Egypt's moment of reform and its reform actors: the variety–capability gap

Abstract

Since July 2004, Egypt has undertaken a comprehensive economic reform agenda, put forward by ‘newly’ emerging political and economic elites with different sources of legitimization than their predecessors. Economic reforms are accompanied by a limited package of political reforms. Following an actor-oriented approach to the analysis of Egypt's reform process, reform actors are defined by a striking dilemma: Reform actors on behalf of the regime show a comprehensive capability in designing the reform agenda (‘capability’) but only half-hearted efforts to seek public support for their reform package (‘variety’). Reform actors from the opposition do have sufficient public support but lack the instruments to alter the reform agenda. This ‘variety–capability gap’ results from the specifics of an authoritarian regime that only allows a limited degree of public dissent and participation (controlled pluralism). The degree of regime interference and repression regarding oppositional reform actors provides a clear indicator of their potential to acquire the capability not only to articulate their views but also to act on them. Finally, the categorization of Egyptian reform actors suggests rethinking the choice of partners for the European Union's democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean, which aims to foster peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

Keywords:

• Egypt
• reform process
• reform actors
• EU democracy promotion

Notes

Capability is primarily based on the organizational capacity of a certain group to aggregate its objectives, to put the latter into a coherent policy, and to participate in the political arena. In this article, capability is measured in terms of its actual impact on the reform agenda with no comprehensive empirical assessments of the individual organizational capacity and other important qualities for political actors (such as flexibility, credibility, and quickness), cf. Demmelhuber, EU-Mittelmeerpolitik und der Reformprozess in Ägypten.

In Arabic, the word for reform is ‘islah’. It has two meanings: in modern standard Arabic, the term ‘islah’ is used in a general sense similar to the meaning of the Latin ‘reformare’. In contemporary Islamic literature, the content is more diverse and refers to the orthodox reformism of the type that emerges in the writings of late nineteenth-century reformers Mohamed Abduh, Rashid Rida, and their students, cf. Encylopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978, 141–71.

For the case study of Egypt, cf. Kienle, A Grand Delusion.

Cf. Francesco Cavatorta's contribution to this Special Issue.

A majority of the NDP in the Maglis al-Sha'b (lower house of parliament) could only be achieved by the joining of the so-called ‘NDPendents’. Upset by the official decision of the NDP committees about which candidate should be fielded in the 222 constituencies, many ran as independent candidates and were able to defeat the official NDP candidates in many constituencies. This lack of party discipline was to be avoided later, but it failed in the 2005 parliamentary elections as well.

For the latest biographical update on Gamal Mubarak, cf. Steiner, ‘Gamal Husni Mubarak’.

The floating of the Egyptian pound (LE) in January 2003 under the disputed government of Prime Minister Ebeid must be seen as the informal trigger for the current reform process.

Richter, ‘Finishing Off Law 1991/203 and Beyond’, 205.

These ‘young’ professionals included Rashid Mohamed Rashid (Ministry of Trade and Industry), Mahmoud Mohieddin (Ministry of Investment), Youssef Boutros Ghali (Ministry of Finance), Tarek Kamel (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology), Essam Sharaf (Ministry of Transport), Ahmed Darwish (Ministry of Administrative Development), Ahmed el-Maghrabi (Ministry of Tourism), Sameh Fahmi (Ministry of Oil), and Fayza Abul-Naga (Ministry of International Cooperation), cf. Gamal Essam el-Din, ‘Reshuffle Postponed’, al-Ahram Weekly 762 (29 September–5 October 2005).

Demmelhuber and Roll, ‘Herrschaftssicherung in Ägypten’, 26.

Gamal Tai'a, ‘Ahmad Ezz … wa milyar al-bursa’, Ruz al-Youssef, 6 June 2006; Ahmad Fakri, ‘Maglis idara al-gam'iyya al-lati tahkumu misr’, al-Ghad, 29 October 2006.

Hamzawy, ‘Understanding Arab Political Reality’, 3.

Pierre Prier, ‘Rumeurs de succession au pays des pharaons’, Le Figaro, 4 May 2007.

Author's interview (confidential) with a young member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, March 2008.

al-Akhbar (Lebanon), 19 February 2007. Author's translation from Arabic.

These developments must be seen in the context of the students' association elections of November 2006. The security apparatuses tried to thwart the Brotherhood's election campaigns, thus prompting many students to set up ‘Free Students Associations’ in order to rival the newly elected student associations, cf. Azuri, ‘The Egyptian Regime vs the Muslim Brotherhood’.

Zollner, ‘Prison Talk’.

Sixty-one per cent of the 144 nominated candidates won (88 mandates), cf. Hamzawy and Brown, ‘Can Egypt's Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic Future?’, 4.

Between 2000 and 2005, 80% of all queries, interpellations, and questions in the Maglis al-Sha'b put forward by independent parliamentarians affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood dealt with cultural, social, and moral issues. This pattern is likely to continue along with an increased self-defined role of the MB as guardian of the government, cf. Gamal Essam el-Din, ‘One More Episode’, al-Ahram Weekly 822 (30 November–6 December 2006).

Ibid.

Michael Slackman, ‘Egypt Debates the Symbol of the Veil’, International Herald Tribune, 5 February 2007; Mahmud Muhammed, ‘Nuwwab al-watany yattafiqun ma'a al-ikhwan ‘ala iqala Faruk Hosni’, al-Masri al-Youm, 22 November 2006.

See Are Hovdenak's contribution to this special issue on the Palestinian case.

el-Ghobashy, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, 382ff.

Demmelhuber and Roll, ‘Herrschaftssicherung in Ägypten’, 25f.

In this case study of Egypt, syndicates are professional associations of people with the same official job title.

The Syndicates Law of 1993 was enacted after several syndicate elections were won by Islamist candidates affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. Law 100 gives the government the ultimate power to appoint governing boards of unions and syndicates, to manage the election procedures for the governing boards, and to declare syndicate elections invalid, cf. Wickham, ‘Islamic Mobilization and Political Change’.

The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, The Situation of Human Rights in Egypt.

That is to say, the Engineers', Doctors', Lawyers', Pharmacists', and Scientists' Syndicates, cf. Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 112.

Author interview with Nasser Amin, Director of the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, Cairo, 28 February 2007.

Saad Mahmoud, ‘Judge Lashes Out at Gov't and Opposition’, The Egyptian Gazette, 22 February 2007.

Oxford Business Group, Emerging Egypt 2007, 12ff.

For an overview of the judges' role in Egyptian history and an analysis of the ‘moment of reform’ in 2005, see el-Ghobashy, ‘Egypt's Paradoxical Elections’.

Ebeid, Parties, Parliament and Democracy in Egypt, 86.

Euchner, ‘Opposition’.

International Crisis Group, ‘Reforming Egypt’, 14.

The SCC ruling was finally overruled by the constitutional amendments of spring 2007.

The debate on the supervisory role of the judiciary during national elections began with a lawsuit filed by an independent candidate for the parliamentary elections in 1990, Gamal al-Nasharti. See Kassem, ‘The 2000 Elections’, 38.

The original Law 40/1977 was amended by Law 170/2005. It established the Political Parties Affairs Committee (PPAC). It is a regime-affiliated committee (associated to the Maglis al-Shura, the upper house of parliament) with full competence to decide over the licensing and possible freezing of parties. The committee is chaired by the speaker of the Maglis al-Shura, who currently serves as General Secretary of the NDP. Dominated by the NDP, it lacks the necessary independence to perform its duties, cf. International Crisis Group, ‘Reforming Egypt’, 7.

Visibility is restricted to the parties' newspapers. All opposition parties are based in Cairo with hardly any party structures in the rest of the country. (Only al-Wafd has a comprehensive network of party offices across the country. Author's interview with Mahmud Abaza, party leader of al-Wafd, Cairo, 25 June 2008.)

In 2007 there were promising internal democratic procedures in al-Ghad. See Maram Mazen, ‘Ehab El Khouly Wins al-Ghad's Party Presidency’, The Daily Star Egypt, 7 March 2007.

For a comprehensive analysis on this issue, see Stacher, ‘Parties Over’.

Comprehensive coverage in al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 1 January 2006.

The slogan ‘Kifaya’ stands for ‘al-haraka al-misriyya min agli al-taghyir’ (‘The Egyptian Movement for Change’).

‘A Declaration to the Nation’ and ‘The Egypt We Want’, published on the movement's website, http://harakamasria.org.

‘Forum on the Middle East and Africa’, conference organized by FRIDE (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), Madrid, 17 December 2004. Ibrahim was quoted in a report which emerged from this forum.

William Safire, ‘Kifaya!’, New York Times, 27 March 2005.

Author's interview with Adam Morrow, freelance writer, Cairo, 20 February 2007.

It remains to be seen how Kifaya's approach to regional and international issues is subject to change under the new general coordinator, Abdel Wahab Messiri. See Yasmine Saleh, ‘Kefaya to Focus on Political Reformation Rather than Demonstrations’, The Daily Star Egypt, 28 January 2007.

March and April 2007 witnessed increased activism of Kifaya in the face of fierce opposition to the constitutional amendments pushed through by the regime; Cynthia Johnston, ‘Kifaya Movement Says Referendum Fixed’, The Daily Star Egypt, 22 March 2007.

Vairel, ‘Quand “assez”! ne suffit plus’.

Sarah Leah Whitson (Middle East Director, Human Rights Watch), quoted in Human Rights News, ‘Egypt: Blogger's Imprisonment Sets Chilling Precedent’.

BBC News, ‘Egypt Blogger Jailed for Insult’.

Esraa al-Shafei, ‘Democracy is Possible, Arab Bloggers Assure us Every Day’, The Daily Star Egypt, 22 February 2007.

Author's interview with Sahar Hamouda, Deputy Director of Alex-Med Research Centre, Alexandria, 19 November 2006.

Author's interviews with Nehad Rageh, Project Director at the Egyptian NGO Support Center, Cairo, 1 November 2006 and 23 March 2008.

The focus on human rights as a legitimate working field for NGOs was legalized in 2000 by ministerial decree, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Margins of Repression, 9.

Author's interview with Bahey el-Din Hassan, Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Cairo, 20 November 2007.

Springborg as quoted in Rania al-Malky, ‘Political and Social Protest: A 30-Year Review’, The Daily Star Egypt, 26 April 2007.