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Abstract
During a regime transition, are citizens more likely to appeal to the courts to protect their rights, or less likely? The study examines 107 decisions of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court on social welfare, passed between 1991 and 2010. As the political system became more authoritarian under President Vladimir Putin, citizen petitions to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts greatly increased, reflecting discontent with the content and implementation of social welfare reforms. Furthermore, citizen petitioners won a surprisingly large number of their cases. The analysis reveals the Constitutional Court to be a strong defender of social rights overall, while establishing an implicit hierarchy of groups entitled to special protection. Its rulings posited that the state has an obligation not just to uphold its current social contract, but to honour the previous social contract for people who spent their productive lives under a different political regime.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding this research through Standard Research Grant no. 410-2006-0903. The original draft of this article was presented to the 2010 meeting of section RC09 (Comparative Judicial Studies) of the International Political Science Association, conference title: “Judicial Review as ‘Insurance Policy’: Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Democratic and Transitional States”, Bologna, Italy, 22 June 2010. The author would like to thank conference participants for their comments, and special thanks go to Alexei Trochev for his suggestions. The author would also like to thank Carleton University (specifically, the Faculty of Public Affairs and Office of the Vice-President, Research and International) for providing the funds that enabled the author to attend the Bologna conference. Thanks to the editor, Professor Aurel Croissant, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Any errors or omissions in the article are exclusively the author's responsibility.
Notes on contributor
Andrea Chandler is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. She is the author of Shocking Mother Russia: Democratization, Social Rights, and Pension Reform in Russia, 1990–2001 (University of Toronto Press, 2004). Her publications also include articles published in the journals Global Social Policy, Nationalities Papers, and Canadian Slavonic Papers.
Notes
1. Stoner-Weiss, “Comparing Oranges and Apples,” 253–73.
2. Shevtsova, “Implosion, Atrophy or Revolution?” 19–21.
3. Chebankova, “Evolution of Russia's Civil Society,” 410–12; Lyall, “Pocket Protests,” 390–1; Henry, “Redefining Citizenship in Russia,” 63–4; Sperling, “Nashi Devushki,” 255–6.
4. Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, 69.
5. Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders, 141; Mazmanyan, “Constrained, Pragmatic, Pro-Democratic,” 416–21; Bravo, “Smoke, Mirrors and the Joker in the Pack,” 544–8.
6. Hernandez, “Constitutional Authoritarianism and the Prospects of Democracy,” 73; Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics.
7. Cheesman, “How an Authoritarian Regime,” 807–12.
8. Brown, “Judicial Review and the Arab World”; Gilley, “Democratic Enclaves in Authoritarian Regimes”; Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes,” 136.
9. Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 156–8.
10. Shahib and Stephan, “Fighting for the Rule,” 497, 508.
11. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, 37–8.
12. Smith, “Social Movements and Judicial Empowerment,” 347–8; Conant, Justice Contained; Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society; Epp, The Rights Revolution.
13. Sajo, “How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform,” 31–2; Ledeneva, “Telephone Justice in Russia,” 346–7.
14. Maveety and Grosskopf, “Constrained Constitutional Courts as Conduits,” 464, 485.
15. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 4, 13, 27–8, 78–80.
16. Remington, Politics in Russia, 69, 233–4; Sharlet, “Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia,” 219–20.
17. Trochev, Judging Russia, 112–37.
18. Trochev, “Suing Russia at Home,” 18–34.
19. Cashu and Orenstein, “The Pensioners' Court Campaign,” 70–1.
20. Hendley, “Demand for Law in Russia,” 75–6.
21. Jordan, Defending Rights in Russia.
22. Sperling, Altered States, 258–66.
23. Solomon, “Courts and Judges,” 127–8.
24. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions Uncertain Democracies, 28–9; Nalepa, Skeletons in the Closet; Shevel, “The Politics of Memory,” 140, 148.
25. Horak, Governing the Post-Communist City, 2–6.
26. Huntington, “Democracy's Third Wave,” 27.
27. Goven, “New Parliament, Old Discourse?” 286–306; Kornai, “The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe,” 227–8; Cook, “Negotiating Welfare Postcommunist States,” 52–3.
28. Orenstein, “Postcommunist Welfare States,” 82–3.
29. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States; Vacroux, “Regulation and Corruption in Transition,” 139–41.
30. Henry, “Redefining Citizenship in Russia,” 61–2.
31. Trochev, Judging Russia, 112–14.
32. Generally, a postanovlenie is a major decision, declaring some part of an existing law unconstitutional, and is published in print. An opredelenie is a more limited, more specific decision.
33. As Trochev notes, this can speed up the court's processes, but can make results harder to publicize (and therefore enforce). Trochev, Judging Russia, 124–5.
34. The veterans' social benefit system raises a lot of separate issues. The author has examined veterans' complaints to the Constitutional Court elsewhere.
35. Chandler, “The Social Promise,” 202–3.
36. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatii, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Os'-89, 1997, 7, 13, 16–17.
37. Opredelenie no. 49-O, 1 March 2001.
38. Hale, McFaul, and Colton, “Putin and the ‘Delegative Democracy’ Trap,” 298–301, 313.
39. RSFSR, Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyi Sovet), Law (zakon), “O sotsial'noi zashchite grazhdan,” 725–50.
40. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter KSRF) no. 18-П, 1 December 1997.
41. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 11-П, 19 June 2002.
42. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 17-П, 10 November 2009.
43. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 415-O, 4 December 2003.
44. Chandler, Shocking Mother Russia, 124–6.
45. Postanovlenie 11-П, 11 October 1995. English translation: Bruce Collins, translator, 18–23.
46. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 18-П, 15 June 1998.
47. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 46-O, 1 March 2001.
48. Federal laws 166-FZ, 167-FZ; and 173-FZ. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 December 2001, 4–6, 11.
49. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 320-O, 5 November 2002.
50. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 107-O, 6 March 2003.
51. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 11-П, 3 June 2004.
52. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 310-O-O, 19 March 2009.
53. Federal law no. 122-FZ (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 31 August 2004, 1–21).
54. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 521-O, 1 December 2005; Opredelenie KSRF, no. 85-O, 18 April 2006.
55. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 521-O, 1 December 2005.
56. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 89-O, 4 April 2006.
57. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 947-O-П, 4 December 2007.
58. Nechaeva, “Novyi semeinyi kodeks,” 57; Antol'skaia, “New Aspects of Russian Family Law,” 4–8.
59. T.P. Evdokimova, “O nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniia,” 1–9 (see Appendix).
60. Opredelenie KSRF N. 1665-O, 17 December 2009.
61. Opredelenie KSRF N. 496-O, 16 November 2006.
62. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 4-П, 22 March 2007.
63. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 231-O, 27 June 2005.
64. Chandler, “Gender, Political Discourse and Social Welfare,” 18–19.
65. Opredelenie KSRF, no. 1085-O, 13 October 2009.
66. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 3-П, 6 February 2009.
67. The woman in question claimed to have been denied benefits because she did not reside on Russian soil. Opredelenie KSRF, no.134-O, 8 June 2000.
68. In postanovlenie 7-П, 24 February 1998, the Constitutional Court noted that social insurance contribution payments should be considered taxes and be “proportional.” In Opredelenie KSRF, no. 195-O, 5 November 1999, the court argued that the judiciary should not determine how taxes should be collected.
69. Postanovlenie KSRF, no. 9-П, 25 June 2001.
70. In two cases, complaints about the election process were dismissed. Russian Federation, Constitutional Court (Konstitutsionnyi Sud), Opredelenie no. 1058-O/2012, 5 June 2012; Russian Federation, Supreme Court (Verkhovnyi Sud) no. ГКПИ12-336, 3 May 2012. (See Bibliography.)
71. Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda no. 624-O, 17 July 2007.