![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
This article examines whether decentralization in the Republic of Macedonia has contributed to widening effective political participation and strengthening democracy at the local level between 2005 and 2012. It begins by demonstrating the debate regarding political decentralization and its ability to mitigate ethnic conflict by facilitating the effective participation of national minorities in local institutions. An assessment of the largely consociational power-sharing mechanisms envisaged locally then determines whether decentralization has contributed to: improving the political representation of diverse groups in local decision-making processes; deepening local democracy by providing opportunities for residents to participate in local governance; and enhancing the transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of municipal governments. The opportunities Macedonian citizens have for participating directly in local decision-making processes are also evaluated. This article argues that whilst political decentralization has expanded the potential space available for citizens to participate in local governance, it has not guaranteed the participation of local communities, or that their participation is both equitable and effective. Advocates of decentralization have failed to sufficiently appreciate the extent to which the over-dominance of some political parties, which lack internal democracy, along with the pervasiveness of patronage-based politics, may undermine the reform's potential benefits.
Notes on contributor
Aisling Lyon is a decentralization advisor and has worked on various local governance projects in Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia. She has a PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, and her research interests include territorial self-governance solutions to ethnic conflict, consociational power-sharing, and the inclusion of non-majority communities in public life.
Notes
1 Hereafter referred to as “Macedonia.”
2 The most recent census in 2002 found Macedonia's ethnic breakdown to be 64.18% Macedonian, 25.17% Albanian, 3.85% Turkish, 2.66% Roma, 1.78% Serbian, 0.84% Bošniak, 0.48% Vlach, and 1.04% who declared themselves “Other.”
3 Hereafter, Macedonia's ethnic communities (ethnic Albanian, ethnic Turkish, and so on) are referred to as “Albanian,” “Turkish,” and so on. Where the term “Macedonian community” is used, it refers to the majority, Slavic ethnic group.
4 Decentralization can also occur in federal states, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina and India.
5 Pickering, “Assessing International Aid.”
6 Risteska, “Insiders and Outsiders.”
7 Sisk, Democracy at Local Level, 74.
8 Scott, Decentralization Local Development, 16.
9 Ghai, Public Participation and Minorities, 6.
10 Scott, Decentralization Local Development, 18.
11 Diprose, “Passing on the Challenges,” 395.
12 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, 31.
13 Weller and Wolff, Autonomy, Self-governance, 268.
14 McGarry, O'Leary, and Simeon, Integration or Accommodation?, 153.
15 Xhaferi, Challenges to Democracy.
16 United Nations Development Programme, National Human Development Report, 104.
17 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 32–33.
18 Wolff, “Conflict Resolution,” 375.
19 Wolff, “Complex Power-Sharing,” 38.
20 Daskalovski, Walking on the Edge, 195.
21 Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia. Law on Local Elections.
22 Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia. Law on Civil Servants.
23 Official Gazette, Law on Local Self-Government, Article 41.3.
24 Ibid., Article 55.
25 European Commission, 2011 Progress Report, 10.
26 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years, 10. DUI stands for “Democratic Union for Integration” (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim – BDI – in Albanian). It has been a (ethnic Albanian) junior member of the national governing coalition with the (Macedonian) VMRO-DPMNE (Внатрешна македонска револуцио нерна организација - Демократска партија за македонско национално единство – ВМРО-ДПМНЕ) since 2008.
27 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years, 10.
28 Ibid., 10.
29 DUI controlled 15 municipalities compared to DPA's two as a result of the 2005 elections, and 14 compared to one DPA-led municipality since subsequent elections in March 2009.
30 Macedonian Center for International Co-operation, Directory of Municipalities 2006; 2010. Data on equitable representation in the wider public administration (teachers, healthcare professionals, and so on) is not disaggregated to the municipal level. For data on public administrators at the state level see the annual reports of the Ombudsman (http://www.ombudsman.mk) and Risteska, Role of the EU.
31 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralization Survey 2009, 58–9.
32 Ragaru, Macedonia: Between Ohrid, 14.
33 Association for Democratic Initiatives, Power Sharing.
34 Interview with Aleksandra Bojadzieva, senior non-governmental organization (NGO) representative: 21 June 200, Skopje.
35 Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, 328.
36 Bieber, Institutionalizing Ethnicity, 21.
37 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralization Survey 2009; Rahić and Haziri, Integration of Non-Majority Communities.
38 United Nations, Programme to Enhance Inter-Ethnic Dialogue and Collaboration, 5.
39 European Commission, Progress Report 2010, 21.
40 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralization Survey 2009, 62.
41 United Nations, People Centred Analysis 2010, 39.
42 European Commission, Progress Report 2009, 20.
43 Interview with Albanian municipal councillor in Kruševo municipality: 4 June 2010, Kruševo.
44 IDIVIDI, Parliament Passes Amendments.
45 Sisk, Democracy at Local Level, 146.
46 Official Gazette, Law on Local Self-Government, Article 25.
47 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralisation Assessment Report 2006–2011, 9.
48 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralization Survey 2008, 45.
49 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralisation Assessment Report 2006–2011, 10.
50 Hodžic, Political Participation, 49.
51 Baiocchi and Heller, “Representation by Design?,” 121.
52 United Nations Development Programme, People Centred Analysis 2009, 86; United Nations Development Programme, People Centred Analysis 2010, 92.
53 United Nations Development Programme, People Centred Analysis 2010, 92.
54 Interviews with: senior representative from UNDP: 12 April 2011, Skopje; Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27 June 2011, Skopje.
55 Forum, Research on Transparency and Accountability; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Decentralisation Assessment Report 2006–2011.
56 Pickering, “Explaining the Varying Impact.”
57 Mitchell Group, Impact Evaluation.
58 United Nations Development Programme, People Centred Analysis 2009, 83.
59 Mavrikos-Adamou, Challenges to Democracy Building, 517.
60 Coppedge, Strong Parties.
61 Eaton and Connerley, “Democracy, Development and Security,” 5.
62 Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, 131.
63 For example Coppedge, Strong Parties; and Montero, “The Politics of Decentralization.”
64 Eaton, “Political Obstacles to Decentralization,” 106.
65 Coppedge, Strong Parties, 37.
66 Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Municipal Elections 2005 and 2009.
67 VMRO-DPMNE, Social Democrats (SDSM), DUI, and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA).
68 During the 2005 municipal elections there were 90 independent candidates for mayor (in only 24 municipalities), of which seven were elected. In the 2009 municipal elections, there were 52 independent candidates for mayor (in 12 municipalities) and only two were elected.
69 Interview with Foundation Open Society Macedonia official: 27 June 2011, Skopje.
70 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years, 20.
71 Ibid., 9.
72 Siljanovska-Davkova, Organizational Structures, 49.
73 Center for Research and Policy Making, Internal Party Democracy.
74 Shefter, Political Parties.
75 Kitshelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients and Policies, 32.
76 O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building.
77 Ibid., 13.
78 Ibid., 28.
79 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years, 10.
80 O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building, 192.
81 Ibid., 170.
82 Kitshelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients and Policies.
83 Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Municipal Elections 2013, 12.
84 Ibid., 11–12. Given the surreptitious nature of clientelistic relationships, it is very difficult to gather specific evidence of its existence. However, the ODIHR report corroborates the perceptions of clientelism expressed by many of my interviewees and of similar findings reported elsewhere, for example in European Commission, 2011 Progress Report, 10 and in International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years, 5.