Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction

Abstract

Consociationalism is often proposed for societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, yet its recommendation remains contentious. Critics argue that it has a low rate of adoption, results in political immobilism, and entrenches the divisions it seeks to alleviate. Overlooked in much of the criticism, however, is the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of consociationalism, alternatively premised on the self-determination or predetermination of the ethnic groups involved in power-sharing. The article considers whether the critiques apply equally to both versions. Corporate consociation freezes a particular inter-group configuration in time, leading to drawn-out executive formation and, in some cases, to a cementing of divisions. However, liberal consociation runs into its own difficulties: consociational settlements are generally negotiated at the very point at which group identities are most politically salient and divisive. Under these conditions, groups are unlikely to settle for anything other than a guarantee of their share in power, thus making liberal consociationalism less likely to be adopted in negotiated settlements. The article also considers the factors enhancing the adoption of liberal consociational rules.

Keywords:

• liberal consociationalism
• corporate consociationalism
• divided societies
• power-sharing
• constitutional design

Notes on contributor

Allison McCulloch is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Brandon University (Canada). Her research is primarily in the area of comparative institutional design for divided societies and is specifically focused on the consociationalism-centripetalism debate. Her work has appeared in Contemporary Political Theory and Ethnopolitics.

Notes

1. Some research suggests that conflict parties are 38% more likely to agree to a peace deal if it entails power-sharing provisions. Nagle, “Plying Nostrums,” 166.

2. For a comprehensive defence of the model, see O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics.”

3. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement,” 197.

4. Ibid.; Jarstad, “The Prevalence of Power-Sharing”; Rothchild and Roeder, “Dilemmas of State-Building.”

5. Arend Lijphart has dubbed the distinction as one between predetermination and self-determination whereas John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have labelled the two versions as corporate and liberal consociationalism, respectively.

6. McGarry and O'Leary, “Iraq's Constitution,” 675.

7. Ibid., 675.

8. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy; McGarry and O'Leary, “Iraq's Constitution”; Nagle, “Plying Nostrums”; Wolff, “Building Democratic States.”

9. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 66.

10. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 72.

11. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25.

12. McGarry and O'Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict, 15.

13. In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled (14:3) that the Dayton constitution “contained discriminatory and unlawful provisions.” Specifically, the electoral rules disenfranchize “Others” in presidential elections. See Bochsler, “Non-Discriminatory Rules.”

14. Zahar, “Power Sharing in Lebanon,” 228–9.

15. Ibid., 232.

16. Bieber and Keil, “Power Sharing Revisited,” 353.

17. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 6.

18. McGarry, “Liberal Consociation”; O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics”; McGarry and O'Leary, “Iraq's Constitution”; and McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared.”

19. McGarry and O'Leary, “Iraq's Constitution,” 698.

20. Ibid., 687.

21. Ibid., 688.

22. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 71. See also Nagle, “Plying Nostrums.”

23. Jarstad, “The Prevalence of Power-Sharing,” 42.

24. Ibid., 42.

25. Rothchild and Roeder, “Dilemmas of State-Building,” 29.

26. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement,” 197; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 569; Horowitz, “Constitutional Design,” 20; and Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa, 257.

27. Wolff, “Post-Conflict State Building,” 1783.

28. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement,” 197.

29. Ibid., 197.

30. Taylor, “The Promise of Consociational Theory.”

31. Ibid., 6, 7.

32. See Adeney, “Constitutional Design.”

33. Tan, “From Sojourners to Citizens,” 959.

34. Mauzy, “Malay Political Hegemony”; and Tan, “From Sojourners to Citizens.”

35. Mauzy, “Malay Political Hegemony,” 122.

36. O'Flynn, “The Problem of Recognising,” 144.

37. Stojanovic, “How to Solve the Dilemma,” 242.

38. Belloni and Deane, “From Belfast to Bosnia,” 232.

39. Bahtić-Kunrath, “Of Veto Players,” 899.

40. Jukic, “Vjekoslav Bevanda to be Named Bosnian PM.”

41. Robert F. Worth, “Lebanon Elects President to Ease Divide,” New York Times, May 26, 2008.

42. Deschouwer and Van Parijs, “A Country-Wide Electoral District.”

43. Robinson, “Belgium, at Last, Forms Government.”

44. McEvoy, “Executive Formation,” 455.

45. Ibid., 455–6.

46. McGarry and O'Leary, “Under Friendly and Less Friendly Fire,” 360–1.

47. Quoted in McEvoy, “Executive Formation,” 459.

48. Seaver, “Regional Sources.”

49. McGarry and O'Leary, “Consociational Theory Part I,” 271.

50. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 73.

51. O'Flynn, “Democratic Theory and Practice,” 286.

52. Wolff, “Post-Conflict State Building,” 1794.

53. Mauzy, “Malay Political Hegemony,” 122.

54. Ibid., 124.

55. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 82–3.

56. Nagle, “Plying Nostrums,” 167.

57. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 34.

58. Taylor, “The Injustice of a Consociational Solution,” 320.

59. McGarry and O'Leary, “Consociational Theory Part II,” 61.

60. Reka, “The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations,” 59.

61. International Crisis Group, Macedonia, 14, 2–3. See also Bieber and Keil, “Power-Sharing Revisited.”

62. O'Flynn, “Democratic Theory and Practice,” 287.

63. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement,” 197.

64. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 5.

65. O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics,” 20–2.

66. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 72.

67. Daley, “Burundi Peace Negotiations,” 345.

68. O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics,” 21.

69. Ibid., 21.

70. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy, 52.

71. O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics,” 26.

72. Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy,” 23.

73. Wolff, “Post-Conflict State Building,” 1788.

74. Mitchell, Evans, and O'Leary, “Extremist Outbidding,” 402.

75. McGarry and O'Leary, “Power Shared,” 41.

76. Vasilev, “EU Conditionality,” 62–3.

77. O'Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics,” 22.