The noble west and the dirty rest? Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers

Abstract

This conclusion summarizes the major findings of this special issue and discusses their implications for research on democratization and international democracy promotion. First, I compare the interactions between EU and US democracy promotion and the responses of non-democratic regional powers. In the cases in which Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China chose to pursue a countervailing strategy, I match the reactions of the US and the EU and explore how the combined (inter-)actions of democratic and non-democratic actors have affected efforts at democracy promotion in the target countries. The second part discusses the theoretical implications of these findings and identifies challenges for theory-building. I argue that the literature still has to come to terms with a counter-intuitive finding of this special issue, namely that non-democratic actors can promote democratic change by unintentionally empowering liberal reform coalitions as much as democracy promoters can unwittingly enhance autocracy by stabilizing illiberal incumbent regimes. I conclude with some policy considerations.

Keywords:

• democracy promotion
• EU
• US
• regional power
• autocracy
• Russia
• China
• Saudi Arabia
• differential empowerment

In November 2014, the world celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin war, which stands for the victory of Western democracy over illiberal forms of political order.¹ After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, democracy promotion became an integral part of the foreign policy of Western states and established itself as a new field of action for Western international and regional organizations.² After the initial enthusiasm about the EU's transformative power in Central and Eastern Europe,³ Western efforts at supporting democratic transition and stabilizing democratic consolidation have been increasingly deemed ineffective.⁴ The failure of the West to bring its liberal institutions to the rest tends to be blamed on “black knights”,⁵ such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, which yield enough hard and soft power to spoil Western attempts at international democracy promotion.⁶

This special issue challenges the conventional wisdom of the West promoting democracy and “the illiberal rest” promoting autocracy. By exploring the impact of non-democratic regional powers, such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, on US and EU democracy promotion, the contributions show, first, that Western democracies do not unequivocally engage in democracy promotion. Similar to non-democratic regimes, they have a tendency to prioritize stability and security over democratic change.⁷ Second, non-democratic regimes do not necessarily engage in autocracy promotion. Rather, they seek to undermine Western efforts at democracy promotion if they see their political and economic interests or their political survival at stake.⁸ Third, domestic factors are much more relevant for the (in-)effectiveness of international democracy promotion than the activities of non-democratic actors.⁹

These findings resonate with more recent studies in the international democratization literature. What this special issue contributes to the state of the art is a “triangular” perspective, which focuses on the interrelated interactions between Western democracy promoters, non-democratic powers, and the target state. By exploring these three sets of interactions, it becomes clear that the domestic conditions in the target state determine how incumbent regimes respond to the incentives offered by democracy promoters and non-democratic powers to engage in or refrain from democratic change, respectively. They also shape the likelihood of whether target states accept the help of non-democratic powers in suppressing democratic opposition. Most importantly, the situation in the target country influences the attempts of non-democratic powers to countervail Western democracy promotion and the reactions of Western democracy promoters, in turn, to such spoiling strategies. Finally, domestic factors shape the effects of external democratic and non-democratic actors on democratic transition and democratic consolidation, or the lack thereof, in the target state.

This conclusion summarizes the major findings of this special issue and discusses their implications for research on democratization and international democracy promotion. It proceeds in three steps. First, I compare the interactions between EU and US democracy promotion and the responses of non-democratic regional powers. In the cases in which Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China chose to pursue a countervailing strategy, I match the reactions of the US and the EU and explore how the combined (inter-)actions of democratic and non-democratic actors have affected efforts at democracy promotion in the target countries. The second part discusses the theoretical implications of these findings and identifies challenges for theory-building. I argue that the literature still has to come to terms with a counter-intuitive finding of this special issue, namely that non-democratic actors can promote democratic change by unintentionally empowering liberal reform coalitions as much as democracy promoters can unwittingly enhance autocracy by stabilizing illiberal incumbent regimes. I conclude with some policy considerations.

Western democracy promoters, illiberal regional powers, and democracy promotion

Illiberal regional powers and western democracy promotion

After the “big bang” enlargement of the EU, which marked the end point of the successful democratization of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, optimism about Western democracy promotion quickly started to fade. The post-Soviet area, which became the target of EU and US efforts at democracy promotion, has not made any significant progress towards democracy. The so called newly independent states seem to have developed rather stable hybrid regimes “in the gray zone between democracy and autocracy”,¹⁰ which have been referred to as “semi-authoritarianism”,¹¹ “electoral authoritarianism”,¹² or “competitive authoritarianism”.¹³ The “Arab Spring” challenged the long-time persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, the EU and the US were clearly taken by surprise by the recent developments and have only reluctantly endorsed democratic change. Their support for the new regimes has done little to foster democracy; Tunisia is the only country which has seen some significant improvements in the democratic quality of its regime.¹⁴ US and EU attempts at promoting democracy and good governance in Sub-Sahara Africa have proven equally futile.¹⁵ While the democratization literature has always been sceptical about the role of external actors in promoting democratic transition and consolidation, the ineffectiveness of their attempts is often blamed on the presence of powerful spoilers in the region that oppose democracy.¹⁶

However, this special issue convincingly demonstrates that illiberal states do not make autocracy promotion an integral part of their foreign policies in the same way as the US and EU have done it with democracy promotion. Nor do they see Western democracy promotion in third countries necessarily as a threat they have to counter. While Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia quell external and domestic attempts at democracy promotion at home, the contributors to this special issue find little evidence that they seek to promote their own or any other non-democratic regime type beyond their own borders. They do not use their economic and military capabilities to induce autocratic reforms in other countries.

Interestingly, illiberal states do engage in governance export at the regional level. Regional organizations can promote autocracy by boosting the legitimacy and sovereignty of their autocratic members.¹⁷ Moreover, the Council of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the League of Arab States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council explicitly prescribe and actively promote and protect the building, modification, and respect of governance institutions in their member states. In addition, they do so by referring to democracy, human rights, or rule of law. The regional commitment of illiberal powers to liberal norms and values serves to prevent political instability in the region, attract foreign aid and trade, or deflect attempts at governance transfer by Western actors.¹⁸ Such signalling is strategic and aims at stabilizing rather than transforming autocracy at home. However, such regional commitments would lose their credibility if illiberal powers promoted autocracy abroad.¹⁹ Furthermore, regional organizations can also restrict illiberal powers in promoting autocracy and resisting Western democracy promotion. Russia's threat to punish Ukraine for entering a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU by economic retaliation runs against the decision-making rules of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) according to which Russia cannot impose any trade restrictions against Ukraine unilaterally. The two other members of the EEU, Belarus and Kazakhstan, have already refused to support Russia in a trade war against Ukraine.²⁰

Like their commitment to liberal norms and values in regional organization, responses of illiberal regional powers to Western democracy promotion are motivated by regime survival, rent-seeking, and the protection of economic and security interests.²¹ The findings of this special issue largely confirm this argument. Saudi Arabia supported the violent suppression of political protest in Bahrain for fear of democratic spill-over.²² The 2011 and 2012 elections in Russia, which were widely perceived as fraudulent, heightened Putin's concerns about the survival of his regime due to possible contagion effects emanating from public uprisings in Ukraine.²³ He has been even more concerned about the Westernization of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia pulling out of Russia's traditional sphere of influence.²⁴ Democratization is a precondition for closer economic and security relations with the West, of which membership in the EU and NATO is the biggest incentive the EU and US have on offer for promoting democracy. Countervailing EU and US democracy promotion in its near abroad is, hence, Putin's strategy to defend Russia's sphere of influence against what he perceives as an expansion of the Western sphere of influence into the post-Soviet area.²⁵ Defending Russia's power over the region also helps to ensure the survival of Putin's regime by boosting his approval rates through a foreign policy that claims to restore Russia as a great power and containing the risk of democratic spill-over. China's indifference towards EU and US democracy promotion in Sub-Sahara Africa and Myanmar confirms the finding that illiberal regional powers do not take issue with Western democracy promotion as long as their strategic interests are not at stake. Angola and Ethiopia are too far away, while Myanmar is too small and too poor to have a negative effect on Beijing's geostrategic interest or regime survival. Hong Kong, by contrast, may turn into an attractive alternative model to the autocratic rule of the Chinese Communist Party threatening its exclusive grip on power at home. While it is unclear to what extent and how actively the US and EU seek to promote democracy in Hong Kong, Beijing argues that the West supports democratic protesters to reaffirm its influence in the region against China's rising power.²⁶ Saudi Arabia saw the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a potential threat, whose model of a democratically elected Islamist regime could have challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi kingdom as the protector of Islam.²⁷ How far Saudi support for the Egyptian military has undermined US and EU democratization and liberalization strategies is not clear given the latter's uneasiness over the Muslim Brotherhood and their tacit approval of the military assisted coup d’état. Likewise, the EU and the US have shared Saudi Arabia's preference for stability and security in the Gulf region. Their response to Saudi financial and military assistance to the Bahraini al-Khalifa regime in suppressing Shia protests was at best “timid”.²⁸ Since more than 70% of Bahrainis are Shia, the overthrow of the Sunni monarchy fuelled fears of Iran escalating violence to enhance its influence in the Gulf region and undermining its stability.

In sum, democratic and non-democratic actors equally pursue geostrategic interests. These interests often conflict with international democracy promotion making Western actors compromise their efforts and illiberal powers resist them. Yet, rent-seeking and securing spheres of influence may also concur with democratic change promoted by the West. Russia, for instance, welcomed the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan as a chance to expand its influence in Central Asia.²⁹ In the end, countervailing strategies appear to depend on whether democratic and non-democratic powers pursue competing interests in a region.

Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers

The EU and the US made democracy promotion an explicit goal of their foreign policy. Yet, they also pursue other goals, such as political stability, economic growth, energy supply, or security. While in principle these goals are seen as complementary, the democratization of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their destabilization at least in the short run. The more unstable and the less democratic the target state is, the more difficult it is to reconcile democracy promotion with ensuring security and stability.³⁰ This democratization-stability dilemma largely confirms the second hypothesis of the editors that Western democracy promoters only react to countervailing policies by non-democratic regional power if they prioritize democracy and human rights goals over stability and security goals.³¹ The prioritizing explains why the US and the EU ignored attempts of Saudi Arabia to undermine democratization processes in Arab Spring countries and the Gulf region.³² Liberal and illiberal regional powers equally prioritize stability and security.³³ Ukraine is one of the few cases in which the EU and US have sought to counter the countervailing strategies of the illiberal regional power, arguably because of Russia's attempts to destabilize the country. Thus, rather than prioritizing democracy over stability, Putin's strategy of “managed instability”³⁴ has driven the EU and the US to step up their efforts at democracy promotion supporting democratic political forces that have the greatest potential to politically and economically stabilize Ukraine.³⁵

In accordance with the second hypothesis of the editors, interdependent relationships with illiberal regional powers, particularly with regard to energy and security, also make Western democracy promoters more likely to compromise their efforts at democracy promotion and tolerate countervailing strategies of illiberal regional powers.³⁶ The EU and US have not been prepared to make full use of sanctions in order to counter Russia's violations of Georgia's and Ukraine's territorial integrity in 2008 and 2014, respectively.³⁷ While Ukraine and the EU signed the Association Agreement in August 2014, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) has been suspended for a year amid Russia's threats of retaliatory measures against both Ukraine and the EU. The EU also signalled that is was prepared to revise parts of the DCFTA to accommodate Russia's concerns.³⁸ In a similar vein, the US has been unwilling to risk its alliance with its most important allies in the region over Saudi Arabia's assistance in suppressing the Shia uprising in Bahrain.³⁹ Finally, China is too important for both the EU and the US to openly support Hong Kong's “umbrella revolution” in its protests against Beijing's efforts to compromise the “one country two systems” doctrine by curbing political freedoms.⁴⁰

In sum, if illiberal powers only counteract Western democracy promotion if their economic or security interests are at stake, Western democracy promoters only respond to such countervailing strategies if they see their geopolitical interests challenged.

The domestic impact of Western and illiberal regional powers

Countervailing democracy promotion is not the same as autocracy promotion.⁴¹ Yet, the outcome of such activities may be still autocracy enhancing. This special issue explores an important distinction between intention and outcome that has not received sufficient attention in the literature. Illiberal regional powers tend to protect their strategic interests rather than block Western democracy promotion per se. The outcome of their countervailing strategies, however, may still affect the chances of democratization in the target country by changing the balance of power between democratic and anti-democratic forces.

While their overall effectiveness is limited, external democracy promoters matter if they empower liberal reform coalitions,⁴² as the US and the EU have done in Ukraine and Georgia.⁴³ Likewise, illiberal regimes may empower illiberal forces by providing them with financial and military support.⁴⁴ Russia and Saudi Arabia do not shy away from using overt or covert military coercion supporting the suppression of political protest by force or fuelling violent ethnic conflict in breakaway regions.⁴⁵ They also use financial and security assistance as well as market access to punish pro-Western policies and reward those straying away from them.⁴⁶ By yielding to Putin's pressure and accepting his economic support, including low gas prices, Yanukovych was spared to meet the demand of the EU to free Yulia Timoshenko and adopt an anti-corruption law and an election reform as the conditions for signing the Association Agreement.⁴⁷ Likewise, Saudi Arabia's financial assistance allowed Egyptian elites to avoid US and EU democratic conditionality.⁴⁸

Differential empowerment certainly relies on the credibility, resources, and legitimacy of external actors as hypothesized by the editors.⁴⁹ But there are at best necessary conditions.⁵⁰ The way in which external actors sway the domestic balance of power between liberal and illiberal forces mostly depends on domestic factors.⁵¹ Economic and security interdependence may matter but is more ambivalent in its effect on the leverage external actors have over the target state.⁵² The Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia are equally dependent on access to Russia's market and vulnerable to its security policy. Yet, due to its own security conundrum, only Armenia yielded to Russia's pressure to join the Eurasian Customs Union. In Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, Putin's economic and security threats have had the opposite effect, empowering pro-Western political forces to sign Association Agreements with the EU as an important step to closer relations with the West.⁵³

Due to its natural resources, Angola is less dependent on the EU and the US than Ethiopia.⁵⁴ However, while having emerged as an equally important economic partner, China cannot compensate for EU and US aid and trade to Ethiopia. This is not the only reason why China has had little do to with the failure of the EU and US to push for democratic reforms in Angola and Ethiopia.⁵⁵ If democratization threatens the survival of the regime or external incentives are limited, Western democracy promotion is unlikely to be effective, irrespective of whether the target state has alternative funding and trade options.⁵⁶

Besides empowering illiberal forces, the contributions to this special issue shed light on two other mechanisms through which countervailing strategies can undermine democratization processes. First, Russia's “managed instability” strategy of subverting Western-oriented governments with economic sanctions and military support for pro-Russian secessionists have harmed the economy and seriously undermined the statehood of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.⁵⁷ The capacity of a government to set and enforce collectively binding rules and provide public goods is not only important to win elections, it is also a precondition for free and fair elections in the first place.⁵⁸ Unsettled disputes and frozen conflicts also render these countries less attractive for foreign direct investments and undermine their prospect of closer integration with the West.⁵⁹

Second, illiberal regional powers can provide an attractive model that is emulated by third countries.⁶⁰ Putin's “sovereign or illiberal democracy” has found supporters outside, and increasingly also inside, Europe.⁶¹ China's developmental capitalism might be even more attractive since, unlike Russia, it combines autocracy with growing prosperity.⁶² China's economy challenges the dominance of the Western model of liberal democracy. Its soft power of attraction may be much more influential in diffusing and enhancing autocracy than any direct attempts at autocracy promotion.

In sum, illiberal regional powers do not engage in autocracy promotion. However, if Western democracy promotion challenges their strategic interests, they employ countervailing strategies which can stabilize and enhance autocracy – or they can have the opposite effect depending on the domestic conditions in the target country. Russia has ultimately promoted rather than undermined democratic change in some countries of its near abroad by empowering liberal reform coalitions in their quest for democracy and closer relations with the West and strengthening the commitment of Western actors to supporting democratization.⁶³ The literature has paid as little attention to such paradoxical outcomes as it has to Western democracy promoters empowering non-democratic forces.

Consorted worlds? Challenges to democratization and international democracy promotion research

The EU and US failed at promoting democracy when they supported authoritarian elites in Tunisia and Egypt before they were swept away by the Arab Spring, remained silent when a democratically elected government was overthrown by the military in Egypt, and stood by when authoritarian regimes violently suppressed political opposition in Bahrain and Syria. This failure cannot be attributed to Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China promoting autocracy or blocking democracy. It results from the democratization-stability dilemma, where democracy promotion requires a transition of power that entails political uncertainty about the outcomes and often involves conflict. This dilemma is the more pronounced, the more fragile the target state is. Where the democratization-stability dilemma is less pronounced, the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion hinges on other domestic factors.⁶⁴ Differential empowerment requires the existence of reform coalitions that have internalized liberal norms and values and are strong enough to use Western trade, aid, and political support to push for democratic change.⁶⁵ Moreover, empowering domestic reformists is not enough if actors lack the necessary resources to introduce domestic change. Statehood is not only a question of administrative capacity but is often further undermined by the contestedness of borders and political authority.⁶⁶ Finally, Western actors require legitimacy to promote democratic change.⁶⁷ EU and US democratic demands meet with public resentment whenever they clash with nationalist or religious beliefs, for example regarding the role of minorities, or are perceived as attempting to control the country.

Domestic conditions severely limit the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion. This special issue shows how countervailing strategies of illiberal powers can further undermine the chances of Western democracy promotion by subverting the statehood of target states or undermining the legitimacy of Western democracy promoters. The various contributions also show that Western democracy promotion, rather than being futile, can have the opposite effect enhancing or stabilizing autocracy. The causal mechanism is domestic empowerment, however, Western aid, trade, and security cooperation may empower both liberal and illiberal forces. What has been largely overlooked by the democratization literature is that non-democratic regimes also use Western democracy promotion to advance their power and interest.⁶⁸

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a case in point. From its very inception, the ENP has focused on building and strengthening state institutions which are capable of fostering legal approximation with EU rules on trade, migration, or energy.⁶⁹ By promoting effective government rather than democratic governance, the EU helped stabilize non-democratic and corrupt regimes in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood rather than transforming them.⁷⁰ Incumbent elites have aligned their political survival strategies with the EU's demand for domestic change. They fought corruption, for instance, where it helped to oust political opponents, reward political allies, deflect international criticism, and attract foreign assistance and investments.⁷¹ The US has been less state-centred, supporting free and fair elections, an independent media, and a stronger civil society.⁷² But like the EU, the US has only reluctantly backed democratic protest movements if its geostrategic interests have been at stake and refrained from putting pressure on incumbent regimes for human rights violations or democratic back-sliding.⁷³ Moreover, US democracy assistance is security driven prioritizing fragile states.⁷⁴

In short, Western democracy promotion can have unintended and negative effects on democratic change in target states. It does not only empower liberal reform coalitions, to the extent that they exist in the first place, but can also boost or stabilize the power of incumbent autocratic elites. Likewise, illiberal powers may not only fail in pulling transition or democratizing countries away from Western democracy, they may end up pushing them in this very direction. Russia's countervailing strategies have empowered pro-Western democratic forces in Ukraine and Georgia and facilitated compliance with EU demands for economic and political reforms. Putin's attempts to destabilize the two countries through economic sanctions and military support for secessionist regions made the US and the EU step up their economic and political support for democratization leading to more rather than less engagement in Russia's near abroad.⁷⁵ In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia's support for Tunisia's disposed dictator Ben Ali and its opposition against the moderate Islamist Ennahda party discredited the Saudi monarchy despite the substantial, unconditional aid offered to the transition government and boosted cooperation with the EU on democracy, notwithstanding its support for the Ben Ali regime.⁷⁶

“Crossed-over” empowerment, where illiberal regional powers strengthen liberal domestic forces and Western democracy promoters stabilize non-democratic regimes, point to a second finding of this special issue with which research on international democracy promotion has to come to terms. While acknowledging the prevalence of domestic factors, the literature still tends to adopt a “top-down” approach where domestic actors merely respond to opportunities and constraints provided by Washington, Brussels, Moscow, Beijing, or Riyadh. However, ruling elites may strategically align external incentives or persuasion efforts with their domestic incentives, political preferences, or survival strategies, so that they can use external resources to push their own political agenda, please their constituencies, and regain or consolidate their power.⁷⁷ They pick and choose from the economic and political incentives offered to them by external actors, often seeking to play off one against the other. Victor Yanukovych, for instance, was not merely a Kremlin puppet yielding to Putin's pressure when he pulled back from the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013. While he had hoped to use closer relations with the EU to decrease Ukraine's dependence on Russia, Putin's threats provided him with a convenient excuse for not complying with EU democratic conditionality.⁷⁸ In a similar vein, Egyptian elites have been playing off the US and EU against Saudi Arabia.⁷⁹ Interestingly, African governments have largely refrained from using their trade and aid relations with China to relinquish EU and US democratic conditionality.⁸⁰

In sum, this special issue points to the importance of a more agency-centred perspective on international democracy promotion that places the domestic actors in the target states at the heart of the analysis and pays more attention to the unintended effects of both liberal and illiberal actors and their interaction.

Conclusion

Exploring and comparing the interactions between Western democracy promoters, illiberal regional regimes, and target countries provides a fruitful approach to studying international democracy promotion and challenges some conventional wisdoms in the state of the art. First, rather than intentionally promoting autocracy or blocking democracy, illiberal powers seek to countervail Western democracy promotion in order to protect their economic, geostrategic, or political interests, which are not so different from those of Western democracy promoters. Where the two differ is that illiberal regional powers do not have to balance security and stability against democracy and human rights.

Second, this democratization-stability dilemma undermines the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion more than the countervailing strategies of non-democratic regional powers. True, if democracy promotion threatens their geopolitical and economic interests or regime survival, Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia seek to undermine democratic processes to the extent that they unfold. They offer non-democratic regimes economic, political, and military assistance and threaten democracy-minded ruling elites to withdraw it. Moreover, they may undermine the capacity of government to introduce democratic changes by destabilizing the country. Yet, with the exception of Ukraine and Georgia, democratic processes are not promoted by Western powers but mostly endogenously driven. More often than not, the EU and US share the interest of illiberal regional powers in the stability and security of a region. Not only did they fail to develop a coherent approach on how to support the Arab Spring, they were also silent on the military coup against a democratically elected government in Egypt, tolerated the Saudi-led military intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council that assisted Bahraini security forces in detaining thousands of protesters, and stood by the massive human rights violations committed by the Assad regime in Syria.

These two findings do not only challenge the admittedly stylized juxtaposition of the “noble West” promoting democracy, and the “dirty rest” promoting autocracy. They also yield some important policy implications, particularly for the EU and the US.

For actors whose foreign policy is not only oriented towards geostrategic interests but which also seek to promote moral goals, all good things seldom go together.⁸¹ The more unstable a target state is and the less democratic, the more difficult it will be to reconcile the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy with ensuring security and stability. The democratization-stability dilemma seems to be somewhat unavoidable and undermines the capacity of Western democracy promoters to design credible democracy promotion policies based on consistent criteria and reliable rewards. However, democratic external actors should at least acknowledge the dilemma and develop strategies on how to balance the different goals. Otherwise reproaches of double standards and hypocrisy will continue to undermine their credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, democracy promotion should focus on countries like Tunisia, which are sufficiently stable and feature pro-democratic reform coalitions that can be empowered by democratic conditionality and assistance. Where such conditions are absent, democracy promotion usually fails. Besides empowering liberal forces, Western democracy promoters should assist target states in reducing their asymmetric interdependence on illiberal regional powers.⁸² Georgia used its approximation with EU energy policies to diversify its energy supply.⁸³ Likewise, the EU has been trying to compensate for the energy cuts imposed by Russia on Ukraine.

Finally, stabilizing autocratic regimes by providing aid and trade should find its limits where dictators engage in massive human rights violations. For all the criticism of the EU and the US for supporting Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia, both treated Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar al-Assad of Syria as pariahs. Only in the case of Libya did they intervene militarily, while they did little to remedy the massive human rights violations by the Assad regime.

Overall, the findings of this special issue confirm the limits of what Western democracy promoters are willing and able to do, particularly if their geostrategic interests are at stake. Rather than blaming their failure to support democracy on illiberal powers, they should develop strategies to balance their different foreign policy goals.

Acknowledgements

I thank Nelli Babayan and Thomas Risse for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to Stefan Rinnert for his help with editing the text.

Notes on contributor

Tanja A. Börzel is professor of political science and holds the Chair for European Integration at the Otto-Suhr-Institut for Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin.

Notes

1 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.

2 Magen and Morlino, Anchoring Democracy; Magen et al., Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above; McMahon and Baker, Piecing a Democratic Quilt?; Kelley, Monitoring Democracy.

3 Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power; Vachudova, Europe Undivided.

4 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood”; Kelley, Monitoring Democracy; Börzel, “Coming Together or Drifting Apart?”

5 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.

6 Ambrosio, The Authoritarian Backlash; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors”; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Cameron and Orenstein, “Post-Soviet Authoritarianism”; Kavalski, The New Central Asia.

7 Jünemann, “Security Building in the Mediterranean after September 11”; Youngs, “The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean”; Schlumberger, “Dancing with Wolves”; Börzel et al., “Democracy or Stability?”

8 Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Obydenkova and Libman, Autocratic and Democratic External Influences in Post-Soviet Eurasia.

9 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.”

10 Hadenius and Toerell, “Authoritarian Regimes”; Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”

11 Ottaway, Democracy Challenged.

12 Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism.

13 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.

14 Börzel et al., “The EU, External Actors, and the Arabellions”; Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”; Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

15 Magen et al., Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law.

16 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization; Ambrosio, The Authoritarian Backlash; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors”; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?”; Cameron and Orenstein, “Post-Soviet Authoritarianism”; Kavalski, The New Central Asia.

17 Söderbaum, The Political Economy of Regionalism; Libman, “Supranational Organizations.”

18 Börzel and van Hüllen, Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations.

19 Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”

20 Libman, “Supranational Organizations.”

21 Ambrosio, The Authoritarian Backlash; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors”; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”

22 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

23 Dannreuther, “Russia and the Arab Spring.”

24 Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”; Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

25 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

26 Chen and Kinzelbach, “Democracy Promotion and China”; Hakenesch, “Not as Bad as it Seems.”

27 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

28 Ibid.

29 Obydenkova and Libman, Autocratic and Democratic External Influences in Post-Soviet Eurasia.

30 Börzel and van Hüllen, “One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals.”

31 Jünemann, “Security Building in the Mediterranean after September 11”; Youngs, “The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean.”

32 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

33 Börzel et al., “The EU, External Actors, and the Arabellions”; Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

34 Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors.”

35 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

36 Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization”; van Hüllen, “Europeanization through Cooperation?”

37 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

38 Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”

39 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

40 Chen and Kinzelbach, “Democracy Promotion and China.”

41 Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?”; Obydenkova and Libman, Autocratic and Democratic External Influences in Post-Soviet Eurasia.

42 Schimmelfennig et al., “Costs, Commitment and Compliance”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe; Vachudova, Europe Undivided.

43 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”; Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”

44 Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

45 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”; Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”; Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

46 Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

47 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

48 Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

49 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.

50 Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

51 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”; Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.”

52 van Hüllen, “Europeanization Through Cooperation?”; Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization.”

53 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

54 Hakenesch, “Not as Bad as it Seems.”

55 Ibid.

56 Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculations and International Socialization”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.

57 Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors.”

58 Siroky and Abrasidze, “Guns, Roses and Democratization”; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actors”; Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

59 Tolstrup, “Sub-National Level.”

60 Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization.

61 Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”

62 Chen and Kinzelbach, “Democracy Promotion and China.”

63 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

64 Börzel and Risse, “When Europeanization Meets Diffusion”; Börzel et al., “The EU, External Actors, and the Arabellions”; Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

65 Vachudova, Europe Undivided.

66 Elbasani, European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans.

67 Krasner and Risse, External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood.

68 Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching-Up”; van Hüllen, “Europeanization through Cooperation?”; Noutcheva and Aydin- Düzgit, “Lost in Europeanisation.”

69 Ademmer and Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood”; Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization.”

70 Youngs, “European Democracy Promotion in the Middle East”; Wetzel and Orbie, “With Map and Compass on Narrow Paths and Through Shallow Waters”; Börzel and van Hüllen, “One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals.”

71 Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization.”

72 Börzel et al., “Democracy or Stability?”; van Hüllen and Stahn, “Comparing EU and US Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent States”; Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

73 Huber, “A Pragmatic Actor”; Hassan, “Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda?”

74 Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

75 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

76 Dandashly, “The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab Revolt”; Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

77 Ademmer, “You Make Us Do What We Want!”; Ademmer and Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood”; Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization”; Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching-Up?”; Woll and Jacqout, “Using Europe.”

78 Delcour and Wolczuk, “Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?”

79 Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver's Seat.”

80 Hakenesch, “Not as Bad as it Seems.”

81 Grimm and Leininger, “Not All Good Things Go Together.”

82 Babayan, “The Return of the Empire?”

83 Ademmer and Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood.”