Revisiting the road to Cypriot independence

ABSTRACT

In September 1958 Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, told Barbara Castle, the then Chair of the British Labour Party, that, after three and a half years of violence from EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών/National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis), he now supported a brief period of self-government, followed by the independence of Cyprus. He agreed to set aside enosis unless it was supported in the United Nations in the future. This led to independence, with Makarios considered ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence. But little has been said about the idea of independence before that point, about the opposition to it from EOKA, or about others who proposed independence from 1954. This article focuses on the role and proposals of Jason Loukianou, a prominent Cypriot in London, which have not been previously discussed. It proposes a revision to the idea that Makarios was ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence.

KEYWORDS:

• Cyprus
• independence
• Makarios
• British Empire

In Athens in September 1958 Archbishop Makarios, the recognized Greek Cypriot leader, met Barbara Castle, the Chair of the British Labour Party. He announced that after three and a half years of violence from EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών/National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis), he now supported independence for Cyprus. He ruled out both enosis and partition (taksim), the preferred option of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, unless they were supported later by the UN (United Nations). This led to the Zurich–London Accords in February 1959 and to independence in 1960.

Makarios is thus considered ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence, due to the fact that he was the first president and Ethnarch, combining the spiritual and political leadership of the Greek Cypriots.¹ This Greek Cypriot narrative implies that he sacrificed enosis by switching to independence and also depicts him as the saviour from the drift into civil war.² A characteristic belief of these authors is that

Makarios showed himself quite capable of seizing the right moment to exercise his political gifts. In September 1958 he made perhaps his most significant political move up to date. He unequivocally shifted emphasis from enosis to independence … [which] enabled the British, Greek and Turkish governments to begin the uphill task of resolving the Cyprus tangle.³

These authors are hostage to the ethnarchic state Makarios created as president, as well as to the official Greek Cypriot history that elevates him to cult status, especially since he did not intend to permanently ‘sacrifice enosis’.⁴

Greek authors have been less inclined to hero-worship Makarios. First in 1966 and then in 1973, Xydis, in two detailed accounts on 1957 and 1958 respectively, largely based on UN documents and interviews, emphasized the importance of Krishna Menon, the Indian Permanent UN Representative, to the idea of independence. Menon suggested independence at the UN debate late in 1954, repeating this in 1955, 1956 and 1957. For Menon the matter was one of Cypriot nationality: just because most Cypriots spoke Greek did not mean that they should join Greece, any more than Americans should join the United Kingdom. He first proposed tabling a resolution for independence in November 1956 at the 11th General Assembly, but because Makarios was still exiled in the Seychelles, Athens rejected the proposal. By February 1957, the Greek foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff, and the US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, both supported independence. Averoff suggested at the UN in February 1957 that a plebiscite decide if Cypriots wanted independence. The plebiscite would not ask about enosis, but enosis would not be ruled out later. London and Ankara opposed independence, while at the 12th General Assembly (1957), Makarios prevented Athens from supporting Menon’s proposed independence resolution. Makarios only adopted independence in September 1958 when concerned by the implementation of Macmillan’s ‘Partnership Plan’, which envisaged a power-sharing system of self-government. Xydis revealed that Averoff played a greater role in supporting independence than Averoff stated in his memoirs. For example, when Selwyn Lloyd, the foreign secretary, and Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor of Cyprus, visited Athens in February 1958, Averoff and Constantine Karamanlis, the prime minister, suggested ‘guaranteed independence’, whereby enosis was prevented unless accepted by the UN later.⁵ More recent work by the Greek historian Sia Anagnostopoulou, now a parliamentarian for the left-wing Syriza, has redefined Makarios’s ‘switch’ as not a ‘deep political break’ with enosis, and argued that it ‘was a tactical move, in which ethnarchism was covered by independence’.⁶ This article agrees with Anagnostopoulou because Makarios left the door open to pursue enosis again after independence, and acted upon this in late 1963.

Other analysts have not been as thorough as Xydis. Some have noted that independence first emanated from the Greek side, namely from Averoff, as soon as partition was suggested in December 1956. Averoff proposed it to Dulles in February 1957, encouraging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general, Paul-Henri Spaak, to pursue it in May 1957. Holland claimed that Dulles especially liked the idea. Crawshaw and Holland both wrongly state that it was later that Menon suggested it to the Greek UN delegation in December 1957.⁷

The published primary sources contrast with the secondary sources that should have used them. In an early account, Evdoros Ioannides (also known by his pseudonym, Doros Alastos), formerly a prominent Cypriot Communist in London, purged by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1953,⁸ referred to the interview with Castle as ‘his [Makarios’s] now celebrated interview’ and that it ‘was an entirely personal decision which had only been taken after much heart-searching and great trepidation’. Ioannides established two myths: that nobody had influenced Makarios; and that his change to independence was revolutionary, even if proposed before by Menon.⁹ For the British, Foot, the last governor, was the first to comment that had Macmillan not pursued the ‘Partnership Plan’, Makarios would not have proposed independence.¹⁰ Macmillan failed to mention Castle’s role (perhaps because he thought she had ruined his plan), or that Makarios had proposed independence in September 1958.¹¹ As expected, Castle emphasized her role, revealing Makarios’s unexpected invitation and their motivation to destroy Macmillan’s plan.¹² The account by Dimitrios Bitsios, the head of the Cyprus desk at the Greek Foreign Ministry, claimed that the idea for independence had emanated from Averoff, influencing works since Xydis.¹³ Then Nikos Kranidiotis, imprisoned in Cyprus for his EOKA activities and then a secretary in the Ethnarchy in Athens, agreed with Xydis that Menon had proposed independence first. He also emphasized Spaak’s promotion of independence in summer 1958.¹⁴ In 1985 Averoff published his memoirs in Greek, saying little about supporting independence. He became angry in March 1957 during a parliamentary debate when the opposition accused him of betraying enosis after he proposed independence to the Turkish delegate at the UN. He mentioned that Spaak proposed independence in September 1957, which Menon supported in December 1957. He then stated that in September 1958 Makarios, ‘greatly disturbed and alarmed by the British insistence on implementing the Macmillan plan even without the participation of either Greece or the Greek Cypriots … [and] with his ability to see straight to the heart of the matter’, changed to support independence. Averoff claimed that he was surprised when Makarios made the announcement on 22 September.¹⁵ Finally, Glafkos Clerides, a Cypriot lawyer who represented EOKA in the courts and was a prominent politician during the Republican period, serving as president in 1974 and from 1993–2003, claimed that at the end of 1957, Athens decided to pursue independence because Washington, many NATO and UN members, the Socialist Bloc, and the Labour Party supported it. So, in mid-1957, the ‘seed of independence not only “took” but started taking shape’. By 1958, Makarios and Athens, encouraged by Washington, had begun talking with Ankara on independence. Then without discussing it with Athens, in August 1958 Makarios invited Castle to Athens.¹⁶

The British journalist Charles Foley revealed that independence had support from Labour figures and from himself. Foley, from 1940–55 the foreign editor of The Daily Express, moved to Cyprus in 1955 to run The Cyprus Times. In the summer of 1957 he attended the Cyprus Conciliation Committee meeting in London, led by Liberal leader Clement Davies, and which included Labourites Lord Atlee, Lena Jaeger, and Philip and Francis Noel-Baker, where independence was proposed. Foley next met Makarios and Averoff in Athens, the latter revealing that Ankara had rejected ‘guaranteed independence’. Foley claimed that his newspaper supported ‘freedom within the Commonwealth’ (i.e. independence) and ‘for enosis we never had a good word to say’. For Foley, it took the ‘active struggle’ for enosis (i.e. EOKA violence) for Greek Cypriot leaders to ‘reveal them at their most independent’, but the barrier to independence was psychological. Despite Menon’s suggestion and US hints, ‘independence for Cyprus had never been discussed simply because any final alternative to enosis was unmentionable to the Greek world’. Back in Cyprus in July, he published an opinion piece entitled ‘The Independence Plan’ in his newspaper, in which he argued that independence was ‘the logical solution’ because ‘every other way ends up against a brick wall’.¹⁷

This literature review reveals three things. There is no complete timeline from the first proposal of independence to Makarios’s announcement in September 1958. Secondly, other than Anagnostopoulou, nobody noted that Makarios only proposed independence as a temporary measure. Thirdly, none mention Jason Loukianou, a Cypriot leader in London, who proposed independence in March 1954 and consistently advised Makarios to adopt his proposals, which were similar to the Zurich–London Accords. By focusing on Loukianou, this article tries to understand comprehensively the road to Cypriot independence and revises the idea that Makarios was the ‘father’ of Cypriot independence. To do this, it first historicizes the idea for Cypriot independence, showing that the Greek Cypriot far right and far left had opposed it. The far right, including Makarios, formed EOKA, and its members swore an oath to die for enosis, thus opposing alternatives. His switch in September 1958 was a tactic to save enosis for later, so for Makarios, independence was not the final solution. For Loukianou it was.

Theories on decolonization and, specifically, who controlled it, inform this analysis. These oscillate between arguments that decolonization was driven and controlled by the colonized or the colonizer, or both.¹⁸ The ‘hybrid’ view might seem the most accurate – however, deeper analysis is needed to provide nuance on the influence over the process of the colonized and colonizer. Additionally, in every case of decolonization, other than Cyprus, the demand from the colonized was for independence. Only the Maltese had alternative positions. Before the Second World War some wanted unification with Italy; after the war the support was for unification with the UK, until the demand for independence took hold in the late 1950s.¹⁹ With Cyprus, it has been established that Macmillan’s government did not welcome independence, but acquiesced because it had given the impression that it only wanted bases in Cyprus and would accept a solution if Greece and Turkey found one.²⁰ Also, and this article takes this back to the decision by Makarios in September 1958, most Cypriot elites did not want independence, hence the fact that Makarios kept the door open to pursue it in the future through the UN, leading to the collapse of the Republic in December 1963.²¹ Another difference with other cases of decolonization is that in the Cypriot case two outside powers, Greece and Turkey, heavily influenced the process and were central to the demands of Greek Cypriot nationalists for enosis with Greece and Turkish Cypriot nationalist demands for taksim. Thus, the Cypriot case is unique in the story of British decolonization because the demand of the colonized was not for independence and because the demands involved the incorporation of Cyprus into other countries, which ultimately became guarantors of the Cypriot Republic that was formed.

Cypriot independence before Loukianou’s proposal in 1954

Makarios did not pluck the idea of independence from thin air in September 1958. Independence had been discussed amongst Cypriot elites for decades and mostly rejected by the vociferous pro-enosis lobby whenever it was raised. This rejection went beyond mere opposition, but was vitriolic, even violent.

Independence was mentioned in 1912 and 1913. In 1912 it was proposed as a stepping stone to enosis by the mayor of Limassol, Christodoulos Sozos. Branded a traitor for even suggesting it, he volunteered for Greece in the Balkan Wars, where he died at Bizani and was immediately hailed an ‘ethno-martyr’.²² The three Muslim deputies in the legislature petitioned the secretary of state for the Colonies, Lewis Harcourt, rejecting enosis, independence and self-rule, fearing Greek domination, indicating that independence had been raised.²³ The British next mentioned independence. In November 1913, Harcourt sent J.C.C. Davidson, his private secretary, later chair of the Conservative Party, to report on the administration of Cyprus. Davidson concluded that the British should foster ‘purely Cypriot ideals … as opposed to Greek and Turkish’, to establish Cypriot self-government, leading to independence.²⁴ This enlightened view was rejected by his Liberal boss, probably because Cyprus was a pawn for British Liberals to trade for some advantage. They tried this in October 1915, offering it to Greece if it joined the Entente, but King Constantine, the Kaiser’s brother-in-law, rejected it.²⁵

It is unclear if independence was discussed in Cypriot political circles, but it became taboo after it was adopted by the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC) in the mid-1920s. The communists appealed to workers, promoted cooperation with Turkish Cypriots, and opposed enosis in favour of self-government before independence as a Cypriot Republic in a Balkan Communist confederation. While the Great Depression hit Cyprus and the peasants and rural labourers protested, in October 1931 the nationalist elites saw their moment to push for enosis, and convinced the leaders of the CPC to join them in an ‘anti-imperial revolt’.²⁶ The CPC leadership largely regretted their weakness, mostly because the government suppressed them after, and they returned to support independence.²⁷ While the British authorities pushed the CPC underground, in 1942 a group of communists and socialists formed a new left-wing party. They claimed that the CPC lacked supporters because of its open communism and support for independence, which a new name, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), and dropping of independence, aimed to rectify. Although there is no evidence of a movement from the population for enosis, AKEL soon supplanted the CPC. It adopted self-government as a prelude to enosis, until in 1949 it abandoned self-government and adopted the right wing’s policy of ‘enosis and only enosis’.²⁸

As for the far right, any compromise on enosis, including self-government, let alone independence, was anathema. The far right, represented by EREK (formed in 1929) and the centre right co-organized the attacks on government buildings in October 1931. As argued elsewhere, the outbreak of violence in October 1931 grew out of the protracted economic crisis caused by the Great Depression, first taking the form of agrarian and food riots (in which attacks were limited to warehouses and mills), before a second phase in which the nationalist, pro-enosis, right wing, along with the CPC (believing this to be an anti-imperial moment), attempted to challenge British rule by organizing demonstrations and attacks on government buildings. While all political forces involved were punished, the British kept its closest watch on the CPC. This allowed the far right to seemingly assassinate a leading lawyer and politician, Antonios Triantafyllides, in January 1934 for arguing that enosis could only be achieved through cooperation with the British, after the British convinced him to join an Advisory Council, as a prelude to reintroducing a constitution and legislative council, which had been withdrawn after the October 1931 riots. Such cooperation was treachery for the far right and risked leading to independence.²⁹ After the Second World War the far right (e.g. ‘Organisation X’, led by Colonel George Grivas in Greece) and centre right (KEK), united against AKEL. A far right extremist in Kyrenia, Polycarpos Ioannides, linked to Triantafyllides’ assassination, reflected this opposition in this typical comment in 1948: ‘Enosis and only enosis: Until it is achieved, we prefer to be ruled by England, but we do not accept power in the hands of the people.’ This statement shows that it cannot be said that there was a national liberation movement in Cyprus, in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots wanted independence from British rule like in other colonial settings, but a specific demand from nationalist Greek Cypriots, which from 1949 also included AKEL, for enosis and only enosis, more akin to earlier irredentist ideas of a ‘Greater Greece’.³⁰ In September 1948 the Ethnarchy, established in July 1945 as an all-party body, but by 1948 only representing the far right, created an Athens office, with none other than Savvas Loizides, the pro-enosis extremist leader of EREK, friend of Polycarpos Ioannides and also implicated in the assassination of Triantafyllides, as director. He organized the meeting in May 1951, where Makarios agreed to the formation of a violent group to achieve enosis, later selecting Grivas to head what became EOKA. The moderate right, which supported a constitutional path to enosis, and perhaps even to independence, were marginalized.³¹

Reintroducing representative institutions risked leading to independence and the ethnarchic role of the Church, redefined in the twentieth century as synonymous with enosis.³² When Churchill’s government announced in 1954 that it wanted a new constitution for Cyprus, Makarios replied that he was

strongly protesting against the application in our Island of such a policy and we are declaring once more categorically that the Cypriot people will never cease to aspire with all its strength, and according to the principles of justice and self-determination of peoples, to its national liberation, through its Union with Mother Greece.³³

For Makarios, a constitution, self-government, and independence, were contrary to enosis, yet four years later he proposed independence, influenced by Jason Loukianou.

Loukianou and his role in the development of the Cypriot community in the UK

References to Loukianou are scant. Reverend Irotheos Kykkotis published the first history of the Greek Cypriot community of the UK in 1968, yet failed to mention Loukianou. This might be because Kykkotis focused on the Cypriot communists, being the brother of Evdoros Ioannides.³⁴ Zavrou, in his 2000 book, mentioned that Loukianou had been the president of the All Saints Church Committee. His potted account revealed that Loukianou had arrived in London in 1932 as a 14 year old after completing two years of secondary schooling at Rizokarpasso. In London he studied to be a teacher and started a restaurant at 16 Bateman St., London, near Soho Gardens. During the Second World War, Loukianou advised Cypriots (from his restaurant) being conscripted and helped Cypriots who were beaten up by far-right anti-immigrant gangs. Finally, Zavrou reveals that Loukianou helped to establish a Greek school at St Sophia Cathedral in 1940, later moving it to the Cypriot Brotherhood.³⁵

Jason Loukianou was born in Yialousa in November 1917 and migrated to London in 1932 to study at the Regent Street Polytechnic. He soon found work and stayed. After running successful restaurants in Hastings and London he ran a coffee importing and distribution business from London.³⁶ In 1935 he joined the St Barnabas Brotherhood and became politically more active. Loukianou also joined the ‘Cyprus Autonomists’, who believed in the autonomy of Cyprus, and had close links to the CPGB, which supported the pro-independence position of the CPC. Loukianou was not a Communist, but it was unsurprising that the British thought he was, since other prominent ‘autonomists’, such as Evdoros Ioannides, were members of the CPGB.³⁷

During the Second World War, Loukianou fell out with the British authorities. He was monitored, as were other Cypriots, by the commissioner of Cyprus in London. T.S. Bell, the commissioner, reported that on 13 January 1940, Cypriots protested against being conscripted into National Service (Armed Forces) Act. Loukianou had chaired the meeting and Bell named him as a communist. On 16 June Bell clarified that Loukianou and Ioannides were ‘autonomists’, while Evanthis S. Nicolaides, the managing editor of Vema (Leap), a communist organ, also attended.³⁸ Loukianou started his own anti-conscription group, the ‘Union of Cypriots’, while Ioannides, a communist, led another group that claimed that Cypriots were being asked to fight, while they endured a dictatorship in Cyprus.³⁹ Another Cypriot communist organ in London, Kypriaka Nea (Cypriot News), reported that 400 Cypriots had broken the law by failing to register for compulsory military service, but the police had not acted against them. Bell believed that the agitation of the communists and Loukianou, who had legal advice from the Peace Pledge Union, had worked.⁴⁰ Loukianou used letters from the Ministry of Labour that stated that the question of Cypriots domiciled in the UK was a matter for the courts. When from May 1940 Cypriots in London could enlist in the Cyprus Regiment, several figures, including Ioannides, enlisted. Loukianou worked for the Greek Consulate at Cardiff. He was summoned by the Ministry of Labour for not registering under the National Service Act and challenged the charge by claiming he was in the UK to study.⁴¹

It was not until 1953 that Loukianou reappeared in the Colonial Office records as the president of the Cypriot Brotherhood. By 1954 the Cypriot Communists in London were still numerous and active, but came under the control of AKEL led by Ezekias Papaioannou, who had returned to Cyprus after 15 years in London. He purged AKEL and the Cypriot branch of the CPGB of those who opposed his policy of enosis and only enosis, including Ioannides in 1953.⁴² The Brotherhood remained pro-British. Kykkotis wrote that in the early 1950s it ‘became the organs of British imperialism’.⁴³ Loukianou was on the committee, perhaps explaining why Kykkotis did not mention him in his book. Yet this contradicts the views of Soteris Terezopoulos on Loukianou, since Terezopoulos, who had become the Cypriot commissioner in London after the war, wanted him replaced as president, because he was not ‘really satisfied with the activities of Mr. Loukianou, who clearly “runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds”’.⁴⁴ It is unclear what Terezopoulos meant, but throughout 1953 and into 1954 they clashed about the rent for the premises of the Cypriot Brotherhood. While Loukianou wanted a rent-free year for 1954 owing to the growing unemployment amongst Cypriots, Terezopoulos refused.⁴⁵ At the start of 1954, Loukianou continued to hope and sent Terezopoulos the names of the 1954 executive committee: Loukianou was president; Kakos Constantinou, vice president; Spyros Kyprianou, secretary; and Panayiotis Tofarides, treasurer.⁴⁶ The committee reveals a new wave of Greek Cypriot nationalists, especially Kyprianou, the minister of foreign affairs for Cyprus from 1960–72 and president of the Republic of Cyprus from 1977–88 Figure 1.

Figure 1. Jason Loukianou in 1956, courtesy of © Andes Loukianou.

Loukianou’s independence proposals

By March 1954 Loukianou, already a prominent political activist in London, considered, unlike the new breed of Cypriot nationalists, alternatives to enosis. The Greek government, as stated in a Foreign Office memorandum from March 1954, wanted enosis in exchange for British bases in Cyprus and in Greece, or self-government and, after eight years, a plebiscite to decide on enosis.⁴⁷ Loukianou argued in The Observer on 21 March (probably triggering the memo), that the Greek Cypriots had a right to decide their future. His view, sent to the Liberal Party, was for constitutional self-government (except defence and foreign affairs), with a vote after five years to decide on enosis or independence; if the decision were the latter, then a vote on whether to remain in the Commonwealth. Loukainou wanted Whitehall to discuss his proposals, which predated Menon’s proposal at the UN later in 1954 by six months, with Makarios.⁴⁸

Loukianou’s letter angered the pro-Ethnarchy members of the Brotherhood, especially Spyros Kyprianou. In 1952, while still a fledgling law student, he became the secretary to Makarios in London and in 1954 to the Ethnarchy office he established there. Francis Noel-Baker, a Labour MP who often acted as a ‘mediator’ between the Greek Cypriot leaders and Whitehall, was often lobbied by ‘the Archbishop’s two young henchmen in London, law students named Spyros Cyprianou (sic) and Phidias Georgiades’.⁴⁹ Unsurprisingly, Kyprianou was angered at Loukianou contradicting the pro-enosis line, regurgitating in The Observer the long-held right-wing Greek Cypriot view of enosis and only enosis, with no period of self-government.⁵⁰ Kyprianou disputed that Loukianou had acted with the instructions of Makarios. He moved to have the executive committee of the Brotherhood resign to establish it as an arm of the Ethnarchy in the UK, calling for a meeting on 11 April 1954. Terezopoulos advised the Cypriot government that because of the Brotherhood’s increased political activity it should withdraw its support and cancel its tenancy agreement.⁵¹ At the extraordinary meeting on 11 April, Loukianou and the executive committee resigned with effect from 2 May, when new elections would be held.⁵² Subsequently, Andreas Papadopoulos of Ayios Theodoros, Larnaca, was elected chairman. British intelligence claimed that until now he had been loyal. The rest of the committee consisted of Kakos Constantinou, vice president (gownmaker), Spyros Kyprianou, secretary (law student) and Panayiotis Tofarides, treasurer (verger).⁵³

After this, Loukianou operated more independently. After calling Makarios, he visited the Colonial Office, but it is unclear what was discussed.⁵⁴ The Cypriot government believed that Loukianou was acting as an intermediary between the Liberal Party and Makarios, after intercepting ‘from a delicate source copies of some remarkable three-cornered correspondence exchanged between them’. The Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police described Loukianou back in 1940 as ‘a cunning and plausible individual, a pacifist and supporter of the enosis movement’. The Cypriot government ‘began to lose faith in the Cypriot Brotherhood’ and in ‘Loukianou in particular’, from when Makarios visited London in February 1953.⁵⁵ The British believed that Loukianou had introduced Makarios to Clement Davies and influenced a Liberal Party resolution in September 1954 calling for Churchill’s government to reconsider its policy on Cyprus, which ruled out a change to its status.⁵⁶

In mid-1955 the Cypriot government withdrew its support of the Brotherhood because it had violated its terms of reference (for not maintaining its premises) and for increasingly ‘engaging in political activity, i.e. pro-Enosis propaganda, within its premises’. By September 1955, leading pro-enosis nationalists moved to reconstitute the Brotherhood with new office bearers and premises, so it could adopt a stronger pro-enosis line and align it with Kyprianou’s Ethnarchy activities. Those involved were: Achilles Antoniades; Zenon Rossides; Nicos Kranidiotis; Father Kalinikos Salatas; Andreas Spiropoulos; Andreas Papadopoulos; and Kyprianou. Kyprianou combined being secretary of the recently created Ethnarchy office in London with being secretary of the Brotherhood. Makarios sent £10,000 for the reorganization. On 20 November the pro-Ethnarchy group changed the statutes before the general election. Loukianou and Kakos Christou Constantinou opposed having full and associate members. Antoniades and Kyprianou took control of the Brotherhood over both Loukianou, ‘who leads a group of Cypriot Nationalists who dissent from the Archbishop’s policy on Enosis, and Kakos Constantinou, who for reasons at present unknown is unpopular with the Antoniades group’.⁵⁷

It was difficult for Loukianou to lead Greek Cypriot moderates because promoting independence was not tolerated by the Ethnarchy nationalists and because Terezopoulos did not trust him. He reported on 27 October 1955 that ‘although Mr. Loukianou is well-disposed towards the British Government and is known to be strongly anti-communist, it appears that he is not averse to Enosis propaganda’.⁵⁸ Four days later, Terezopoulos advised that Loukianou was trying to re-constitute the Brotherhood, which had disbanded, on non-political lines, but was being strongly opposed by Archimandrite Kallinikos Macheriotis ‘as an anti-enosis movement’.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Loukianou persevered to form what he called the ‘Cypriot Welfare Society’ on non-political lines, which Terezopoulos now supported, but right-wing extremists and Terezopoulos’ untimely death in February 1956 scuttled the plan.⁶⁰ Loukianou shifted to focusing on influencing Makarios. He warned him against purchasing 21 Fitzroy Square, beside the Cypriot government building housing the Brotherhood, to move the Brotherhood there for £20,000, but failed. He told Makarios in October 1955 to find an ‘honourable and constitutional solution’ in negotiations with Governor Sir John Harding; Makarios replied that he had tried, but had ‘met intransigence’.⁶¹ Then in July 1956, with Makarios exiled to the Seychelles, Loukianou visited the Colonial Office and suggested self-government followed by independence, coinciding with Menon raising it again at the UN. The Colonial Office knew that Loukianou was connected to the Liberal Party, especially to Davies, and had split from the Brotherhood because it was fixated on enosis and he supported independence.⁶²

After Whitehall had put partition on the table in December 1956, the Greek side, including Makarios, put independence, alongside enosis, on the table, although in their minds, always as an interim step towards pursing enosis in the future. Menon again raised independence as a solution at the UN in January 1957. Ankara was opposed and had the Iraqi delegate, Dr Muhammad Fadhel al-Jamali, oppose it.⁶³ After Averoff had responded positively to Menon’s suggestion, the opposition in Greece attacked him. Nevertheless, according to Xydis, Makarios gave a televised address on 15 May 1957 supporting self-government followed by Cypriots voting on self-determination, either enosis or independence (within or outside the Commonwealth). Although there is no way of verifying the interview and there is no mention of it in Greek, Cypriot or British newspapers, Makarios repeated the statements in an interview with Ελευθερία newspaper published on 21 July.⁶⁴ Three years after Loukianou had made this exact same proposal in his article in The Observer, Makarios was prepared to accept it and said so publicly. It is unknown if Loukianou influenced Makarios at this time, though he had met Makarios in Athens before his television interview and mentioned his idea for ‘guaranteed independence’. This was because upon his return Loukianou drafted a comprehensive solution for ‘guaranteed independence’, which he issued under the Yialousa Association, 42 Gloucester Gardens, London, in September 1957, and sent to the Colonial Office, which in turn sent it to the Cypriot government and the Cypriot commissioner in London, Phaedon Constantinides (who replaced Terezopoulos in 1956). Loukianou stated that

efforts ought to aim at healing the wounds and foster an atmosphere of conciliation and mutual trust so that a constructive solution to the Cypriot problem is found with full regard to the interests of all concerned and self-respect of the Cypriot people.⁶⁵

He believed in the ‘encouraging prospects’ for a settlement after discussing his proposals with many individuals and government departments, including Makarios now in Athens. They reflected the silent majority and thus ‘the wishes of the Cypriot people generally’ because they were ‘the basis to achieve their well-being, progress and security’. Many Cypriots in Britain supported his ideas to create a ‘Free State guaranteed by international treaty, NATO and/or the United Nations, in three stages’, though were afraid to speak up, let alone to organize themselves. The first stage, lasting eight years, would establish self-government. From the fourth year the governor’s discretionary powers would be removed in stages until the eighth year, when the Cypriot government would become autonomous, and be responsible for defence and foreign affairs. In stage two, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey would sign Treaties of Association, and Cyprus and the UK would sign a Treaty of Defence, all for fixed periods. The Treaties of Association would link Cyprus to both Greece and Turkey, yet provide independence and cultural autonomy, through various constitutional clauses: 1) recognition of Cypriot independence; 2) reciprocal trading rights; 3) Cypriots in Greece and Turkey, and vice versa with ‘protected’ status between aliens and full citizens; 4) Cypriots with voting rights in Greece and Turkey if resident for six months, with voting rights in Cyprus if they returned and resided there for six months; 5) for Greek and Turkish diplomats to represent Cypriots abroad when no Cypriot representation; 6) for no military service for Cypriots in Greece or Turkey and vice versa; 7) for the Greek and Turkish flags to fly in Cyprus on official occasions with the Cypriot flag; and 8) for Cypriots to enter into Greek and Turkish educational institutions and vice versa. Stage three would see Britain declare the independence of the ‘Free State of Cyprus’. Within three months, a plebiscite would decide if Cyprus would be a republic within the Commonwealth, or leave the Commonwealth.⁶⁶

Loukianou’s proposals were ahead of their time and closely resembled the guarantees and some of the provisions, certainly in spirit, in the Zurich–London Accords. Like that settlement, his proposals combined the creation of an independent state, with cultural autonomy and power-sharing. His proposals for two treaties, ‘association’ and ‘defence’, closely matched the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee.⁶⁷ In addition to communicating his ideas to the British, Loukianou apprised Athens, probably via the Greek Embassy given his links with it, and Makarios, with whom he maintained communication. While Averoff proposed independence in 1957 and Makarios had suggested it as an option in a future plebiscite, neither closed the door to enosis: independence was a prelude to enosis. But for Loukianou, independence was the lasting solution.

The British authorities in Cyprus and the UK (i.e. Colonial Office) believed that Loukianou was genuine, but lacked influence, viewing him as a ‘person of moderate views who is sincerely anxious to promote a compromise solution of the Cyprus problem … [but] like so many other moderate, well-meaning Greek Cypriots, he seems to have no political influence’. Special Branch in Cyprus believed that Loukianou’s proposal came from a ‘fear’ that another UN debate would lead to another stalemate. This was a harsh assessment, since Loukianou had supported independence since at least March 1954. As for his proposals, the Cypriot authorities believed that an ‘independent status for Cyprus amounts, in the final analysis, to vesting sovereignty in a Greek Cypriot majority … [so] no matter what sovereignty and safeguards are provided for Turkish interests’, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey fear Greek Cypriot domination or absorption into Greece. Special Branch in Cyprus knew that after Loukianou had resigned as the Brotherhood’s president he had grown closer to the Liberal Party, but was unsure if he had any supporters, and if he was associated with Costakis Mavronicolas, another London Cypriot holding the same views, who went to New York in September 1957 to discuss the proposals of London Cypriots with Makarios.⁶⁸

Scotland Yard reported on Loukianou and Special Branch in Cyprus investigated further. The Yialousa Association was formed in 1954, soon after Loukianou resigned as president of the Brotherhood, by Cypriots in London from Yialousa, a village in the Karpass. It raised funds to improve amenities in Yialousa and had built a high school. Funds were raised primarily by holding dinner-dances, usually at the ‘George Restaurant’, 122 Southampton Row, London, owned by George Theodosiou. It was a loose association, without fees, with Loukianou its leader and secretary, Theodosiou, the chairman and treasurer, Pallaris, who worked at the restaurant, Sophocleous Taliadoros and Dr Antonis Georgiades the main persons. Loukianou used the association to further his ideas for Cypriot independence, supported by the others. They had produced the document in September 1957, which they sent to British parliamentarians, departments and Harding; and Dr Georgiades made a ‘personal approach’ to Makarios in Athens in 1957 ‘to denounce terrorism’ and adopt their independence plan. The Association had helped to establish two churches ‘divorced from the influence of extreme political elements’, All Saints near Angel and St Barnabas, Kentish Town. They had negotiated with the Cypriot nationalist newspaper, Kypros, to publish articles to counter Cypriot extremism, before extending circulation to the UK. They also tried to arrange a meeting between Makarios, Davies and Professor Vincent Harlow, the Beit Professor of Commonwealth History at Balliol College, Oxford, before Makarios went to New York, but the Colonial Office told them to let the UN debate unfold. Costakis Mavronikolas met Makarios in New York and proposed Loukianou’s positions. Meanwhile the far right and left criticized Loukianou’s views.⁶⁹

Constantinides, who had the Special Branch report, told the Cypriot government that Loukianou had often visited him and the Colonial Office to ‘express his views about a solution for the Cyprus question, which are extremely moderate and come very much into line with the policy of H.M.G’. Constantinides revealed that Dr Georgiades now lived in Famagusta and was the uncle of Nicos Sampson Georgiades, an EOKA prisoner in Britain after his death sentence for weapons possession was commuted to life in prison, and later the coupist president installed by the Junta in 1974. Dr Georgiades, a founder of PEK, was born in Vasili, also in the Karpass, and studied medicine at the University of Athens. He practised in Yialousa (1924–31), when he joined the far-right EREK, and after the 1931 disturbances was confined in Larnaca, where he practised until 1934, followed by four years in Rizokarpaso. By now, he had moderated his views, believing in cooperation with the British to achieve enosis. In 1938 he went to London, but settled in Varosha in 1940. Constantinides opined that Loukianou had done much to counter pro-enosis propaganda and although he ‘has a lot of supporters he has been unable to do anything substantial mainly, I think, owing to a lack of funds and organizing ability’, his efforts should be encouraged to bring like-minded Cypriots together.⁷⁰

Loukianou’s role in Makarios’s ‘switch’ to independence

Loukianou and his supporters may not have had public influence, but NATO secretary-general Paul-Henri Spaak did. By summer 1957 he had decided that only independence could avoid a NATO schism among Britain, Greece and Turkey. His proposal for ‘guaranteed independence’ was virtually identical to Loukianou’s. Over summer 1957, Spaak visited Athens, meeting Makarios, and Ankara.⁷¹ On 16 July he rejected partition to Adnan Menderes, the Turkish prime minister, because it was ‘wholly artificial’; according to Spaak, partition ‘involve[d] large transfers of population’ he and asked Menderes to consider “guaranteed independence” because

[u]nder the treaty in which the independence … would be anchored, the Powers concerned would renounce all sovereignty over Cyprus … not only never to lay claim to such sovereignty, but also to reject any offer of sovereign rights.⁷²

Menderes was indifferent, but Spaak started talks with the Greek and Turkish NATO delegates.⁷³ Averoff then suggested independence at the NATO meeting in October 1957 as a ‘personal suggestion’ to Spaak to have the 12 disinterested NATO members propose independence within the Commonwealth under NATO guarantees for a number of years; after that, a plebiscite would decide on independence, with enosis prohibited. London objected to guaranteed independence, because by now they wanted a tricondominium, sharing sovereignty with Greece and Turkey. This was clear in a Foreign Office memorandum handed to Spaak that stated that Washington favoured guaranteed independence as a final solution, but Ankara rejected it. The British ‘saw greater difficulties in the idea than the Americans’, especially because ‘both Greeks and Turks would regard it as an interim solution which could be improved by intrigue’. This would increase tensions between them and make it ‘difficult to devise adequate guarantees and to persuade the Turks that these would be effective’. Spaak disagreed, proposing that Cyprus join NATO and the Commonwealth as the best guarantees, but the British referred to Averoff’s comments in the Greek parliament that independence was a prelude to enosis.⁷⁴ The British believed that independence could not protect the Turkish Cypriots or Turkish interests. Ultimately, the Foreign Office advised its delegation to NATO to ‘discourage’ Spaak ‘from lending any support to this proposal’.⁷⁵

The Foreign Office also rejected independence when Averoff suggested it again early in 1958, resulting in the reports on Loukianou. In February 1958, Selwyn Lloyd and Sir Hugh Foot visited Athens and warned Averoff and Dimitrios Bitsios, then head of the Cyprus desk in the Foreign Ministry, that the situation in Cyprus was deteriorating and Turkey demanded partition. Lloyd outlined Foot’s plan for self-government followed by a plebiscite on self-determination, with strong guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish security through military bases for all three countries. Averoff rejected the proposals, largely because he opposed a Turkish base and only accepted a plebiscite if there was no separate voting. He suggested ‘a proposal to create an independent Cypriot State, which would join the British Commonwealth’, along the lines proposed by Spaak. Averoff must have known of Loukianou’s proposals and mentioned his name, because the British investigation on him begins then, probably initiated by Foot. According to Bitsios, Lloyd appeared disinterested in independence, underscoring differences between the Foreign and the Colonial offices, the latter more open to Loukianou’s ‘guaranteed independence’. Lloyd told Averoff to negotiate with the Turks, probably believing that they could never agree.⁷⁶ As it turned out, this is what the Greeks and Turks did in December.⁷⁷ In Lloyd’s account to Washington and Spaak, he claimed that Averoff had suggested guaranteed independence to alleviate Turkish security concerns and Greece would accept it if a third party proposed it.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, with Foot’s plan failing, Macmillan stepped up. After rejecting independence when Eisenhower had suggested it in Bermuda in March 1957⁷⁹ he decided to undermine the idea further with his tricondominium plan, once exclusive sovereign bases were secured:⁸⁰

Our essential military needs in Cyprus are to secure the continued use of an operational air base, primarily for the support of the Baghdad Pact, and of certain wireless facilities for intelligence and propaganda purposes which cannot be provided elsewhere. These needs can be met if we insist on retaining exclusive British sovereignty over relatively small enclaves.⁸¹

But Macmillan did not propose to fully relinquish British sovereignty over the rest of Cyprus either:

We should offer to surrender the rest of the island to a condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The sovereignty would be vested in the three countries jointly. The indigenous population would acquire Greek and Turkish as well as British nationality.⁸²

Here was a complex plan for retaining British sovereignty, far removed from creating an independent state. Meanwhile, in Macmillan’s plan, self-government would include Greek and Turkish government representatives, possibly preparing the ground for partition. Athens and Makarios rejected the plan, while the British went to implement it with the Turks only. Makarios told Averoff and Bitsios that he would make concessions to stop this. He told Foot that he would abandon enosis and support a period of self-government, the first phase of Loukianou’s plan.⁸³ Macmillan visited Athens on 8 August to sell his plan. Castle stated that ‘he descended on the Greek and Turkish capitals like an avenging angel, telling the two governments that they had no choice but to accept the plan’.⁸⁴ Karamanlis rejected the plan, telling Macmillan that Greece would compromise if an interim solution did not prejudice enosis later, with the solution being ‘guaranteed independence’.⁸⁵

From March 1958 Makarios acted against extremists around him, indicating that he wanted to make a concession that they might oppose. In April 1958 Constantinides disclosed that Dr George Marangos, a leading doctor who had worked in both Greece and Cyprus, had told Makarios that the Cypriot people were ‘fed up’ and wanted a solution, ‘no matter what, provided they get back to a normal life again’. Makarios told Marangos that ‘nothing could be done’ to achieve enosis because of Turkish objections, and that he ‘did not know even what to do next’. Nevertheless, Makarios had started to lay the ground for a concession. In March 1958, Polycarpos Ioannides, who had been exiled with Makarios, criticized Makarios in the Athenian newspaper Estia for negotiating with the British on self-government. Consequently, Ioannides was bashed by Cypriot students in Athens, and British intelligence believed that ‘it was the Archbishop who gave the orders for Polycarpos to be beaten up in the streets of Athens’. Although unclear if this concession was independence, it is interesting that Marangos told Makarios that he had an ‘opportunity to finish all this trouble and wait for a few years before he starts diplomatic talks with the British Government’.⁸⁶ This opportunity could only be independence, since ‘diplomatic’ relations are only carried out between two states.

The Labour Party also opposed the Macmillan Plan and Castle helped facilitate Makarios’s ‘switch’ to independence. As a member of Labour’s Colonial Sub-committee of the National Executive Council, she was particularly interested in small colonies. Castle claimed that ‘most of us in the party had an instinctive sympathy with the Greek Cypriots’, and so, wanting to stop the ‘partitionist’ Macmillan Plan, adopted the proposal of the party’s Commonwealth officer, John Hatch. She claimed that after visiting Cyprus in August 1958, Hatch then ‘sounded out’ Makarios in Athens on abandoning enosis for independence, reporting to the National Executive Council that Makarios might consider it. Hatch, who had first communicated with Kyprianou in December 1955, had earlier in 1958 prepared Castle’s response to Macmillan’s plan, where Labour undertook to give Cypriots ‘freedom’ in the next Labour government. Makarios, attracted by this, had Kyprianou, now in Athens, invite Castle in August 1958 to visit him.⁸⁷ According to Foley, Hatch visited Cyprus in August 1958 as his guest. He described Hatch as ‘a shrewd, hard-headed young man’. Before leaving London, he had met with the Greek and Turkish ambassadors. In Cyprus Hatch saw various local leaders and Foot. He was convinced that independence was the only compromise. He next visited Zorlu in Ankara and Averoff in Athens, and both privately accepted independence. Makarios also said he would set enosis aside for ‘guaranteed independence’. He returned to London, but Makarios had already invited Castle.⁸⁸ According to Andreas Azinas, a member of the Ethnarchy, Makarios had contacted the Labour Party on 22 August.⁸⁹ If Kyprianou had called Castle on 22 August, Hatch was still in Cyprus. Hatch had been in Cyprus from 21 August, left for Ankara on 29 August, and for Athens on 30 August. He told Greek Cypriot leaders that the Labour Party had always opposed violence and if EOKA activity resumed, Labour sympathies would be forfeited. Foot recognized that ‘Hatch does not agree with the Government’s policy and recent action … [but] has a fairly good understanding of the situation and [that] what he has said to Greek Cypriots about dangers of resuming violence may have done some good’.⁹⁰

Castle arrived in Athens on 14 September. Kyprianou immediately whisked her off to see Makarios. He told her that ‘we will not accept any intervention by a third party … whether from Greece or Turkey’. This was of course a fundamental tenet of Loukianou’s proposal. Castle replied, perceptively, that Makarios ‘had brought in the Greek government by endorsing enosis, so he could not be surprised that the Turkish government wished to be brought in too. He did not demur.’ Makarios then hinted at a compromise, allowing Castle to ask him if he accepted independence within the Commonwealth, prohibiting both taksim and enosis. Makarios replied ‘yes’, under certain conditions. Clearly, Makarios had taken this new position before inviting Castle to Athens to tell her because he trusted the Labour Party. They were both united behind replacing Macmillan’s plan with independence, and so Castle left to consult the other governments.⁹¹

Before leaving for Ankara and Nicosia, Castle met Karamanlis and Bitsios. Castle and Bitsios differed in how they remembered this. Castle detailed her ‘plan for independence for Cyprus’. Karamanlis ‘nearly jumped for joy’, but instead caressed her hand, and exclaimed ‘we accept’. When Castle told them that Makarios was willing to make a statement supporting independence that ruled out enosis, Karamanlis nearly kissed her cheek.⁹² Bitsios recollected that Castle had stated that to stop Macmillan’s plan they had to ‘act quickly’, and that Makarios was ‘ready to declare that Cyprus should become an independent state [within the Commonwealth] and therefore Enosis and partition should be excluded’. Karamanlis and Bitsios were shocked. The former stated that he supported the Cypriots to free themselves from colonial rule. Castle replied that the Labour Party would promote independence as the solution whether the Conservatives did or not. Makarios told Bitsios on 17 September about his meeting with Castle, but clarified that with UN support, enosis could happen after independence. Bitsios stated:

September 16 left its imprint on Cyprus’ history. The conversation of Mrs Castle with the Archbishop and the latter’s statement on independence were the first public indications of the turn things were later to take. Macmillan, the British Premier, would intensify his efforts to impose his ‘adventure in partnership’, but little did he realise that he was losing the leading role in the pursuit of a solution.⁹³

Foot and the British Ambassador in Ankara, Michael Stewart, reported on Castle’s visits to Cyprus and Ankara, agreeing that she was too meddling. Only in Ankara from 16–17 September, Stewart complained that this was a third of the time she spent in Athens, confirming her ‘anti-Turkish and pro-Greek prejudice’. Castle, according to Stewart, ‘put her points well and unprovocatively and made a good personal impression on the Turks … . She did not, however, make the slightest dent on them’, since they preferred partition or a tricondominium. To accept independence, they wanted Turkish troops in Cyprus to stop Greek Cypriots oppressing Turkish Cypriots.⁹⁴ In Cyprus, Foot found her passionate about her views. She revealed that Karamanlis ‘was overjoyed’ that Makarios would accept independence and renounced enosis, and would accept it if Makarios made a public statement.⁹⁵ Foot, writing on 23 September, noted that that day’s papers had reported on her success.

On 22 September 1958 Makarios stunned the world. Castle returned to Athens and he agreed to make a public statement, which Castle penned, and he issued that night. He supported self-government, followed by independence, with enosis and taksim ruled out unless the UN approved. He broke his oath to fight to the death for enosis and was asking others to break it too. The statement made immediate headlines.⁹⁶

Castle met Lennox-Boyd on 13 October and wanted the meeting regarded as ‘private’. She stated that she ‘had not known when she started her journey that the Makarios proposal for independence was coming up’, but had known about the idea for ‘guaranteed independence’ and would raise it. Makarios told her that the Greek government would raise independence at the UN and if London accepted it, he would too. Castle clarified to Lennox-Boyd that independence, to follow self-government, could not be changed without UN agreement. Allen promised to apprise the Foreign Office. Then she met Karamanlis, who was overjoyed, and would support independence if Makarios publicly did. She then apprised Makarios, who stated that if Whitehall had not responded to Allen’s note by her return to Athens, he would make a public statement. In Ankara, Castle claimed to Lennox-Boyd that she became enthused by independence, since they did not reject it, and discussed how to guarantee independence, including with Turkish troops in Cyprus. Castle was ‘convinced that the right policy for Cyprus was guaranteed independence’.⁹⁷

Who lay behind Makarios’s supposed switch? Castle was merely a cog in Makarios’s communications strategy, since he had already decided to switch before she entered the picture. Kyprianou must be ruled out given his earlier opposition but also, as acknowledged by Kykkotis, because he would ask Makarios for orders on every matter, incapable of making proposals himself.⁹⁸ It was Jason Loukianou who must have played a key role in this change given the similarity of the proposals Makarios made with Loukianou’s. On 16 October Loukianou briefed the Colonial Office about his trip to Athens in August and September, where he had numerous lengthy private meetings with Makarios, where Makarios agreed to accept ‘guaranteed independence’ if enosis was still allowed in the future. Loukianou further convinced Makarios to accept self-government first and that independence could be guaranteed by a tripartite treaty, which the UN would oversee. This was similar to the plan Loukianou had developed and proposed a year earlier. Loukianou advised the Colonial Office that it was with the approval of Makarios that he was briefing it. Although Loukianou had not managed to gather a following behind his views, the Colonial Office now knew that he had played a significant role behind the scenes in the announcement by Makarios in September 1958, though the British were still unconvinced about the merits of independence or that Makarios had really abandoned enosis.⁹⁹ Grivas, on the other hand, could not hide his disgust at the shift in strategy, calling it a ‘national betrayal’, though it is unclear if he knew about the role of Loukianou (Figure 2).¹⁰⁰

Figure 2. Jason Loukianou meets Makarios, c. 1970, courtesy of © Andes Loukianou.

Conclusion

The process of decolonization and who controlled it was not straightforward in the case of Cyprus. British ‘decolonisation’ of Cyprus was far from being controlled by colonizer or colonized, given the roles of Greece and Turkey, as well as the unofficial part played by Jason Loukianou, as a member of the London Cypriot diaspora. While in other cases of decolonization the demand was always for independence, in Cyprus independence was opposed by Cypriot elites from both sides, even though Cyprus also became an independent state, and this meant that when Makarios proposed it in September 1958 he made sure to keep the door open to pursue enosis once Cyprus had become independent, even though this was prohibited by the independence agreements.

For Loukianou, one of the few Cypriot supporters of what he called ‘guaranteed’ independence, the establishment of an independent Cypriot state was meant to be permanent. For this he was ahead of his time. Although it cannot be said that Loukianou was ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence, he did play an important role behind the scenes. It also cannot be said that Makarios was the ‘father’ of Cypriot independence because he seemed to follow others, including Loukianou, when it came to accepting independence, given that for him independence was not the end solution, but, as argued by Anagnostopoulou, ‘a tactical move, in which ethnarchism was covered by independence’.

Independence was not only opposed by the Cypriot nationalist elites of both sides, but also by the British government. It was reluctant to support Loukianou’s proposals because it was sceptical about independence and only accepted it once they realized that they could ‘get out’ of Cyprus without losing face and that their sovereign bases would secure their strategic interests. The Cypriot people, fed up with the years of violence and uncertainty, which also influenced Makarios in mid-1958, mostly welcomed independence, but their trust in their leadership was misplaced, as civil war erupted in December 1963, after Makarios attempted to alter the independence agreements to allow him to pursue enosis again. Thus British warnings about independence proved prophetic.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the people who attended my talk based on this article at the Australasian Association for European History (AAEH), Australian National University, 27–30 June 2023.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by an Australian Research Council Discovery Project ARC DP180102200, entitled ‘Managing Migrants and Border Control in Britain and Australia, 1901–1981’.

Notes on contributors

Andrekos Varnava

Andrekos Varnava, FRHistS, is a Professor in Imperial and Colonial Histories at Flinders University and an Honorary Professor in History at De Montfort University. He is the author of four monographs, most recently Assassination in Colonial Cyprus in 1934 and the Origins of EOKA (Anthem Press, 2021). He has edited/co-edited 16 volumes/special issues, most recently: New Perspectives on the Greek War of Independence: Myths, Realities, Legacies and Reflections (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022). He has published over 60 articles/chapters, including in English Historical Review (2017), The Historical Journal (2014), Journal of Modern History (2018) and Historical Research (2014, 2017, 2022).

Notes

1. Varnava and Michael, “Archbishop-Ethnarchs since 1767,” 1–16.

2. Vanezis, Makarios, 130; Vanezis, Pragmatism v Idealism; Vanezis, Makarios, 49; Assos, Makarios; and Kassimeris and Philaretou, “Playing Politics with Charisma,” 337–52.

3. Vanezis, Makarios, 130.

4. Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III,” 263–4.

5. Xydis, Cyprus, 40–2, 47–8, 52–3, 136–7, 139–40; and Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic, 99–102, 188, 234–8, 241–4, 247, 272, 278, 280. Also see Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 113, 122–3.

6. Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III,” 263–4.

7. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, 322; and Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 193–4.

8. Varnava, “Border Control and Monitoring,” 132–76, 146.

9. Alastos (Evdoros Ioannides), Cyprus Guerrilla, 196–7.

10. Foot, A Start in Freedom, 169–70.

11. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 686–9.

12. Castle, Fighting all the Way, 289–310.

13. Bitsios, Cyprus, 61–4.

14. Kranidiotis, Δύσκολα Χρόνια: Κύπρος 1950–1960.

15. Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities, 120–1, 173, 188 and 253–5.

16. Clerides, Cyprus, 49–68.

17. Foley, Island in Revolt, 150–6.

18. Darwin, “Decolonisation and the End of Empire,” 541–57; Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire; and Burton, The Trouble with Empire.

19. Smith, “Conflict and Co-Operation,” 115–34.

20. Varnava, “Reinterpreting Macmillan’s Cyprus Policy,” 79–106.

21. Varnava, “Remembering the Cypriot Civil War,” 113–16.

22. Varnava, British Imperialism in Cyprus, 262.

23. Ibid., 257.

24. Davidson, Memoirs of a Conservative, 16–17; and Piperoglou and Varnava, “Performing Empire,” 97–123.

25. Varnava, British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914–1925, 28–30; Varnava, British Imperialism in Cyprus, 261–5; and Varnava, “‘Cyprus is of No Use to Anybody’,” 35–60.

26. Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus, 139–40, 174–7.

27. Sir Ronald Storrs Papers, Pembroke College, Cambridge, Box IV/2, Decision of the CPC Central and Local Committee, Nicosia Section, 24 May 1932.

28. Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus, 173–95.

29. Varnava, Assassination in British Cyprus in 1934 and the Origins of EOKA, 35–9, 45–6, 70–8, 86–8.

30. Varnava, “British and Greek Liberalism,” 219–40; and Varnava, “Cyprus and 1821,” 183–215, 204–7.

31. Varnava, Assassination in British Cyprus in 1934 and the Origins of EOKA, 85–102.

32. Varnava and Pophaides, “Kyrillos II, 1909–16,” 148–76; and Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III, 1950–77,” 255–65.

33. Makarios to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 August 1954, Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III, 1950–77,” 256.

34. Kykkotis, Εξ Ανατολών: Η Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Παροικίας της Μεγάλης Βρεττανίας.

35. Zavrou, Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Παροικίας στη Μεγάλη Βρετανία, 93–4.

36. Loukianos, emails to author, 7 & 10 July 2020, 31 August 2022, 6 September 2022 & 16 September 2022.

37. Smith and Varnava, “Creating a ‘Suspect Community’,” 1149–81.

38. CO67/306/17, Bell to CO, 15 January 1940; CO67/306/17, Bell to CO, 16 January 1940.

39. CO67/306/17, Bell to CO, 13 February 1940; CO67/306/17, secret, Bell to Colonial Secretary, Cyprus (sent to CO, 11 March), 8 March 1940.

40. CO67/306/17, secret, Bell to Colonial Secretary, Cyprus, 5 April 1940.

41. CO67/306/17, R. St. J.O. Wayne, Liaison Office, to Colonial Secretary, Cyprus, & to CO, 17 May 1940. See also FCO/141/2660, including ‘Kypriaka Nea’, April 1940; FCO/141/2660, Wayne to CSC, 9 April 1940.

42. See People’s History Museum, Manchester, CP/CENT/DISC/12, Personal & Discipline Files: Evdoros Ioannides.

43. Kykkotis, Εξ Ανατολών, 51.

44. FCO141/3307, Terezopoulos to CSC, 27 November 1953.

45. FCO141/3307, Terezopoulos to Loukianou, 4 January 1954; and FCO141/3307, SCS to Terezopoulos, 7 January 1954.

46. FCO141/3307, Loukianou to Terezopoulos, 7 January 1954; and FCO141/3307, Terezopoulos to CSC, 15 March 1954.

47. FO371/112844/1081/64, Nicolas Cheetham, Memorandum, “Cyprus,” 22 March 1954.

48. FCO141/3307, Loukianou, letter, The Observer, 21 March 1954.

49. Noel-Baker, My Cyprus File, 13.

50. FCO141/3307, Kyprianou, letter, The Observer, 21 March 1954.

51. FCO141/3307, confidential, Terezopoulos to CSC, 7 April 1954.

52. FCO141/3307, confidential, Terezopoulos to CSC, 15 April 1954.

53. FCO141/3307, confidential, Terezopoulos to CSC, 13 May 1954; FCO141/3307, confidential, CSC to DCLa, 20 May 1954; and FCO141/3307, confidential, Terezopoulos to CSC, 2 June 1954.

54. FCO141/3307, confidential, SoS to GoC, 2 June 1954.

55. FCO141/3307, secret, A.S. Aldridge, CSC office, to W.A. Morris, CO, 9 June 1954.

56. FO371/112861/1081/550, Liberal Party resolution to Eden, 13 September 1954; FO371/112860/1081/513, Nutting to W. Robson Brown, 27 September 1954; CO926/461, minute, Morris, 23 July 1956; FO371/123900/1081/1289G, immediate, secret, Sinclair, Acting Governor, to CO, 15 June 1956; and FO371/123900/1081/1289G, immediate, secret, Deputy Governor, to CO, 18 June 1956.

57. FCO141/4198, secret, “UK Eyes Only,” T.P. Aubrey, Security Liaison Officer, to Administrative Secretary, 15 December 1955, enclosing reports on Cyprus Brotherhood dated 26 October 1955 and 16 November 1955.

58. FCO141/3749, top secret, Terezopoulos to CO, 27 October 1955.

59. FCO141/3749, secret, Terezopoulos to Reddaway and CO, 31 October 1955.

60. FCO141/3749, secret, Terezopoulos to Reddaway and CO, 18 November 1955; and FCO141/3307, secret, Terezopoulos to Reddaway, 5 January 1956.

61. FCO141/3307, secret, Terezopoulos to Reddaway, 6 January 1956 & secret, Special Branch to Reddaway, 13 January 1956.

62. CO926/461, minute, W.A. Morris, 23 July 1956; FO371/123900/1081/1289G, immediate, secret, Sinclair, Acting Governor, to CO, 15 June 1956; and FO371/123900/1081/1289G, immediate, secret, Deputy Governor, to CO, 18 June 1956.

63. FO371/130125/1071/57, confidential, Sir M. Wright, Iraqi Embassy, to FO, 30 January 1957.

64. Xydis, Cyprus, 108 & 152; and Ελευθερία (Freedom), 21 July 1957, 1.

65. FCO141/3899, secret, Special Branch, Cyprus, to Security Liaison Officer, 22 November 1957, enclosing Loukianou’s memo ‘Proposals for the Independence of Cyprus’, September 1957.

66. Ibid.

67. Yakinthou, “Consociational Democracy and Cyprus,” 23–37; and Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies.

68. FCO141/3899, secret & personal, minute, unsigned, 8 November 1957; and FCO141/3899, secret, Special Branch, Cyprus, to Security Liaison Officer, 22 November 1957, enclosing Loukianou’s memo ‘Proposals for the Independence of Cyprus’, September 1957.

69. FCO141/3899, secret, Aubrey, Security Liaison Officer, to Special Branch, Administrative Secretary, and Director of Intelligence, 4 March 1958; FCO141/3899, secret, Reddaway to Constantinides, 20 March 1958, enclosing Metropolitan Police Special Branch report on Yialousa Association; and FCO141/3899, secret, Constantinides to R.G. Sheridan, Administrative Secretary’s Office, 25 March 1958.

70. FCO141/3899, secret, Constantinides to R.G. Sheridan, Administrative Secretary’s Office, 25 March 1958.

71. Spaak, The Continuing Battle, 281–3.

72. Spaak to Menderes, 16 July 1957, in Spaak, The Continuing Battle, 284–5.

73. Spaak, The Continuing Battle, 285–6; Holland, “NATO and the Struggle for Cyprus,” 33–61, 45–8.

74. DO35/5253, secret, immediate, UK NATO delegation to FO, 2 October 1957; minutes of meeting between Spaak, Andre Saint Mleux, Sir Frank Roberts, Sir John Martin, and A.D.M. Ross, 18 October 1957, with Annexe I, ‘Cyprus’, given to Spaak; secret, memo, J.A. Thomson, 31 October 1957.

75. DO35/5253, secret, immediate, FO to UK NATO delegation, 22 November 1957.

76. Bitsios, Cyprus, 61–4.

77. Varnava, “Reinterpreting Macmillan’s Cyprus Policy.”

78. FO371/136306/10319/74G, secret, immediate, Lloyd to Dulles and Spaak, 17 February 1958.

79. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 104.

80. FO371/136364/1051/102G, top secret, memo, ‘Cyprus’, J.M. Addis, 2 May 1958; top secret, notes for talk with Dulles, undated.

81. CAB129/88, C(57)161, 9 July 1957.

82. Ibid.

83. Bitsios, Cyprus, 69–71.

84. Castle, Fighting all the Way, 293, 296.

85. Bitsios, Cyprus, 74; and Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic, 188.

86. FCO141/4230, secret, personal, Constantinides to Reddaway, 21 April 1958; secret, personal, Reddaway to Constantinides, 29 April 1958.

87. Castle, Fighting all the Way, 294; FCO141/3749, secret, minute, Administrative Secretary’s Office, Cyprus, 6 December 1955.

88. Foley, Island in Revolt, 209–10.

89. Azinas, 50 Years of Silence: Cyprus’ Struggle for Freedom, 693.

90. FO371/136372/1051/247, priority, secret, Foot to Lenox-Boyd, 23 August 1958; immediate, secret, Foot to Lenox-Boyd, 29 August 1958; priority, British Embassy Ankara to FO, 30 August 1958.

91. Castle, Fighting all the Way, 293–5.

92. Ibid., 296–7.

93. Bitsios, Cyprus, 78–80. As regards the date 17 September when Makarios told Bitsios, see Purcell, Cyprus, 296–7.

94. FO371/136341/10344/317, personal, confidential, Michael Stewart to J.M. Addis, FO, 18 September 1958.

95. FO371/136373/1051/268, priority, secret, Foot to Lennox-Boyd, 19 September 1958.

96. The Times, 23 September 1958, 10; and Castle, Fighting all the Way, 301–3.

97. FO371/136374/1051/283, confidential, note, meeting between Lennox-Boyd and Castle, 13 October 1958.

98. Kykkotis, Εξ Ανατολών, 91.

99. FCO141/3307, confidential, note of a meeting between J.D. Higham, CO, and Loukianou, 16 October 1958.

100. Grivas, The Memoirs of General Grivas, 187–8, 194, 198–9.