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Abstract
Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government has sought to navigate a difficult path between the multi-party democracy favoured by donors and a more tightly managed political environment that it argues is necessary for security. Using the fragile post-genocide political context and a history of political manipulation of ethnic identity as justification, the government has stigmatized and criminalized all references to ethnicity. This paper argues that this strategy has required careful management and manipulation of local narratives of identity and citizenship. It suggests that this has led, for one group in particular – the indigenous Batwa – to a politics of exclusion which limits their ability to participate effectively in post-genocide politics and advocate for their rights. Drawing on interviews with Rwandan civil society activists, government representatives and key bilateral and multilateral donors, the paper explores the often-overlooked impacts of these strategies on the Batwa, Rwanda's smallest ethnic group. Rwanda has been praised for its achievements in creating stability, relative security and a degree of competitive politics in a divided society that is needed to prevent the recurrence of large scale violence. And though the government explains its attempts to manage identity narratives as part of a wider effort to create an inclusive national identity, promoting ‘Rwandan-ness’, it is suggested that the effects of this policy for the Batwa have been negative and exclusionary. Whatever the potential virtues of such a strategy, the paper argues that there is little room for effective representation and accordingly for a political voice for the indigenous Batwa in such a tightly managed system.
Notes
The number of victims of the genocide, whether Hutu, Tutsi or, as we shall see later, Batwa, remains highly contested. The Rwandan government estimate is over one million, whereas the more commonly cited United Nations figure is around 800,000. See ‘Genocide’, Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda, http://www.gov.rw/page.php?id_article=19 (accessed June 17, 2010) and United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.
Those involved in carrying out the genocide.
For a discussion of the specific events which precipitated these conflicts see Prunier, ‘The Great Lakes Crisis’.
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 111.
See for example: Beswick, ‘Managing Dissent in a Post-genocide Environment’; Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’.
CAURWA is the Communauté des Autochtones du Rwanda. It is the most prominent Batwa rights organization and was formed in 1995 from three groups: Association for the Promotion of Batwa, Association for the Global Development of the Batwa of Rwanda, and Association for the Protection of Unaccompanied Children in Distress.
Matthews, ‘The People Who Don't Exist’.
See Lewis, The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region.
Igoe, ‘Becoming Indigenous Peoples’; Hitchcock and Vinding, ‘Indigenous People's Rights in Southern Africa’.
Lewis, The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region, 5. It should however be noted that some authors quoted in this paper use terms Twa and Batwa interchangeably, and their points should be regarded as applicable to the Batwa as a group, even where they use the singular term, ‘Twa’.
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Indigenous Issues, 1.
There are relatively few academic works on the Batwa. Notable exceptions include a recent article by Thomson, ‘Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy’; and Klieman, ‘The Pygmies were our Compass’. There are however brief mentions of the Batwa in more general works on Rwanda and the genocide such as Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda.
See for example the work of Christopher Taylor on the importance of the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, a theory expounded by Rwanda's Belgian colonial rulers which considered Tutsi as racially superior to both the Hutu and Twa. Tutsi were regarded as being stereotypically more ‘Nilotic’ in appearance and purportedly more intelligent. See Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror. Most observers agree that it was under Belgian rule, via a Tutsi monarchy, that primarily socio-economic divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi, and to a lesser extent the Twa, acquired greater political significance and became more entrenched. Colonial rule also entrenched the idea of Hutu and Tutsi identities as monolithic and defined chiefly in relation (or opposition) to each other. Tutsi were considered to be significantly superior to Hutu, based on physiology and intellect, receiving preferential access to employment and education. By contrast, Hutu were regarded as inferior and, to some degree, naturally subservient. The Twa, which make up less than 1% of the population, were also marginalized as a ‘pygmy group’, defined as having less social status than Hutu. See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis.
1994 speech by head of a Batwa rights organization, Charles Uwiragiye. Quoted in IRIN, ‘Minorities Under Siege: Pygmies Today in Africa’, 11.
Matthews, ‘The People Who Don't Exist’.
Klieman, ‘The Pygmies Were our Compass’.
Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, 36.
Ibid.
Huggins, ‘Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa’, 3.
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 5.
Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, 48.
Thomson, ‘Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy’, 3.
Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, 36.
Thomson, ‘Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy’, 3.
Klieman, ‘The Pygmies Were our Compass’.
Forest Peoples Programme, Submission, 10.
Huggins, ‘Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa’, 8.
IRIN, ‘Minorities Under Siege’, 8.
Huggins, ‘Land Rights and the Forest Peoples of Africa’.
Ibid., 5–9 and 12–16; Jackson, ‘Rwanda: Dispossessed Twa People Press for Recognition’. As an anonymous reviewer for this paper has pointed out, Batwa are not the only people who have lacked legal title to land in Rwanda. However, analysis by groups such as the Forest Peoples Programme and Minority Rights Group International suggests that indigenous groups are particularly disadvantaged in the process of establishing claims to land during any formal process of registration. This is often due to factors such as high levels of illiteracy, a lack of citizenship papers or historical documents supporting claims to land ownership, and the negative view of their lifestyle and livelihoods as less modern and less valid than that of agriculturalists and even pastoralists.
Thomson, ‘Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy’. For an excellent example of the disaggregation of experiences of individual Hutu during the genocide see Fujii, Killing Neighbours. More detail on the experiences of the Batwa during genocide, including the devastating effect of the killings on the number of male Batwa and on Batwa livelihoods can be found in Lewis, ‘The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region’, 23.
Lewis, ‘The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region’, 23.
Lewis (see preceding note) estimates 14% of all Rwandans were killed during the genocide, this is based on an estimated total of one million Rwandans killed during the genocide. As set out in note 1, this total figure is contested and others use the more conservative estimate of 800,000. However, even if the lower total estimate were used, the proportion of Batwa killed based on Lewis' estimate would remain higher than that of the general population.
Forest Peoples Programme, Submission, 10.
Thomson, ‘Ethnic Twa and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy’, 6.
Frontline, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, 41–2 and 59.
Kinzer, A Thousand Hills.
Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, Ten Years On’; Uvin, ‘Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda’; and Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’.
Government of Rwanda, ‘Decision of the General Assembly’.
Hayman, ‘Rwanda: Milking the Cow’, 160.
The Government of National Unity officially continued until 2003, but this label reflected the inclusion in the government of key Hutu politicians. However, the government's claim to be cross-party and cross-ethnicity was undermined by the resignation of prominent moderate Hutu figures – Minister of Interior Seth Sendashonga and Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu in 1995, and the President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2000.
Pottier, Reimagining Rwanda.
Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and Identity in Post-genocide Rwanda’.
This has been perhaps most effectively demonstrated in research on approaches to justice in post genocide Rwanda. See for example: Tiemessen, ‘After Arusha’; Buckley-Zistel, ‘Remembering to Forget’.
Republic of Rwanda, The Unity of Rwandans.
Beswick, ‘Managing Dissent in a Post-genocide Environment’.
This contention is found in much contemporary criticism of Rwanda's ruling party by human rights organizations within Rwanda and beyond. In reality, it is difficult to establish how frequently the charge of genocide ideology has been officially levelled against individuals in Rwanda. This author asked for figures on prosecutions under legislation on genocide ideology during an interview with police spokesman Theos Badege in February 2006. The information, though promised, was never provided.
Government of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 52.
See Beswick, ‘Managing Dissent in a post-Genocide Environment’.
This states that ‘discrimination occurs when the author makes use of any speech, written statement or action based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, colour of the skin, physical features, sex, language, religion, or ideas with the aim of depriving one or a group of persons their human rights…The crime of sectarianism occurs when the author makes use of any speech, written statement or action that causes conflict that causes an uprising that may degenerate into strife among people.’ Chapter 2, Article 3 of Law number 47/2001 of 18/12/2001 instituting punishment for offences of discrimination and sectarianism. Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, February 15, 2002, 12–15.
This has been adopted by parliament and the senate but at time of writing has not yet been gazetted.
See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality’; Freedom House, Country Report – Rwanda; Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: Deeper into the Abyss’.
Frontline, Disappearances, Arrests, Threats.
JGA, Rwanda: Joint Governance Assessment Report, 33.
Interview, anonymous international human rights observer, Kigali, March 2006.
Interview with human rights activist, Kigali, March 2007. State Department, ‘Rwanda: Country Report on Human Rights Practices: 2004’, Section 4.
Waldorf, ‘Censorship and Propaganda in Post-genocide Rwanda’.
Rwandan Parliamentary Commission, Report on MDR – 2003; Frontline, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, 74–5.
Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, Ten Years On’, 184. Also, Human Rights Watch and Christian Aid are amongst those who suspected that the banning of MDR was actually intended to reinforce the position of the RPF in the upcoming elections. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: Preparing for Elections’, 6; Christian Aid, It's Time To Open Up, 7.
Waldorf, ‘Censorship and Propaganda in Post-genocide Rwanda’, 404.
Beswick, ‘Managing Dissent in a Post-genocide Environment’.
Amnesty International in 2004 highlighted the cases of three missing individuals, believed to have been close to former President Bizimungu or involved in one of Rwanda's banned political parties. Tellingly, the Amnesty report also stated that ‘Local human rights groups fear (they) are all dead as it is unusual for there to be no news of their whereabouts after such a long time. The Government of Rwanda has not made public any investigation into their “disappearances” in the face of international pressure for them to do so.’ Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: Further Information on Fear for Safety/Possible “Disappearance” /Incommunicado Detention’, 38.
Hayman, ‘Rwanda: Milking the Cow’.
Silva Leander, ‘On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation’, 1604.
Ibid., 1604.
Beswick, ‘Managing Dissent in a Post-genocide Environment’.
This is arguably nothing new, Bayart's work on extraversion convincingly demonstrates that such broad and internationally backed concepts have frequently been adapted and manipulated by local/national leaders to suit various purposes. See Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’.
USAID, ‘Rwanda: Conflict Vulnerability Assessment’, 5.
Christian Aid, It's Time To Open Up.
Frontline, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, 38.
Burnet suggests women's groups have been most successful when aligning themselves with the political agendas of the RPF, gaining high level support and some notable advances in women's rights and political representation. However, despite their seemingly strong platform to carry out advocacy, the same groups have shied away from some politically sensitive topics. This, in Burnet's analysis reflects an understanding of the RPF's conceptualization of civil society as an ‘extension of, rather than a counterbalance to, the state…(f)rom this perspective, the “correct” relationship between civil society and the state is one where civil society serves the ends of the state’. Burnet, ‘Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-genocide Rwanda’, 375–6.
The New Partnership for Africa's Development.
Jordaan, ‘Inadequately Self-critical’, 339.
Ibid., 40–1; Also Frontline, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats.
Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs, ‘Critical Review of the African Peer Review Mechanism Process in Rwanda’, 14.
Jordaan, ‘Inadequately Self-critical’; Jordaan, ‘Grist for the Sceptic's Mill’, 338.
NEPAD, Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda, 51.
Matthews, ‘The People Who Don't Exist’.
Forest Peoples Programme, Submission, 23.
Interview, Patrick Osodo, Manager of Civil Society Development and Advocacy Programme, Trocaire Rwanda, Kigali, 24 February 2006.
‘Sebishwi Fills Mpayimana's Senate Seat’. New Times (Kigali), March 1, 2009.
‘Threat: Government to Stop Funding for Batwa Over Name Change’. Focus (Kigali), March 2006, 2.
Ibid.
Interview, representative of a European state development agency in Rwanda, Kigali, March 2006.
Interview, Charles Gasana, Executive Secretary of NEPAD Rwanda, Kigali, 2 March 2006.
NEPAD, Country Review Report, 136–7.
Since March 2006, the Rwandan government has offered to provide health insurance under the nation-wide scheme, Mutuelle, for all the Batwa. They also contacted CAURWA to ask for details of Batwa children without means to attend primary school, indicating that they will supply school materials.
Interview, Patrick Osodo, Manager of Civil Society Development and Advocacy Programme, Trocaire Rwanda, Kigali, 24 February 2006.
The 2004 Frontline report documents in considerable detail the harassment of LIPRODHOR staff and various strategies employed to limit the organization's ability and willingness to challenge the government on aspects of human rights. See Frontline, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, 45–56.
Interview, anonymous international human rights observer, Kigali, March 2006.
Interview, a representative of a European state development agency in Rwanda, Kigali, March 2006. This is also reflected in a statement on the homepage of the website of COPORWA, http://www.coporwa.org/.
Interviews with two heads and one senior representative of Rwandan NGOs focused on human rights. Kigali, November 2005 and March 2006.
Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and Identity in Post-genocide Rwanda’, 221–30.
Snyder, From Voting to Violence.
Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’, 14.