: conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni.”

4. On the Portuguese mobilisation, see Strachan, “The First World War as a Global War,” and Teixeira, O poder e a guerra 1914–1918. Several reasons have been cited to have led to the end of the First Republic. On the political consequences of the war, among other authors and more recent studies, see Cabral, “Sobre o fascismo e o seu advento em Portugal: ensaio de interpretação a pretexto de alguns livros recentes;” Rosas, “A crise do liberalismo e as origens do ‘autoritarismo moderno’ e do Estado Novo em Portugal;” Baiôa, Elites e poder: A crise do sistema liberal em Portugal e Espanha (1918–1931); and Meneses, “O impacto da I Guerra Mundial no sistema político português.”

5. Correia, “Forgotten Places of Memory: First World War Memorials in Portugal, 1919–1933”.

6. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, 7.

7. Baioni, “Commémoration et musées,” 1141.

8. In the 1970s, historians such as George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers; Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time; and Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française 1914–1939, overcome the marginalisation of war death and mourning and bring it to the centre of the debate. In this regard, see also Becker, Les Monuments aux morts, mémoire de la Grande Guerre; King, Memorials of the Great War in Britain. The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance; Inglis, Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape; Gillis, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity; Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between History and Memory in the Twentieth Century; Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, The First World War: Myths and Realities; Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory; and Horne, “Demobilizing the Mind. France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919–1939.”

9. On the interwar French memory construction, see Sherman, The Construction of the Memory in Interwar France, 7–10. See also Horne, “Demobilizing the Mind. France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919–1939;” and Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14–18, Retrouver la guerre.

10. On the notion of war culture see Lemoine, “Culture(s) de guerre’, évolution d’un concept,” 136.

11. Two of the first authors working on this perspective were Isnenghi, Il mito della Grande Guerra and Le guerre degli Italiani and Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience” and Fallen Soldiers.

12. Winter proposed going beyond the usual divisions between modernism and traditionalism, suggesting, to the contrary, the adoption of a more careful formula for how Europeans imagined the war and its consequences, avoiding creating a rupture in terms of interpretations and results (Winter, Sites of War, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History, 3). In this regard, see also Prost, “The Impact of War on French and German Political Cultures.” On a different perspective that points out a deep and modernising rupture provoked by the war, see Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory; Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age; and Hynes, A War Imagined and The Soldier’s Tale.

13. Correia, “Forgotten Places of Memory: First World War Memorials in Portugal, 1919–1933”, 55.

14. Although in Portugal the numbers are smaller than in the countries that I use as reference in this paper.

15. Historiographical debate about the use of the concept “Total War” is long and diverse, from authors that use the term to address the scope – total – of war mobilisation and consequences, profoundly diminishing the boundary between the front and the home front, to authors that use the term to merge First and Second world wars as a sole conflict. On the subject, among others see Strachan, “The First World War as a Global War” and Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century; Guiomar, L’invention de la guerre totale: XVIIIe-XXe siècle; Horne, “Corps, lieux et nation: la France et l’invasion de 1914;” and Chickering, The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939.

16. Dalisson, “La célébration du 11 novembre ou l’enjeu de la mémoire combattante dans l’entre deux-guerres (1918–1939),” 11.

17. The Sacred Union governments emerged from the need to create an alliance that would guarantee national unity in times of war. In practice, only two parties were integrated. In 1917 António José de Almeida’s government fell in Parliament and his Evolutionist Party was left out of the next executive, headed by the Democratic Party’s leader Afonso Costa.

18. The Battle of La Lys contributed with the greatest myths of the Portuguese participation in the Great War. On the memory of the battle, see, among others, Gomes da Costa, A Batalha do Lys; Estanco and Paz, “Uma memória esquecida sobre a guerra de 1914–1918: a batalha de La Lys;” and Marques, Das trincheiras com saudade.

19. Sidonismo was a conservative and anti-parliamentary regime headed by Sidónio Pais. It was established on 5 December 1917 and lasted until the assassination of the head of state in Lisbon on 14 December 1918. On Sidonismo, see Samara, Verdes e Vermelhos and Silva, Sidónio e Sidonismo.

20. Sidónio Pais denied being a Germanophile and being against Portugal’s participation in the war (Biblioteca de Acção Nacionalista 1924, 44). On Sidónio Pais’s political appropriation of the disabled veterans, see Casa Pia de Lisboa, Anuário da Casa Pia de Lisboa, 107–9. To understand the political use of war commemorations by Sidónio Pais, see Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933. Between Experience and Myth,” 60–7.

21. Decree No 4: 951 – Diário de Governo, Series I, No 244, 11 Nov. 1918.

22. On the Portuguese participation in the Paris parade, see AHD, Legação de Paris, Maço 116, 25/Guerra/CEP, Pr. 25 – Parada Militar 14 de Julho de 1919. Estrangeiros [Chagas], 26 de Junho de 1919, 1-3 and “Os festejos da Paz. O que foi o desfile das tropas em Paris,” A Capital, 15 July 1919, 1. On the participation in the London Peace Celebration on 19 July, see AHM, 1ª Divisão, 36ª Secção, Caixa 1266. Unfortunately, it has not been possible, so far, to find sources about the participation in other foreign parades, such as in Brussels and Rome (Cf. BN, E 47, Caixa 7 – Relatório do adido militar em Paris, referido a 30 de Setembro de 1919. II – Festa da Vitória).

23. Finally, the army could celebrate its efforts and be applauded, since most men were not present at the Lisbon parade in November 1918, since at that moment the troops that had fought at the front had not yet been demobilized. Since it was created, the JPN played a prominent place in the war propaganda and war victims’ assistance. On some of the JPN initiatives, see “A parada military,” Ilustração Portuguesa, 22 July 1919, 65–7 and AMAE, Correspondance Politique et commerciale, T. 1. 1914–1940, Portugal 1918–1929, Europe Z, Corps Diplomatique Français, 1 – Légation, Consulats et Attachés de France, 1 Juin 1918-31 de Décembre 29, 528.

24. Becker, “Du 14 juillet 1919 au 11 novembre 1920 mort, où est ta victoire?”, 33.

25. On the debates about 14 July in France, see Amalvi, “Le 14 juillet. Du Dies irae à jour de fête,” 439.

26. After 1921, 14 July (commemorated only by the JPN and the French community) and 11 November (celebrated irregularly until 1926 on the veterans’ and foreign communities’ initiative) lost their commemorative significance.

27. Another commemorative day, in the immediate days after the war, was the Portugal national holiday. In 1920, it was decreed that 10 June "will be considered a national holiday dedicated to the inauguration of local monuments honouring the dead in the name of the motherland in the Great War, Africa, France and at the sea” (Law No. 983 – Ordem do Exército, Series I, 4 June 1920). The proposal, presented at the Ordens do Exército on 4 June had the best results. Along with the celebration of Camões, there took place multiple tributes to the war dead, mostly through new toponymy and plaques. See Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933. Between Experience and Myth,” 338.

28. The CPGG, besides its primary goal of constructing monuments to the dead, tried to instate an intensive “patriotic propaganda, in solemn sessions, celebrations, conferences and festivals, celebrating some special dates: the National Date of 9 April, which we consider the symbol of the effort of our Sailors and our Soldiers, and the Universal Date of 11 November, which celebrates and remembers the emotion caused by the ceasefire after the armistice ratification, in Rethondes in 1918”. After the immediate post-war celebrations, the CPGG would be responsible for defining a commemorative model and introducing central elements of the commemorative process, such as the two minutes of silence (1922) and the designation of Race Effort Day (1923). The CPGG also helped to organize the Armistice Day, especially when there was a monument being inaugurated. On the CPGG, see CPGG 1936, 57; CPGG, FD-CPGG – Romagem à Batalha 9 de Abril e 11 de Novembro 1922-1928, 4ª Comemoração da Raça em 9 de Abril de 1925. On the 9 April commemorations, see FD-CPGG – Romagem à Batalha 9 de Abril e 11 de Novembro 1922-1936; FD-CPGG – Comemorações Patrióticas dos anos de 1929–1934 (9 April and Armistice Day). About the war material culture, see chapter VIII about cemeteries and IX about memorials in Correia, Entre a Morte e o Mito: políticas da memória da I Guerra Mundial em Portugal (1918–1933).

29. Gradually, the commemoration’s organisation was transferred to the newly created LCGG. The LCGG would reproduce official commemorative trends, collaborating with the Military Dictatorship’s government in the Armistice Day’s growing dynamism, and maintained the celebration of 9 April, despite increasing controversy and a clear decline.

30. The national political problems would affect the LCGG and create a rift among its members, given the involvement of prominent associates in the February 1927 revolt (first attempt to overthrow the military dictatorship) (LCGG 1929, 112–113). Later, during the Estado Novo, the LCGG would be subject to reorganisation and political sanitisation, being controlled directly by the Ministry for War.

31. The 9 April was used, by some of the 28 May leaders or supporters, predominantly to deliver a stinging attack on the Republic in the pages of A Guerra and O Século already in 1925. See, for example, Gomes da Costa, “A batalha do Lys,” O Século, 9 April 1925, 2 or Trindade Coelho, “A Grande Guerra. O 9 de Abril,” O Século, 9 April 1925, 1. See also Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933. Between Experience and Myth,” 412. The 28 May 1926 Revolution was a nationalist, military and unparliamentary coup that ended the First Portuguese Republic, leading to the establishment of the Military Dictatorship (Ditadura Militar), which later dubbed itself the “National Dictatorship” and was finally converted (Constitution of 1933) into the Estado Novo regime (authoritarian right-wing regime) that endured in Portugal until 25 April 1974 (on this designation see Ferreira, O comportamento político dos militares: forças armadas e regimes políticos em Portugal do século XX). The revolution emerged from a conservative Republican military group’s desire to “restore order,” although the growing right-wing power inside the Dictatorship allowed Salazar’s rise and the removal of those republicans.

32. On this perspective, see Sousa, “Guerra e Nacionalismo: na República e no Estado Novo, entre a democracia e a ditadura (1914–1939).”

33. Two exemplary heroes are the Soldado Milhais for his persistent and isolated resistance during the 9 April attacks and the Brigada do Minho for its resistance in frontline combat, suffering the largest losses in this battle (60% casualties).

34. Dalisson, “La célébration du 11 novembre ou l’enjeu de la mémoire combattante dans l’entre deux-guerres (1918–1939),” 10.

35. It was considered a national holiday for the first time in April 1921 (Law No. 1:140, Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 20, 6 April 1921).

36. On the 9 April official consignation, see Law No. 1:140 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 70, 6 April 1921; Ordens do Exército, Series I, 6 April 1927, 606; Decree No. 15:319 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 79, 4 April 1928. On 11 November, see Decree No. 12:635 – Diário do Governo, I Series, No 252, 10 November 1926; Decree No. 20:487 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 259, 9 November 1931.

37. Dalisson, “La célébration du 11 novembre ou l’enjeu de la mémoire combattante dans l’entre deux-guerres (1918–1939),” 5.

38. Prost, “Les monuments aux morts. Culte républicain? Culte civique? Culte patriotique?,” 207–22.

39. In the LCGG’s words: “Although still a recent event, it had been almost erased from the Portuguese memory. The great conflagration’s key dates passed unnoticed in this blessed seaside corner. From North to South there wasn’t a monument, however modest it might be, a tombstone, even a simple sign or a street to perpetuate the memory of those who died for this country and to express their compatriots’ gratitude” (LCGG 1929, 48–9).

40. For an understanding of the war-commemoration parades participants, see Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933. Between Experience and Myth,” 231–71.

41. Correia, Entre a Morte e o Mito: políticas da memória da I Guerra Mundial em Portugal (1918–1933).

42. Eduardo Faria, “Nove de Abril,” A Guerra, No. 64, 6 April 1931, 1.

43. CPGG, Relatório Geral da Comissão (1921–1936). Padrões da Grande Guerra. Consagração do esforço militar de Portugal 1914–18, 57.

44. The Law of Separation, establishing total separation between the Church and the State, was published on 20 April 1912. However, during the Sidonismo period (1917–1918) there was a rapprochement that ended Republican hopes for a secularized Portuguese society. There were several religious celebrations for the souls of those who died in the war that would not have been surprising if it were not for the presence of the head of government. This happened, for example, in May 1917, where “for the first time after eight years of the Republic, representatives of two powers that the law divorced are together in the same big religious ceremony: the spiritual and the temporal” (“Pelos soldados mortos em campanha,” Ilustração Portuguesa, No. 625, 11 February 1918, 106–7). On the same subject, see also “Pelos soldados portugueses,” Ilustração Portuguesa, No. 636, 29 April 1918, 336; “Sufragando os mortos pela pátria,” Ilustração Portuguesa, No. 640, 27 May 1918, 407–8.

45. Prost, “Les monuments aux morts. Culte républicain? Culte civique? Culte patriotique?,” 209.

46. This practice would be inaugurated by the JPN, which joined its Great War orphans in Porto or in the parades to the Unknown Soldier’s tomb (Aguiar, Junta Patriótica do Norte: 15 anos de Benemerência 1916–1931. Relato geral da sua obra e da Casa dos Filhos dos Soldados).

47. Ordinance No. 3:971 – Diário do Governo, Series I, No. 71, 31 March 1924.

48. The ritual format persisted. As an example, one can cite the 1928 commemoration. The early-morning ceremonies began in the Alto de S. João cemetery, where there was ​​a general tribute to the Great War’s dead combatants and a flag as hoisted in the centre of the field. Then, at 11.30 a.m., the concentration of veterans, widows, orphans and mothers started, also including members of the LCGG’s Central Administration and the representative of the Minister for War. After 12 pm, everyone moved, in a parade, from the cemetery to the Avenida da Liberdade, into the place where the national monument would be built in 1931. There, the participants would pay tribute to the war dead. The President of the Ministry, the Ministers for War, the Navy and Colonies; the British Ambassador and the French minister were normally present, among other important representatives of society. At the end of the day, the Ministers for War and the Navy visited the LCGG’s headquarters (“A dez anos da Guerra,” A Guerra, No. 35, 3, November 1928, 11–15).

49. Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française 1914–1939, 2: 62.

50. Serrano, meaning mountain man, is an informal term for the Portuguese First World War soldier.

51. About war heroes and the Portuguese Unknown Warriors, see Correia, “Death and Politics: The Unknown Warrior at the Center of the Political Memory of the First World War in Portugal.”

52. Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française 1914–1939, 2: 56.

53. “Aos que se bateram pela Pátria,” O Século, 9 April 1924, 1.

54. Prost, In the Wake of War: “Les Anciens Combattants” and French Society, 1914–1939, 76. With reference to France, the Portuguese citizens’ political participation limits in the First Portuguese Republic must be safeguarded.

55. Jaime Cortesão, author of these words, was a Republican volunteer in the Great War and opposed the Dictatorship; he was present in the 1958 commemorations of 9 April (ACPC-BN, Esp. 25: Jaime Cortesão, 35: Cartas de Portugal – O Significado Nacional do 9 de Abril, 1958).

56. About the veterans’ perception of the political memory appropriation, see Correia, “The Veterans’ Movement and First World War Memory in Portugal (1918–1933): Between the Republic and Dictatorship.”

57. For an analysis of 11 November in France, see Dalisson, “La célébration du 11 novembre ou l’enjeu de la mémoire combattante dans l’entre deux-guerres (1918–1939),” Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, La Grande Guerre, 1914–1918, La Grande Guerre, 1914–1918; Audouin-Rouzeau and J.-J.Becker, Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre, 1914–1918; J.-J.Becker, La France en guerre, 1914–1918, la grande mutation; Becker, “Du 14 juillet 1919 au 11 novembre 1920 mort, où est ta victoire?,” 33; Cabanes and Husson, Les Sociétés en guerre, 1911–1946; Lorcin and Brewer, France and Its Spaces of War: Experience, Memory, Image; and Theodosiou, “Symbolic Narratives and the Legacy of the Great War: the Celebration of Armistice Day in France in the 1920s.” On the British case, see Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day, 1919–1946; and Connelly, The Great War, Memory and Ritual: Commemoration in the City and East London, 1916–1939. On the Italian case, see Isnenghi, Il mito della Grande Guerra: da Marinetti a Malaparte; Mosse, Fallen Soldiers; and Dogliani, “Commemorare la Grande guerra: la ricorrenza dell'11 settembre,” 2012.

58. Sherman, The Construction of the Memory in Interwar France, 9–10.

59. Trindade Coelho, “A Grande Guerra. O 9 de Abril,” O Século, 9 April 1925, 1.

60. Cordes and Costa had first­hand experience at CEP’s command in the Portuguese army’s greatest defeat at Germans hands – the battle of La Lys.

61. Gomes da Costa, “A batalha do Lys,” O Século, 9 April 1925, 2.

62. To understand the political appropriation of the Great War commemorations in Portugal by those men, but also their general disappointment in relation to the lack of the political recognition of the army war effort through commemorations, cemeteries and parades, see Correia, Entre a Morte e o Mito: políticas da memória da I Guerra Mundial em Portugal (1918–1933).

63. Contrary to what occurs with other contemporary Western European authoritarian regimes, Salazar and his supporters had no interest in having the military conservative republicans, responsible for the May 28 coup and protagonist of the war experience, in their political sphere and government, thus the gradual removal of conservative Republicans military from the political centre of decision-making from 1928 (see Ferreira, O comportamento político dos militares: forças armadas e regimes políticos em Portugal do século XX, and Rosas, Salazar e o Poder: A Arte de Saber Durar).

64. ANTT, AOS, CP 49, Arquivo Pessoal, Abril de 1943 – Personal correspondence with Lt. Col. Esmeraldo Carvalhais. He was present in the majority of the war commemorations, even during the First Republic, and was one of Salazar’s most important informants about veterans’ affairs.

65. The persistence of Republican institutions that served the glorification of the war intervention and victory proved to be unviable. Once Salazar took over the Ministry for War (May 1936), his intentions became clear: the President of the Council of Ministers wanted to limit the war celebrations and, in that year, made ​​a set of restrictions such as the participation of military units. Perhaps Salazar was concerned that even commemorative acts that were appropriated by the military dictatorship could be a potential problem for his regime; probably his concern intensified with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, Assis Gonçalves, a former member of the LCGG and close to the dictator, accused the organisation of “falling into the hands of Freemasonry” (Gonçalves, Relatórios para Oliveira Salazar: 1931–1939, 74). The LCGG’s administration had Republican opponents to the dictatorships, namely Ivens Ferraz and Ferreira Martins (conservative Republicans who were in power during the Military Dictatorship until the end of Ivens Ferraz’s government, January 1930) or even active members such as the physician MacBride, who publicly criticized Salazar’s health policy. With regard to MacBride, Assis Gonçalves added: “He never accepted me in the LCGG, but he accepted others, the affiliates, etc. It is ... the power of the Masonic mentality.” On the relationship between Salazar and Great War veterans in the early years of the Estado Novo, see Correia, “Politics of Memory of the First World War in Portugal, 1918–1933.” On the way Salazar viewed the army and the war and its commemorations, see Meneses, “Salazar, the Portuguese Army and Great War Commemoration, 1936–1945; Portugal 1914–1926: From the First World War to Military Dictatorship.”

66. Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française 1914–1939, 2: 58.

67. Dalisson, “La célébration du 11 novembre ou l’enjeu de la mémoire combattante dans l’entre deux-guerres (1918–1939),” 20–1.

68. This phenomenon was already obvious with the chaplains’ presence on the front. However, an analysis of the Church’s role in the Great War remembrance project does not fit in this project, which focuses on the official memory policies of a secular state. On the critics to the Government and the Church rapprochement in the war commemorations, see “A reação religiosa triunfante,” A Batalha: Suplemento Literário e Ilustrado, 14 April 1924, 2.

69. Raul Esteves, “9 de Abril,” O Dia, 9 April 1923, 1–2. See, by the same author, “O dia do Soldado,” A Guerra, No. 23, 2 November 1927, 4.

70. Correia, “Forgotten Places of Memory: First World War Memorials in Portugal, 1919–1933”, 55.