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Abstract
According to the theory of ‘democratic peace’, India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia's predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighbouring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any kind of official democracy-promotion policy, and its past record on democracy promotion efforts in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the article analyses the substantial role India has come to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005–2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi's traditional policy of non-interference in its neighbours' internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. However, the analysis shows that India's involvement in Nepal was the product of short-term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long-term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Gero Erdmann, Patrick Köllner, Bert Hoffmann, Joachim Betz, Jörn Grävingholt, and the journal's anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
Notes
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 12 September 2009.
Nayar and Paul, India in the World Order, 46–7.
See, for example, Doyle, ‘Liberalism’ and ‘Three Pillars’; Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.
Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, ‘Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?’.
On Myanmar, see Kurlantzick, ‘Burma's Buddy’; Mohan, ‘Balancing Interests and Values’, 111–2. On Sri Lanka, see Destradi, ‘Nach dem Bürgerkrieg’.
For an overview of India's influence on events in Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, see Destradi, ‘Demokratischer Wandel’. In Afghanistan, India has been promoting a huge programme of reconstruction and development cooperation which, however, only influences democratic developments in an indirect way. See Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’. As highlighted by Mallavarapu, India's efforts in Afghanistan should be only understood as state-building assistance, not as democracy promotion. Mallavarapu, ‘Democracy Promotion’, 55.
Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’, 14.
Cartwright, ‘India's Support for Democracy’, 421–5; Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’, 23.
Destradi, ‘Demokratischer Wandel’.
On India's traditional approach, see Mohan, ‘Balancing Interests and Values’, 99; Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’, 9.
The interviewees have been made anonymous.
On the successful implementation and extraordinary resilience of democracy in India, see, for example, Mitra, ‘Crisis and Resilience’; Kohli, Success of India's Democracy; Ganguly et al., State of India's Democracy.
MEA, Remarks by Prime Minister.
Ibid.
See, for example, Menon, ‘Pakistan’.
Interview with expert, New Delhi, April 5, 2009.
See World Values Survey, ‘Online Data Analysis’; deSouza, Palshikar, and Yadav, ‘Fragility of Support’.
For recent analyses of Indian perspectives on and approaches to democracy promotion, see Mallavarapu, ‘Democracy Promotion’; Muni, India's Foreign Policy.
Interview with government official, New Delhi, November 20, 2008.
On the ‘Nehruvian’ or ‘moralist’ tradition in Indian foreign policy, see Bajpai, ‘Strategic Culture’; Sagar, ‘State of Mind’.
Cohen, India, 145.
Embassy of India, Washington DC, ‘Defence and Security’.
MEA, Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?
The most significant concession was the announcement of duty-free access to India's market for the least developed countries of South Asia by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the 2007 summit of the SAARC. MEA, Address by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.
MEA, Address by Minister of External Affairs Shri Pranab Mukherjee.
MEA, Foreign Secretary's Shyam Saran's Speech on ‘India and its Neighbours’.
Interview with government official, New Delhi, November 20, 2008; interview with former Indian diplomat, New Delhi, November 7, 2008; interview with expert, New Delhi, November 18, 2008; interview with journalist, New Delhi, December 10, 2008.
Mallavarapu, ‘Democracy Promotion’, 59–60.
See Cartwright, ‘India's Support for Democracy’, 418–22.
See Mohan, ‘Balancing Interests and Values’, 105.
Cartwright, ‘India's Support for Democracy’, 421–5; Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’, 23.
Carothers, ‘Backlash’.
See Grover, ‘Bullet-Proof Democracy’; Chellaney, ‘South Asia’.
Chellaney, ‘South Asia’.
Menon, ‘Pakistan’.
Mohan, ‘Balancing Interests and Values’, 105.
Faust and Wagner (‘India’, 4) add a global and a domestic factor to explain India's ‘defensive approach’ to democracy promotion: on the one hand, India's fear of losing its position as a representative of the ‘South’; on the other, the fear of triggering a wave of criticism of India's own democracy.
On the selection of ‘key’ texts in discourse analysis, see Neumann, ‘Discourse Analysis’.
The following documents were selected as ‘key’ texts: MEA, Challenges Ahead – India's Views on Regional Development; MEA, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's Speech on ‘India and its Neighbours’; MEA, Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the 13th SAARC Summit; MEA, Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy; MEA, Challenges Ahead for India's Foreign Policy.
MEA, Challenges Ahead for India's Foreign Policy.
MEA, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's Speech on ‘India and its Neighbours’
Ibid. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh puts it, ‘[i]nternal security is today a larger concern for us than direct external threats. In fact, the most virulent manifestation of the major external threat that we face is in its internal forms, as we saw in Mumbai in July’. Reference was made, in this case, to the problem of terrorism. Government of India, Extracts of PM's Address.
See, for example, Ramana, ‘Left-Wing Extremist Network’.
Muni, ‘Introduction’, 17. For an account of Naxalite activities in India, see Ramana, ‘India's Maoist Movement’.
MEA, Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the 13th SAARC Summit.
Ibid. The notion of connectivity was prominently outlined by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his speech at the 13th SAARC Summit.
MEA, Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy.
Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 18, 2008.
Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 26, 2008.
‘Centre Considering Unified Command for Armed Forces’, The Hindu.
See Singh, Small Neighbours, 152–8; Rose, Nepal, 238–42.
Wagner, ‘Demokratieförderung und Außenpolitik’, 5–6.
See, among others, Gellner, ‘Nepal and Bhutan’, Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, 145–83.
For an analysis of election results, see ICG, Nepal's Election.
See Muni, ‘Restructuring of the State’.
See Paranjpe and Thomas Raju, ‘India and South Asia’, 176.
See Rose, Nepal, 185–6.
See Parajulee, Democratic Transition, 191.
The Ranas were a dynasty of prime ministers who ruled in Nepal from 1846 until 1951. See Whelpton, History of Nepal, 46–7.
See Singh, Small Neighbours, 104.
See Thapa and Sijapati, Kingdom under Siege, 18.
See Shah, ‘Himalayan Red Herring’; Mishra, ‘Causes of the Maoist Struggle’.
Mishra, ‘Causes of the Maoist Struggle’, 42.
See Parajulee, Democratic Transition, 191.
The analysis of India's approach to Nepal is based on an assessment of the non-verbal and verbal foreign policy means employed by India and arrayed along a continuum reaching from cooperation to coercion. This allows us to highlight the extent to which New Delhi supported or put pressure on the government of Nepal according to the domestic developments in that country. The non-verbal means are identified through the analysis of significant events as reported in the press, while the verbal means are identified through a qualitative content analysis of all official statements, press briefings, declarations, and Q&A sessions in parliament on Nepal issued in the time-span analysed and available on the MEA website (http://meaindia.nic.in/) as well as of all relevant speeches by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh available at http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm. These primary sources were coded with the help of the Atlas.ti software according to their more or less threatening and coercive or cooperative and conciliatory ‘tone’ according to the following ‘code families’: threat, diplomatic pressure, hard persuasion, neutral statement, soft persuasion, promise/commitment, diplomatic praise, and leadership. These data were complemented by the expert interviews mentioned above.
See Ghosh, ‘Continuing Conflict’.
For an account of the Maoists' goals and ideology and of their ‘People's War’, see Muni, Maoist Insurgency; Upreti, Maoists in Nepal.
See Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, 113. Whelpton, History of Nepal, 209.
Whelpton, History of Nepal, 218.
The following parties formed the SPA: NC, CPN (UML), Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi), NC (Democratic), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Workers and Peasant Party, and United Left Front. See ICG, Nepal's Maoists, 1.
See Mehta, ‘People's Revolution’, 135. After Gyanendra's takeover, CPN-M leader Prachanda called on the political parties ‘to form a united front with the Maoists against this “fratricidal, artificial king”’. Alam, ‘Extremist Strategy’.
See Cherian, ‘King Size Crisis’.
See International Crisis Group, From People Power to Peace, 10.
See UNMIN, Proclamation to the Nation.
See Ramana, ‘Left-Wing Extremist Network’.
See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). ‘Arms Transfers Database’.
See Mishra, ‘India's Role’, 639.
MEA, Press Statement on Visit of H.E. Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa.
See Manchanda, ‘Royal Coup’.
MEA, Statement on Developments in Nepal.
See Cherian, ‘Summit in Trouble’.
Just to cite an example: ‘In this context, we have called for a return to democratic processes at the earliest. All arrested political leaders, media personnel, intellectuals and human rights activists should be released immediately and allowed to exercise their Constitutional rights’. MEA, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 365.
See MEA, On the Visit of External Affairs Minister Shri Natwar Singh to South Africa; MEA, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 978.
See MEA, Visit of Shri Shyam Saran.
See Varadarajan, ‘India Does a U-Turn’; MEA, In Response to a Question on Resumption of Military Supplies.
Even though some Indian experts (Bidwai, ‘India's U-Turn’; interview with expert, New Delhi, November 26, 2008) underline the fact that India's leverage over Nepal is much more extensive than China's (and, therefore, that India should not fear China's presence in this country), the preoccupation about Nepal moving into China's sphere of influence should not be underestimated. As one of the interviewees stated very clearly, ‘Initially it was only China, but in the 1990s Pakistan came to Nepal and opened a new flank against India’. Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 25, 2008.
Interview with journalist, New Delhi, December 10, 2008. The acquisition of arms from China had already been an issue in the late 1980s and had led to a de facto blockade by India in 1989. See Whelpton, History of Nepal, 113.
See Bidwai, ‘India's U-Turn’.
See Stachoske, ‘Der König packt die Koffer’, 133.
See, for example, MEA, Suo Moto Statement by External Affairs Minister Shri Natwar Singh: ‘We continue to believe that the principles of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, enshrined in the country's constitution will be adhered to in order to ensure political stability in the country’.
See Manchanda, ‘Challenging the Monarchy’.
See Mehta, ‘People's Revolution’, 135.
See UNMIN, 12-Point Understanding.
Interview with government official, New Delhi, November 20, 2008.
Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 7, 2008; interview with government official, New Delhi, November 27, 2008; interview with journalist, New Delhi, December 10, 2008.
Interview with journalist, New Delhi, December 10, 2008.
See Mishra, ‘India's Role’, 637.
See Jha, ‘Nepal at the Crossroads’.
Interview with journalist, New Delhi, December 10, 2008.
Beyond this, several other Indian interlocutors of different actors within Nepal contributed to ‘amplify the existing policy dissonance in Delhi and [to] create maximum confusion’. Varadarajan, ‘Road Ahead’.
Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 7, 2008. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect to me.
‘The situation is an evolving one. For the present let me only say that we are concerned over the arrests and detention, once again, of several political leaders, professionals and students which we strongly deplore. These actions by the government in Nepal are counter-productive. There needs to be cooperation among the constitutional forces in Nepal, not confrontation. We urge the immediate release of those arrested and a return to the path of dialogue and reconciliation’. MEA, In Response to Questions on Developments in Nepal (emphasis added).
See, for example, MEA, Visit of Minister of State Mr. Anand Sharma to Namibia.
See, for example, MEA, In Response to Questions on Nepal.
See, for example, MEA, In Response to Questions on Nepal; MEA, Visit of Dr. Karan Singh.
Interview with former diplomat, New Delhi, November 7, 2008.
International Crisis Group, From People Power to Peace?, 10.
See MEA, Visit of Minister of State Mr. Anand Sharma to Namibia
International Crisis Group, From People Power to Peace?, i.
MEA, Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary Shri Shyam Saran.
See Gellner, ‘Nepal and Bhutan’, 83.
On the regimentation of the ceasefire, see UNMIN, Code of Conduct.
See UNMIN, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
In January 2007, the UN Security Council resolved to establish a political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to monitor the management of arms and armed personnel, to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, and to support the planning, preparation, and conduct of the elections of the Constituent Assembly. See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1740.
See ‘Former rebels join Nepal's interim government; elections planned for June 20’, International Herald Tribune.
See, for example, Transparency International Nepal, Annual Progress Report.
For an analysis of election results, see International Crisis Group, Nepal's Election.
See ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal’, eKantipur.com.
See ‘PM Dahal Takes Charge of Office’, eKantipur.com.
On the other hand, the Maoists themselves, who had been gradually renouncing to their anti-India rhetoric, were looking for India's support. For example, the ‘number two’ Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai met the Indian ambassador at the end of June with the aim of gaining India's support in the institutionalization of the peace and democratization process. See FES, ‘News Update’, 4.
In October 2007, Shyam Saran was sent to Kathmandu as a special envoy of the Indian prime minister to convey India's interest in early elections. See MEA, Visit of Shri Shyam Saran.
See Embassy of India, Kathmandu, ‘India-Nepal Relations’. Interview with government official, New Delhi, November 17, 2008.
See Varadarajan, ‘Road Ahead’.
Around May–June 2006, Indian diplomats started conceding, privately, that ‘there is the need for such an international body with New Delhi constantly playing an active behind-the-scenes role’. Jha, ‘Tricky Tasks’.
See Muni, ‘Civil-Military Crisis’.
See Varadarajan, ‘Dangers’.
Muni, ‘Restructuring of the State’, 186.
On coordination with the USA, see Cartwright, ‘India's Support for Democracy’, 410.