The political economy of external exploitation. A comparative investigation of China's foreign relations

Abstract

On the basis of the selectorate theory, this article examines the link between distributional policies, autocratic cooperation, and its potential for autocratic stability. It compares to what extent Cambodia, Myanmar, and Mongolia complied with China's key external interests in the period 1990–2010. Against this background, the article examines the cooperation between winning coalitions in these countries and China and thereby links a political economy argument to the discussion on regime type and regime stability in autocracy research. The article finds that autocratic exploitation is beneficial to authoritarian powers, such as China, but that hybrid regimes rather than closed autocracies are most vulnerable to such exploitation.

Keywords:

• political economy
• selectorate theory
• external exploitation
• regime type
• external factors
• autocracy
• China

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Aurel Croissant, Oliver Hensengerth, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, as well as my former colleagues at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik where this article was written.

Notes on contributor

Julia Bader is an Assistant Professor for International Relations at the University of Amsterdam and an Associate Fellow of the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Her work focuses on the political economy of authoritarian regimes, foreign aid and democracy promotion and has been published in Contemporary Politics and Politische Vierteljahresschrift. She is also the author of the book China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies (forthcoming).

Notes

1. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism,” 139–57.

2. Kagan, “The End of the End of History”; Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” 101–18; Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?,” 81–100.

3. Burnell, “New Autocracy Promotion?,” 269–94; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actor,” 922–44; Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash.

4. Koesel and Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing”; Vanderhill, “Learning to Be Bad.”

5. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion,” 375–92.

6. See also Jackson, “The Role of External Factors,” 101–18.

7. Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actor,” 922–44; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” 20–33; Ambrosio, “Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion,” 375–92. For an overview see Ambrosio.

8. Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?,” 81–100.

9. Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown”; Hadenius, “Pathways from Authoritarianism,” 143–57.

10. Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 567–76; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

11. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator's Handbook.

12. Ibid.; Milner and Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade?” 107–43; Lake and Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy,” 587–621; Faust, “Democracy's Dividend,” 1–26.

13. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions,” 251–84.

14. Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?,” 81–100.

15. Smith, “Political Groups, Leader Change, and International Cooperation,” 853–77.

16. Data were gathered between 2007 and 2010. During this period, more than 80 semi-structured interviews were conducted with academics, political actors, administrative staff, and international experts in Beijing, Shanghai, Ulaanbataar, Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Singapore, Berlin, and Bonn.

17. Since June 2011, the regime in Myanmar has embarked on reforms designed to liberalize the political sphere. In order to make sure that the degree of compliance was not affected by these changing political conditions, the investigation ends before these changes took place.

18. Cock, “Anticipating an Oil Boom,” 525–46.

19. Clapp, Building Democracy in Burma.

20. Barkmann, “Zur Entwicklung der politischen Eliten.”

21. Deng and Wang, China Rising.

22. Global Witness, Country for Sale.

23. Storey, “China's Tightening Relationship with Cambodia”; Job and Williams, CSCAP Regional Security Outlook; Shaw and Sisovann, “China's Patronage Raises Concerns About Intent.”

24. Chenyang and Fook, “China's Policies Towards Myanmar,” 255–87; Ganesan, “Myanmar-China Relations,” 95–111.

25. Clapp, Burma's Long Road to Democracy; Selth, Burma's China Connection.

26. Reeves, “Mongolia's Environmental Security,” 453–71.

27. Marks, “China's Cambodia Strategy,” 92–108.

28. Ros, Cambodge, la Répétition de l'Histoire; Peou, Intervention & Change in Cambodia.

29. Roberts, “Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia,” 520–38; Peou, Intervention & Change in Cambodia; Marks, The Growing Cambodian-Chinese Alliance.

30. Peou, Intervention & Change in Cambodia.

31. Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition.

32. Cock, “External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite,” 241–65.

33. Mengin, La Présence Chinoise au Cambodge.

34. Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge.

35. Mengin, La Présence Chinoise au Cambodge; Marks, “China's Cambodia Strategy,” 92–108.

36. Interview, Phnom Penh, 17 November 2009.

37. See also Lintner, Blood Brothers; and Marks, “China's Cambodia Strategy,” 92–108. As an underworld figure, Theng Bunma's birthplace is however not known.

38. Interview, Beijing, 18 September 2009.

39. Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 60.

40. Storey, “Burma's Relation with China”; Storey, “Emerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations,” 5–8.

41. Selth, “Burma and the Competition between China and India,” 222.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 214.

44. International Crisis Group, China's Myanmar Dilemma.

45. Clapp, Building Democracy in Burma.

46. International Crisis Group, China's Myanmar Dilemma, 32.

47. Chenyang and Fook, “China's Policies Towards Myanmar,” 255–87.

48. International Crisis Group, China's Myanmar Dilemma, 10.

49. Kramer, From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt? This is not orchestrated by the PRC's central government. However, Chinese state loans encouraged exploitative investments in the context of an initiative to stop opium cultivation, and lax controls allowed illegal logging by southern Chinese authorities and companies.

50. International Crisis Group, China's Myanmar Dilemma, 40.

51. Ibid., 40 and 26.

52. Ibid., 10.

53. Lampton, “China's Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process,” 1–33; International Crisis Group, Stirring up the South China Sea.

54. Sun, “China's Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmar,” 73–96.

55. Zhao, China and India Courting Myanmar.

56. Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, “China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” 38–56; Lundholm, “Pipeline Politics.”

57. As was argued in an Economist article on 11 February 2012, the example of falling dictators during the Arab Spring finally triggered Myanmar's junta to take up the reform process again.

58. Interview, Ulaanbataar, 6 October 2009.

59. Declaring independence in 1911, Mongolia has been considered a lost territory by China, which agreed to Mongolia's independence only to make Russia enter the war against Japan in 1945. To safeguard independence, Mongolian leaders aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

60. Batchimeg, “Future Challenges”; Campi, “Sino-Mongolian Relations from Beijing's Viewpoint.”

61. Campi, Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations.

62. Batchimeg, “Future Challenges.”

63. Campi, Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations.

64. Batchimeg, “Future Challenges”; Campi, “Sino-Mongolian Relations from Beijing's Viewpoint”; Bulag, “Mongolia in 2009,” 97–103.

65. Interview, Beijing, 31 October 2009.

66. Rossabi, Modern Mongolia; Baabar, “A Country without Much Hope”; Tsenddoo, “From Russian Mongolia to the Russian-Chinese Mongolia.”

67. Reeves, “Mongolia's Environmental Security,” 453–71.

68. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator's Handbook.

69. Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 64–99; Yunling and Shiping, “China's Regional Strategy.”

70. Bulag, “Mongolia in 2009,” 97–103.

71. International Crisis Group, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway.