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Abstract
The inclusion of Hindu nationalist parties in India's democratic process has not resulted in their moderation in a linear manner. Since 1947, the parties have oscillated between a sectarian strategy of religious mobilization and a more moderate one of abiding by democratic processes and liberal norms. While the former has led to radicalization, the latter has facilitated democratic coalition building. Whether the Hindu nationalist parties opted for the path of radicalization or that of moderation has chiefly depended on their relation with their mother organization, the perception of Muslims that prevails at a given time in India, and the electoral strategies of the other parties.
Notes
Schwedler, “Faith in Moderation.”
Michels, A Sociological Study, 333–341; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 283.
Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation.”
Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems.”
Vali Nasr, The Vanguard; Schwedler, Faith in Moderation.
Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion?”
Ozzano, “The Many Faces.”
Emerson and Hartman, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism.”
Andersen and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron; Minault, The Khilafat Movement; Savarkar, Hindutva.
The Organizer, June 25, 1956, 5.
Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement.
Adams et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different.”
Greene, “Creating Competition.”
The Organizer, January 24, 1956, 5.
The Organizer, November 16, 1961, 7.
Gould, “Religion and Politics,” 67.
Nehru, Letters.
Gupta, Nehru on Communalism, 250.
National Herald, January 8, 1962.
Cows are traditionally sacred to Hindus: therefore, since the 1960s the Hindu nationalist movement has launched a movement aimed at banning cow slaughtering, in opposition to the secular state, but also exploiting the issue in an anti-Muslim perspective (since those promoting cow slaughtering are believed to be mainly Muslims).
Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement.
The slogan chanted by the Hindu nationalists after this episode, was “Ayodhya ke shahidon ko bhoulo mat, bhoulo mat!” (“Do not forget the martyrs of Ayodhya, do not forget them!”) For a detailed analysis see the section entitled “The Kar Seva and the Creation of a Cult of Martyrdom” (in Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 420–424).
Unlike in countries such as France, in India religion is not excluded from the public sphere and from politics. Indian secularism, as defined by the constitution, is rooted in the “multicultural” idea that all religious traditions are equal and there should be no discrimination based on religious affiliation.
For a synthetic view of the Jana Sangh's resolutions regarding the language issue, see Chapter 12 of Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism. A Reader.
Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation.”
Dutt, Five Headed Monster.
The number of Hindu-Muslim riots rose from 169 in 1976 to 188 in 1977, 230 in 1978 and 304 in 1979 (Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 301). Among them, the riots of Aligarh (1978) and Jamshedpur (1979) were investigated by independent commissions which concluded that Hindu nationalist activists had been involved (See First Annual Report, 73 and Report of the Three-Member Commission of Inquiry, 40).
Rudolph and Hoeber Rudolph, “Rethinking Secularism.”
Narayan, JP’s Call to RSS, 1.
For a detailed analysis of the social basis of the Jana Sangh, see Graham, Hindu Nationalism.
A former Congress minister in the government of Uttar Pradesh, Charan Singh was a peasant (kisan) leader who had founded his own party in 1969 before joining hands with the Janata Party, who elected him prime minister of India in 1979 for a short while. He had reconstituted a separate political force in the early 1980s. See the biography of Charan Singh by Brass, An Indian Political Life.
Hindu Vishva 14, nos. 7–8, 92, March 1979.
van Der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated!”
For a detailed report on a Mahayajna, see, for example, the one on Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, November 11, 1989, 9, and Dainik Bhaskar, November 11, 1989, 3.
Outlook, October 25, 1999, 38.
Organiser, Varsha Pradipada Special, March 29, 1998, 27–30.
NDA, For a Proud, Prosperous India, 1.
Jaffrelot, “The 2002 Pogrom in Gujarat.”
Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories,” 318.
Ibid., 329.
Nayar, “The Limits of Economic Nationalism.”
Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion?”
A note on these dynamics at the state level is in order. The variations of the Hindu nationalists’ strategies are not only observed in terms of time, but also in terms of space. This article has dealt with the national leadership only. But state leaders have used their room to manoeuvre for shaping their own oscillations between moderate and radical strategies. Interestingly, the key variables mentioned about the Jana Sangh and the BJP at a national level remain relevant at the state level. The role of elections and coalition-making are cases in point. In Gujarat, the BJP of Modi polarized society through the 2002 pogrom and made sure that it drew its electoral benefits by holding elections a few months later. This extremist strategy was made easier by the fact that the BJP did not depend upon coalition partners and did not face strong secularist parties. In Bihar, by contrast, the BJP is associated with the JD(U) in the framework of a ruling coalition. The JD(U) – which is very critical of Modi's policies – cultivates a Muslim electorate, and the local BJP has become so moderate that it has approved positive discrimination measures in favour of Muslims.
Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories,” 318.
Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India.
Kaviraj, “Démocratie et développement en Inde.”