Democracy in microstates: why smallness does not produce a democratic political system

Abstract

In recent decades, several scholars have pointed to a statistical correlation between population size and democracy. Whereas these studies have thus far failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of this link, more case-oriented and qualitative publications have primarily highlighted the democracy-undermining effects of smallness. According to such studies, the proclivity of microstates to democratic rule should be explained on the basis of other factors, which coincide with smallness. In the current article, the nature and quality of politics and democracy in the four microstates of San Marino, St Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau is analysed on the basis of interviews with local respondents. The results indicate that microstate politics is characterized by a disparity between formally democratic institutions and a more antidemocratic political reality, and that size therefore does not directly generate a democratic political system. Instead, for the four analysed microstates the variables of colonial history, geographical location, and international relations appear to have greater explanatory value. Precisely because microstate politics is all about interpersonal relations and informal dynamics, this article contends that qualitative research is the preferable approach for studying politics and democracy in microstates.

Keywords:

• size
• democracy
• microstates
• personalistic politics
• patron-client linkages

Acknowledgement

I would very much like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments and suggestions. This research has been facilitated financially by the Netherlands Institute of Government and the Leiden University Fund/van Walsem.

Notes on contributor

Wouter Veenendaal is a lecturer in political science at Leiden University. In April 2013 he obtained his PhD on the basis of a dissertation in which he studied the effects of a small state size on the nature and quality of democracy.

Notes

1. Hadenius, Democracy and Development; Anckar and Anckar, “Size, Insularity, and Democracy”; Diamond and Tsalik, “Size and Democracy”; Ott, Small is Democratic; Anckar, “Why Are Small Island States Democracies?”; Srebrnik, “Small Island Nations and Democratic Values.”

2. Population size figures have been retrieved from the CIA World Factbook, which has a July 2011 estimate for every country (CIA World Factbook 2011).

3. Freedom House, 2012.

4. Srebrnik, “Small Island Nations and Democratic Values,” 339.

5. Anckar and Anckar, “Size, Insularity, and Democracy,” 220–222; Anckar, “Why Are Small Island States Democracies?,” 386–388.

6. Diamond and Tsalik, “Size and Democracy,” 120; Srebrnik, “Small Island Nations and Democratic Values,” 332.

7. Ott, Small is Democratic, 200–205.

8. Although these philosophers mention many advantages of smallness, especially in the case of Plato and Aristotle, these advantages mostly relate to governability and conceptions of the public good, and therefore not so much to democracy.

9. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful; Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets.

10. Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 65–68.

11. Benedict, “Sociological Aspects of Smallness,” 49; Richards, “Politics in Small Independent Communities”; Doumenge, “The Viability of Small Intertropical Islands,” 87–90; Lowenthal, “Social Features,” 40–41; Veenendaal, “Size and Personalistic Politics.”

12. Parsons, The Social System, 508; Wood, “The Smaller Territories,” 33–34; Farrugia, “The Special Working Environment,” 224; Sutton, “Democracy and Good Governance in Small States,” 212–214.

13. Sutton, “Political Aspects,” 12–16; Gerring and Zarecki, “Size and Democracy Revisited,” 8–11; Baldacchino, “Islands and Despots.”

14. Peters, The Democratic System in the Eastern Caribbean; Ryan, Winner Takes All; Duncan and Woods, “What About Us?”; Hinds, “Beyond Formal Democracy.”

15. Seibert, Comrades, Clients, and Cousins, 316–317.

16. Ibid., 244.

17. For example, Van Trease, Atoll Politics, 79–80; Connell, “Nauru,” 56; Morgan, “The Origins and Effects,” 117, 135.

18. Larmour, “Corruption and Accountability.”

19. Of course, additional reasons for the formally democratic structures of microstates can be imagined, such as religious and cultural factors, or the insular geographical nature of most microstates. However, because such reasons have been forcefully refuted (for example, Anckar and Anckar, “Size, Insularity and Democracy,” 216–218), in this article the focus is on the three strongest, most plausible, and most often-mentioned explanations.

20. Sutton and Payne, “Lilliput under Treat,” 586–587; Anckar, “Regime Choices in Microstates,” 215–217; Sutton, “Democracy and Good Governance in Small States,” 202–203. Although the notion that their Anglo-American colonial background can explain democracy in microstates has been contradicted by several authors (Diamond and Tsalik, “Size and Democracy,” 118–119; Anckar, “Why Are Small Island States Democracies?,” 384–385), the correlation between the variables of size and colonial heritage is certainly remarkable (Clague, Gleason, and Knack, “Determinants of Lasting Democracy,” 27, 31). According to Anckar and Diamond and Tsalik, however, there is strong evidence for an inverted relationship, in the sense that ex-British colonies are in general more likely to be democratic because many of them are so small. This argument is buttressed by the observation that among all states in the world, less than half of the former British colonies is now a democracy (Anckar, “Why Are Small Island States Democracies?,” 384–385).

21. Baldacchino, “Bursting the Bubble,” 31.

22. Masala, “Schwimmende Politeia?,” 252. Translation by author from original German text: “[a]lle hier untersuchten Mikroinseln befinden sich in Gebieten, die dem mittelbaren Einflussgebiet der USA oder demokratischer Regionalhegemone (wie Australien) zugeordnet werden müssen.”

23. Ibid., 254.

24. Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships”; Sutton and Payne, “Lilliput under Threat,” 589; Seibert, Comrades, Clients, and Cousins, 12.

25. Masala, “Schwimmende Politeia?,” 254.

26. Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” 21.

27. In subsequent parts of this article, I use interview quotes to underline or illustrate my findings and the general argument. Due to the strong interpersonal relations and the smallness of the microstate societies, I have decided not to disclose the names of the people to whom the specific interview excerpts belong. However, for each quote the profession of the informant has been provided, and the date and location of the interview are reported in a note. In general, the presented findings are based on the opinions of broad majorities of respondents in each of the four microstates.

28. Dahl, Polyarchy.

29. Even though Seychelles is rated as “partly free” by Freedom House (2012), according to Dahl's definition the archipelago does qualify as a polyarchy because meaningful competition for public offices is present, and no large groups are excluded from this competition. Furthermore, despite its ranking of Seychelles as partly free, Freedom House does classify the country as an “electoral democracy.”

30. Veenendaal, “Size and Personalistic Politics.”

31. 17 November 2010, Domagnano, San Marino.

32. 12 January 2011, Basseterre, St Kitts.

33. 18 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles.

34. The Parliament of Palau.

35. 9 July 2011, Koror, Palau.

36. 10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino.

37. 3 March 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles.

38. 10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino.

39. 4 March 2011, Île Perseverance, Seychelles.

40. 13 July 2011, Koror, Palau.

41. 5 July 2011, Koror, Palau.

42. Whereas (the discussion on) the personalization of politics can also be observed in advanced and larger democracies, the smallness of the microstates results in a situation in which politicians and citizens know each other personally and have direct contact, which is clearly not the case in larger democracies. In this sense, personalistic politics is therefore not only more intensely felt in microstates, but also refers to a different phenomenon than for example the debate on the “presidentialization” of British politics. In similar fashion, whereas patronage and clientelism are also commonly observed in larger (new) democracies, direct contact and personal connections between citizens and politicians result in more intense and personalized particularistic linkages in small settings.

43. Peters, The Democratic System in the Eastern Caribbean, 25–26.

44. Payne, “Caribbean Democracy,” 9.

45. Sutton, “Democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean,” 69.

46. Campling, Confiance, and Purvis, Social Policies in Seychelles, 8.

47. Palauan chiefly titles are hereditarily passed on, and chiefs are traditionally selected by councils of female elders (Shuster, “Custom Versus a New Élite”; Wilson, Speaking to Power, 5; Hassall, “Palau,” 175). In addition to the three branches of government that were adopted from the United States system, Palau has a fourth branch of government, which consists of the 16-member Council of Chiefs. In the council, which is jointly presided over by the two highest Chiefs in the country (Ibedul and Reklai), the highest chief from each of Palau's 16 states is represented. According to the constitution, the Council of Chiefs has the competence to advise the president on matters of tradition and custom.

48. Wilson, Speaking to Power, ix–x, 7.

49. Masala, “Schwimmende Politeia?,” 239.

50. Muñiz and Beruff, “US Military Policy,” 113.

51. 14 January 2011, Basseterre, St Kitts.

52. Wilson, Speaking to Power, 30.

53. Kabutaulaka, “Australian Foreign Policy”; Connell, “Saving the Solomons.”

54. 13 July 2011, Koror, Palau.

55. 18 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles.

56. Hatchard, “Re-Establishing a Multi-Party State,” 602.

57. Van Nieuwkerk and Bell, “Seychelles,” 143; Baker, “Seychelles,” 280. Specifically, Baker asserts that President René “was confronted with the resident ambassadors of Britain, France and USA who handed him a letter giving him until 5 December 1991 to announce the restoration of the multiparty system or else they would denounce him in public in Seychelles itself. Under political pressure, therefore, from the Commonwealth, exiles and domestic critics, and with the economy in trouble, President René announced a return to multiparty government at the Extraordinary Congress of the Seychelles People's Patriotic Front (SPPF) in December 1991” (Baker, “Seychelles,” 280).

58. Hatchard, “Re-Establishing a Multi-Party State,” 602.

59. Lewis, “The Eastern Caribbean States,” 112.

60. 12 January 2011, Basseterre, St Kitts. In this regard, Peters argues that, “domestic politics are closely monitored by Britain and the United States, and any policy that they believe may threaten the political stability of the region is quickly nipped in the bud, particularly if there are foreign policy implications” (Peters, The Democratic System in the Eastern Caribbean, 76).

61. 6 July 2011, Koror, Palau.

62. 11 July 2011, Koror, Palau.